| 1 Φιλοσοφώτατον λόγον ἐπιδείκνυσθαι μέλλων, εἰ αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός, συμβουλεύσαιμι ἄν ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς ὅπως προσέχητε προθύμως τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. 2 καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος εἰς ἐπιστήμην παντὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἄλλως τῆς μεγίστης ἀρετῆς, λέγω δὴ φρονήσεως, περιέχει ἔπαινον. 3 εἰ ἄρα τῶν σωφροσύνης κωλυτικῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς φαίνεται ἐπικρατεῖν, γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν κυριεύειν ἀναφαίνεται, οἷον κακοηθείας, καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀνδρείας ἐμποδιστικῶν παθῶν, θυμοῦ τε καὶ φόβου καὶ πόνου. | 1 As I am about to demonstrate a most philosophical proposition—namely, whether devout reason (ho eusebēs logismos) is absolute master over the passions—I would rightly advise you to pay earnest attention to philosophy. 2 For this discourse is not only necessary for true knowledge, but it also encompasses the praise of the greatest virtue, by which I mean prudence (phronēsis). 3 If, therefore, reason is shown to master the passions that impede temperance, such as gluttony and lust, 4 it is also clearly demonstrated to rule over the passions that obstruct justice, such as malice, and those that obstruct courage, namely anger, pain, and fear. |
| 5 πῶς οὖν, ἴσως εἴποιεν ἄν τινες, εἰ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας οὐ δεσπόζει; γελοῖον ἐπιχειροῦντες λέγειν. 6 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς κρατεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης ἐναντίων, καὶ τούτων οὐχ ὥστε αὐτὰ καταλῦσαι, ἀλλ' ὥστε αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶξαι. | 5 How is it then, some might perhaps object, if reason rules the passions, that it does not master forgetfulness and ignorance? To say this is to attempt a ridiculous argument. 6 For reason does not rule over its own internal deficiencies, but over those passions that are opposed to justice, courage, temperance, and prudence; and even over these, its mastery is not to eradicate them completely, but to refuse to yield to them. |
| 7 πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλλαχόθεν ἔχοιμ' ἄν ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός, 8 πολὺ δὲ πλέον τοῦτο ἀποδείξαιμι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας τῶν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀποθανόντων, Ἐλεαζάρου τε καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ ἀδελφῶν καὶ τῆς τούτων μητρός. 9 ἅπαντες γὰρ οὗτοι τοὺς ἕως θανάτου πόνους ὑπεριδόντες ἐπεδείξαντο ὅτι περικρατεῖ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός. | 7 Now, from many various arguments I could demonstrate to you that devout reason is the absolute ruler of the passions. 8 But I can prove this far more powerfully from the noble heroism of those who died on behalf of virtue: namely, Eleazar, the seven brothers, and their mother. 9 For all of these, by looking down upon tortures even unto death, demonstrated that reason holds mastery over the passions. |
| 10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρετῶν ἔπεστί μοι ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας ἀποθανόντας μετὰ τῆς μητρὸς ἄνδρας, τῶν δὲ τιμῶν μακαρίσαιμ ἄν. 11 θαυμασθέντες γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ὑπομονῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰκισαμένων, αἴτιοι κατέστησαν τοῦ καταλυθῆναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦ ἔθνους τυραννίδα νικήσαντες τὸν τύραννον τῇ ὑπομονῇ ὥστε καθαρισθῆναι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν πατρίδα. 12 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τούτου νῦν αὐτίκα δὴ λέγειν ἐξέσται ἀρξαμένῳ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ὅπερ εἴωθα ποιεῖν, καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν τρέψομαι λόγον δόξαν διδοὺς τῷ πανσόφῳ θεῷ. | 10 It is my privilege to praise these men, along with their mother, who died at that momentous time on behalf of noble righteousness (kalokagathia), and I would deem them blessed because of their honors. 11 For they were marveled at not only by all humanity for their courage and endurance, but even by their very tormentors; thus, they became the cause of the overthrow of the tyranny weighing upon our nation, conquering the tyrant through their endurance, so that the homeland was cleansed through them. 12 But it will be permitted to speak of this immediately, once I begin the narrative, as is my custom to do, and so I will turn to their account, giving glory to the all-wise God. |
| 13 ζητοῦμεν δὴ τοίνυν εἰ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶν τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός. 14 διακρίνομεν τί ποτέ ἐστιν λογισμὸς καὶ τί πάθος, καὶ πόσαι παθῶν ἰδέαι, καὶ εἰ πάντων ἐπικρατεῖ τούτων ὁ λογισμός. | 13 We seek to discover, then, whether reason is absolute ruler of the passions. 14 Let us distinguish precisely what reason is and what passion is, how many forms of passion exist, and whether reason dominates all of them. |
