Eusebius: Praeparatio Evangelica, Book 14

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΕΣΣΑΚΑΙΔΈΚΑΤΟΝ
Fourteenth Book

ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ
Preface

Eusebius transitions from his analysis of Plato to the remaining Greek philosophical schools. He reiterates his methodology: rather than offering personal attacks, he will use the Greeks' own writings to demonstrate their internal disagreements and departure from truth. While acknowledging the impressive intellect of these thinkers when evaluated strictly against human standards, Eusebius maintains that their fallible speculations fall far short of the divine revelation, prophecy, and absolute truth granted through the Hebrew prophets and scriptures.

^1.1 Ὅσα μὲν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἦν ἀμφὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε τούτου πρὸς τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια συμφωνίας, δι' ἣν τὸν ἄνδρα καταπεπλήγμεθα, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαφωνίας, δι' ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις αὐτὸν εὖ φρονῶν ἀποδέξαιτο, διελθὼν ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου, μέτειμι νῦν ἐπὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ διαβοηθέντων.	^1.1 Having in the preceding book traversed all that was to be said and heard concerning the philosophy according to Plato—both his agreement with the Hebrew oracles, on account of which we have admired the man, and again his disagreement with them, on account of which no right-thinking person would accept him—I pass now to the remaining sects of those among the Greeks who were renowned for philosophy.
^1.2 Καὶ τούτων αὖ πάλιν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ὄλισθον οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδὲ παρ' ἐμαυτοῦ, διὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πάλιν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φωνῶν μαρτυρίας, σκοπεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θήσω· οὐ μέν δή τισι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπεχθόμενος, ὧν γε καὶ μέγα θαῦμ’ ἔχειν ὁμολογῶ, ὅταν δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἷάπερ ἀνθρώποις, παραβάλλω τοὺς ἄνδρας·	^1.2 And concerning these, in turn, I will place their slip away from the truth before the eyes of my readers to examine, not from my own arguments or on my own authority, but through the testimony of the very voices of the Greeks themselves. I do this not out of hostility toward any of these men, for whom I confess to holding great admiration whenever I compare them to other men, as human beings to human beings;
^1.3 Ἐπὰν δὲ τοῖς Ἑβραίων θεολόγοις τε καὶ προφήταις, θεῷ τε τῷ διὰ τούτων καὶ μελλόντων προρρήσεις καὶ θαυμάτων ἐπιδείξεις πεποιημένῳ, ἀτὰρ δὴ καὶ μαθημάτων εὐσεβῶν δογμάτων τε ἀληθῶν διδασκαλίαν καταβεβλημένῳ, οὐκέτ’ οἶμαί τινα δεῖν εὐλόγως ἐπιμέμψασθαι, εἰ θεὸν πρὸ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀλήθειαν αὐτὴν πρὸ θνητῶν λογισμῶν τε καὶ στοχασμῶν τιμώμεθα.	^1.3 But when I compare them to the theologians and prophets of the Hebrews, and to the God who through them produced predictions of future events and demonstrations of miracles, and who laid down the teaching of pious doctrines and true tenets, I think no one could reasonably blame us if we honor God above men, and truth itself above mortal reasonings and conjectures.
^1.4 Τοῦτο δέ μοι πᾶν ὁ τῆς παρούσης Προπαρασκευῆς δείξειν πεφιλοτίμηται λόγος, εἰς ἀπόκρισιν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπολογίαν τῶν δὴ πευσομένων, τί δὴ ἄρα καλὸν ἢ σεμνὸν ἰδόντες ἐν τοῖς βαρβάρων γράμμασι τῆς πατρῴας καὶ εὐγενοῦς φιλοσοφίας, τῆς Ἑλλήνων λέγω, προκρίνειν αὐτὰ διανενοήμεθα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη δι’ ἔργων ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἡμῖν χωρείτω.	^1.4 The argument of this present Preparation strives to demonstrate all of this, serving both as an answer and a defense for those who inquire what good or noble thing we saw in the writings of the barbarians that led us to prefer them over our ancestral and noble philosophy—I mean that of the Greeks. But come, let our demonstration now proceed through actual evidence.

Chapter 2

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius outlines his structural plan for Book 14. He will trace Greek philosophy chronologically—starting with the pre-Socratic natural philosophers (physikoi), moving to Plato's Academy, and continuing through Aristotle, the Stoics, Pyrrhonian Skeptics, Cyrenaics, Eleatics, and Epicureans. His goal is to showcase their mutual hostility and endless debates over epistemology, sensation, and physics. Eusebius clarifies that he does not expose these contradictions out of anti-Hellenic malice or hatred for learning, but rather to defend the Christian choice to prefer Hebrew truth over internally fractured, uncertain human philosophy.

^2.1 Ἡγοῦμαι δὲ δεῖν πρώτιστα πάντων ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης καταβολῆς τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων ἀπάρξασθαι, καὶ τοὺς πρόσθεν ἢ Πλάτωνα γενέσθαι φυσικοὺς ἐπικληθέντας φιλοσόφους καταμαθεῖν, τίνες ποτὲ γεγόνασι, καὶ ὁποίων ἔτυχεν ἡ κατ’ αὐτοὺς φιλοσοφία προστατῶν τοῦ λόγου, εἶτ’ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος παρελθεῖν διαδοχήν, καὶ τίνες ποτ’ ἦσαν καὶ οἵδε, τάς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους λογομαχίας αὐτῶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἐπιθεωρῆσαι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρέσεων τὰς διαστάσεις, τῶν τε δοξῶν τὰς ἀντικαταστάσεις, ἐν αἷς πυκτεύοντας τοὺς γενναίους καὶ φιλοτίμως διαπληκτιζομένους, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τοῖς θεαταῖς, παραδείξω.	^2.1 I consider it necessary first of all to start from the very beginning, from the first founding of the philosophers among the Greeks, and to examine those who were called natural philosophers (physikoi) before Plato—who they were, and what sort of champions of reason their philosophy happened to have. Next, I shall proceed to Plato's succession, examining who these men were as well, investigating their verbal battles with one another, and inspecting the divisions among the other sects and the opposition of their opinions. In these, I will present these noble men boxing and ambiciously exchanging blows before the spectators, as if on a stage.
^2.2 Αὐτίκα γοῦν μάλα θεασώμεθα ὅπως μὲν ὁ Πλάτων τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ πρώτους ἔσκωπτεν, ὅπως δὲ τοὺς Πλάτωνος οἰκείους τε καὶ διαδόχους ἄλλοι· καὶ αὖ πάλιν ὅπως οἱ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι τὰ σοφὰ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πολυνοίας ἀπήλεγχον· ὅπως θ’ οἱ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ τὸν Περίπατον αὐχοῦντες τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς τὴν ἐναντίαν πρεσβεύουσι τὸ μηδὲν ὄντα παρίστων.	^2.2 Indeed, let us observe right away how Plato used to mock his predecessors, and how others mocked Plato's associates and successors; and again, how Plato's companions refuted the clever ideas of Aristotle's wide intellect; and how those who boasted of Aristotle and the Peripatos demonstrated that the opinions of those holding the opposite view were worth nothing.
^2.3 Καὶ τὰ δεινὰ δὲ καὶ ἀκριβῆ τῆς τῶν Στωικῶν λεπτολογίας ὑφ’ ἑτέρων αὖ πάλιν ὄψει καταγελώμενα, πάντας τε πανταχόθεν κατὰ τῶν πέλας κονιομένους καὶ μάχην καὶ πάλην ἀνδρικώτατα συνισταμένους, ὡς διὰ χειρῶν ἤδη καὶ γλώττης, ἢ μᾶλλον διὰ καλάμου καὶ μέλανος, τὸν κατ’ ἀλλήλων αὐτοὺς πόλεμον ἐπιτειχίζεσθαι, μονονουχὶ βάλλοντας καὶ βαλλομένους τοῖς διὰ λόγων δόρασί τε καὶ παντευχίαις.	^2.3 And you will see the formidable and subtle hair-splitting of the Stoics laughed at in turn by others, and all of them from every side raising dust against their neighbors, setting up a fight and wrestling match in the most manly fashion—so that now by hand and tongue, or rather by pen and ink, they fortify their warfare against one another, all but casting spears and being hit with the weapons and full armor of words.
^2.4 Περιέξει δ’ ἡμῖν τὸ στάδιον ἐν τῷ γυμνικῷ τῷδε ἀγῶνι γυμνοὺς ἀληθείας ἀπάσης πρὸς τοῖς δηλωθεῖσι καὶ τοὺς πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀραμένους τὰ ὅπλα, τοὺς ἀμφὶ Πύρρωνα λέγω, μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀποφηναμένους, καὶ τούς τε κατ’ Ἀρίστιππον μόνα λέγοντας τὰ πάθη εἶναι καταληπτά, καὶ αὖ πάλιν τοὺς κατὰ Μητρόδωρον καὶ Πρωταγόραν μόναις δεῖν φάσκοντας ταῖς τοῦ σώματος πιστεύειν αἰσθήσεσιν.	^2.4 And in this gymnastic contest, our arena will contain, stripped bare of all truth—in addition to those already mentioned—those who took up arms against all the dogmatic philosophers alike (I mean the followers of Pyrrho), who declared that nothing is comprehensible to human beings. It will also include the followers of Aristippus, who say that sensations alone are comprehensible, and again those following Metrodorus and Protagoras, who claim that one must trust only in the senses of the body.
^2.5 Ἔμπαλιν δὲ τούτοις συναποδύσομεν τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ξενοφάνην καὶ Παρμενίδην τὴν ἐναντίαν παραταξαμένους καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνελόντας.	^2.5 In opposition to these, we shall strip alongside them the followers of Xenophanes and Parmenides, who arrayed themselves on the opposite side and did away with the senses entirely.
^2.6 Οὐ παρήσομεν δὲ οὐδὲ τοὺς τῆς ἡδονῆς προμάχους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὸν ἀριστέα Ἐπίκουρον σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις καταλέξομεν. πρὸς ἅπαντας δὲ ὁμοῦ τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν βέλεσι τὸν κατ’ αὐτῶν ἀντιθήσομεν ἔλεγχον.	^2.6 Nor shall we pass over the champions of pleasure, but shall reckon their chieftain Epicurus along with those already mentioned. Against all of them together, we shall turn our refutation using their very own missiles.
^2.7 Καὶ τῶν ἐπίκλην δὲ φυσικῶν ἁπάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν τε δογμάτων τὰς διαφωνίας καὶ τῆς σπουδῆς τὴν ἀχρηστομάθειαν εἰς φανερὸν οἴσω, οὔ τι που μισέλλην οὐδὲ μισόλογος τις ὤν, πολλοῦ γε δέω, διαβολῆς δ’ αἰτίαν ἀπολυόμενος, ὅτι δὴ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας ἥκιστα μεταποιηθέντες τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια προτετιμήκαμεν.	^2.7 And I will bring to light the disagreements among the doctrines of all those called natural philosophers, as well as the useless learning of their zeal. I do this not out of any hatred for the Greeks or hatred of learning—far from it!—but to clear myself of the charge of slander, because without making much account of Greek education, we have preferred the Hebrew oracles instead.

Chapter 3

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius contrasts the unbroken continuity and divine unity of Hebrew doctrine with the endless squabbling and instability of Greek philosophy. He asserts that the Hebrews—from the ancient patriarchs to Moses, the later prophets, and down to the Christian church—have preserved a single, unchanging, and divine truth without adding, subtracting, or contradicting one another. In stark contrast, Greek thinkers immediately fell into irreconcilable conflict. To prove this, he introduces the pre-Socratic natural philosophers: Protagoras embraced agnosticism; Democritus posited atoms and the void; Heraclitus claimed everything is in constant change via fire; while Parmenides and Melissus maintained that the universe is one, unbegotten, and completely motionless.

^3.1 Οἱ μέν γε Ἑβραῖοι ἄνωθεν ἐξ αἰῶνος μακροῦ καὶ αὐτῆς, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀνθρωπογονίας τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνηρευνηκότες, ἀκήρατον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μετέπειτα ταύτην διατετηρήκασι, παῖς παρὰ πατρὸς θησαυρὸν λόγων ἀληθῶν ὑποδεξάμενοί τε καὶ φυλάξαντες, ὡς μήτ’ ἐπιθεῖναι μήτ’ ἀφελεῖν τινὰ τοῖς ἅπαξ κεκριμένοις τολμῆσαι.	^3.1 Now the Hebrews, having searched out piety and true philosophy from long ages past and, so to speak, from the very first generation of mankind, have preserved it uncorrupted for subsequent generations. Son receiving from father a treasure of true teachings and guarding it, no one has dared to add to or take away from what was once decided.
^3.2 Οὔτ’ οὖν ὁ πάνσοφος Μωσῆς, πάντων μὲν Ἑλλήνων πρεσβύτατος ἀποφανθεὶς διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, πάντων δὲ ὕστατος τὴν ἡλικίαν τῶν πρὶν Ἑβραίων γεγονώς, κινῆσαί τι καὶ μεταθεῖναι τῶν τοῖς προπάτορσι δοξάντων τῆς δογματικῆς πέρι θεολογίας διανενόηται, πλὴν ὅσον τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ἀνθρώποις ἀγωγῆς βίου καταλλήλου τρόπον καί τινος μέσης πολιτείας νομοθεσίαν καταβαλέσθαι,	^3.2 Thus, neither Moses the all-wise—who was shown in our earlier books to be older than all the Greeks, though younger in age than the earlier Hebrews—conceived of moving or altering any of the dogmas held by the ancestors concerning theology, except insofar as to lay down for those under him an appropriate way of life and the legislation of a middle state of government;
^3.3 Οὔθ’ οἱ μετὰ τοῦτον προφῆται, μυρίαις ὅσαις ὕστερον ἐτῶν περιόδοις ἐκλάμψαντες, διάφωνόν τι ῥῆμα πρός τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς τὰ Μωσεῖ καὶ τοῖς πάλαι θεοφιλέσι νομισθέντα προέσθαι τῇ φωνῇ τετολμήκασιν.	^3.3 Nor have the prophets after him, who shone forth myriads of years later, dared to utter a discordant word among themselves or against the decrees ordained by Moses and the ancient beloved of God.
^3.4 Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸ καθ’ ἡμᾶς διδασκαλεῖον, ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν ὁρμώμενον καὶ δι’ ἐνθέου δυνάμεως ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν Ἑλλάδα τε καὶ τὴν βάρβαρον ἐμπλῆσαν, διάφωνόν τι τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμπεριείληφεν, εἰ μή τις φαίη ὅτι μὴ μόνον τοῖς δόγμασι τῆς θεολογίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ βίου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγωγὴν τοῖς πρὸ Μώσεως θεοφιλέσιν Ἑβραίοις παραδίδωσι.	^3.4 Nor indeed does our own school of teaching—which originated from there and by divine power filled all Greece and barbarian lands alike—contain any discord with those who came before, unless someone should say that it hands down the very same lifestyle as those God-beloved Hebrews who lived before Moses, not only in theological doctrines but also in the conduct of life.
^3.5 Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοιαῦτα, μιᾷ διανοίᾳ μιᾷ τε φωνῇ ὑπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τῶν μέσων καὶ τῶν ὑστάτων μεμαρτυρημένα, τῆς ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας ὁμοῦ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸ βέβαιον ἁπάσαις ψήφοις ἐπισφραγίζεται, πληροῖ τε τὴν σύμπασαν οἰκουμένην, ὁσημέραι νεάζοντα καὶ ἀνθοῦντα, ὡς ἄρτι πρώτην ἀκμὴν καταβεβλημένα· καὶ οὔτε νόμων διατάξεις οὔτ’ ἐχθρῶν ἐπιβουλαὶ οὔτι πολεμίων πολλάκις ἀκονηθέντα ξίφη κρείττονα τῆς ὧν μετήλθομεν λόγων ἀρετῆς τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιδέδεικται.	^3.5 Such are our affairs: verified by a single mind and a single voice by those who came first, those in the middle, and those who came last, the certainty of true piety and philosophy is sealed by every vote. It fills the entire inhabited world, blooming and flourishing daily as if just now reaching its first vigor; and neither statutory decrees, nor enemy plots, nor the sharpened swords of foes have shown a power superior to the virtue of the doctrines we pursue.
^3.6 Τὰ δὲ τῆς Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίας ἐπισαλεύσαντα τίνα ποτὲ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐπεδείξατο νυνὶ θεασώμεθα, πρώτους ἁπάντων εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα καθιέντες τοὺς φυσικοὺς ἐπικληθέντας· οἱ δὴ πρόσθεν ἢ Πλάτωνα διαλάμψαι λεγόμενοι ὅπως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐστασίασαν παρ’ αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν ἔστι τοῦ Πλάτωνος· ὃς δὴ τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν Ἡράκλειτόν τε καὶ τὴν πρὸς Παρμενίδην καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν διαμάχην ἐξελέγχει.	^3.6 Now let us observe what power the unstable philosophy of the Greeks has demonstrated, bringing first of all into the arena those called "natural philosophers." How those who are said to have flourished before Plato fell into factional strife against one another can be learned from Plato himself, who exposes the battle between the followers of Protagoras and Heraclitus on the one side, and Parmenides and his circle on the other.
^3.7 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δημοκρίτου γεγονὼς ἑταῖρος, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἄθεον ἐκτήσατο δόξαν· λέγεται γοῦν τοιᾷδε κεχρῆσθαι εἰσβολῇ ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν συγγράμματι· «Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ οἶδα οὔθ’ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν.» Ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἔφη εἶναι τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες· τὸ πλῆρες ὂν λέγων καὶ στερεόν, τὸ δὲ κενὸν μὴ ὄν. Διὸ καί φησι μηδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι· ὅτι τε ἐξ ἀιδίου τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ κενῷ συνεχῶς καὶ ὀξέως κινεῖται.	^3.7 For Protagoras, who was a companion of Democritus, acquired a reputation for godlessness; at any rate, he is said to have used this opening line in his treatise On the Gods: "Concerning the gods, I am unable to know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what form they might have." Democritus, however, said that the first principles of all things are the void and the full—calling the full "being" and "solid," and the void "non-being." Wherefore he says that being is no more real than non-being, and that from eternity all existing things move continuously and swiftly in the void.
^3.8 Ὁ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἔφη εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα γίνεται, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἀναλύεται. Ἀμοιβὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, χρόνον τε ὡρίσθαι τῆς τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἀναλύσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτου γενέσεως. Οἵδε μὲν οὖν πάντα κινεῖσθαι ἔφασαν·	^3.8 And Heraclitus declared that fire is the first principle of all things, from which all things come to be, and into which they are resolved. For all things are an exchange, and a set time has been determined for the resolution of all things into fire and their rebirth from it. These thinkers, then, asserted that all things are in motion;
^3.9 Ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ γένος Ἐλεάτης ὤν, ἓν μὲν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, ἀγέννητον δὲ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ κατὰ σχῆμα σφαιροειδὲς ὑπάρχειν ἐδογμάτιζε. Παρμενίδου δὲ Μέλισσος ἑταῖρος γέγονε, τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Παρμενίδῃ δοξάζων. Τούτων δὴ οὖν πέρι ὁποῖα ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ διέξεισιν ἄκουε.	^3.9 But Parmenides, being an Eleatic by birth, dogmatized that the universe is one, unbegotten, motionless, and spherical in shape. Melissus became an associate of Parmenides, holding the same opinions as Parmenides. Listen, then, to what Plato says concerning these thinkers in the Theaetetus.

Chapter 4

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius quotes extensively from Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist to demonstrate how early Greek thinkers endlessly contradicted one another regarding ontology and perception (e.g., flux vs. stasis; corporeal vs. incorporeal). He then traces the breakdown of Plato’s own Academy. Rather than preserving Plato’s teachings, his successors—including Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, Arcesilaus (who introduced the Sceptical "Second Academy"), Carneades, and Antiochus—distorted his views, fractured the school into five competing Academies, and reduced philosophy to perpetual dispute.