| 15 λογισμὸς μὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν νοῦς μετὰ ὀρθοῦ λόγου προτιμῶν τὸν σοφίας βίον. 16 σοφία δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν γνῶσις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτιῶν. 17 αὕτη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδεία, δι' ἧς τὰ θεῖα σεμνῶς καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα συμφερόντως μανθάνομεν. | 15 Reason, then, is the intellect (nous) guided by right discourse, which deliberately chooses the life of wisdom. 16 Wisdom (sophia), furthermore, is the knowledge of things divine and human, and of their causes. 17 This wisdom is, in truth, the education found in the Torah (tou nomou paideia), through which we learn divine matters with reverence and human matters to our profit. |
| 18 τῆς δὲ σοφίας ἰδέαι καθεστήκασιν φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη· 19 κυριωτάτη δὲ πάντων ἡ φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς δὴ τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπικρατεῖ. | 18 The principal forms of wisdom are fourfold: prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. 19 Prudence (phronēsis) is the most authoritative of them all, for it is by means of it that reason exercises dominion over the passions. |
| 20 παθῶν δὲ φύσεις εἰσὶν αἱ περιεκτικώταται δύο ἡδονή τε καὶ πόνος· τούτων δὲ ἑκάτερον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πέφυκεν. 21 πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον παθῶν εἰσιν ἀκολουθίαι. 22 πρὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν χαρά. 23 πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πόνου ἐστὶν φόβος, μετὰ δὲ τὸν πόνον λύπη. 24 θυμὸς δὲ κοινὸν πάθος ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνου, ἐὰν ἐννοηθῇ τις ὅτι αὐτῷ περιέπεσεν. | 20 The two most comprehensive sources of the passions are pleasure (hēdonē) and pain (ponos); each of these by nature pertains both to the body and to the soul. 21 There are many subordinate branches of passions connected to both pleasure and pain. 22 Prior to pleasure is desire (epithumia); following pleasure is joy (chara). 23 Prior to pain is fear (phobos); following pain is grief (lupē). 24 Anger (thumos) is a passion common to both pleasure and pain, if one reflects upon an injury that has befallen him. |
| 25 ἐν τῇ ἡδονῇ δὲ ἔνεστιν καὶ ἡ κακοήθης διάθεσις, πολυτροπωτάτη πάντων οὖσα τῶν παθῶν, 26 καὶ τὰ μὲν ψυχῆς ἀλαζονεία καὶ φιλαργυρία καὶ φιλοδοξία καὶ φιλονεικία καὶ βασκανία, 27 κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα παντοφαγία καὶ λαιμαργία καὶ μονοφαγία. | 25 Within pleasure there also exists a malicious disposition (kakoēthēs diathesis), which is the most multifaceted of all the passions. 26 In the soul, it manifests as arrogance, love of money, love of glory, contentiousness, faithlessness, and envy. 27 In the body, it manifests as indiscriminate eating, gluttony, and solitary gorging. |
| 28 καθάπερ οὖν δυεῖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φυτῶν ὄντων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ πόνου πολλαὶ τούτων τῶν φυτῶν εἰσιν παραφυάδες, 29 ὧν ἑκάστην ὁ παγγέωργος λογισμὸς περικαθαίρων καὶ ἀποκνίζων καὶ περιπλέκων καὶ ἐπάρδων καὶ πάντα τρόπον μεταχέων ἐξημεροῖ τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ὕλας. 30 ὁ γὰρ λογισμὸς τῶν μὲν ἀρετῶν ἐστιν ἡγεμών, τῶν δὲ παθῶν αὐτοκράτωρ. | 28 Therefore, just as pleasure and pain are two wild plants growing from the body and the soul, there are many offshoots of these plants. 29 Each of these offshoots the master gardener, Reason (ho paggeōrgos logismos), thoroughly cleanses, prunes, binds up, irrigates, and by every means of transplanting, tames the wild thicket of habits and passions. 30 For reason is the leader of the virtues and the absolute monarch over the passions. |
| ἐπιθεωρεῖτε τοίνυν πρῶτον διὰ τῶν κωλυτικῶν τῆς σωφροσύνης ἔργων ὅτι αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός. 31 σωφροσύνη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐπικράτεια τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, 32 τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ψυχικαί, αἱ δὲ σωματικαί, καὶ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἐπικρατεῖν ὁ λογισμὸς φαίνεται. 33 ἐπεὶ πόθεν κινούμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἀπειρημένας τροφὰς ἀποστρεφόμεθα τὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡδονάς; οὐχ ὅτι δύναται τῶν ὀρέξεων ἐπικρατεῖν ὁ λογισμός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι. 34 τοιγαροῦν ἐνύδρων ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ ὀρνέων καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ παντοίων βρωμάτων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀπεχόμεθα διὰ τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἐπικράτειαν. 35 ἀνέχεται γὰρ τὰ τῶν ὀρέξεων πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος νοὸς ἀνακοπτόμενα, καὶ φιμοῦται πάντα τὰ τοῦ σώματος κινήματα ὑπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ. | Observe this first through the restrictive functions of temperance, proving that reason is the absolute master over its passions. 31 Temperance (sōphrosunē), then, is the mastery over desires. 32 Of these desires, some belong to the soul and others to the body, and reason is demonstrated to rule over both. 33 For when we are drawn toward forbidden foods, from where does our aversion to their pleasures originate? Is it not because reason is capable of dominating our appetites? I certainly believe so. 34 Therefore, when we crave aquatic creatures, birds, quadrupeds, and all kinds of foods forbidden to us according to the Law, we abstain because of the dominion of reason. 35 For the passions of our appetites are checked and turned back by the temperate mind, and all the impulses of the body are muzzled by reason. |