^4.1 «Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ’ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξαίσιοι σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφέρεσθον, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, εἰπὼν Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;»	^4.1 "For from motion, change, and mixture with one another arise all those things which we say 'are'—incorrectly addressing them; for nothing ever is, but always becomes. And on this point all the wise in succession except Parmenides agree—Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, as well as the highest poets of both types of poetry: Epicharmus in comedy, and Homer in tragedy when he says 'Oceanus the origin of the gods, and mother Tethys,' declaring that all things are offshoots of flux and motion. Or does he not seem to say this?"
^4.2 «Ἔμοιγε. — Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;» Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς προϊὼν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιφέρει λέγων·	^4.2 "To me he does. — Who then could still dispute against so great an army, with Homer as its commander, without becoming a laughingstock?" Then, continuing his argument, Plato adds:
^4.3 «Προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ’ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ’ ὀλίγοις γέγονεν. — Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως. — Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.»	^4.3 "We must therefore approach closer, as our argument on behalf of Protagoras demanded, and examine this moving reality by tapping it to see whether it sounds whole or cracked. For the battle over it is no trivial matter, nor among a few people. — Far from being trivial, it is spreading enormously in Ionia! For the followers of Heraclitus champion this doctrine with great vigor. — Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must examine it all the more from the beginning, just as they themselves propose."
^4.4 «Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὁμηρείων τε καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι εἶναι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίως ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαί τε καὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας. ἀλλ’ ἄν τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, καὶ ἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξῃ καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν, οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλ’ εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι μήτ’ ἐν λόγῳ μήτ’ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι. τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.»	^4.4 "By all means! For regarding these Heracliteans, Socrates—or as you call them, Homeric and even older—it is no more possible to converse with those around Ephesus who pretend to be experts than it is with people driven mad by gadflies! For they are carried along literally like their writings, and to abide by an argument or a question and quietly answer and ask in turn is less than nothing to them. Or rather, 'less than nothing' falls short of expressing the total absence of quiet in these men. But if you ask anyone anything, pulling enigmatic little phrases out as if from a quiver, they shoot them at you; and if you seek to get an account of what he said, you will be struck by another newly re-coined phrase! You will never reach a conclusion with any of them, nor do they among themselves, but they guard exceedingly well against allowing anything to be settled either in speech or in their own souls—thinking, as it seems to me, that stability itself is static; and against this they fight fiercely, casting it out from everywhere as far as they can."
^4.5 «Ἇσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ’, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑτοῖς ποιῆσαι. — Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητής, ἀλλ’ αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ᾖα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.»	^4.5 "Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men fighting, but have not spent time with them in peace, for they are not your companions. But I imagine they explain such things to their disciples at leisure, whom they wish to make like themselves. — What disciples, my good sir? No one among such men becomes the disciple of another; rather, they spring up spontaneously, wherever each happens to become inspired, and neither thinks the other knows anything! Therefore, as I was about to say, you could never get a rational account from them, either willingly or unwillingly; we must take the problem ourselves and examine it like a puzzle."
^4.6 «Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ δὲ δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ῥεῦμα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, "Οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι," καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται.»	^4.6 "You speak reasonably. But as for this problem, have we not received it from the ancients who hid it from the many through poetry—that the origin of all things, Oceanus and Tethys, happens to be a stream and nothing stands still—and from the moderns who, being wiser, demonstrate it openly so that even the shoemakers may learn their wisdom by listening, and cease foolishly thinking that some things stand still while others move, and honoring them once they learn that all things move? But I almost forgot, Theodorus, that others have declared the exact opposite—such as 'Unmoving is that for which the name is the All,' and all the other things that the followers of Melissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all these, asserting that the universe is one and stands still within itself, having no place in which to move."
^4.7 «Τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἐὰν μή πῃ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία.»	^4.7 "What then, my friend, shall we do with all these people? For proceeding bit by bit, we have unawares fallen into the middle between both sides! And unless we somehow defend ourselves and escape, we shall pay the penalty like those playing the line-game in the wrestling schools when they are seized by both sides and dragged in opposite directions."
^4.8 Ταῦτα μὲν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ. μεταβὰς δὲ ἑξῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Σοφιστὴν αὖθις περὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενομένων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων τοιάδε φησίν· «Εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις ἡμῖν πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν. — Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι, παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῃ, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσιν. τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος ἅπαν, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δέ τινες καὶ Σικελικαὶ ὕστερον Μοῦσαι ξυνενόησαν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστερον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὂν πολλά τε καὶ ἕν ἐστιν, ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν· ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναί φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ’ Ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ διὰ νεῖκός τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν.»	^4.8 So much for the Theaetetus. Turning next to the Sophist, Eusebius notes that Plato again speaks as follows regarding the natural philosophers who came before him: "Parmenides seems to me to have conversed with us easily, as has everyone who ever set out to define how many and of what sort existing things are. — Each one seems to me to be telling us a myth, as if we were children! One says that existing things are three, and that some of them are at war with one another at times, while at other times becoming friends they provide marriages, births, and the rearing of offspring. Another says there are two—wet and dry, or hot and cold—and pairs them off and gives them away in marriage. But our whole Eleatic tribe, starting from Xenophanes and even earlier, proceeds with its myths on the assumption that what are called 'all things' are actually one. Later, certain Ionian and Sicilian Muses thought it safer to weave both together and say that Being is both many and one, held together by enmity and friendship. For 'ever differing, it is ever brought together,' say the stricter Muses; while the softer Muses relaxed the requirement that these things should always be so, saying that by turns the universe is now one and friendly through Aphrodite, and now many and hostile to itself through some Strife. Whether anyone spoke truly or not in these matters, it is harsh and offensive to criticize famous and ancient men so severely."
^4.9 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· «Τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δ’ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν’ ἐκ πάντων ἴδωμεν ὅτι τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν. — Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους. — Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.»	^4.9 And shortly after, he adds: "Now, we have not gone through all those who treat with precision of Being and Non-Being, but let this suffice. We must look in turn at those who speak differently, so that from all of them we may see that Being is no easier to define than Non-Being. — Must we proceed to them then? — Indeed, there seems to be among them a sort of Battle of the Giants because of their dispute with one another over reality."
^4.10 «Πῶς; — Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τις φήσει μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. — Ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων πλέον οἷς προσέτυχον.»	^4.10 "How so? — Some drag everything down from heaven and the invisible to the earth, literally grasping rocks and oaks with their hands! For touching all such things, they insist that only that exists which offers impact and touch, defining body and reality as the same thing; and if anyone says that something without a body exists, they despise him entirely and refuse to hear another word! — Truly formidable men you describe; I too have already met quite a few of them!"
^4.11 «Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπὸ τούτων ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντὶ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκεν. — Ἀληθῆ.»	^4.11 "Therefore, those who dispute against them defend themselves very cautiously from somewhere above, insisting that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms constitute true reality. Breaking down the bodies of the others and what they call 'truth' into tiny pieces in their arguments, they term it a sort of moving 'becoming' instead of 'reality.' And in the middle surrounding these issues, a boundless battle between both sides is always raging, Theaetetus. — True."
^4.12 Διὰ δὴ τοσούτων τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυσικοὺς φιλοσόφους διαβέβληκεν ὁ Πλάτων. ὁποίαν δὲ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν ἐζητημένων ἐπήγετο δόξαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου διειλήφαμεν, ὅτε συμφωνεῖν αὐτὸν τοῖς Ἑβραίων δόγμασι καὶ τῇ Μωϋσέως συντρέχειν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος διδασκαλίᾳ παριστῶμεν.	^4.12 Through so many statements, Plato has discredited the natural philosophers before him. But what opinion he himself held regarding the matters under inquiry we have explained in the preceding books, when we demonstrated that he agrees with the doctrines of the Hebrews and coincides with the teaching of Moses regarding true Being.
^4.13 Καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος διαδόχους φέρε τῷ λόγῳ θεωρήσωμεν. Πλάτωνά φασιν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ συστησάμενον τὴν διατριβὴν πρῶτον Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν κληθῆναι, καὶ τὴν ὀνομασθεῖσαν Ἀκαδημαϊκὴν φιλοσοφίαν συστήσασθαι. μετὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα Σπεύσιππον τὸν ἐξ ἀδελφῆς Πλάτωνος, τῆς Ποτώνης, εἶτα Ξενοκράτην, ἔπειτα Πολέμωνα τὴν διατριβὴν ὑποδέξασθαι.	^4.13 Now let us consider Plato's own successors in our account. They say that Plato, having established his school in the Academy, was the first to be called an "Academic," and founded the so-called Academic philosophy. After Plato, Speusippus (the son of Plato's sister Potone), then Xenocrates, and then Polemon inherited the school.
^4.14 Τούτους δὲ ἀφ' ἑστίας ἀρξαμένους εὐθὺς τὰ Πλατωνικὰ φασι παραλύειν, στρεβλοῦντας τὰ τῷ διδασκάλῳ φανέντα ξένων εἰσαγωγαῖς δογμάτων, ὥστε σοι μὴ εἰς μακρὸν ἐλπίζειν τὴν τῶν θαυμαστῶν ἐκείνων διαλόγων ἰσχὺν ἀποσβῆναι, ἅμα τε τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τελευτῇ καὶ τὴν τῶν δογμάτων διαδοχὴν συναποτελευτῆσαι· μάχης ἐντεῦθεν καὶ στάσεως ἀπὸ τῶνδε ἀρξαμένης, οὔποτε καὶ εἰς δεῦρο διαλειπούσης, τοὺς τὰ αὐτῷ φίλα ζηλοῦν ἀσπαζομένους οὐδένας μὲν ὄντας, πλὴν εἰ μὴ εἷς που ἢ δεύτερος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βίῳ, ἢ καί τινες ἄλλοι κομιδῇ βραχεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ πάμπαν ἀλλότριοι τῆς ἐπιπλάστου σοφιστείας· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ πρόσθεν τὸν Πλάτωνα διαδεξάμενοι τοιοίδε τινες διαβέβληνται.	^4.14 They say that these men, starting right from the hearth, immediately began to dismantle Plato's doctrines, distorting what seemed clear to their teacher by introducing foreign dogmas. Thus you could not hope for the strength of those wonderful dialogues to endure for long, but along with the death of the man, the succession of his doctrines died as well! Battle and faction began among them from that point and have never ceased down to the present day, leaving no one who truly embraces his cherished views—except perhaps one or two in a whole lifetime, or a very few in number, and even they were not altogether foreign to artificial sophistry; for even those who succeeded Plato earlier have been discredited as such.
^4.15 Πολέμωνα γάρ φασι διαδέξασθαι Ἀρκεσίλαον, ὃν δὴ κατέχει λόγος ἀφέμενον τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ξένην τινὰ καὶ, ὥς φασι, δευτέραν συστήσασθαι Ἀκαδημίαν. φάναι γὰρ περὶ ἁπάντων ἐπέχειν δεῖν· εἶναι γὰρ πάντα ἀκατάληπτα καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερα λόγους ἰσοκρατεῖς ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δὲ ἀπίστους εἶναι καὶ πάντα λόγον. ἐπῄνει γοῦν Ἡσιόδου τουτὶ τὸ ἀπόφθεγμα: «κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ νόον ἀνθρώποισιν.» ἐπειρᾶτο δὲ καὶ παράδοξά τινα ἀνακαινίζειν.	^4.15 For they say that Arcesilaus succeeded Polemon, and tradition holds that he abandoned Plato's doctrines and established a foreign and, as they say, "Second Academy." For he declared that one must suspend judgment about all things, since all things are incomprehensible and the arguments on either side are of equal weight, and that the senses and all reason are untrustworthy. At any rate, he used to praise this saying of Hesiod: "For the gods keep hidden from men the means of life." And he tried to introduce certain paradoxical innovations.
^4.16 Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον τοὺς ἀμφὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον, τῆς τῶν προτέρων δόξης ἀποτραπέντας, τρίτης Ἀκαδημίας αἰτίους γενέσθαι φασίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασι τὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Φίλωνα καὶ Χαρμίδην. τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον. Τοιαύτη μέν τις ἡ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑπῆρξε διαδοχή. ὁποῖοι δὲ γεγόνασιν οἵδε τὸν τρόπον, ἀνάγνωθι τὰς ὧδε ἐχούσας Νουμηνίου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου φωνάς, ἃς τέθειται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ὧν ἐπέγραψε Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως.	^4.16 After Arcesilaus, they say that Carneades and Clitomachus, turning away from the opinion of their predecessors, were responsible for a Third Academy. Some add a fourth—that of Philo and Charmidas—and some even reckon a fifth, that of Antiochus and his followers. Such was the succession of Plato himself. To see what sort of men they were in their conduct, read the following words of Numenius the Pythagorean, which he set down in the first book of his work entitled On the Disagreement of the Academics with Plato.

Chapter 5

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In this chapter, Numenius details how Plato’s successors compromised the purity of Platonic philosophy. While Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon maintained an outward appearance of continuity, they altered Plato’s core teachings. Contrastingly, Epicureans remained strictly loyal to Epicurus’s doctrines. Stoicism fractured into unending internal disputes, similar to the earlier splintering of Socrates's followers (Aristippus, Antisthenes, the Megarians, and Eretrians). Numenius argues that Plato deliberately wrote with ambiguity—mixing clarity and obscurity—to protect his ideas, which inadvertently seeded future schisms. Arcesilaus and Zeno studied together under Polemon, but each synthesized eclectic and opposing influences: Zeno combined Heraclitus, Stilpo, and Crates, while Arcesilaus merged Crantor, Diodorus Cronus, Pyrrho, and Menedemus into a highly rhetorical, skeptical dialectic.

^5.1 «Ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν Σπεύσιππον τὸν Πλάτωνος μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦν, Ξενοκράτην δὲ τὸν διάδοχον τοῦ Σπευσίππου, Πολέμωνα δὲ ἐκδεξάμενον τὴν σχολὴν παρὰ Ξενοκράτους, ἀεὶ τὸ ἦθος διετείνετο τῶν δογμάτων σχεδόν τι ταὐτόν, ἕνεκά γε τῆς μήπω ἐποχῆς ταυτησὶ τῆς πολυθρυλήτου τε καὶ εἰ δή τινων τοιούτων ἄλλων· ἐπεὶ εἴς γε τὰ ἄλλα πολλαχῇ παραλύοντες, τὰ δὲ στρεβλοῦντες, οὐκ ἐνέμειναν τῇ πρώτῃ διαδοχῇ· ἀρξάμενοι δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βράδιον διίσταντο προαιρέσει ἢ ἀγνοίᾳ, τὰ δὲ δή τινι αἰτίᾳ ἄλλῃ οὐκ ἀφιλοτίμῳ ἴσως.	^5.1 "Down through Speusippus, who was Plato’s nephew, Xenocrates the successor of Speusippus, and Polemon who received the school from Xenocrates, the general character of their doctrines remained nearly the same—at least as far as this much-touted 'suspension of judgment' (epoche) or anything else of that sort had not yet appeared. Yet, in other respects, by dismantling many points and twisting others, they failed to abide by the original succession. Starting from Plato, they diverged sooner or later, whether by deliberate choice or out of ignorance, or for some other reason that was perhaps not free from personal ambition.
^5.2 καὶ οὐ μὲν βούλομαί τι φλαῦρον εἰπεῖν διὰ Ξενοκράτην, μᾶλλον μὴν ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος ἐθέλω· καὶ γάρ με δάκνει ὅτι μὴ πᾶν ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ἔδρων σώζοντες τῷ Πλάτωνι κατὰ πάντα πάντῃ πᾶσαν ὁμοδοξίαν· καίτοι ἄξιος ἦν αὐτοῖς ὁ Πλάτων, οὐκ ἀμείνων μὲν Πυθαγόρου τοῦ μεγάλου, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως οὐδὲ φλαυρότερος ἐκείνου, ᾧ συνακολουθοῦντες σεφθέντες τε οἱ γνώριμοι ἐγένοντο πολυτιμητίζεσθαι αἰτιώτατοι τὸν Πυθαγόραν.	^5.2 Now I do not wish to say anything harsh on account of Xenocrates, but rather I wish to speak on behalf of Plato. For it bites me to the quick that they did not undergo everything and do everything to preserve total agreement with Plato in every way and on all points. And yet Plato was worthy in their eyes—not better than the great Pythagoras, to be sure, but perhaps not inferior to him either; whose pupils, by following and venerating him, became the primary cause of Pythagoras being held in such high honor.
^5.3 τοῦτο δὲ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι οὐκ ὤφελον μὲν, μαθόντες δ’ οὖν ἐν οὐδενὶ μὲν ὤφθησαν Ἐπικούρῳ ἐναντία θέμενοι οὐδαμῶς, ὁμολογήσαντες δὲ εἶναι σοφῷ συνδεδογμένοι καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπέλαυσαν τῆς προσρήσεως εἰκότως· ὑπῆρξέ τε ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς μετέπειτα Ἐπικουρείοις μηδ’ αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν πω ἐναντίον οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε Ἐπικούρῳ μηδὲν εἰς μηδέν, ὅτου καὶ μνησθῆναι ἄξιον· ἀλλὰ παρανόμημα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοτομηθέν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τολμᾷ, κατὰ πολλὴν δὲ εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς ἠρεμεῖ τὰ δόγματα ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἀεί ποτε συμφωνίας· ἔοικέ τε ἡ Ἐπικούρου διατριβὴ πολιτείᾳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ, ἀστασιαστοτάτῃ, κοινὸν ἵνα νοῦν, μίαν γνώμην ἐχούσῃ· ἀφ’ ἧς ἦσαν καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσονται φιλακόλουθοι.	^5.3 The Epicureans, on the other hand—though I wish they had not learned philosophy at all—having learned it, were never seen setting themselves up in opposition to Epicurus in any way. By agreeing that they shared the doctrines of a wise man, they deservedly enjoyed that title as well. This led to the result among later Epicureans that not a single one ever said anything contrary either to one another or to Epicurus on any point worthy of mention; rather, any innovation was judged a transgression, or rather an impiety, and condemned! For this reason, no one even dares to make innovations, and their doctrines rest in great peace, preserved by their perpetual agreement with one another. Indeed, the school of Epicurus resembles a true and peaceful state, free from faction, possessing one common mind and a single purpose; from which they were, are, and, as it seems, will continue to be devoted followers.
^5.4 τὰ δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν ἐστασίασται, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ μηδέπω τελευτῶντα καὶ νῦν· ἐλέγχουσι δὲ ἀγαπώντως ὑπὸ δυσμενοῦς ἐλέγχου, οἱ μέν τινες αὐτοὶ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἔτι, οἱ δ’ ἤδη μεταθέμενοι· εἴξασιν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι ὀλιγαρχικωτέροις, οἳ δὴ διαστάντες ὑπῆρξαν εἰς τοὺς μετέπειτα πολλῆς μὲν τοῖς προτέροις, πολλῆς δὲ τῆς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιτιμήσεως αἴτιοι, εἰσέτι ἑτέρων ἕτεροι Στωϊκώτεροι· καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσοι πλέον ἐπὶ τὸ τεχνικὸν ὤφθησαν μικρολόγοι· αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπερβαλλόμενοι τῇ τε πολυπραγμοσύνῃ τοῖς τε σκαριφηθμοῖς ἐπετίμων θάττον.	^5.4 The affairs of the Stoics, however, have been torn by faction, beginning with their founders and not even ending today. They criticize one another contentiously with malicious examination—some remaining in the school, others having already changed their allegiance. The earliest among them resembled oligarchs, who, having split apart, became the cause of immense criticism of their predecessors and of one another among those who came after, each generation trying to be 'more Stoic' than the rest—especially those who appeared more pedantic in their technical quibbling. For these very men, outdoing the others in meddlesomeness and petty hair-splitting, were quick to criticize.
^5.5 πολὺ μέντοι τούτων πρότερον ταὐτὰ ἔπαθον οἱ ἀπὸ Σωκράτους ἀφελκύσαντες διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους, ἰδίᾳ μὲν Ἀρίστιππος, ἰδίᾳ δὲ Ἀντισθένης, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἰδίᾳ οἱ Μεγαρικοί τε καὶ Ἐρετρικοὶ, ἢ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτων.	^5.5 Long before these men, however, the very same thing happened to those who dragged Socrates’s teachings off in different directions—Aristippus individually, Antisthenes individually, and elsewhere the Megarians and Eretrians, along with anyone else who followed them.
^5.6 αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντος αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἑκάστῳ ῥυθμοῖς, οἱ διακούσαντες τοῦτο μὲν ἠγνόουν, ᾤοντο δὲ λέγειν πάντα αὐτὸν εἰκῆ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς νικώσης ἀεὶ προστυχῶς ἄλλοτε ἄλλης τύχης, ὅπως πνέοι.	^5.6 The cause of this was that, although Socrates recognized three gods and philosophized about them in the rhythms appropriate to each, his listeners failed to understand this. Instead, they thought he spoke everything at random, blown along by whatever chance happened to win out at the moment, depending on how the wind blew.
^5.7 ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πυθαγορίσας, ᾔδει δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην μηδαμόθεν ἢ ἐκεῖθεν διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τε καὶ γνόντα εἰρηκέναι, ὧδε οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς συνεδήσατο τὰ πράγματα, οὔτε εἰωθότως, οὔτε δὲ εἰς τὸ φανερόν· διαγαγὼν δὲ ἕκαστα ὅπη ἐνόμιζεν, ἐπικρυψάμενος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ δῆλα εἶναι καὶ μὴ δῆλα, ἀσφαλῶς μὲν ἐγράψατο, αὐτὸς δὲ αἰτίαν παρέσχε τῆς μετ’ αὐτὸν στάσεως τε ἅμα καὶ διολκῆς τῶν δογμάτων, οὐ φθόνῳ μὲν, οὐδέ γε δυσνοίᾳ· ἀλλ’ οὐ βούλομαι ἐπὶ ἀνδράσι πρεσβυτέροις εἰπεῖν ῥήματα οὐκ ἐναίσιμα.	^5.7 Plato, having adopted Pythagorean principles—and knowing that Socrates had spoken and known what he said from no other source than that—bound his system together in this way, neither in the customary manner nor openly. Treating each topic as he thought best, concealing his meaning halfway between being clear and unclear, he wrote safely indeed, but he himself provided the cause for the faction and twisting of doctrines that followed him—not out of envy or ill will, but... well, I do not wish to speak improper words about elder men.
^5.8 τοῦτο δὲ χρὴ μαθόντας ἡμὰς ἐπενεγκεῖν ἐκεῖσε μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς προὐθέμεθα χωρίζειν αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Ζήνωνος, οὕτω καὶ νῦν τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς ἀντιλάβηται, χωρίζοντες ἐάσομεν αὐτὸν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ νῦν εἶναι Πυθαγόρειον· ὡς νῦν μανικώτερον ἢ Πενθεῖ τινι προσῆκε διελκόμενος πάσχει μὲν κατὰ μέλη, ὅλος δ’ ἐξ ὅλου ἑαυτοῦ μετατίθεταί τε καὶ ἀντιμετατίθεται οὐδαμῶς.	^5.8 Learning this, we ought to turn our mind rather in that direction; and just as we originally set out to separate Plato from Aristotle and Zeno, so now, if God helps us, we shall separate him from the Academy and allow him to remain by himself as a Pythagorean. For as he is now torn apart more wildly than Pentheus ever was, he suffers limb by limb, yet as a whole self he is by no means transformed or altered into something else.
^5.9 ὅπως οὖν ἀνὴρ μεσεύων Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους, τοῦ μὲν τὸ σεμνὸν ὑπαγαγὼν μέχρι τοῦ φιλανθρώπου, τοῦ δὲ τὸ κομψὸν τοῦτο καὶ παιγνιῆμον ἀναγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρωνείας εἰς ἀξίωμα καὶ ὄγκον, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο κεράσας Σωκράτει Πυθαγόραν, τοῦ μὲν δημοτικώτερος, τοῦ δὲ σεμνότερος ὤφθη.	^5.9 Thus, as a man occupying a middle ground between Pythagoras and Socrates, he brought down the solemnity of the former to the level of human warmth, while raising the clever, playful tone of the latter up from irony to dignity and grandeur. Blending Pythagoras with Socrates in this way, he appeared more accessible than Pythagoras, yet more majestic than Socrates.
^5.10 Ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ τι ταῦτα διαιτήσων περὶ τούτων οὔσης νῦν μοι τῆς ζητήσεως· ἃ δὲ προὐδέδοκτο καὶ εἶμι ἐκεῖσε, ᾗ δὴ φροῦδος ἀναδραμεῖν δοκῶ μοι, μὴ καί που ἀποκρουσθῶμεν τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς φερούσης.	^5.10 "But I am not here to adjudicate these matters now, since that is not the subject of my present inquiry. Let me return to what was previously intended, lest I seem to run off on a tangent and get knocked off the path that leads where we are going.
^5.11 Πολέμωνος δὲ ἐγένοντο γνώριμοι Ἀρκεσίλαος καὶ Ζήνων· πάλιν γὰρ αὐτῶν μνησθήσομαι ἐπὶ τέλει. Ζήνωνα μὲν οὖν μέμνημαι εἰπὼν Ξενοκράτει, εἶτα δὲ Πολέμωνι φοιτῆσαι, αὖθις δὲ παρὰ Κράτητι κυνίσαι· νυνὶ δὲ αὐτῷ λελογίσθω ὅτι καὶ Στίλπωνός τε μετέσχε καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων.	^5.11 Arcesilaus and Zeno became students of Polemon; I shall mention them again at the end. I remember saying that Zeno studied under Xenocrates, then Polemon, and later adopted Cynic practices under Crates. Now let it also be reckoned to him that he partook of Stilpo’s teachings and the Heraclitean arguments.
^5.12 ἐπεὶ γὰρ συμφοιτῶντες παρὰ Πολέμωνι ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀλλήλοις, συμπαρέλαβον εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Στίλπωνα ἅμα καὶ Κράτητα, ὧν ὑπὸ μὲν Στίλπωνος ἐγένετο μαχητής, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἡρακλείτου αὐστηρός, κυνικὸς δὲ ὑπὸ Κράτητος· ὁ δ’ Ἀρκεσίλαος Θεόφραστον ἴσχει καὶ Κράντορα τὸν Πλατωνικὸν καὶ Διόδωρον, εἶτα Πύρρωνα, ὧν ὑπὸ μὲν Κράντορος πιθανουργικός, ὑπὸ Διοδώρου δὲ σοφιστής, ὑπὸ δὲ Πύρρωνος ἐγένετο παντοδαπὸς καὶ ἴτης καὶ οὐδέν.	^5.12 For when studying together under Polemon they became rivals, they recruited allies for their battle against one another: Zeno took Heraclitus, Stilpo, and Crates together—becoming a fighter under Stilpo, austere under Heraclitus, and a Cynic under Crates. Arcesilaus, on the other hand, took Theophrastus, Crantor the Platonist, Diodorus, and then Pyrrho—becoming persuasive under Crantor, a sophist under Diodorus, and versatile, reckless, and a complete nonentity under Pyrrho!
^5.13 ὃ καὶ ἐλέγετο περὶ αὐτοῦ ᾀδόμενόν τι ἔπος παραγωγὸν καὶ ὑβριστικόν: "πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὄπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διόδωρος." Τίμων δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ Μενεδήμου τὸ ἐριστικόν φησι λαβόντα ἐξαρτυθῆναι, εἴπερ γε δή φησι περὶ αὐτοῦ: "τῇ μὲν ἔχων Μενεδήμου ὑπὸ στέρνοισι μόλυβδον θεύσεται, ἢ Πύρρωνα τὸ πᾶν κρέας, ἢ Διόδωρον."	^5.13 This is why a certain playful and insulting verse was sung about him: 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle.' Timon also says that he received his eristic style from Menedemus and was fully equipped by it, writing about him: 'Bearing under his chest the leaden weight of Menedemus, he will run either to Pyrrho, that lump of flesh, or to Diodorus.'
^5.14 ταῖς οὖν Διοδώρου διαλεκτικοῦ ὄντος λεπτολογίαις τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς Πύρρωνος καὶ τὸ σκεπτικὸν καταπλέξας διεκόσμησε λόγου δεινότητι τῇ Πλάτωνος φλήναφόν τινα κατεστωμυλμένον, καὶ ἔλεγε καὶ ἀντέλεγε, καὶ μετεκυλινδεῖτο κἀκεῖθεν κἀντεῦθεν, ἑκατέρωθεν, ὁπόθεν τύχοι, παλινάγρετος καὶ δύσκριτος καὶ παλίμβολός τε ἅμα καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένος, οὐδέν τε εἰδὼς, ὡς αὐτὸς ἔφη, γενναῖος ὤν· εἶτά πως ἐξέβαινεν ὅμοιος τοῖς εἰδόσιν, ὑπὸ σκιαγραφίας τῶν λόγων παντοδαπὸς πεφαντασμένος.»	^5.14 Thus, weaving the skepticism and reasoning of Pyrrho into the fine-spun subtleties of Diodorus the dialectician, he adorned a talkative babble with the eloquence of Plato. He would speak for and against, rolling back and forth from one side to the other, whichever way it happened—unpredictable, hard to judge, shiftless, and audacious. Knowing nothing (as he himself claimed), noble as he was, he somehow came out looking like those who did know, appearing under the shadow-play of his arguments as a man of every shape."

Chapter 6

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Numenius delivers a vivid critique of Arcesilaus and Zeno of Citium. He compares Arcesilaus to Homer’s Diomedes—a philosophical mercenary whose true allegiance was impossible to identify. Though Arcesilaus claimed the Academic title out of respect for his lover Crantor, Numenius argues he was actually a thoroughgoing Pyrrhonian Skeptic who used Diodorean dialectic and Platonic eloquence to dismantle all positions without holding any of his own. When Zeno and Arcesilaus clashed, Zeno shrank from directly confronting Arcesilaus and instead directed his attacks against the deceased Plato, attacking his doctrines with Cynic-style vulgarity. Meanwhile, Arcesilaus systematically dismantled Zeno’s core epistemological criterion, the "comprehensible impression," dominating Athenian intellectual life through pure rhetorical style and charm.

^6.1 «Τοῦ τε Ὁμηρικοῦ Τυδείδου ὁποτέροις μετείη ἀγνοουμένου, οὔτε εἰ Τρῶσιν ὁμιλέοι οὔτε εἰ καὶ Ἀχαιοῖς, οὐδὲν ἧττον Ἀρκεσίλαος ἠγνοεῖτο. τὸ γὰρ ἕνα τε λόγον καὶ ταὐτόν ποτ’ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐνῆν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδέ γε ἠξίου ἀνδρὸς εἶναί πω τὸ τοιοῦτο δεξιοῦ οὐδαμῶς. ὠνομάζετο οὖν δεινὸς σοφιστὴς, τῶν ἀγυμνάστων σφαγεύς.	^6.1 "Just as it was unknown which side the Homeric Diomedes belonged to—whether he was fighting alongside the Trojans or the Achaeans—no less was Arcesilaus an unknown quantity. For saying one and the same thing on any occasion was not in his nature, nor did he consider such consistency to be at all the mark of a clever man. He was named, therefore, a formidable sophist, a slaughterer of the unpracticed.
^6.2 ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ Ἔμπουσαι ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τοῖς τῶν λόγων ὑπὸ παρασκευῆς τε καὶ μελέτης ἐφάρματτεν, ἐγοήτευεν, οὐδὲν εἶχεν εἰδέναι οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἐᾶν· ἐδειμάτου δὲ καὶ κατεθορύβει, καὶ σοφισμάτων γε καὶ λόγων κλοπῆς φερόμενος τὰ πρῶτα κατέχαιρε τῷ ὀνείδει, καὶ ἡβρύνετο θαυμαστῶς, ὅτι μήτε τί αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε αὖ κακόν ἐστι τί ᾔδει, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς πέσοι τοῦτο εἰπὼν, αὖθις μεταβαλὼν ἀνέτρεπεν ἂν πλεοναχῶς ἢ δι' ὅσων κατεσκευάκει.	^6.2 For like Empusas taking shape in phantom illusions of arguments, he would bewitch and enchant through preparation and practice; he had nothing he professed to know himself, nor would he allow others to know anything. He terrified and confounded people, and held the top prize for sophisms and literary theft, taking absolute delight in the reproach! He preened himself amazingly over the fact that he knew nothing of what was noble or shameful, good or bad; but whichever way his argument fell into men's souls, he would turn right around and overthrow it in more ways than he had built it up!
^6.3 ἦν οὖν ὕδραν τέμνων ἑαυτὸν καὶ τεμνόμενος ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀμφότερα ἀλλήλων δυσκρίτως, καὶ τοῦ δέοντος ἀσκέπτως· πλὴν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἤρεσεν, ὁμοῦ τῇ ἀκροάσει εὐπρόσωπον ὄντα θεωμένοις· ἦν οὖν ἀκουόμενος καὶ βλεπόμενος ἥδιστος, ἐπεί τε προσειθίσθησαν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τοὺς λόγους ἰόντας ἀπὸ καλοῦ προσώπου τε καὶ στόματος οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι φιλοφροσύνης.	^6.3 Thus he was a Hydra cutting himself down and being cut down by himself, both sides being hard to distinguish from one another, and recklessly indifferent to what was necessary. Yet he pleased his listeners, who watched his handsome face at the same time they heard him speak. He was most pleasant to hear and see, once people became accustomed to accepting arguments coming from a handsome face and mouth, accompanied by the charm in his eyes.
^6.4 δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκοῦσαι μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἔσχεν ὧδε ἐξ ἀρχῆς. συμβαλὼν γὰρ ἐν παισὶ Θεοφράστῳ, ἀνδρὶ πράῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀφυεῖ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ, διὰ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι, ἔτι ὢν ὡραῖος, τυχὼν ἐραστοῦ Κράντορος τοῦ Ἀκαδημαϊκοῦ, προσεχώρησε μὲν τούτῳ, οἷα δὲ τὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἀφυὴς, τρεχούσῃ χρησάμενος αὐτῇ ῥᾳδίᾳ, θερμουργὸς ὑπὸ φιλονεικίας, μετασχὼν μὲν ῥοῦ εἰς τὰ πεπανουργημένα πιθάνια ταῦτα τὰ κομψὰ, ὡμιληκὼς δὲ Πύρρωνι—ὁ δὲ Πύρρων ἐκ Δημοκρίτου ὥρμητο ὁπόθεν γέ ποθεν—οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἔνθεν καταρτυθεὶς, πλὴν τῆς προσρήσεως, ἐνέμεινε Πύρρωνι, ὡς τῇ πάντων ἀναιρέσει.	^6.4 Now one must hear these things not simply, for matters stood thus from the beginning: when as a boy he met Theophrastus—a gentle man not lacking skill in erotic matters—on account of his beauty while still in his youth, he happened upon Crantor the Academic as a lover and attached himself to him. Being naturally gifted, using his quick and agile mind, and hot-headed out of love for contention, he plunged into the stream of these clever and mischievous persuasions after conversing with Pyrrho (and Pyrrho had derived his impetus somehow or other from Democritus). Thus equipped from these sources, except for the mere title, he remained a follower of Pyrrho in the total destruction of all dogmas.
^6.5 Μνασέας γοῦν καὶ Φιλόμηλος καὶ Τίμων οἱ σκεπτικοὶ σκεπτικὸν αὐτὸν προσονομάζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν, ἀναιροῦντα καὶ αὐτὸν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ πιθανόν.	^6.5 At any rate, Mnaseas, Philomelus, and Timon the Skeptics call him a Skeptic just like themselves, since he too abolished truth, falsehood, and the plausible.
^6.6 λεχθεὶς οὖν αἰτίᾳ τῶν Πυρρωνείων Πυρρώνειος, αἰδοῖ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ὑπέμεινε λέγεσθαι Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς ἔτι. ἦν μὲν τοίνυν Πυρρώνειος, πλὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος· Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς δ' οὐκ ἦν, πλὴν τοῦ λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πείθομαι, τοῦ Κνιδίου Διοκλέους φάσκοντος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Διατριβαῖς Ἀρκεσίλαον φόβῳ τῶν Θεοδωρείων τε καὶ Βίωνος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ἐπεισιόντων τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ οὐδὲν ὀκνούντων ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐλέγχειν, αὐτὸν ἐξευλαβηθέντα, ἵνα μὴ πράγματα ἔχῃ, μηδὲν μὲν δόγμα ὑπειπεῖν φαινόμενον, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ μέλαν τῆς σηπίας προβαλέσθαι πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐποχήν. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐ πείθομαι.	^6.6 Though called a Pyrrhonian because of his Pyrrhonian views, out of respect for his lover he endured continuing to be called an 'Academic.' He was indeed a Pyrrhonian in everything except name, and he was not an Academic except in name. For I am not persuaded by Diocles of Cnidus, who claims in his work entitled Discourses that Arcesilaus—in fear of the followers of Theodoras and Bion the Sophist, who were attacking philosophers and hesitating at nothing in their refutations—acted with extreme caution so as not to have trouble, holding back from putting forward any apparent doctrine, but rather throwing up his 'suspension of judgment' (epoche) before himself like the black ink of a cuttlefish! I am not persuaded by this at all.
^6.7 οἱ δ' οὖν ἔνθεν ἀφορμηθέντες, ὅ τε Ἀρκεσίλαος καὶ Ζήνων, ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρωγῶν, ἀμφοτέροις συμπολεμούντων λόγων, τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς ὅθεν ἐκ Πολέμωνος ὡρμήθησαν ἐπιλανθάνονται, διαστάντες δέ γε καὶ σφέας αὐτοὺς ἀρτύναντες, "σὺν δ' ἔβαλον ῥινοὺς, σὺν δ' ἔγχεα, καὶ μένε' ἀνδρῶν χαλκεοθωρήκων· ἀτὰρ ἀσπίδες ὀμφαλόεσσαι ἔπληντ' ἀλλήλῃσι, πολὺς δ' ὀρυμαγδὸς ὀρώρει." "ἀσπὶς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ" ἐδνοπάλιζεν. "ἔνθα δ' ἅμ' οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων," τῶν Στωϊκῶν·	^6.7 At any rate, setting out from there, both Arcesilaus and Zeno—armed with such allies of arguments fighting on both sides—forgot the origin from which they had set out under Polemon. Standing apart and arraying themselves, 'they clashed their hide-shields, their spears, and the might of bronze-armored men; and the bossed shields met one another, and a great din arose!' 'Shield pressed against shield, helmet against helmet, and man tumbled man!' 'And there arose at once the groaning and the vaunting of men killing and being killed'—namely, of the Stoics!
^6.8 οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐβάλλοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀγνοούμενοι ᾗ ἦσαν ἁλῶναι δυνατώτεροι. ἡλίσκοντο δὲ, τῆς βάσεως αὐτοῖς σεισθείσης, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἕλοιεν μήτε μάχεσθαι ἀφορμήν. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀρχὴ ἦν τὸ μὴ Πλατωνικὰ λέγοντας αὐτοὺς ἐλέγξαι· τὸ δὲ μηδ' ἔχειν τινὰ ἀφορμὴν, ἣν εἷλον μόνον ἕν τι μετέστρεψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἀφελόντες.	^6.8 For the Academics were not hit by them, since it was unknown where they could be more easily captured. They could be captured, however, their foundation having been shaken, if they held no starting principle and no vantage point from which to fight. Now their starting principle was not to refute them by stating Platonic views; and as for having no vantage point, the only one they took was altering a single thing by stripping away part of the definition concerning the 'comprehensible impression' (kataleptike phantasia).
^6.9 ὅπερ νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μηνύειν μοι ἐν καιρῷ, μνησθήσομαι δ’ αὐτοῦ αὖθις ἐπὰν κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα γενέσθαι μέλλω. διαστάντες δ’ οὖν εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἔβαλλον ἀλλήλους οὐχ οἱ δύο, ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος τὸν Ζήνωνα. ὁ γὰρ Ζήνων εἶχε δή τι τῇ μάχῃ σεμνὸν καὶ βαρὺ καὶ Κηφισοδώρου τοῦ ῥήτορος οὐκ ἄμεινον· ὃς δὴ ὁ Κηφισόδωρος, ἐπειδὴ ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτέλους βαλλόμενον ἑαυτῷ τὸν διδάσκαλον Ἰσοκράτην ἐώρα, αὐτοῦ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους ἦν ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἄπειρος, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ καθορᾶν ἔνδοξα τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπάρχοντα, οἰηθεὶς κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπολέμει μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει, ἔβαλλε δὲ Πλάτωνα, καὶ κατηγόρει ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν, τελευτῶν εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ᾔδει, ἀλλὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἀμφ’ αὐτῶν ᾗ λέγεται ὑπονοῶν.	^6.9 It is not opportunistic for me to explain this now, but I shall mention it again when I am about to treat that specific topic. At any rate, standing apart in the open, they threw missiles at each other—or rather, not both of them, but Arcesilaus threw at Zeno. For Zeno carried himself in battle with a certain solemnity and weight no better than Cephisodorus the rhetorician. This Cephisodorus, seeing his master Isocrates being attacked by Aristotle, was ignorant and inexperienced regarding Aristotle himself; but seeing that Plato's works enjoyed great fame, he assumed that Aristotle philosophized according to Plato. So he waged war against Aristotle by attacking Plato, bringing accusations starting from the Ideas and ending with other matters which he himself did not even know, but merely suspected based on popular opinion as it was spoken!
^6.10 πλὴν οὗτος μὲν ὁ ᾧ ἐπολέμει μὴ μαχόμενος, ἐμάχετο ᾧ μὴ πολεμεῖν ἐβούλετο. ὁ μέντοι Ζήνων καὶ αὐτὸς, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου μεθίετο, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ Πλάτωνι ἐπολέμει, ἐφιλοσόφει δήπου ἐμοὶ κριτῇ πλείστου ἀξίως, ἕνεκά γε τῆς εἰρήνης ταύτης. εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἀγνοῶν μὲν ἴσως τὰ Ἀρκεσιλάου, τὰ μέντοι Πλάτωνος ἀγνοῶν, ὡς ἐξ ὧν αὐτῷ ἀντέγραψεν ἐλέγχεται, ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἐναντία καὐτὸς, μήτε ὃν ᾔδει πλήττων, ὅν τε οὐκ ἐχρῆν ἀτιμότατα καὶ αἴσχιστα περιυβρικὼς, καὶ ταῦτα πολὺ κάκιον ἢ προσήκει κυνί.	^6.10 Thus Cephisodorus did not fight the man he wared against, but fought the one he did not wish to war against. So too Zeno himself, when he let go of Arcesilaus—if he had refrained from warring against Plato as well—would have philosophized, in my judgment, most worthily, for the sake of that peace! But if, while perhaps not ignorant of Arcesilaus's views, he was ignorant of Plato's (as is proved from what he wrote in reply to him), he did the exact opposite himself: hitting neither the man he knew, while most dishonorably and shamefully abusing the one he ought not to have abused—and that far worse than becomes even a Cynic!
^6.11 πλὴν διέδειξέ γε μὴν μεγαλοφροσύνῃ ἀποσχόμενος τοῦ Ἀρκεσιλάου. ἤτοι γὰρ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν ἐκείνου, ἢ δέει τῶν Στωϊκῶν, "πολέμοιο μέγα στόμα πευκεδανοῖο" ἀπετρέψατο ἄλλῃ εἰς Πλάτωνα. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν Ζήνωνι εἰς Πλάτωνα καλῶς τε καὶ αἰδημόνως οὐδαμῶς νεωτερισθέντων εἰρήσεταί μοι αὖθίς ποτε, ἐὰν φιλοσοφίας σχολὴν ἀγάγω. μή ποτε μέντοι ἀγάγοιμι σχολὴν τοσαύτην, τούτου γοῦν ἕνεκεν, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ παιδιᾶς.	^6.11 Yet Zeno showed high-mindedness in refraining from Arcesilaus. For either out of ignorance of his arguments, or out of fear of the Stoics, he turned the 'great mouth of bitter war' elsewhere, against Plato. But as for Zeno's innovations against Plato—which were neither noble nor respectful—I shall speak at another time, if I ever find leisure for philosophy. May I never find so much leisure, however—at least for that purpose—unless in play!
^6.12 τὸν δ' οὖν Ζήνωνα ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντίτεχνον καὶ ἀξιόνικον ὑπάρχοντα θεωρῶν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνου ἀποφερομένους λόγους καθῄρει, καὶ οὐδὲν ὤκνει.	^6.12 Arcesilaus, seeing that Zeno was a rival artist and a worthy adversary, tore down the arguments brought forward by him, hesitating at nothing.
^6.13 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἃ ἐμεμάχητο ἐκείνῳ οὔτ' ἴσως εἰπεῖν ἔχω, εἴτε καὶ εἶχον, οὐδὲν ἔδει νῦν αὐτῶν μνησθῆναι· τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο αὐτοῦ πρώτου εὑρομένου, καὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα βλέπων εὐδοκιμοῦν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, πάσῃ μηχανῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐπ' αὐτήν. ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστέρῳ ὢν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, οὐ δυνάμενος ἀδικεῖσθαι, Ἀρκεσίλαος μὲν ἀφίετο, πολλὰ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελε, τάχα δὲ μᾶλλον ἄλλως, πρὸς δὲ τὸν οὐκέτι ἐν ζῶσιν ὄντα Πλάτωνα ἐσκιαμάχει, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ἁμάξης πομπείαν πᾶσαν κατεθορύβει, λέγων ὡς οὔτ' ἂν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀμυνομένου, ὑπερδικεῖν τε αὐτοῦ ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ μέλον· εἴτε μελήσειεν Ἀρκεσιλάῳ, αὐτός γε κερδανεῖν ᾤετο ἀποτρεψάμενος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον. τοῦτο δὲ ᾔδη καὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸν Συρακόσιον ποιήσαντα τὸ σόφισμα ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους.	^6.13 As for the other matters on which he fought him, I can neither say, nor if I could, would there be any need to mention them now. But regarding this doctrine which Zeno was the first to invent—seeing that both the concept and the name of 'comprehensible impression' were held in high repute at Athens—Arcesilaus used every device against it. Zeno, being on the weaker side, keeping quiet because he could not bear being wronged, let Arcesilaus alone—though he had much he could say, he was unwilling (or perhaps rather unable). Instead, he shadow-boxed against the long-dead Plato, raising a clamor with all manner of street-level abuse (ap' amaxes pompeia), saying that Plato could not defend himself, nor did anyone else care to plead his cause. If Arcesilaus did care, Zeno thought he would profit by diverting Arcesilaus away from himself—a trick he knew Agathocles of Syracuse had used against the Carthaginians!
^6.14 οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ὑπήκουον ἐκπεπληγμένοι. ἡ μοῦσα γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τότε ἦν φιλολόγος οὐδ' ἐργάτις χαρίτων, ὑφ' ὧν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος τὰ μὲν περικρούων, τὰ δὲ ὑποτέμνων, ἄλλα δ' ὑποσκελίζων, κατεγλωττίζετο αὐτοὺς καὶ πιθανὸς ἦν. τοιγαροῦν πρὸς οὓς μὲν ἀντέλεγεν ἡττωμένων, ἐν οἷς δὲ λέγων ἦν καταπεπληγμένων, δεδειγμένον πως τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις ὑπῆρχε μηδὲν εἶναι μήτ' οὖν ἔπος, μήτε πάθος, μήτε ἔργον ἓν βραχὺ, μηδὲ ἄχρηστον τοὐναντίον ὀφθῆναί ποτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ δοκεῖ τῷ Πιταναίῳ· τῷ δ’ ἄρα οὐδὲν ἐδόκει οὐδ’ ἀπεφαίνετο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ῥηματίσκια ταῦτ’ εἶναι καὶ φόβους.»	^6.14 The Stoics listened in utter shock. For their Muse was even then neither literary nor a worker of graces—those graces by which Arcesilaus, striking at some points, cutting away others, and tripping them up at every turn, out-talked them and won persuasion! Therefore, those he argued against were defeated, and those he spoke among were stunned; so that it became somehow demonstrated to the people of that time that no word, no feeling, no action—not a single brief thing, nor its useless opposite—could ever be seen as valid, unless it seemed so to Arcesilaus of Pitane! Yet to him, it turned out, nothing seemed valid, nor did he declare anything to be more than mere phrases and bugbears."