| Τὸ βιβλίον «Μακκαβαίων Δ´», ὡς «ἀπόκρυφον» δὲν συγκατελέχθη ὑπὸ τῆς ᾿Εκκλησίας μεταξὺ τῶν κανονικῶν βιβλίων τῆς Παλαιᾶς Διαθήκης. ᾿Εν τούτοις, λόγῳ τῆς σπουδαιότητος τοῦ περιεχομένου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπεριλήψεώς του εἰς ἀρχαῖα χειρόγραφα τῆς Μεταφράσεως τῶν ῾Εβδομήκοντα (Ο´), ἐκδίδεται συνήθως μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βιβλίων τῶν Μακκαβαίων (Α´-Γ´). | The book of "4 Maccabees," being "apocryphal," was not included by the Church among the canonical books of the Old Testament. Nonetheless, due to the significance of its content and its inclusion in ancient manuscripts of the Septuagint translation (LXX), it is usually published alongside the other books of the Maccabees (1-3 Maccabees).) |
1. The Bold Synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem
4 Maccabees represents the absolute zenith of Hellenistic Jewish syncretism. Rather than rejecting Greek philosophy, the anonymous author captures it, utilizing the language, structures, and tools of Stoicism and Platonism to champion orthodox Jewish fidelity to the Torah:
The Stoic Thesis: The book opens exactly like a classical Stoic philosophical treatise or diatribe, proposing a thesis to be debated: Is devout reason absolute master over the passions? (v. 1).
The Four Cardinal Virtues: In verses 15–18, the author adopts the classic Platonic/Stoic matrix of the four cardinal virtues: Prudence (phronēsis), Justice (dikaiosunē), Courage (andreia), and Temperance (sōphrosunē).
The Radical Jewish Subversion: In verse 17, the author takes the ultimate philosophical concept—Wisdom (sophia)—and completely redefines it. Wisdom is not found in the schools of Athens or through secular speculation; it is explicitly defined as the education of the Torah (tou nomou paideia). To live a perfectly philosophical life, one must strictly keep the Mosaic Law.
2. A Refined Modification of Stoic Psychology (v. 5–6)
The author engages in a highly sophisticated critique of radical Stoicism regarding human passions:
Orthodox Stoics argued for apatheia—the total eradication or destruction of the passions, viewing them as erroneous judgments that must be completely uprooted.
The author of 4 Maccabees introduces a realistic psychological modification (v. 6): Reason's job is not to destroy (katalusai) the passions, but refuse to yield (mē eixai) to them. Passions (like hunger, sexual desire, or anger) are innate biological realities; righteousness consists of using the muzzling power of the mind (v. 35) to master their direction rather than pretending they do not exist.
3. The Allegory of the Master Gardener (Ho Paggeōrgos Logismos) (v. 28–29)
The text introduces a vivid horticultural allegory to explain psychological conditioning:
Human nature produces two volatile trunk lines: Pleasure and Pain, which sprout chaotic, wild branches of vice (arrogance, greed, gluttony).
The author frames Reason as a Master Gardener (ho paggeōrgos). The mind treats the human soul like an orchard, utilizing specific agricultural techniques: cleansing (intellectual clarity), pruning (abstinence), binding (self-control), and irrigating (spiritual study). This imagery transforms virtue from an abstract state into an active, lifelong discipline of emotional cultivation.
4. Dietary Laws as Philosophical Gymnastics (v. 30–35)
To prove that Reason rules the body, the author points to the everyday dietary practices of the Jewish community:
For a Greek philosopher, Jewish dietary laws (kashrut) seemed irrational, superstitious, and anti-social.
The author completely flips this perception, framing kosher restrictions as the ultimate philosophical training ground. Craving forbidden meat (like pork or shellfish) is a natural physical impulse. Choosing to abstain purely out of obedience to the Torah proves that a Jew's mind can "muzzle" (phimoutai) the biological impulses of the flesh. Keeping kosher is redefined as the ultimate demonstration of Stoic self-mastery.
5. Martyrdom as Political Cleansing (v. 10–11)
The prologue introduces the historical canvas of the book: the brutal Seleucid persecutions under Antiochus IV Epiphanes.
The author notes that the martyrs (Eleazar, the seven brothers, and their mother) did not simply save their own souls; their internal mental endurance had a geopolitical consequence: “they became the cause of the overthrow of the tyranny... so that the homeland was cleansed through them” (v. 11).
This introduces a profoundly influential theological concept that bridges the Old and New Testaments: the idea of vicarious, atoning martyrdom, where the blood of the righteous serves as an expiation (katharisthēnai) to cleanse the land of national sin and defeat political tyranny.