Chapter 7

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Numenius recounts a humorous, satirical anecdote about the Academic philosopher Lacydes (successor of Arcesilaus). Miserly and paranoid about his household pantry, Lacydes developed an overly complex locking mechanism: after sealing his storeroom, he dropped his signet ring inside through the keyhole so no one could forge his seal. Finding his pantry looted anyway (because his clever slaves unlocked it, ate the food, resealed it, and dropped the ring back inside), Lacydes concluded that Academic "inapprehensibility" (akatalepsia) was at work. When a friend laughed at his delusion and exposed the physical absurdity of his scheme, Lacydes abandoned the trick—only for his slaves to start using Stoic and Academic jargon against him to justify their continued stealing. Exhausted by their philosophical counter-arguments, Lacydes gave up his theoretical skepticism in practical matters, famously admitting: "We talk one way in the lecture halls, boys, but we live another!" The chapter concludes with a brief historical transition through Evander to Carneades, who founded the Third Academy and introduced the doctrine of probabilism (distinguishing between the "inapprehensible" and the "unclear").

^7.1 «Περὶ δὲ Λακύδου βούλομαί τι διηγήσασθαι ἡδύ. ἦν μὲν δὴ Λακύδης ὑπογλισχρότερος, καί τινα τρόπον ὁ λεγόμενος οἰκονομικὸς, οὗτος ὁ εὐδοκιμῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνοιγνὺς τὸ ταμεῖον, αὐτὸς δ' ἀποκλείων. καὶ προῃρεῖτο δὲ ὧν ἐδεῖτο, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐποίει πάντα δι’ αὐτουργίας, οὔ τί που αὐτάρκειαν ἐπαινῶν, οὐδ’ ἄλλως πενίᾳ χρώμενος, οὐδ’ ἀπορίᾳ δούλων, ᾧ γε ὑπῆρχον δοῦλοι ὁπόσοι γοῦν· τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν ἔξεστιν εἰκάζειν.	^7.1 "Now concerning Lacydes, I wish to relate a delightful story. Lacydes was rather stingy, and in a certain way what people call a 'thrifty manager'—the sort highly esteemed by the multitude—opening his storeroom with his own hands and locking it up himself. He picked out what he needed and did all other such tasks through personal labor—not at all because he praised self-sufficiency, nor because he lived in poverty or suffered from a lack of slaves, for he had as many slaves as anyone could want; but one may guess the real reason!
^7.2 ἐγὼ δὲ ὃ ὑπεσχόμην τὸ ἡδὺ διηγήσομαι. ταμιεύων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τὴν μὲν κλεῖδα περιφέρειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ᾤετο δεῖν, ἀποκλείσας δὲ κατετίθει μὲν ταύτην εἰς τι κοῖλον γραμματεῖον· σημηνάμενος δὲ δακτυλίῳ τὸν μὲν δακτύλιον κατεκύλιε διὰ τοῦ κλείθρου ἔσω εἰς τὸν οἶκον μεθιεὶς, ὥσθ’ ὕστερον ἐπειδὴ πάλιν ἐλθὼν ἀνοίξειε τῇ κλειδὶ δυνησόμενος ἀνελὼν τὸν δακτύλιον, αὖθις μὲν ἀποκλείειν, εἶτα δὲ σημαίνεσθαι, εἶτα δ’ ἀναβάλλειν ὀπίσω πάλιν ἔσω τὸν δακτύλιον διὰ τοῦ κλείθρου.	^7.2 I shall relate the delightful story I promised. Acting as his own steward, he did not think it necessary to carry the key around on his person. Instead, after locking up, he would deposit the key inside a hollow writing-desk. Then, having sealed the desk with his signet ring, he would roll the ring through the keyhole and drop it inside into the storeroom! In this way, later on, when he returned to open it with the key, he would be able to pick up the ring, lock it again, seal it, and then toss the ring back inside through the keyhole once more.
^7.3 τοῦτο οὖν τὸ σοφὸν οἱ δοῦλοι κατανοήσαντες, ἐπειδὴ προΐοι Λακύδης εἰς περίπατον ἢ ὅποι ἄλλοσε, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνοίξαντες ἂν, κἄπειτα ὡς σφίσιν ἦν θυμὸς, τὸ μὲν φαγόντες, τὰ δ’ ἐμπιόντες, ἄλλα δὲ ἀράμενοι ἐκ περιόδου ταῦτα ἐποίουν, ἀπέκλειον μὲν, ἐσημαίνοντο δὲ, καὶ τὸν δακτύλιον πολλά γε αὐτοῦ καταγελάσαντες εἰς τὸν οἶκον διὰ τοῦ κλείθρου ἠφίεσαν.	^7.3 The slaves, having figured out this clever trick, whenever Lacydes went out for a walk or anywhere else, would open the door themselves; and then, as their appetite moved them, eating some things, drinking down others, and carrying off still other items in succession, they would go about this business! They would lock the door, seal it, and—laughing hearty laughs at him—drop the ring back into the storeroom through the keyhole.
^7.4 ὁ οὖν Λακύδης πλήρη μὲν καταλιπὼν, κενὰ δὲ εὑρισκόμενος τὰ σκεύη, ἀπορῶν τῷ γιγνομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσε φιλοσοφεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν, ᾤετο τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο αὑτῷ συμβαίνειν περὶ τὸ ταμιεῖον. ἀρξάμενός τε ἔνθεν ἐφιλοσόφει παρὰ τῷ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ, μηδὲν μήτε ὁρᾶν μήτε ἀκούειν ἐναργὲς ἢ ὑγιές· καί ποτε ἐπισπασάμενος τῶν προσομιλούντων αὐτῷ τινα εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἰσχυρίζετο πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερφυῶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, τὴν ἐποχὴν, καὶ ἔφη· "τοῦτο μὲν ἀναμφίλεκτον ἐγώ σοι ἔχω φράσαι, αὐτὸς ἀπ’ ἐμαυτοῦ μαθὼν, οὐκ ἄλλου πειραθείς."	^7.4 So Lacydes, leaving his vessels full but finding them empty, was completely baffled by what was happening. Having heard that 'inapprehensibility' (akatalepsia) was being taught as philosophy under Arcesilaus, he believed that this very phenomenon was happening to him regarding his storeroom! Starting from this event, he began studying philosophy under Arcesilaus, maintaining that nothing seen or heard is clear or sound. Once, having pulled one of his acquaintances into his house, he vehemently maintained the doctrine of suspension of judgment (epoche) to him, as it seemed, saying: 'This much I can tell you without dispute, having learned it from my own experience and not from testing someone else!'
^7.5 κἄπειτα ἀρξάμενος περιηγεῖτο τὴν ὅλην τοῦ ταμιείου συμβᾶσαν αὐτῷ πάθην. "τί οὖν ἂν," εἶπεν, "ἔτι Ζήνων λέγοι πρὸς οὕτως ὁμολογουμένην διὰ πάντων φανεράν μοι ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε ἀκαταληψίαν; ὃς γὰρ ἀπέκλεισα μὲν ταῖς ἐμαυτοῦ χερσὶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐσημηνάμην, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφῆκα μὲν εἴσω τὸν δακτύλιον, αὖθις δ’ ἐλθὼν ἀνοίξας τὸν μὲν δακτύλιον ὁρῶ ἔνδον, οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, πῶς οὐ δικαίως ἀπιστούντως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἕξω; οὐ γὰρ τολμήσω εἰπεῖν ἔγωγε ἐλθόντα τινὰ κλέψαι ταῦτα, ὑπάρχοντος ἔνδον τοῦ δακτυλίου."	^7.5 And then, beginning his tale, he recounted the entire misfortune that had befallen his storeroom. 'What, then,' said he, 'could Zeno still say against an inapprehensibility so universally agreed upon and made plain to me in such matters? For I locked it with my own hands, sealed it myself, and dropped the ring inside myself; yet coming back and opening it, I see the ring inside, but not the other contents! How shall I not rightly hold an attitude of distrust toward reality? For I will certainly not dare to say that someone came in and stole these things, when the ring is right inside!'
^7.6 καὶ ὃς ἀκούων—ἦν γὰρ ὑβριστὴς—ἐκδεξάμενος τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἔσχεν ἀκοῦσαι, μόλις καὶ πρότερον ἑαυτοῦ κρατῶν, ἀπέρρηξε γέλωτα καὶ μάλα πλατὺν, γελῶν τε ἔτι καὶ καγχάζων διήλεγχεν ἅμα αὐτοῦ τὴν κενοδοξίαν. ὥστε ἔκτοτε Λακύδης ἀρξάμενος οὐκέτι μὲν τὸν δακτύλιον ἔσω ἐνέβαλλεν, οὐκέτι δὲ τοῦ ταμιείου ἐχρῆτο ἀκαταληψίᾳ, ἀλλὰ κατελάμβανε τὰ ἀφειμένα, καὶ μάτην ἐπεφιλοσοφήκει.	^7.6 His listener—who was an insolent fellow—taking in the whole story as he heard it, could hardly control himself; he burst into loud, roaring laughter, and while still laughing and cackling, thoroughly exposed Lacydes’ vain foolishness! Consequently, from that time onward, Lacydes stopped throwing the ring inside, and no longer applied 'inapprehensibility' to his storeroom, but actually comprehended what was left behind—having studied philosophy in vain!
^7.7 οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ οἵ γε παῖδες φόρτακες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐ θατέρᾳ ληπτοὶ, οἷοι δὲ οὗτοι οἱ κωμῳδικοί τε καὶ Γέται καὶ Δάκοι, κἀκ τῆς Δακικῆς λαλεῖν στωμυλήθρας κατεγλωττισμένοι, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς τὰ σοφίσματα ἤκουσαν, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλως ἐκμαθόντες, εὐθὺ τοῦ τολμήματος ᾔεσαν, καὶ παρελύοντο αὐτοῦ τὴν σφραγῖδα, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἑτέραν ἀντ’ ἐκείνης ὑπετίθεσαν, τοτὲ δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλην, διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἐκείνῳ γε ἀκατάληπτα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω καὶ ἄλλως.	^7.7 Nevertheless, his servants were knaves, not easily caught in any other way—just like the comic slaves, the Getai and Dakoi, out-talking everyone with their chatter of Dacian chatter. When they heard the Stoic sophisms, or perhaps having learned them in some other way, they went straight to their audacious work: they would tamper with his seal, sometimes placing a different seal in its place, and sometimes no seal at all, thinking that to him it would all be inapprehensible anyway, whether done this way or that!
^7.8 ὁ δὲ εἰσελθὼν ἐσκοπεῖτο· ἀσήμαντον δὲ τὸ γραμματεῖον θεωρῶν, ἢ σεσημασμένον μὲν, σφραγῖδι δ’ ἄλλῃ, ἠγανάκτει· τῶν δὲ σεσημάνθαι λεγόντων, αὐτοῖς γοῦν τὴν σφραγῖδα ὁρᾶσθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ, ἠκριβολογεῖτο ἂν καὶ ἀπεδείκνυε· τῶν δ’ ἡττωμένων τῇ ἀποδείξει καὶ φαμένων εἰ μή τι ἔπεστιν ἡ σφραγὶς αὐτὸν ἴσως ἐπιλελῆσθαι καὶ μὴ σημήνασθαι· καὶ μὴν αὐτός γε ἔφη σημηνάμενος μνημονεύειν, καὶ ἀπεδείκνυε, καὶ περιῄει τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ἐδεινολογεῖτο πρὸς αὐτοὺς, οἰόμενος παίζεσθαι, καὶ προσώμνυεν.	^7.8 Lacydes would go in and look: seeing the writing-desk unsealed, or sealed with a different ring, he would become indignant. But when the slaves claimed it was sealed—that they, at least, could see his own seal—he would examine it closely and point out the difference. When they were defeated by his proof, they would say that if his seal was not on it, he had probably forgotten and failed to seal it. Yet he declared that he remembered sealing it, showed them the proof, argued in circles, and expressed indignation at them, believing he was being played with, swearing oaths to it.
^7.9 οἱ δ’ ὑπολαβόντες τὰς προσβολὰς ἐκείνου αὐτοί γε ᾤοντο ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παίζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ σοφῷ γε ὄντι δεδόχθαι τῷ Λακύδῃ εἶναι ἀδοξάστῳ ὥστε καὶ ἀμνημονεύτῳ· μνήμην γὰρ εἶναι δόξαν· ἔναγχος γοῦν του χρόνου ἔφασαν ἀκοῦσαι ταῦτα αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους.	^7.9 The slaves, taking up his arguments, thought they were being played with by him; for since Lacydes was a wise man, he must surely hold the opinion that one should refrain from holding opinions (adoxastos), and therefore be without memory too—for memory is merely an opinion! At any rate, they said they had heard him say these very things to his friends quite recently.
^7.10 τοῦ δ’ ἀναστρέφοντος αὐτοῖς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις καὶ λέγοντος οὐκ Ἀκαδημαϊκὰ, αὐτοὶ φοιτῶντες εἰς Στωϊκῶν τινος τὰ λεκτέα ἑαυτοῖς ἀνεμάνθανον, κἀκεῖθεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀντεσοφίστευον, καὶ ἦσαν ἀντίτεχνον κλέπται Ἀκαδημαϊκοί· ὁ δὲ Στωϊκοῖς ἐνεκάλει· οἱ παῖδες δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα παρέλυον αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἀκαταληψίας οὐκ ἄνευ τωθασμῶν τινων.	^7.10 When he reversed their arguments against them and spoke not like an Academic, the slaves themselves went to the school of a Stoic to learn what they ought to say. Starting from there, they counter-sophisticated him, becoming rival Academic thieves! Lacydes brought Stoic charges against them, but the servants dissolved his accusations under the guise of 'inapprehensibility,' not without a few taunts.
^7.11 διατριβαὶ οὖν ἦσαν πάντων ἐκεῖ καὶ λόγοι καὶ ἀντιλογίαι· καὶ ἓν οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ κατελείπετο, οὐκ ἀγγεῖον, οὐ τῶν ἐν ἀγγείῳ τιθεμένων, οὐχ ὅσα εἰς οἰκίας κατασκευὴν ἄλλ’ ἐστὶ συντελῆ.	^7.11 Thus there were daily debates and arguments and counter-arguments among them all; and not a single thing in the house was left in peace—no jar, no contents of any jar, nor anything else that contributes to household provision!
^7.12 καὶ ὁ Λακύδης τέως μὲν ἠπόρει, μήτε λυσιτελοῦσαν ἑαυτῷ θεωρῶν τὴν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δόγμασι βοήθειαν, εἴτε μὴ ἐξελέγχοι πάντα ἀνατρέψεσθαι ἑαυτῷ δοκῶν, πεσὼν εἰς τὸ ἀμήχανον τοὺς γείτονας ἐκεκράγει καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ ἰοὺ ἰού, καὶ φεῦ φεῦ, καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ νὴ τὰς θεὰς, ἄλλαι τε ὅσαι ἐν ἀπιστίαις δεινολογουμένων εἰσὶν ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, ταῦτα πάντα ἐλέγετο βοῇ καὶ ἀξιοπιστίᾳ.	^7.12 And Lacydes for a time was at a loss, seeing that the defense of his own doctrines was of no benefit to him; and thinking that unless he refuted everything he would overturn his own principles, falling into utter helplessness, he cried out to his neighbors and the gods, with 'Oh! Oh!' and 'Alas! Alas!' and 'By the gods and goddesses!'—and all the other unscientific proofs used by those expressing indignation at bad faith, all uttered with loud shouts and claims to credibility.
^7.13 τελευτῶν δὲ, ἐπεὶ μάχην εἶχεν ἀντιλεγομένην ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας, αὐτὸς μὲν ἂν δήπουθεν ἐστωικεύετο πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας, τῶν παίδων δὲ τὰ Ἀκαδημαϊκὰ ἰσχυριζομένων, ἵνα μηκέτι πράγματα ἔχοιεν, οἰκουρὸς ἦν φίλος τοῦ ταμιείου προκαθήμενος. οὐδὲν δὲ εἰς οὐδὲν ὠφελῶν, ὑπιδόμενος οἷ τὸ σοφὸν αὐτῷ ἔρχεται, ἀπεκαλύψατο. "ἄλλως," ἔφη, "ταῦτα, ὦ παῖδες, ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς λέγεται ἡμῖν, ἄλλως δὲ ζῶμεν."	^7.13 Finally, since he had an endless war of words going on in his house, he himself would act like a Stoic toward his servants; but when the servants asserted Academic doctrines so that they would no longer have trouble, he became a homebody, sitting down as a guardian in front of his storeroom! Accomplishing nothing at all, and sensing where his wisdom was taking him, he threw off his disguise. 'Boys,' he said, 'we talk one way in our lecture halls, but we live another!'
^7.14 Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ περὶ τοῦ Λακύδου. τούτου δὲ γίνονται ἀκουσταὶ πολλοὶ, ὧν εἷς ἦν διαφανὴς ὁ Κυρηναῖος Ἀρίστιππος. ἐκ πάντων δ’ αὐτοῦ τῶν γνωρίμων τὴν σχολὴν αὐτοῦ διεδέξατο Εὔανδρος καὶ οἱ μετὰ τοῦτον.	^7.14 So much for Lacydes. He had many hearers, one of whom was the prominent Aristippus of Cyrene. Out of all his acquaintances, Evander succeeded to his school, along with those after him.
^7.15 μεθ' οὓς Καρνεάδης ὑποδεξάμενος τὴν διατριβὴν τρίτην συνεστήσατο Ἀκαδημίαν. λόγων μὲν οὖν ἀγωγῇ ἐχρήσατο ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπετήδευε τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχείρησιν, καὶ πάντα ἀνεσκεύαζε τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα· μόνῳ δ' ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγῳ πρὸς αὐτὸν διέστη, φὰς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ὄντα περὶ ἁπάντων ἐπέχειν· διαφορὰν δ' εἶναι ἀδήλου καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου, καὶ πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. μετεῖχε δὲ οὗτος καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν λόγων, πρὸς οὓς καὶ ἐριστικῶς ἱστάμενος ἐπὶ πλέον ηὐξήθη, τοῦ φαινομένου τοῖς πολλοῖς πιθανοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἀληθείας στοχαζόμενος· ὅθεν καὶ πολλὴν παρέσχε τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀηδίαν. γράφει δ' οὖν καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα·»	^7.15 After these, Carneades took over the school and established the Third Academy. He used a line of argument similar to that of Arcesilaus; for he too practiced arguing on both sides of a question, and tore down everything said by others. He differed from Arcesilaus only in his account of 'suspension of judgment' (epoche), saying that it is impossible for a human being to suspend judgment on all things, and that there is a difference between what is 'unclear' (adelon) and what is 'inapprehensible' (akatalepton): all things are inapprehensible, but not all things are unclear. He also drew upon Stoic arguments, against which he stood in eristic opposition and grew even greater, aiming at what was plausible (pithanon) to the majority rather than at the truth—whence he caused great unpleasantness to the Stoics. Numenius writes the following about him as well:"

Chapter 8

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Numenius describes the intellectual rise, philosophical methods, and overwhelming dominance of Carneades, founder of the Third (or New) Academy. Ignoring his immediate predecessor Hegesinus, Carneades revived the core skeptical battle against Stoicism initiated by Arcesilaus. Unlike Arcesilaus—who Numenius claims genuinely fell victim to his own radical skepticism—Carneades was a cunning dialectician who strategically introduced the doctrine of the "plausible" (pithanon) to preserve practical action without conceding dogmatic truth. He so completely outmatched his contemporary Stoic opponent, Antipater of Tarsus, that Antipater retreated from public debate entirely, offering only written replies from a corner. Numenius concludes by revealing Carneades’ internal pragmatism: when catching his disciple Mentor in bed with his concubine, Carneades relied directly on the certainty of his eyes rather than skeptical "inapprehensibility." Numenius compares Carneades' technique to a merchant hiding real truth beneath layers of plausible falsehoods, like good seeds submerged beneath empty ones floating on water.

^8.1 «Καρνεάδης δὲ ἐκδεξάμενος παρ’ Ἡγησίνου, οὗ χρεὼν φυλάξαι ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ ὅσα κεκινημένα ἦν, τούτου μὲν ἠμέλει, εἰς δ’ Ἀρκεσίλαον, εἴτ’ οὖν ἀμείνω εἴτε καὶ φαυλότερα ἦν, ἐπανενεγκὼν διὰ μακροῦ τὴν μάχην ἀνενέαζε.»	^8.1 "Carneades, taking over from Hegesinus—who ought to have preserved what was unmovable and what was moved—neglected him entirely, and reviving after a long interval the fight with Arcesilaus (whether for better or for worse), he renewed the battle."
^8.2 Καὶ ἐξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Ἦγε δ’ οὖν καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἀπέφερεν, ἀντιλογίας τε καὶ στροφὰς λεπτολόγους συνέφερε τῇ μάχῃ ποικίλλων, ἐξαρνητικός τε καὶ καταφατικός τε ἦν κἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀντιλογικός· εἴτε που ἔδει τι καὶ θαῦμα ἐχόντων λόγων, ἐξηγείρετο λάβρος οἷον ποταμὸς ῥοώδης, πάντα καταπιμπλὰς τὰ τῇδε καὶ τἀκεῖθι, καὶ εἰσέπιπτε καὶ συνέσυρε τοὺς ἀκούοντας διὰ θορύβου.	^8.2 And next he adds: "So he too drove and carried off everything; bringing together subtle arguments and twists, he varied his tactics in battle, being both negative and affirmative, and arguing on both sides. Whenever there was need for arguments containing something extraordinary, he would rise up impetuous like a rushing river, filling everything here and there, rushing in and sweeping away his listeners in a tumult!
^8.3 τοιγαροῦν ἀπάγων τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸς ἔμενεν ἀνεξαπάτητος, ὃ μὴ προσῆν τῷ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περιερχόμενος τῇ φαρμάξει τοὺς συγκορυβαντιῶντας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν πρῶτον ἐξηπατηκὼς μὴ ᾐσθῆσθαι, πεπεῖσθαι δ’ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἃ λέγει διὰ τῆς ἁπαξαπάντων ἀναιρέσεως χρημάτων.	^8.3 Therefore, while leading others astray, he himself remained undeceivable—a quality Arcesilaus did not possess. For Arcesilaus, going about bewildering those who were sharing his Corybantic madness, failed to notice that he had first deceived himself into not realizing it, and into believing that what he said was true through the total abolition of all things.
^8.4 κακὸν δὲ ἦν ἂν κακῷ ἐπανακείμενον, ὁ Καρνεάδης τῷ Ἀρκεσιλάῳ, μὴ χαλάσας τι σμικρὸν, ὑφ’ οὗ οὐκ ἄπρακτοι ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ πιθανοῦ λεγομένας αὐτῷ θετικάς τε καὶ ἀρνητικὰς φαντασίας, τοῦ εἶναι τόδε τι ζῷον ἢ μὴ ζῷον εἶναι.	^8.4 Carneades would have been an evil laid upon an evil atop Arcesilaus, had he not yielded a tiny bit—by which men were not destined to remain inactive—according to what he called the affirmative and negative impressions based on the plausible (pithanon), such as whether this particular thing is an animal or not an animal.
^8.5 τοῦτο οὖν ὑπανεὶς, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀναχάζοντες θῆρες βιαιότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἑαυτοὺς ἱεῖσιν εἰς τὰς αἰχμὰς, καὐτὸς ἐνδοὺς δυνατώτερον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεί τε ὑποσταίη τε καὶ εὖ τύχοι, τηνικαῦτα ἤδη καὶ οὗ προὐδέδεκτο ἑκὼν ἠμέλει καὶ οὐκ ἐμέμνητο.	^8.5 By conceding this point, then—just as wild beasts that give ground throw themselves all the more violently onto the spear-points—so he too, by yielding, was able to attack more powerfully. Whenever he stood his ground and scored a hit, he then willingly ignored and forgot what he had previously conceded!
^8.6 τὸ γὰρ ἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐνεῖναι συγχωρῶν, ὥσπερ ξυνεργαζόμενος τῆς ζητήσεως τρόπῳ, παλαιστοῦ δεινοῦ λαβὴν δοὺς περιεγίγνετο ἔνθεν. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ πιθανοῦ ῥοπὴν ἑκάτερον παρασχὼν οὐδέτερον εἶπε βεβαίως καταλαμβάνεσθαι. ἦν γοῦν λῃστὴς καὶ γόης σοφώτερος.	^8.6 For by conceding that truth and falsehood exist in things, acting as if he were cooperating in the mode of inquiry, he gave the hold of a skilled wrestler and overcame his opponent from that very vantage point! For weighing each side according to the balance of the plausible, he declared that neither could be comprehended with certainty. He was, in truth, a robber and a wizard more clever than any other!
^8.7 παραλαβὼν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ μὲν ὅμοιον ψεῦδος, καταληπτικῇ δὲ φαντασίᾳ καταληπτὸν ὅμοιον, καὶ ἀγαγὼν εἰς τὰς ἴσας, οὐκ εἴασεν οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδος, ἢ οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ πιθανοῦ.	^8.7 For taking a falsehood that resembled truth, and an impression resembling a comprehensible impression (kataleptike phantasia), and bringing them to equal status, he permitted neither truth nor falsehood to exist—or at least, no more one than the other, except by degree of plausibility.
^8.8 ἦν οὖν ὀνείρατα ἀντὶ ὀνειράτων, διὰ τὸ ὁμοίας φαντασίας ἀληθέσιν εἶναι τὰς ψευδεῖς, ὡς ἀπὸ ὠοῦ κηρίνου πρὸς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὠόν.	^8.8 It was, therefore, dreams against dreams; because false impressions were so like true ones, as a wax egg is to a real egg!
^8.9 συνέβαινεν οὖν τὰ κακὰ καὶ πλείω. καὶ μέντοι λέγων ὁ Καρνεάδης ἐψυχαγώγει καὶ ἠνδραποδίξετο. ἦν δὲ κλέπτων μὲν ἀφανὴς, φαινόμενος δὲ λῃστὴς, αἱρῶν καὶ δόλῳ καὶ βίᾳ τοὺς καὶ πάνυ σφόδρα παρεσκευασμένους.	^8.9 Thus evils resulted, and in greater measure. Indeed, when Carneades spoke, he beguiled and enslaved his audience. He was a thief who remained hidden, but a robber in full view, capturing even those who were exceedingly well prepared, both by trickery and by force.
^8.10 πᾶσα γοῦν Καρνεάδου διάνοια ἐνίκα καὶ οὐδεμία ἡτισοῦν ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς προσεπολέμει ἦσαν εἰπεῖν ἀδυνατώτεροι.	^8.10 At any rate, every thought of Carneades conquered, and no other thought whatsoever succeeded, since those he warred against were powerless to speak.
^8.11 Ἀντίπατρος γοῦν ὁ κατ’ αὐτὸν γενόμενος ἔμελλε μὲν ἀγωνιᾶν τι γράφειν, πρὸς δ’ οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ Καρνεάδου καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀποφερομένους λόγους οὔποτε ἐδημοσίευσεν, οὐκ ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς περιπάτοις, οὐδὲ εἶπεν, οὐδὲ ἐφθέγξατο, οὐδ’ ἤκουσέ τις αὐτοῦ, φασὶν, οὐδὲ γρῦ· ἀντιγραφὰς δὲ ἐπανετείνετο καὶ γωνίαν λαβὼν βιβλία κατέλιπε γράψας τοῖς ὕστερον, οὔτε νῦν δυνάμενα, καὶ τότε ἦν ἀδυνατώτερα πρὸς οὕτως ἄνδρα ὑπέρμεγαν φανέντα καὶ καταδόξαντα εἶναι τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις τὸν Καρνεάδην.	^8.11 Antipater, for instance, who lived in his time, was anxious to write something; but against the arguments carried off daily from Carneades, he never spoke out in public—not in the lectures, not in the walks, nor did he say a word, nor utter a sound, nor did anyone hear so much as a grunt from him, as they say! Instead, he kept threatening written replies, and taking to a corner, he left behind books written for posterity—books which are powerless now, and were even more powerless then against a man who appeared so immensely great to the people of that time as Carneades did.
^8.12 ὅμως δὲ, καίτοι καὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῆς Στωϊκῆς φιλονεικίας εἰς τὸ φανερὸν κυκῶν, πρός γε τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἑταίρους δι’ ἀπορρήτων ὡμολόγει τε καὶ ἠλήθευε καὶ ἀπεφαίνετο ἃ κἂν ἄλλος τῶν ἀπιτυχόντων.»	^8.12 Nevertheless, although Carneades himself threw things into confusion in public out of Stoic love of contention, to his own companions in private he confessed, spoke the truth, and declared what any other ordinary person would say."
^8.13 Εἶτα ἑξῆς φησι· «Καρνεάδου δὲ γίνεται γνώριμος Μέντωρ μὲν πρῶτον, οὐ μὴν διάδοχος· ἀλλ’ ἔτι ζῶν Καρνεάδης ἐπὶ παλλακῇ μοιχὸν εὑρὼν, οὐχ ὑπὸ πιθανῆς φαντασίας, οὐδ’ ὡς μὴ κατειληφὼς, ὡς δὲ μάλιστα πιστεύων τῇ ὄψει καὶ καταλαβὼν παρῃτήσατο τῆς διατριβῆς. ὁ δὲ ἀποστὰς ἀντεσοφίστευε καὶ ἀντίτεχνος ἦν, ἐλέγχων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀκαταληψίαν.»	^8.13 Then next he says: "Mentor was first a disciple of Carneades, but by no means his successor. While Carneades was still alive, he caught Mentor in adultery with his concubine—not by a 'plausible impression,' nor as if he had not 'comprehended' it, but trusting his own sight to the utmost and grasping the fact, he dismissed him from the school! Mentor, leaving the school, counter-sophisticated against him as a rival artist, exposing the 'inapprehensibility' in Carneades' arguments."
^8.14 Καὶ πάλιν ἐπιφέρει λέγων· «Ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης, οἷον ἀντεστραμμένα φιλοσοφῶν, τοῖς ψεύσμασιν ἐκαλλωπίζετο καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀληθῆ ἠφάνιζε. παραπετάσμασιν οὖν ἐχρῆτο τοῖς ψεύσμασι, καὶ ἠλήθευεν ἔνδον λανθάνων καπηλικώτερον. ἔπασχεν οὖν πάθημα ὀσπρίων, ὧν τὰ μὲν κενὰ ἐπιπολάζει τε τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ὑπερέχει, τὰ χρηστὰ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστι κάτω καὶ ἐν ἀφανεῖ.»	^8.14 And again he adds, saying: "Carneades, philosophizing in an inverted manner, as it were, preened himself on his falsehoods and under them concealed the truth. He used falsehoods as curtains, and kept the truth hidden inside in a rather huckster-like manner. He suffered the fate of legumes, of which the empty ones float to the surface of the water and stick out, while the good ones stay down at the bottom and out of sight."
^8.15 Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ Καρνεάδου λέγεται. διάδοχος δ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς διατριβῆς καθίσταται Κλειτόμαχος, μεθ’ ὃν Φίλων, οὗ πέρι ὁ Νουμήνιος μνημονεύει ταῦτα·	^8.15 These things too are said concerning Carneades. Clitomachus became the successor to his school, and after him Philo, concerning whom Numenius mentions the following:

Chapter 9

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Numenius concludes his critique of the Academic succession by recounting Philo of Larissa's shift away from rigid skeptical suspension of judgment (epoche) as experience brought him face-to-face with vivid reality (enargeia), followed by Antiochus of Ascalon breaking away to form his own "Fifth Academy" by blending Stoic doctrine with Academic roots.

Transitioning out of Numenius's narrative, Eusebius steps in to frame his overarching theological critique: if ancient pagan theology and mysteries had truly provided settled, divine, and unassailable truth, the Greek natural philosophers would never have felt compelled to wander the world, quarrel among themselves, borrow from barbarians, or invent conflicting doctrines. The unending dissension among philosophers proves that pagan theology lacked genuine divine revelation and rested merely on uncertain human conjecture.

^9.1 «Ὁ δὲ Φίλων ἄρα οὗτος μὲν ἐκδεξάμενος τὴν διατριβὴν ὑπὸ χαρμονῆς ἐξεπέπληκτο, καὶ χάριν ἀποδιδοὺς ἐθεράπευε, καὶ τὰ δεδογμένα τῷ Κλειτομάχῳ ηὖξε, καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐκορύσσετο νώροπι χαλκῷ.	^9.1 "This Philo, then, having succeeded to the school, was beside himself with joy, and out of gratitude paid court to his predecessors, enlarged upon the dogmas of Clitomachus, and armed himself against the Stoics in gleaming bronze!
^9.2 ὡς δὲ προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξιτήλου δ’ ὑπὸ συνηθείας οὔσης αὐτῶν τῆς ἐποχῆς, οὐδὲν μὲν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ ἐνόει, ἡ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων αὐτὸν ἀνέστρεφεν ἐνάργειά τε καὶ ὁμολογία. πολλὴν δῆτ’ ἔχων ἤδη τὴν διαίσθησιν ὑπερεπεθύμει, εὖ οἶσθ’ ὅτι, τῶν ἐλεγξόντων τυχεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐδόκει μετὰ νῶτα βαλὼν αὐτὸς ἑκὼν φεύγειν.	^9.2 However, as time went on and their doctrine of suspension of judgment (epoche) faded through habit, his thoughts no longer remained consistent with themselves; rather, the self-evidence (enargeia) of experiences and common agreement turned him around. Having gained considerable insight, he became exceedingly eager—you may be sure—to find critics who would refute him, so that he might not seem to have turned his back and fled of his own free will.
^9.3 Φίλωνος δὲ γίνεται ἀκουστὴς Ἀντίοχος, ἑτέρας ἄρξας Ἀκαδημίας. Μνησάρχῳ γοῦν τῷ Στωϊκῷ σχολάσας ἐναντία Φίλωνι τῷ καθηγητῇ ἐφρόνησε, μυρία τε ξένα προσῆψε τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ.»	^9.3 Antiochus became a student of Philo, but founded another Academy. At any rate, after studying under Mnesarchus the Stoic, he held views contrary to his teacher Philo, and attached countless foreign innovations to the Academy."
^9.4 Ταῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια τούτοις μυρία τῆς Πλάτωνος περὶ διαδοχῆς μνημονεύεται. ὥρα δ’ οὖν ἄνωθεν τὸν λόγον ἀναλαβόντας τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων τὰς ψευδοδοξίας ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀντιδοξίας ἐπισκέψασθαι, οἱ τὴν πολλὴν γῆν πλανηθέντες, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εὕρεσιν περὶ πλείστου πεποιημένοι, ταῖς τε τῶν παλαιῶν ἁπάντων δόξαις καθωμιληκότες, καὶ τἀκριβὲς τῆς παρὰ πᾶσι Φοίνιξί τε καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις αὐτοῖς τε Ἕλλησι πολὺ πρότερον θεολογίας ἐξηκριβωκότες, τίνα τῶν πόνων τὸν καρπὸν εὕροντο παρ’ αὐτῶν ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς ἂν μάθοιμεν εἴ τι θεοπρεπὲς εἰς αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κατῆλθεν.	^9.4 These and thousands of similar details are recorded concerning the succession of Plato. But now it is time for us to resume our discourse from the beginning and examine the false opinions and conflicting doctrines of the natural philosophers—those men who wandered over vast lands, who held the discovery of truth in highest esteem, who associated with the doctrines of all the ancients, and who had earlier investigated with precision the exact theology of the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, and the Greeks themselves. It is worth hearing what fruit they obtained from these labors, so that we may learn whether anything worthy of God came down to them from their elders.
^9.5 ἐκράτει μὲν γὰρ πρότερον ἐκ παλαιοῦ αἰῶνος παρὰ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ πολύθεος δεισιδαιμονία, νεῴ τε καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ μυστήρια τῶν θεῶν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ χώρας συνήθως παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐφυλάττοντο. οὐ δὴ οὖν οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας ἀνθρωπίνης ἦν χρεία, εἰ δὴ τὸ τῆς θεοσοφίας προειλήφει· οὐδ’ ἦν τις ἀνάγκη καινοτομεῖν τοὺς σοφοὺς, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν προγόνων αὐτοῖς εὖ ἔχοντα ἦν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι τοὺς γενναίους φιλοσόφους, εἰ δὴ σύμφωνος καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡ πάτριος αὐτοῖς περὶ θεῶν δόξα τυγχάνειν δεδοκίμαστο.	^9.5 For in ancient times polytheistic superstition held sway among the nations, and temples, sacred rites, and mysteries of the gods were customarily observed by all in every city and country. Surely, then, there was no need for human philosophy if divine wisdom (theosophia) had already been acquired; nor was there any need for wise men to innovate if the traditions of their ancestors were sound; nor, indeed, for noble philosophers to engage in faction and dispute if the ancestral opinion concerning the gods had been proven to be harmonious and true.
^9.6 τί δὲ ἔδει πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μάχεσθαι, ἢ τὴν μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω περιτρέχειν πλανᾶσθαί τε καὶ τὰ βαρβάρων ὑποσυλᾶν, οἴκοι δέον μένοντας παρὰ θεῶν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰ δή τινες ἦσαν θεοὶ, ἢ παρὰ τῶν θεολόγων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἀληθεῖς καὶ ἀδιαπτώτους περὶ τῶν ἐπιζητουμένων ἐν φιλοσοφία λόγους, περὶ ὧν μυρία ὅσα μοχθήσαντες διηνέχθησαν, μακρῷ τῆς τἀληθοῦς εὑρέσεως ἀφυστερήσαντες;	^9.6 Why, then, was it necessary to wage war and fight against one another, or to run back and forth on long journeys wandering about and plundering the lore of barbarians—when, remaining at home, they ought to have learned from the gods (if indeed there were any gods) or from inspired theologians the true and infallible doctrines concerning the objects of philosophical inquiry? Yet concerning these matters, after countless labors, they fell into disagreement, falling far short of finding the truth!
^9.7 τί δὲ καὶ περὶ θεῶν νεώτερα χρῆν ἐπιζητεῖν τολμᾶν, ἢ στασιάζειν καὶ διαπυκτεύειν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ δὴ ἀσφαλὴς καὶ βεβαία θεῶν εὕρεσις καὶ γνῶσις εὐσεβείας ἀληθὴς ἐν τελεταῖς καὶ μυστηρίοις τῇ τε ἄλλῃ τῶν παλαιτάτων περιείχετο θεολογίᾳ, αὐτὴν ἐκείνην παρὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ὁμολογουμένην συμφώνως περιέπειν;	^9.7 Why, too, was it necessary to venture to seek innovations concerning the gods, or to engage in bitter disputes with one another, if a safe and sure discovery of the gods and true knowledge of piety were contained in the rites, mysteries, and general theology of the most ancient peoples—when it was open to them simply to cherish that very theology, unmoved and in harmonious agreement?
^9.8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰ φανεῖεν οὗτοι μηδὲν ἀληθὲς περὶ θεοῦ παρὰ τῶν προτέρων μεμαθηκότες, οἰκείαις δ’ ἐπινοίαις τῇ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιβεβληκότες ἐξετάσει, καὶ στοχασμοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ καταλήψει κεχρημένοι, τί χρὴ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐχὶ συνομολογεῖν τὴν παλαιὰν τῶν ἐθνῶν θεολογίαν μηδὲν πλέον τῆς ἀποδοθείσης ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου συγγράμμασιν ἱστορίας ἐπέχειν;	^9.8 But if it should appear that these men learned nothing true about God from those who came before them, but instead applied themselves to the investigation of nature through their own inventions, relying on guesswork rather than clear apprehension (kataleptis), what remains but to confess that the ancient theology of the nations possesses no more value than the account handed down in our preceding books?
^9.9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνων στοχασμῶν καὶ πολλῆς λογομαχίας καὶ πλάνης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἀκριβοῦς καταλήψεως, ἡ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὑπέστη φιλοσοφία, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀνεβὼ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ Πορφυρίου μάθοις ἂν, αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀκούσας ὁμολογοῦντος ἐν τούτοις·	^9.9 That philosophy among the Greeks arose from human guesswork, endless disputes, and error, and not from any accurate apprehension, you may learn from Porphyry's Letter to Anebo the Egyptian, hearing him confess this very point in the following words:

Chapter 10

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius marshals Porphyry’s own words against Greek philosophy. Quoting three distinct works of Porphyry—the Letter to Anebo, On the Soul (addressed to Boethus), and On the Philosophy from Oracles—Eusebius highlights how the eminent Neoplatonist conceded that Greek philosophical doctrines were rooted in conjecture, human reasoning, and endless, irresoluble debate. Crucially, Porphyry records an oracle of Apollo acknowledging that while the Greeks lost their way on the steep road to the divine, "barbarians" (specifically Chaldeans, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Lydians, and Hebrews) discovered true wisdom. Eusebius uses this admission to defend Christians' embrace of Hebrew revelation over Greek dialectic. Finally, Eusebius sets up a critique of the Greek quadrivium (astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, and music), noting that although Greeks boasted these liberal arts were essential for reaching divine truth, figures like Socrates explicitly rejected them in favor of true moral and spiritual understanding.

^10.1 «Ἄρξομαι δὲ τῆς πρὸς σὲ φιλίας ἀπὸ θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων ἀγαθῶν τῶν τε τούτοις συγγενῶν φιλοσοφημάτων, περὶ ὧν εἴρηται μὲν πλεῖστα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήνων φιλοσόφοις, εἴρηται δὲ ἐκ στοχασμοῦ τὸ πλέον τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχοντα τῆς πίστεως.»	^10.1 "I shall begin my friendship with you from the subject of the gods and good spirits, and the philosophical doctrines related to them—concerning which much indeed has been said even by the Greek philosophers, but said mostly from conjecture, which holds the origin of their belief."
^10.2 Καὶ ὑποβὰς ἑξῆς ἐπιφέρει λέγων· «Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν λογομαχία τίς ἐστι πολλὴ, ἅτε ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκαζομένου· οἷς δὲ μεμηχάνηται ἡ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον συνουσία, εἰ παρεῖται τὸ μέρος τοῦτο εἰς ἐξέτασιν, μάτην αὐτοῖς ἡ σοφία ἐξήσκηται.»	^10.2 And going on, he adds lower down, saying: "For among us there is a great deal of word-warfare, since the Good is guessed at from human reasonings; and as for those who have devised communion with the Higher Power, if this branch of study has been passed over without examination, their wisdom has been cultivated in vain!"
^10.3 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀντέγραψε Βοηθῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ αὐτὸς ὧδε γράφων ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς λέξιν· «Ὡς τὰ μὲν τῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναμφιλέκτως συνίστησι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον· οἱ δὲ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων κομισθέντες λόγοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι εὐανάτρεπτοι, διὰ τὴν ἐν πᾶσιν εὑρεσιλογίαν τῶν ἐριστικῶν. τίς γὰρ λόγος τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία οὐκ ἀμφισβητήσιμος τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις, ὅπου καὶ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἐναργῶν ἐπέχειν αὐτῶν τισιν ἐδόκει;»	^10.3 Moreover, in his reply to Boethus On the Soul, the same author explicitly concedes the following in his own words: "While concepts and historical testimony indisputably establish that the soul is immortal, the arguments brought forward by philosophers for proof appear easily overthrown, owing to the verbal quibbling (heuresilogia) of controversialists. For what philosophical argument is not disputed by those of different sects, when it seemed good to some of them to suspend judgment even concerning things that seem self-evident?"
^10.4 Καὶ ἐν οἷς δὲ ἐπέγραψε «Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας» διαρρήδην ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πεπλανῆσθαι, ἐπιμαρτυρόμενος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεὸν, ὡς τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος διὰ χρησμῶν ἐξειπόντος, καὶ βαρβάροις μᾶλλον ἢ Ἕλλησι τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιμαρτυρήσαντος, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἑβραίων μνημονεύσαντος ἐν τοῖς μαρτυρηθεῖσι.	^10.4 And in the work he titled On the Philosophy from Oracles, he expressly admits that the Greeks have gone astray, calling his own god to witness how Apollo himself declared this through oracles, witnessing that the discovery of truth belonged to barbarians rather than to Greeks, and indeed making mention of the Hebrews among those commended.
^10.5 μετὰ γοῦν τὴν τοῦ χρησμοῦ παράθεσιν ἐξῆς τούτοις κέχρηται τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις· «Ἀκήκοας πόσος πόνος, ἵν’ ὑπὲρ σώματός τις τὰ καθάρσια θύσῃ, οὐχ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐξεύρῃ; χαλκόδετος γὰρ ἡ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁδὸς αἰπεινή τε καὶ τραχεῖα, ἧς πολλὰς ἀτραποὺς βάρβαροι μὲν ἐξεῦρον, Ἕλληνες δὲ ἐπλανήθησαν, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες ἤδη καὶ διέφθειραν· τὴν δὲ εὕρεσιν Αἰγυπτίοις ὁ θεὸς ἐμαρτύρησε Φοίνιξί τε καὶ Χαλδαίοις (Ἀσσύριοι γὰρ οὗτοι) Λυδοῖς τε καὶ Ἑβραίοις.»	^10.5 At any rate, after citing the oracle, he adds these concluding words: "You have heard how great a labor it is merely to offer purification sacrifices for the body, not to mention finding the salvation of the soul! For steep and rough is the bronze-bound path to the gods; many byways of this path were discovered by barbarians, but the Greeks went astray, and those who dominated it actually corrupted it! The god testified to its discovery among the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, the Chaldeans (for these are Assyrians), the Lydians, and the Hebrews."
^10.6 Ταῦτα ὁ φιλόσοφος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ αὐτοῦ θεός. ἆρ’ οὖν ἄξιον μετὰ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιμέμψασθαι, ὅτι δὴ τοὺς πεπλανημένους Ἕλληνας καταλείψαντες τὰ Ἑβραίων εἱλόμεθα, τῶν δὲ ἀληθείας καταλήψει μεμαρτυρημένων;	^10.6 Such are the words of the philosopher—or rather, of his god! Is it right, then, after these admissions, to find fault with us because we abandoned the errant Greeks and chose the lore of the Hebrews, who are attested to have grasped the truth?
^10.7 τί δὲ χρὴ παρὰ φιλοσόφων μαθήσεσθαι προσδοκᾶν; ἢ ποία ἐλπὶς τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ὠφελείας, εἰ δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐκ στοχασμῶν καὶ εἰκασμῶν τὸ πλέον τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχοντα τῆς πίστεως τυγχάνει; λογομαχίας δὲ τίς ὁ καρπὸς, εἰ δὴ πάντες οἱ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγοι εὐανάτρεπτοι καθεστήκασι διὰ τὴν ἐν πᾶσιν εὑρεσιλογίαν; ταῦτα γὰρ οὐχ ἡμῶν ἀρτίως, ἀλλὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν εἰρημένα ἠκούετο.	^10.7 And what should we expect to learn from philosophers? Or what hope of benefit is there from them, if what is said among them has its principles of belief mostly from conjectures and guesses? What is the fruit of word-warfare, if all the arguments of philosophers stand easily overthrown through their universal verbal quibbling? For these things were heard stated not by us just now, but by themselves!
^10.8 διόπερ εὖ μοι δοκοῦμεν καὶ μετὰ κρίσεως ἑξητασμένης, οὐχὶ δ’ ἀλόγως, ὡς ἂν τοιούτων καταπεφρονηκέναι, τὰ δὲ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις ἠγαπηκέναι, οὐχ ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ δαίμονος μεμαρτύρηται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τῆς ἐνθέου ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δυνάμεως μέτοχα ὄντα ἀποδείκνυται.	^10.8 Therefore, we seem to have acted well and with examined judgment—not irrationally—in despising such systems and loving the teachings among the Hebrews, not merely because testimony was borne to them by the demon, but because they are shown to participate in divine virtue and power.
^10.9 ἵνα δ’ οὖν καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔργοις τὰς τῶν θαυμαστῶν φιλοσόφων λογομαχίας μάθοις, τάς τε περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς συστάσεως διαφωνίας, μικρὸν μὲν ὕστερον ἐκθήσομαί σοι τὰς αὐτῶν φωνάς. πρῶτον δ’ ἐπειδὴ περιφέρουσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλοῦντες τὰ μαθήματα, δεῖν ἐξ ἅπαντος φάσκοντες τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν πείρᾳ τῆς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καταλήψεως γίνεσθαι μετελθεῖν ἀστρονομίαν, ἀριθμητικὴν, γεωμετρίαν, μουσικὴν, αὐτὰ δὴ τὰ παρὰ βαρβάρων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἥκειν ἀποδειχθέντα·	^10.9 Now, in order that you may learn from actual facts the word-battles of these admired philosophers, and their disagreements concerning first principles, God, and the constitution of the universe, I shall set forth their own words a little later. First, however—since they go about boasting incessantly of the liberal subjects (mathemata), declaring that those who intend to experience the attainment of truth must absolutely pursue astronomy, arithmetic, geometry, and music (the very subjects shown to have come to them from barbarians!)—
^10.10 τούτων γὰρ ἄνευ μὴ δύνασθαι λόγιον ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόσοφὸν ἀποτελεσθῆναι, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας ψαῦσαι, μὴ τούτων ἐν ψυχῇ τῆς γνώσεως προτυπωθείσης· εἶτ’ ἐπανατεινάμενοι τῇ μαθήσει τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ μονονουχὶ τοῦ αἰθέρος βαίνειν μετέωροι ἀρθέντες οἴονται, ὡς δὴ τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς περιφέροντες, ἡμᾶς τε, ὅτι μὴ τὰ ὅμοια ζηλοῦμεν, βοσκημάτων κατ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ἡγοῦνται, ταύτῃ δέ φασι μηδὲ θεὸν, μηδέ τι τῶν σεμνῶν ἡμὰς δύνασθαι εἰδέναι· φέρε τοῦτο πρῶτον οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχον ἀπευθύνωμεν, τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀντὶ φωτὸς αὐτοῖς παραβάλλοντες.	^10.10 they claim that without these subjects no man can become learned or a philosopher, nor even touch the truth of real entities unless the knowledge of these arts has been pre-formed in his soul! Then, exalting themselves through the study of these subjects, they imagine they walk on air, lifted high almost into the ether itself, as though carrying God Himself within numbers; and because we do not emulate the same things, they consider us no different from cattle, saying that on this account we can know neither God nor anything noble. Come, then, let us first correct this error, setting the true word against them like a light.
^10.11 ὁ δὲ μυρίους μὲν Ἕλληνας, μυρία δὲ καὶ βαρβάρων γένη, τοὺς μὲν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις μαθήμασιν οὔτε θεὸν οὔτε σώφρονα βίον οὔθ' ὅλως τι τῶν βελτίστων καὶ συμφερόντων ἐπιγνόντας ἀποδείξει, τοὺς δὲ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκτὸς πάντων εὐσεβεστάτους καὶ φιλοσοφωτάτους γεγονέναι. ὁ γοῦν παρὰ πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ᾀδόμενος Σωκράτης ὅπως ποτὲ ἐδόξαζε περὶ τῶνδε μάθοις ἂν Ξενοφῶντι πιστεύσας ἐν Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν ὧδέ πῃ ἱστοροῦντι·	^10.11 This true word will demonstrate that ten thousand Greeks and ten thousand barbarian races, who possessed these mentioned subjects, knew neither God, nor a temperate life, nor anything at all of what is best and beneficial; whereas others, completely outside these subjects, have proved to be most pious and wise. At any rate, how Socrates himself—who is praised by all of them—thought about these matters, you may learn by trusting Xenophon, who records it in his Memorabilia roughly as follows:

Chapter 11

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In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Book 4, Chapter 7) to demonstrate that Socrates advocated for a strictly practical and limited application of liberal studies—such as geometry, astronomy, and arithmetic—for everyday utility (land measurement, navigation, timekeeping, and basic budgeting). Socrates strongly discouraged pursuing abstract or speculative dimensions of these arts, arguing that attempting to unravel the hidden mechanics of the heavens or the mind of God wastes precious human life and risks madness, as seen in Anaxagoras’s flawed theories about the sun.

^11.1 «Ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρις ὅτου δέοι ἔμπειρον εἶναι ἑκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον. αὐτίκα γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔφη δεῖν μανθάνειν, ἕως ἱκανός τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσειε, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι, ἢ ἔργον ἀποδεῖξαι. οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι μαθεῖν, ὥστε τὸν προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν τῇ μετρήσει ἅμα τήν τε γῆν ὁπόση ἐστὶν εἰδέναι, καὶ ὡς μετρεῖται ἐπιστάμενον ἀπιέναι.	^11.1 "He also taught up to what point a properly educated person ought to be experienced in each subject. For instance, he said that one ought to learn geometry up to the point of being able, should the need ever arise, to receive, hand over, or divide land correctly by measurement, or to assign a task. He said this was so easy to learn that anyone who applied his mind to measuring would know at once how large the land was, and go away understanding how it is measured.
^11.2 τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσξυνέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μανθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν· ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελοίη ταῦτα οὐκ ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄπειρός γε αὐτῶν ἦν. ἔφη δὲ ἱκανὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου βίον κατατρίβειν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποκωλύειν.	^11.2 But learning geometry to the point of obscure diagrams he disapproved of; for he said he could not see what benefit these had—and yet he was by no means inexperienced in them. He said these were sufficient to consume a man’s life and keep him from many other useful subjects.
^11.3 ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρονομίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γινώσκειν, ἕνεκα τοῦ πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἢ νυκτὸς ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς τούτων ἔχειν τεκμηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγινώσκοντα. καὶ ταῦτα δέ ῥᾴδια μαθεῖν παρά τε νυκτοθηρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ταῦτα εἰδέναι.	^11.3 He also urged them to become experienced in astronomy—yet this, too, only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the month, and the year, for the sake of journeys, voyages, and night-watches, and for whatever other tasks are done by night, month, or year, so as to have these signs to use by distinguishing the times of the aforementioned activities. He added that these things were easy to learn from night-hunters, helmsmen, and many others whose business it is to know them.
^11.4 τὸ δὲ μέχρι τούτου ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν, μέχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ περιφορᾷ ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας καὶ ἀσταθμήτους ἀστέρας γνῶναι, καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ τὰς περιόδους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ζητοῦντα κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν. ὠφέλειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν. ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν.	^11.4 But learning astronomy to the point of wearing oneself out seeking those bodies that are not in the same orbit—and knowing the planets and unstable stars, their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes—he strongly discouraged. For he said he saw no benefit in these either, although he was not unacquainted with them either. He said these, too, were sufficient to consume a man’s life and keep him from many useful things.
^11.5 ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.	^11.5 In general, he discouraged becoming a thinker concerning heavenly matters and how God contrives each of them; for he did not think these were discoverable by human beings, nor did he believe that one who seeks what the gods did not wish to make clear pleases them. He said that a person worrying over these things ran the risk of going mad no less than Anaxagoras went mad—he who prided himself most on explaining the mechanisms of the gods!
^11.6 ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον ἠγνόει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ῥᾳδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὔ. ἠγνόει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ἠγνόει ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὢν οὔτε λάμπει οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος πάντα τὸν χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὢν διαμένει.	^11.6 For Anaxagoras, in claiming that fire and the sun were the same thing, failed to realize that humans can easily look directly at fire, but cannot look straight at the sun; and that when people are shone upon by the sun they have darker skin, but not so under fire. He was also ignorant of the fact that none of the things growing from the earth can grow well without sunlight, whereas all things heated by fire perish! And in claiming that the sun was a red-hot stone, he also ignored the fact that a stone in fire neither shines nor lasts for a long time, whereas the sun remains for all time the brightest of all things.
^11.7 ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν, καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν· μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι.» Ταῦτα Ξενοφῶν ἐν Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν. ἐν ἐπιστολῇ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τῇ πρὸς Αἰσχίνην περὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν αὐχούντων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φυσιολογίαν τοιαῦτα γράφει·	^11.7 He urged them to learn calculations (arithmetic) as well, but urged them to guard against vain labor in these just as in the other subjects; yet up to the point of utility, he himself examined and went through everything with his companions." These things Xenophon records in the Memorabilia. And in his letter to Aeschines concerning Plato and those who boast of the physics of the universe, the same author writes as follows:

Chapter 12

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius quotes a letter from Xenophon to Aeschines Socraticus to demonstrate Socrates' strict focus on practical ethics over natural philosophy. Xenophon asserts that the divine realm is beyond human comprehension and that Socrates concentrated purely on human virtues (justice, courage, and moral goodness) rather than geometry, astronomy, or speculative physics. Furthermore, Xenophon uses this letter to launch a covert attack on Plato ("alluding to Plato"), accusing him of abandoning Socratic simplicity in favor of Egyptian lore, Pythagorean mysticism, tyrannical ambition, and Sicilian luxury.

^12.1 «Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τὰ θεῖα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς παντὶ δῆλον· ἀπόχρη δὲ τῷ κρείττονι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοὺς σέβειν· οἷοι δέ εἰσιν οὔτε εὑρεῖν ῥᾴδιον οὔτε ζητεῖν θεμιτόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ δεσποτῶν φύσιν ἢ πρᾶξιν δούλοις εἰδέναι πλέον ὑπηρεσίας προσήκει. καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὅσῳ χρὴ ἄγασθαι τἀνθρώπινα διαπονουμένων, τοσῷδε τοῖς δόξης ἐκ πολλῶν ἀκαίρων καὶ κενῶν γλιχομένοις ἄχθος φέρει. πότε γὰρ, ὦ Αἰσχίνη, Σωκράτους ἀκήκοέ τις οὐρανίων πέρι λέγοντος; ἢ γραμμὰς εἰς ἐπανόρθωσιν παραινοῦντος μανθάνειν; μουσικὴν μὲν γὰρ ἴσμεν αὐτὸν μέχρι ὤτων συνιέντα· διετέλει δὲ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοῖς λέγων τί καλὸν καὶ τί ἀνδρεία δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί. ἀνθρώπινα γοῦν αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐκάλει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώποις ἁλῶναι ἔφασκεν, ἢ μύθων εἶναι συγγενῆ, μετ' ὀφρύος σοφιστῶν παίγνια διεξιόντων. καὶ οὐκ ἔλεγε μὲν ταῦτα, οὐχὶ δὲ ἔπραττε. γράφειν δὲ τὰ πραχθέντα εἰδότι σοι, καίπερ οὐκ ἀηδὲς ἐσόμενον, χρόνον ἔχει, ἀνέγραψά τε ἄλλοθι. παυσάσθωσαν οὖν ἐλεγχόμενοι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ εἰκὸς ἴτωσαν, οἷς Σωκράτης οὐκ ἤρεσεν, ᾧ ζῶντι μὲν ὁ θεὸς σοφίαν ἐμαρτύρησεν, οἱ δὲ κτείναντες τῆς μετανοίας ἀποκάθαρσιν οὐχ εὗρον. τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἄρα, Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθησαν καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρα τερατώδους σοφίας, ὧν τὸ περιττὸν καὶ μὴ μόνιμον ἐπὶ Σωκράτει ἤλεγξεν ἔρως τυραννίδος, καὶ ἀντὶ διαίτης λιτῆς Σικελιῶτις γαστρὸς ἀμέτρου τράπεζα.»

Ταῦτα Ξενοφῶν τὸν Πλάτωνα αἰνιττόμενος. ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων ἐν Πολιτείᾳ περὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ μουσικῆς τάδ' ἱστορεῖ φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην·

^12.1 "That divine matters are above us is clear to everyone; and it is enough to revere them according to the limit of our capacity. What their nature is like, however, is neither easy to discover nor lawful to seek. For it is no more fitting for servants to know the nature or business of their masters beyond what concerns their service. And most importantly: in proportion as one ought to admire those who toil over human concerns, to that extent those who crave glory from many unseasonable and empty pursuits bring a burden upon themselves. For when, O Aeschines, did anyone ever hear Socrates speaking about heavenly matters? Or advising people to learn geometrical lines for moral improvement? As for music, we know he appreciated it only so far as hearing goes; but he continually spoke to them, asking what is noble, what is courage, justice, and the other virtues. These he called human goods, whereas the other matters he declared were either impossible for humans to grasp, or were akin to myths—playthings expounded with raised eyebrows by sophists. Nor did he merely say these things without practicing them! But to write about his deeds to you who already know them, though not unpleasant, takes time, and I have recorded them elsewhere. Let those who were dissatisfied with Socrates cease being refuted, or let them yield to reason—Socrates, to whose wisdom God bore witness while he lived, and whose killers found no purification through their repentance! But instead, forsooth, they fell in love with Egypt and the portentous wisdom of Pythagoras—the superfluous and impermanent nature of which was exposed, in contrast to Socrates, by a passion for tyranny, and by a Sicilian table of immoderate gluttony in place of a simple diet."

These things Xenophon writes, alluding to Plato. But Plato himself, at any rate, in the Republic, records Socrates saying the following regarding gymnastics and music:

Chapter 13

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In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato’s Republic (Book 7, 521d–531c) to illustrate Socrates’ discussion with Glaucon regarding higher education. They argue that physical gymnastics and traditional music educate only the body, habits, or senses, rather than drawing the soul upward toward true Being. Socrates sharply criticizes empirical musicians who test strings by ear alone, as well as astronomers who merely observe physical celestial movements, insisting instead that harmonic and astronomical studies must ascend to abstract mathematical principles and intelligible truth. Finally, Eusebius concludes the chapter by transitioning to Plutarch’s De Placitis Philosophorum (On the Opinions of the Philosophers) to document the contradictions and futile arguments among all major philosophical schools.

^13.1 «Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; — Ἔφαμεν γάρ.	^13.1 "What study then, O Glaucon, would draw the soul away from that which is becoming toward that which truly Is? And I am thinking of this as I speak: did we not say that these men, while young, must inevitably be athletes of war?" — "We did indeed."
^13.2 — Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν πρὸς ἐκείνῳ. — Τὸ ποῖον; — Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι. — Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴπερ οἷόν τε. — Γυμναστικῇ πῃ καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν. — ᾞν ταῦτα, ἔφη. — Καὶ γυμναστικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετελεύτηκε· σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως ἐπιστατεῖ. — Φαίνεται. — Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. — Οὐ γάρ. — Ἀλλ' ἄρα μουσικὴ ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν;	^13.2 "— Then this study we are seeking must also possess this added quality." — "What quality?" — "That it be not useless to warlike men." — "It must indeed," he said, "if possible." — "Now in our earlier scheme they were educated in gymnastics and music." — "That was so," he said. — "And gymnastics is devoted entirely to that which comes into being and perishes; for it presides over the growth and decay of the body." — "So it appears." — "This, then, cannot be the study we are seeking." — "No, it cannot." — "Could it then be music, as far as we covered it before?"
^13.3 — Ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινὰ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν· μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἄγον, οἷον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ.	^13.3 "— But that," he said, "if you recall, was the counterpart of gymnastics, training the guardians through habits, imparting through harmony a certain grace of tone (not knowledge), and through rhythm a grace of movement, and having in its discourse other kindred habits of the same sort, whether in mythical stories or in those that were truer. But as for a study leading toward any such thing as you now seek, there was nothing of the kind in it."
^13.4 — Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. Ἀλλ' ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἵ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάναυσοί που ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι. — Πῶς δ' οὔ;»	^13.4 "— Most accurately," I said, "do you remind me; for in truth it contained nothing of the sort. But, my admirable Glaucon, what study could there be like this? For all the practical crafts were deemed vulgar, were they not?" — "How could they be otherwise?"
^13.5 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς προϊὼν ἐπιλέγει· «Μή ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν οὓς θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξῆκον ἐκεῖσε ἀεὶ οἷς πάντας δεῖ ἀνήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι ποιοῦσι.	^13.5 Then proceeding further, he adds: "Lest those whom we are to nurture ever attempt to learn anything incomplete from us, that does not reach the goal to which all ought to attain—just as we were saying recently about astronomy. Or do you not know that they do another similar thing regarding harmony? For they measure audible concords and sounds against one another, laboring in vain just like astronomers!"
^13.6 — Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη, καὶ γελοίως γε, πυκνώματ' ἄττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μέν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἠχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα ᾧ μετρητέον, οἱ δ' ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη φθεγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησάμενοι.	^13.6 "— By the gods," he said, "and absurdly too! Talking about certain 'condensations' (pyknomata) and holding their ears close, as if hunting for a sound from next door, some say they can still hear a small note in between and that this is the smallest interval by which measurement must be made, while others contend that the notes are already identical—both putting ears before the mind!"
^13.7 — Σὺ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας. ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται, πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος, καὶ οὔ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας εἰρῆσθαι.	^13.7 "— You mean," I said, "those worthy musicians who harass and torment the strings, twisting them upon the pegs! But lest the image become too long—with the strikes of the plectrum, the accusations, denials, and arrogance of the strings—I drop the image, and I do not mean these men, but rather those whom we said just now speak about harmony.
^13.8 ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ. τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὒ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι.	^13.8 For they do the same thing as those in astronomy: they look for numbers in these audible concords, but do not ascend to problems, to examine which numbers are harmonious and which are not, and why each is so."
^13.9 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν πρὸ ὁδοῦ κείσθω, ἀπολογουμένοις ὅτι μὴ δίχα διανοίας ὀρθῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀχρηστομαθείας ὠλιγωρήσαμεν. σκεψώμεθα δῆτα λοιπὸν ἤδη ἄνωθεν ἀρξάμενοι τὰς τῶν εἰρημένων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων δογματικὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιδοξίας, γράφει δὴ ἀθρόως ἁπάντων τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ Πυθαγορείων τῶν τε ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπικεκλημένων καὶ αὖ πάλιν τῶν νεωτέρων Περιπατητικῶν τε καὶ Στωϊκῶν καὶ Ἐπικουρείων τὰς δόξας συναγαγὼν ὁ Πλούταρχος ἐν οἷς ἐπέγραψε "Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων," ἐξ ὧν παραθήσομαι ταῦτα·»	^13.9 Well then, let these quotes serve our purpose, defending us against the charge that it was not without right reason that we held such useless learning in low esteem. Let us now examine, starting from the beginning, the dogmatic disagreements among the aforementioned natural philosophers. Plutarch—having gathered into one work the opinions of all the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and those called the older natural philosophers, as well as the later Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans—writes in the work he entitled On the Opinions of the Philosophers, from which I shall present the following excerpts:

Chapter 14

☜ ☞

Eusebius quotes Pseudo-Plutarch's De Placitis Philosophorum (Book 1, Chapter 3) to catalog the conflicting views of early Greek natural philosophers concerning the ultimate principles (archai) of the universe. The surveyed views include:

Thales (water)

Anaximander (the indefinite / apeiron)

Anaximenes (air)

Heraclitus and Hippasus (fire)

Democritus and Epicurus (atoms and the void)

Empedocles (the four elements driven by Love and Strife)

Eusebius observes that these early thinkers relied purely on material causes, completely ignoring God, divine reason, or incorporeal forces. He concludes by highlighting Anaxagoras as the sole early Greek philosopher who introduced Mind (Nous) as the ordering principle, though noting that Anaxagoras was nearly stoned to death by the Athenians as an atheist and ultimately failed to apply his own doctrine consistently.

^14.1 «Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος, εἷς τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν, ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος ἄρξαι τῆς φιλοσοφίας, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ Ἰωνικὴ αἵρεσις προσηγορεύθη· ἐγένοντο πλεῖσται διαδοχαί. φιλοσοφήσας δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ πρεσβύτερος ἦλθεν εἰς Μίλητον. ἐξ ὕδατος δέ φησι πάντα εἶναι καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ πάντα ἀναλύεσθαι. στοχάζεται δὲ ἐκ τούτου πρῶτον ὅτι πάντων ζῴων ἡ γονὴ ἀρχή ἐστι, ὑγρὰ οὖσα· οὕτως εἰκὸς καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ὑγροῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν. δεύτερον, ὅτι πάντα τὰ φυτὰ ὑγρῷ τρέφεταί τε καὶ καρποφορεῖ, ἀμοιροῦντα δὲ ξηραίνεται. τρίτον δὲ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ταῖς τῶν ὑδάτων ἀναθυμιάσεσι τρέφεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κόσμος. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Ὅμηρος ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ὑποτίθεται περὶ τοῦ ὕδατος, "Ὠκεανός, όσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται." ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Θαλῆς.»	^14.1 "Thales of Miletus, one of the Seven Sages, declared water to be the principle of existing things. This man seems to have been the founder of philosophy, and from him the Ionian school derived its name, from which arose a long line of successors. Having studied philosophy in Egypt, he returned in his old age to Miletus. He asserts that all things come from water and all are dissolved back into water. He conjectures this first from the fact that the seed of all living creatures is the principle of life, and is moist; thus it is likely that all things derive their origin from moisture. Second, because all plants are nourished and bear fruit by moisture, and wither when deprived of it. Third, because the very fire of the sun and stars, and the cosmos itself, is nourished by the vapors of the waters. On this account Homer also sets forth this opinion concerning water: 'Oceanus, who is the origin of all things.'" Thus far Thales.
^14.2 «Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιός φησι τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθείρεσθαι· διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται. λέγει δ' οὖν, διότι τὸ ἀπέραντόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ ἡ γένεσις ἡ ὑφισταμένη. ἁμαρτάνει δὲ καὶ οὗτος μὴ λέγων τί ἐστι τὸ ἄπειρον, πότερον ἀήρ ἐστιν, ἢ ὕδωρ, ἢ γῆ, ἢ ἄλλα τινὰ σώματα· ἁμαρτάνει δ' οὖν τὴν μὲν ὕλην ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν. τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν· οὐ δύναται δὲ ἡ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ὑπόθηται.»	^14.2 "Anaximander of Miletus says that the principle of existing things is the Indefinite (apeiron); for from this all things come into being and into this all things are destroyed. Wherefore infinite worlds are generated, and again destroyed into that from which they arose. He says, then, that it is infinite so that ongoing generation may never fail. But he too errs by failing to state what the Indefinite is—whether it is air, water, earth, or some other bodies. He errs, therefore, by declaring the matter, but doing away with the efficient cause. For the Indefinite is nothing other than matter; and matter cannot exist in actuality unless an efficient cause is posited."
^14.3 «Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀέρα ἀπεφήνατο· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι. οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ, φησὶν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ ἐστι· συγκρατεῖ γὰρ ἡμᾶς· καὶ ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ ἐμπεριέχει· λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀὴρ καὶ πνεῦμα. ἁμαρτάνει δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἐξ ἁπλοῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος δοκῶν συνεστάναι τὰ ζῷα. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ὑποστῆναι· ἀλλά καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ τιθέναι. οἷον, οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος· ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ ξύλων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης.»	^14.3 "Anaximenes of Miletus declared air to be the principle of existing things; for from this all things come to be and into it are again dissolved. 'Just as our soul,' he says, 'which is air, holds us together, so breath and air encompass the whole world' (air and breath being used synonymously). But he too errs in thinking that living creatures consist of simple and uniform air and breath; for it is impossible for matter alone to be posited as a single principle of existing things, but one must also posit the efficient cause. For instance, silver is not enough to create a cup unless there is an efficient cause—that is, the silversmith; and similarly with copper, wood, and other matter."
^14.4 «Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἵππασος ὁ Μεταποντῖνος ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων τὸ πῦρ. ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς γὰρ τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς πῦρ πάντα τελευτᾶν λέγουσι· τούτου δὲ κατασβεννυμένου κοσμοποιεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ παχυμερέστατον αὐτοῦ εἰς αὑτὸ συστελλόμενον γῆ γίγνεται· ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσει ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ἀναθυμιώμενον δὲ ἀέρα γίνεσθαι. πάλιν δὲ τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ σώματα ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἀναλοῦσθαι ἐκπυρώσει. ἀρχὴ οὖν τὸ πῦρ, ὅτι ἐκ τούτου τὰ πάντα, τέλος δὲ καθότι εἰς τοῦτο ἀναλύεται τὰ πάντα.»	^14.4 "Heraclitus and Hippasus of Metapontum make fire the principle of all things. For they say that all things come from fire and all things end in fire; and as this fire is quenched, the cosmos is formed. First, its densest part, contracting into itself, becomes earth; then the earth, loosened by fire, naturally produces water, and this evaporated becomes air. Again the cosmos and all bodies are consumed by fire in the conflagration. Fire is therefore the principle, because all things come from it, and the end, because all things are dissolved into it."
^14.5 «Δημόκριτος, ᾧ μετὰ πλεῖστον Ἐπίκουρος ἠκολούθησεν, ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων σώματα ἄτομα, λόγῳ δὲ θεωρητὰ, ἀμέτοχα κενοῦ, ἀγέννητα, ἀΐδια, ἄφθαρτα, οὐδὲ θραυσθῆναι δυνάμενα, οὔτε διαπλασμὸν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λαβεῖν, οὔτε ἀλλοιωθῆναι, εἶναι δ' αὐτὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ, ταῦτα μέντοι κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ καὶ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ· εἶναι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄπειρα. συμβεβηκέναι δὲ τοῖς σώμασι τρία ταῦτα, σχήματα, μέγεθος, βάρος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἔλεγε δύο, μέγεθος καὶ σχῆμα· ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τούτοις καὶ τρίτον βάρος προσέθηκεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ, φησὶ, κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα τῇ τοῦ βάρους πληγῇ, ἐπεὶ οὐ κινηθήσεται. εἶναι δὲ τὰ σχήματα τῶν ἀτόμων περιληπτὰ, οὐκ ἄπειρα· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι μήτε ἀγκιστροειδεῖς, μήτε τριαινοειδεῖς, μήτε κρικοειδεῖς· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σχήματά ἐστιν εὔθραυστα, αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι ἀπαθεῖς, ἄθραυστοι· ἴδια δὲ ἔχειν σχήματα λόγῳ θεωρητά. καὶ εἴρηται ἄτομος οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλαχίστη, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ δύναται τμηθῆναι, ἀπαθὴς οὖσα καὶ ἀμέτοχος κενοῦ· ὥστε ἐὰν εἴπῃ ἄτομον, ἄθραυστον λέγει, ἀπαθῆ, ἀμέτοχον κενοῦ. ὅτι δέ ἐστιν ἄτομος σαφές· καὶ γάρ ἐστι στοιχεῖα καὶ ζῷα κενὰ καὶ ἡ μονάς.»	^14.5 "Democritus—whom Epicurus followed much later—posited as the principles of existing things atomic bodies, apprehendable by reason, having no share of void, unbegotten, eternal, imperishable, incapable of being broken, taking no reshaping of parts, nor subject to alteration, being intelligible by reason; these move in the void and through the void. He taught that both the void itself is infinite and the atomic bodies are infinite. Three things belong to these bodies: shape, size, and weight—though Democritus mentioned two, size and shape, whereas Epicurus added a third: weight. For he says bodies must move by the impact of weight, since otherwise they will not move. The shapes of atoms are limited in variety, not infinite; for they are neither hook-shaped, nor trident-shaped, nor ring-shaped, since these shapes are fragile, whereas atoms are impassive and unbreakable, having their own distinct shapes apprehendable by reason. An atom is called 'indivisible' not because it is the smallest particle, but because it cannot be cut, being impassive and free of void; so when one says 'atom', one means unbreakable, impassive, and lacking void. That atoms exist is clear, for there are elements, void animals, and the monad."
^14.6 «Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Μέτωνος, Ἀκραγαντῖνος, τέτταρα μὲν στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ, γῆν, δύο δὲ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυνάμεις, φιλίαν τε καὶ νεῖκος, ὧν ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἑνωτικὴ, τὸ δὲ διαιρετικόν. φησὶ δὲ οὕτως· "τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· Ζεὺς ἀργὴς, Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος, ἠδ' Ἀϊδωνεύς, Νῆστίς θ', ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον." Δία μὲν γὰρ λέγει τὴν ζέσιν καὶ τὸν αἰθέρα, Ἥραν δὲ φερέσβιον τὸν ἀέρα· τὴν γῆν τὸν Ἀϊδωνέα· Νῆστιν δὲ καὶ κρούνωμα βρότειον, οἱονεὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ.»	^14.6 "Empedocles, son of Meton, of Agrigentum, posits four elements—fire, air, water, earth—and two principles or forces: Love and Strife, of which the former is unifying, and the latter dividing. He speaks thus: 'Hear first the four roots of all things: gleaming Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis, who with her tears wets the mortal spring.' By Zeus he means heat and ether; by life-giving Hera, air; by Aidoneus, earth; and by Nestis and the mortal spring, as it were, seed and water."
^14.7 Τοσαύτη μὲν ἡ τῶν πρώτων φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων διαφωνία, τοιαύτη δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ περὶ ἀρχῶν δόξα, οὐ θεὸν, οὐ ποιητὴν, οὐ δημιουργὸν, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον, οὐδὲ μὴν θεοὺς, οὐδ' ἀσωμάτους δυνάμεις, οὐ νοερὰς φύσεις, οὐ λογικὰς οὐσίας, οὐδ' ὅλως τι τῶν ἐκτὸς αἰσθήσεων ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑποθεμένων.	^14.7 Such was the disagreement among the earliest natural philosophers, and such was their opinion concerning principles—positing as principles no God, no Creator, no Craftsman, no Cause of the universe, nor indeed any gods, incorporeal powers, intellectual natures, or rational substances, nor anything at all beyond the reach of physical senses.
^14.8 μόνος δ' οὖν πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων Ἀναξαγόρας μνημονεύεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγοις νοῦν τὸν πάντων αἴτιον ἀποφήνασθαι. φασὶ γοῦν ὡς ἄρα οὗτος μάλιστα παρὰ τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐθαύμασε φυσιολογίαν· μηλόβοτόν γε τοι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν δι' αὐτὴν εἴασε, τόν τε περὶ ἀρχῶν λόγον πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων διήρθρωσεν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς πάντων οὐσίας ἀπεφήνατο, ὡς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν αἰτίου.	^14.8 Anaxagoras alone among the Greeks is recorded as the first in his accounts of principles to declare Mind (Nous) to be the cause of all things. They say at any rate that he admired natural philosophy far beyond those before him; indeed, he left his own lands for sheep-grazing on its account, and was the first of the Greeks to articulate the doctrine of principles. For he did not merely declare the substance of all things, as did those before him, but also the cause that moves it.
^14.9 «ἦν γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ,» φησὶν, «ὁμοῦ τὰ πράγματα πεφυρμένα, νοῦς δὲ εἰσελθὼν αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγε.» θαυμάσαι δ' ἔστιν ὡς οὗτος πρῶτος παρ' Ἕλλησι τοῦτον θεολογήσας τὸν τρόπον, δόξας Ἀθηναίοις ἄθεος εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ τὸν ἥλιον ἐθεολόγει, τὸν δὲ ἡλίου ποιητὴν, μικροῦ δεῖν καταλευσθεὶς ἔθανε.	^14.9 "For in the beginning," he says, "all things were mingled together, but Mind came and brought them out of disorder into order." Yet one may marvel that, though he was the first among the Greeks to theologize in this way, he was considered an atheist by the Athenians because he did not treat the sun as a god, but rather proclaimed the Maker of the sun—and so he nearly died by being stoned!
^14.10 λέγεται δὲ μηδὲ οὗτος σῶον φυλάξαι τὸ δόγμα. ἐπιστῆσαι μὲν γὰρ νοῦν τοῖς πᾶσι, οὐκέτι δὲ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμὸν τὴν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀποδοῦναι φυσιολογίαν. ἐπάκουσον δ' οὖν οἷα ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Περὶ ψυχῆς αἰτιᾶται τὸν ἄνδρα ἐν τούτοις·	^14.10 And it is said that not even he kept his doctrine sound. For though he set Mind over all things, he no longer provided his physical explanation of existing things in accordance with Mind and reason. Listen, then, to what charges Socrates brings against the man in Plato’s dialogue On the Soul (Phaedo), in these words:

Chapter 15

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Socrates from Plato’s Phaedo (97b–99c) to demonstrate the critical limitations of Anaxagoras’s philosophy. Socrates explains his initial excitement upon hearing that Anaxagoras posited Mind (Nous) as the cause of all things, hoping to find teleological explanations for physical phenomena based on what is "best." However, upon reading Anaxagoras’s books, Socrates was utterly disappointed to find that Mind was discarded in favor of purely material mechanisms (air, ether, water).

Socrates illustrates this absurdity using his own situation in prison: material conditions (bones, muscles, sinews) are merely necessary preconditions, whereas the true cause of his being in prison is his moral decision to obey Athenian law rather than flee. The passage concludes with Eusebius noting that Archelaus succeeded Anaxagoras, and Socrates studied under Archelaus. Eusebius also mentions that Xenophanes and Pythagoras advanced ideas about divine imperishability and the soul's immortality, paving the way for the various subsequent schools of Greek philosophy.

^15.1 «Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινὸς, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγινώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ.	^15.1 "But having once heard someone reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and saying that Mind is that which sets all in order and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me in a way good that Mind should be the cause of all. And I thought that if this were so, the ordering Mind orders all things and places each thing wherever it is best.
^15.2 εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπη ἢ γίνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.	^15.2 If, then, anyone wished to find the cause concerning each thing, how it comes to be, perishes, or exists, he must find this concerning it: how it is best for it either to exist, or to suffer, or to do anything else whatsoever. From this argument, then, it belongs to a person to consider nothing else regarding himself and other things except what is best and highest; and it is necessary that this same person know also what is worse, for the knowledge concerning both is the same.
^15.3 ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσασθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος.	^15.3 Reasoning thus, I was glad to think I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher to my mind regarding the cause of existing things, and that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round, and when he told me, would go on to explain the cause and necessity, telling what was better, and why it was better that it should be so. And if he said it was in the center, he would explain further how it was better for it to be in the center. And if he showed me these things, I was prepared to long no more for any other kind of cause.
^15.4 καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πή ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτ' αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει.	^15.4 And indeed, regarding the sun, I was prepared in the same way to inquire likewise, and about the moon and the other stars, their relative speeds, their turns, and their other conditions—how it is better for each of them both to act and to be affected as it is affected. For I never thought that he, while claiming that these things were ordered by Mind, would assign to them any other cause than that it is best for them to be just as they are.
^15.5 ἑκάστῳ οὖν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπιδιηγήσασθαι ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦν ἀνεγίνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐλπίδος ᾠχόμην φερόμενος. ἐπεὶ δὲ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.	^15.5 Assigning, then, to each thing its cause, and to all in common what is best for each, I thought he would fully explain the good common to all. And I would not have sold my hopes for much, but taking up his books with great eagerness, I read them as fast as I could, so that I might as quickly as possible know the best and the worse. From a wonderful hope, my friend, I was swept away! For as I went on reading, I saw a man making no use of Mind at all, nor assigning any causes for the setting in order of things, but accusing airs, ethers, waters, and many other strange things!
^15.6 καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐνθάδε διὰ ταῦτα νῦν κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστι στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν τε καὶ δέρματος, ὃ συνέχειν αὐτά.	^15.6 And he seemed to me to have suffered something very similar to someone saying, 'Socrates does all that he does by Mind,' and then, attempting to state the causes of each thing I do, should say first that I am sitting here now for this reason: that my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and have joints separate from one another, while the sinews are capable of being stretched and relaxed, surrounding the bones along with the flesh and skin that holds them together.
^15.7 αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι. καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιάσδε αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον εἶναι παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην, ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν,	^15.7 The bones, then, hanging suspended in their joints, the sinews relaxing and tightening make it possible for me to bend my limbs now, and for this cause, bent together, I am sitting here. And again, concerning my conversing with you, he should state other such causes, blaming voices, airs, hearings, and a thousand other such things, neglecting to state the true causes: that since it seemed better to the Athenians to condemn me, for this reason it has also seemed better to me to sit here, and more just to remain and undergo whatever penalty they order.
^15.8 ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ περὶ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττῃ.	^15.8 For, by the dog, as I think, these sinews and bones would long ago have been somewhere around Megara or Boeotia, carried along by a belief in what is best, had I not thought it more just and noble, rather than fleeing and running away, to undergo whatever penalty the city imposes!
^15.9 ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τε ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.»	^15.9 To call such things causes is exceedingly strange. But if someone were to say that without having such things—bones and sinews and whatever else I have—I would not be able to do what I resolved, he would speak the truth. Yet to say that because of these things I do what I do, and that I act with Mind in this, but not from the choice of what is best, would be a great and protracted carelessness of argument!"
^15.10 Εἶτα ἐπιλέγει· «Διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου ἄν ποτε Ἄτλαντα ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.»	^15.10 Then he adds: "Therefore one man wraps a vortex around the earth and makes the earth stay put under the influence of heaven, while another supports it like a broad trough upon the air as a pedestal. But the power by which they are now set so that they might be placed as best as possible—this power they neither seek nor do they think it has any divine strength; rather, they believe they will someday find an Atlas stronger, more immortal, and more holding all things together than this, and they think nothing of how the good and binding truly binds and holds together."
^15.11 Τοσαῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης περὶ τῆς Ἀναξαγόρου δόξης. ἦν δὲ Ἀναξαγόρου μὲν διάδοχος τῆς τε διατριβῆς ὁμοῦ καὶ τῆς δόξης Ἀρχέλαος, Ἀρχελάου δὲ ἀκουστὴς γεγονέναι λέγεται Σωκράτης. πλὴν ἀλλὰ φυσικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι Ξενοφάνης καὶ Πυθαγόρας, συνακμάσαντες Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, ἀφθαρσίας θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας ἐφιλοσόφησαν· ἐκ τούτων τε καὶ μετὰ τούτους αἱ τῆς Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίας ὑπέστησαν αἱρέσεις, τῶν μὲν τοῖσδε, τῶν δὲ ἑτέροις ἐξηκολουθηκότων, τινῶν δὲ καὶ ἰδίας δόξας ἐπινενοηκότων. πάλιν δ' οὖν ὁ Πλούταρχος τὰς περὶ θεῶν ὑπολήψεις τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτον γράφει τὸν τρόπον·	^15.11 So much for Socrates concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras. Archelaus was the successor of Anaxagoras in his school and doctrine, and Socrates is said to have been a hearer of Archelaus. Nevertheless, other natural philosophers, such as Xenophanes and Pythagoras, who flourished at the same time as Anaxagoras, philosophized on the imperishability of God and the immortality of the soul. From these and after these arose the schools of Greek philosophy, some following these men, others following others, and some devising their own unique opinions. Plutarch, then, writes again in this manner concerning their views of the gods:

Chapter 16

☜ ☞

Eusebius presents a catalog summarizing the widely divergent and contradictory theological views held by various Greek philosophers:

Atheists: Diagoras, Theodorus, Euhemerus (who treated gods as mortal men), Euripides (veiled atheism via Sisyphus).

Rational Order Posited: Anaxagoras and Plato (Mind/God ordering pre-existing matter).

Epicurean / Sceptical Critiques: Objections raised against divine providence (why do the good suffer while evil triumphs?) and the nature of God (God cannot be burdened by creating or managing the world).

Early Physical & Stoic Definitions: Thales (cosmos as God), Anaximander (stars as gods), Democritus (spherical fire-soul), Pythagoras (Monad vs. Dyad), Socrates/Plato (pure transcendent Mind), Aristotle (unmoved form on the outer sphere), Stoics (immanent craftsman-fire/spirit), Epicurus (anthropomorphic, unconcerned atoms).

Eusebius concludes by underscoring that these major Greek theological developments occurred very late in history compared to the ancient Hebrew scriptures. He argues that Greek philosophy was either mired in materialist polytheism inherited from Egypt and Phoenicia (which deified dead mortals) or came to the knowledge of one Supreme Mind only recently through Anaxagoras and his successors.

^16.1 «Ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων, καθάπερ Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος καὶ Εὐήμερος ὁ Τεγεάτης, καθόλου φασὶ μὴ εἶναι θεούς· τὸν δὲ Εὐήμερον καὶ Καλλίμαχος ὁ Κυρηναῖος αἰνίττεται ἐν τοῖς ἰάμβοις. καὶ Εὐριπίδης ὁ τραγῳδοποιὸς ἀποκαλύψασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἠθέλησε, δεδοικὼς τὸν Ἄρειον πάγον, ἐνέφηνε δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· τὸν γὰρ Σίσυφον εἰσήγαγε προστάτην ταύτης τῆς δόξης, καὶ συνηγόρησεν αὐτοῦ τῇ γνώμῃ.	^16.1 "Some of the philosophers, like Diagoras of Melos, Theodorus of Cyrene, and Euhemerus of Tegea, say outright that gods do not exist at all; Callimachus of Cyrene also hints at Euhemerus in his Iambics. And Euripides the tragic poet was unwilling to reveal his view openly out of fear of the Areopagus, but hinted at it in this manner: he introduced Sisyphus as the champion of this opinion and agreed with his view."
^16.2 Ἐπὶ τούτοις πάλιν τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν εἰσάγει, πρῶτον φάσκων αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς φρονῆσαι περὶ θεοῦ. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· "Ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ὡς εἱστήκει κατ' ἀρχὰς τὰ σώματα, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε θεοῦ καὶ τὰς γενέσεις τῶν ὅλων ἐποίησεν. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ ἑστηκότα ὑπέθετο τὰ πρῶτα σώματα, ἀτάκτως δὲ κινούμενα· διὸ, φησὶν, ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστήσας ὡς τάξις ἀταξίας ἐστὶ βελτίων, διεκόσμησεν αὐτά."	^16.2 "In addition to these, he introduces Anaxagoras, stating that he was the first to hold correct views about God. He speaks as follows: 'Anaxagoras says that in the beginning bodies stood at rest, but the Mind of God ordered them and produced the generations of the universe. Plato, however, posited that the primary bodies were not at rest, but moving in a disorderly fashion; wherefore, he says, God, knowing that order is better than disorder, set them in order.'"
^16.3 Οἷς ἐπιλέγει· "Ἁμαρτάνουσιν δὲ ἀμφότεροι, ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησαν ἐπιστρεφόμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζοντα· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ζῷον, πεπληρωμένον τε πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῦ παντὸς ἄδεκτον, ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας τε καὶ ἀφθαρσίας, ἀνεπιστρεφές ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. κακοδαίμων δ' ἂν εἴη, ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτονος ἀχθοφορῶν καὶ μεριμνῶν εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευήν.	^16.3 To which he adds: "Both err because they made God concerned with human affairs, and creating the cosmos for that reason; for the blessed and imperishable Being, full of all goods and incapable of receiving any evil, being entirely absorbed in the preservation of its own happiness and immortality, is unconcerned with human affairs. It would be miserable if, like a laborer or carpenter, it bore burdens and worries for the construction of the cosmos.
^16.4 καὶ πάλιν, ὁ θεὸς ὃν λέγουσιν, ἤτοι τὸν ἔμπροσθεν αἰῶνα οὐκ ἦν, ὅτε ἦν ἀκίνητα τὰ σώματα, ἢ ὅτε ἀτάκτως ἐκινεῖτο, ἢ ἐκοιμᾶτο, ἢ ἐγρηγόρει, ἢ οὐδέτερον τούτων. ἢ οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον ἔστι δέξασθαι· πᾶς γὰρ θεὸς αἰώνιος· οὔτε τὸ δεύτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἐκοιμᾶτο ἐξ αἰῶνος ὁ θεὸς, ἐτεθνήκει· αἰώνιος γὰρ ὕπνος θάνατός ἐστιν. ἀλλά γε ἄδεκτος ὕπνου ὁ θεός· τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγὺς ὕπνου κεχώρισται.	^16.4 And again: the God whom they describe either did not exist in the preceding age when bodies were motionless or moving disorderly, or He was asleep, or awake, or neither of these. Now, the first option cannot be accepted, for every god is eternal; nor the second, for if God were asleep from eternity, He would be dead, since eternal sleep is death. Yet God cannot accept sleep, for what is immortal and close to God is separated from sleep.
^16.5 εἰ δὲ ἦν ὁ θεὸς ἐγρηγορὼς, ἤτοι ἐνέλιπεν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν, ἢ πεπλήρωτο ἐν μακαριότητι. καὶ οὔτε κατὰ τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστι μακάριος ὁ θεός· τὸ γὰρ ἐλλεῖπον εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ μακάριον· οὔτε κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον· μηδὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσι. πῶς δὲ, εἴπερ ὁ θεός ἐστι καὶ τῇ τούτου φροντίδι τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀστεῖον τὸ ἐναντίον πάσχει; Ἀγαμέμνων τε γὰρ ἀμφότερον, 'βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής,' ὑπὸ μοιχοῦ καὶ μοιχαλίδος ἡττηθεὶς ἐδολοφονήθη· καὶ ὁ τούτου δὲ συγγενὴς Ἡρακλῆς, πολλὰ τῶν ἐπιλυμαινομένων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον καθάρας, ὑπὸ Δηϊανείρας φαρμακευθεὶς ἐδολοφονήθη."	^16.5 If God was awake, He either lacked happiness or was full of blessedness. Under the first condition, God is not blessed, for whatever lacks happiness is not blessed; nor under the second, for lacking nothing, He would not attempt useless tasks. Moreover, if God exists and human affairs are governed by His care, why does the counterfeit prosper while the noble suffers the opposite? For Agamemnon, both 'a good king and a mighty warrior,' was defeated and murdered by an adulterer and an adulteress; and his relative Heracles, having cleansed many of the plagues ruining human life, was poisoned and murdered by Deianira!"
^16.6 "Θαλῆς τὸν κόσμον εἶναι τὸν θεόν. Ἀναξίμανδρος τοὺς ἀστέρας οὐρανίους θεούς. Δημόκριτος θεὸν ἐν πυρὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν. Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεόν· καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ δαίμονα καὶ τὸ κακὸν, περὶ ἥν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος, ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος."	^16.6 "Thales says that the cosmos is God. Anaximander says the stars are heavenly gods. Democritus says God is the spherical fire, the soul of the cosmos. Pythagoras says that of the principles, the Monad is God and the Good, which is the nature of the One, Mind itself; whereas the indefinite Dyad is a daemon and the Evil, around which is material multiplicity, and that the visible world is also such."
^16.7 Μετὰ δὲ τούτους οἱ νέοι τῷ χρόνῳ πῶς ἐδόξαζον ἄκουε· "Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων ἓν τὸ μονοφυὲς καὶ αὐτοφυὲς, τὸ μοναδικὸν, τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἀγαθόν. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸν νοῦν σπεύδει. νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεὸς χωριστὸν εἶδος, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἀμιγὲς πάσης ὕλης καὶ μηδενὶ παθητῷ συμπεπλεγμένον.	^16.7 Hear now how those who were younger in time held their opinions: "Socrates and Plato hold that the Good is One, single-natured, self-begotten, monadic, and truly existing. All these names converge upon Mind. God, then, is Mind, a separate Form—that is, unmixed with any matter and unentangled with anything passive.
^16.8 Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος χωριστὸν, ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντὸς, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλούμενον· διῃρημένου δὲ τούτου κατὰ σφαίρας τῇ μὲν φύσει συναφεῖς, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ κεχωρισμένας, ἑκάστην οἴεται τῶν σφαιρῶν ζῷον εἶναι σύνθετον ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν αἰθέριον, κινούμενον κυκλοφορικῶς, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ λόγος ἀκίνητος, αἴτιος τῆς κινήσεως κατ' ἐνέργειαν.	^16.8 Aristotle holds that the supreme God is a separate Form mounted upon the sphere of the universe, which is an etherial body, called by him the fifth element. This sphere being divided into sub-spheres naturally connected but logically distinct, he thinks each of the spheres is a living creature composed of body and soul, of which the body is etherial, moving circularly, while the soul is motionless reason, the cause of active motion.
^16.9 Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικὸν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου, περιειληφότος πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίνεται. καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον δι' ὅλης τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε. θεὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι.	^16.9 The Stoics declare God to be intelligent, a creative fire proceeding systematically toward the generation of the world, comprehending all the seminal reasons according to which each thing comes to be by fate; and a spirit pervading the whole cosmos, taking different names according to the matter through which it passes. They call God the cosmos, the stars, the earth, and the supreme Mind in the ether.
^16.10 Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἄλλας τέσσαρας φύσεις κατὰ γένος ἀφθάρτους τάσδε, τὰ ἄτομα, τὸ κενὸν, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰς ὁμοιότητας, αὗται δὲ λέγονται ὁμοιομέρειαι, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα."	^16.10 Epicurus holds that all the gods are human-shaped, but all are apprehendable by reason through the subtlety of the nature of images. The same philosopher posits four other indestructible natures by genus: atoms, void, infinity, and similarities (also called homeomeries), as well as the elements."
^16.11 Τοιαῦται μὲν δὴ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ αἱ περὶ θεοῦ διαστάσεις τε καὶ δυσφημίαι, ὧν πρώτους ὁ λόγος συνίστησι τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν Πλάτωνά τε καὶ Σωκράτην νοῦν καὶ θεὸν ἐπιστῆσαι τῷ κόσμῳ. οὗτοι δὴ κομιδῇ παῖδες τοῖς χρόνοις ἀποδείκνυνται καθ' οὓς χρόνους τὰ ὕστατα ἱστορεῖται τῆς Ἑβραίων ἀρχαιολογίας.	^16.11 Such were the divisions and blasphemies of the natural philosophers concerning God, among whom argument shows that Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Socrates were the first to set Mind and God over the cosmos. These men are shown to be mere children in time compared to the era in which the final records of Hebrew antiquity are set down.
^16.12 οὐκ ἦν ἄρα παλαιτάτη παρὰ πᾶσιν ᝈλλησι καὶ τοῖς πρόπαλαι τὴν πολύθεον δεισιδαιμονίαν παρά τε Φοίνιξι καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις εἰσηγησαμένοις ἡ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ γνῶσις, ἣν πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξήνεγκαν. καὶ μὴν τὰ τῆς πολυθέου δεισιδαιμονίας πάντων ἐθνῶν ἐκράτει· ἀλλ' ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ τὴν ἀληθῆ περιέχοντα θεολογίαν, ἀλλ' ἣν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Φοίνικες πρῶτοι πάντων συστήσασθαι ἐμαρτυρήθησαν.	^16.12 Therefore, the knowledge of the God of all things—which Anaxagoras and those around him were the first Greeks to publish—was not the most ancient among all the Greeks or those who of old introduced polytheistic superstition among the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Indeed, polytheistic superstition held sway over all nations; but it contained, as it seems, not true theology, but that which Egyptians and Phoenicians were recorded to have established first of all.
^16.13 αὕτη δὲ ἦν θεοὺς μὲν οὐδαμῶς, οὐδέ τινας θείας δυνάμεις, ἄνδρας δὲ ἤδη πάλαι ἐν νεκροῖς κειμένους θεολογοῦσα, ὡς ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας πάλαι ἀπέδειξε λόγος. φέρ' οὖν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν τὸν λόγον. ἐπειδὴ τῶν φυσικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ μὲν πάντα κατέβαλλον ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οἱ δ' αὖ πάλιν τούτοις ἀνθεῖλκον, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον καὶ Παρμενίδην Ἐλεάτην, οἱ δὴ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνῄρουν, μηδὲν εἶναι φάσκοντες καταληπτὸν τῶν ἐν αἰσθήσει, διὸ μόνῳ δεῖν πιστεύειν τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντειρημένα διασκεψώμεθα.	^16.13 This superstition theologized not gods at all, nor any divine powers, but men who had long been dead, as the argument of truth demonstrated long ago. Come then, let us resume our account. Since some of the natural philosophers reduced everything to the senses, while others pulled in the opposite direction—such as Xenophanes of Colophon and Parmenides of Elea, who did away with the senses entirely, claiming that nothing in sense perception is graspable and that reason alone must be trusted—let us examine the arguments directed against them.

Chapter 17

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius quotes an argument refuting Eleatic and Megarian philosophers (such as Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, and Stilpo) who rejected sensory perception and declared that reality is one, unchanging, and unmoving, leaving reason as the sole path to truth.
The text demonstrates the inner contradiction of this position:

Sense perception is real because the act of perceiving involves being acted upon by an external object, which logically proves multiplicity and motion.

The Eleatics rely on sensory evidence even to formulate their critiques (e.g., Melissus citing observations of hot becoming cold to argue that senses deceive). If they truly believed senses were useless, they should destroy their senses as Pandarus threatened to burn his bows in the Iliad.

Philosophers who deny senses in theory continue to rely on them in practice.

Eusebius concludes that sound philosophy must employ both reason and sense perception, and provides a lineage connecting Xenophanes down through Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno, Democritus, Anaxarchus, and finally to Pyrrho, the founder of Scepticism.

^17.1 «Ἄλλοι δ’ ἐγένοντο τούτοις τὴν φωνὴν ἀφιέντες. οἴονται γὰρ δεῖν τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς φαντασίας καταβάλλειν, αὐτῷ δὲ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Μέλισσος ἔλεγον, ὕστερον δ' οἱ περὶ Στίλπωνα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. ὅθεν ἠξίουν οὗτοί γε τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μὴ εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαί τι μηδὲ φθείρεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.	^17.1 "Others arose who voiced agreement with these men. For they thought it necessary to reject both sense perceptions and mental impressions, trusting in reason alone. Such things were said earlier by Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, and later by Stilpo and the Megarians. Hence these men claimed that reality is One, that 'otherness' does not exist, and that nothing is generated, destroyed, or moved at all."
^17.2 τὸν μὲν οὖν πλείω πρὸς τούτους λόγον εἰσόμεθα φιλοσοφοῦντες· νυνὶ μέντοι τοσοῦτον λεκτέον· εἴποιμεν γὰρ ἂν ὡς ὁ μὲν λόγος ἡμῶν εἴη τὸ θειότατον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δεῖ γε καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὥσπερ γε δὴ καὶ σώματος. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἀληθεύειν πέφυκε δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν αἰσθανόμενον μὴ οὐχὶ πάσχειν τι· πάσχων δὲ τὸ πάθος ἂν εἰδείη· γνῶσις οὖν τίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις.	^17.2 "Now, as we pursue philosophy, we shall know more of the argument against them; however, for the present, so much must be said: we might say that our reason is indeed the most divine thing in us, but nevertheless, we also have need of sense perception, just as we have need of a body. And that sense perception is naturally suited to yield truth is clear; for it is impossible that the person who perceives should not be affected in some way, and being affected, he would know the affection. Therefore, sense perception is also a kind of knowledge.
^17.3 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τί ἐστιν, ἅπαν δὲ τὸ πάσχον ὑπό του πάσχει, πάντως ἕτερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν εἴη ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἕτερον· οἷον τὸ χρῶμα καὶ ὁ ψόφος· ἔπειτα δὲ ἓν τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται· καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀκίνητον· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησίς ἐστι κίνησις.	^17.3 Furthermore, if perceiving is being affected in some way, and everything that is affected is affected by something, the acting agent and the affected subject must be entirely distinct. Thus, first of all, there must be what is called 'otherness'—such as color and sound. Secondly, reality will not be One; nor, indeed, will it be motionless, for sense perception itself is motion.
^17.4 ταύτῃ δὲ βούλεται πᾶς τις κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἅτε δὴ πιστεύων, οἶμαι, ταῖς ὑγιαινούσαις μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς νοσούσαις. εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ δεινός τις ἔρως αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἐντέτηκεν. οὐδείς γέ τοι μὴ μεμηνὼς ἕλοιτ' ἄν ποτε μίαν αἴσθησιν ἀποβάλλειν, ὅπως αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γένοιτο.	^17.4 For this reason, everyone desires his senses to be in a natural state, trusting, I suppose, healthy senses rather than diseased ones. Reasonable it is, then, that a fierce love for them is implanted in us. Indeed, no one who is not mad would ever choose to cast away even a single sense, even if all other good things were to become his!
^17.5 τοὺς δὴ διαβάλλοντας αὐτὰς ἐχρῆν, πεπεισμένους γε διότι μάτην ἔχοιεν αὐτὰς, εἰπόντας ἅπερ ὁ Πάνδαρος λέγει παρὰ τῷ Ὁμήρῳ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τόξων· 'αὐτίκ' ἔπειτ' ἀπ' ἐμεῖο κάρη τάμοι ἀλλότριος φὼς, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τάδε τόξα φαεινῷ ἐν πυρὶ θείην, χερσὶ διακλάσας, ἀνεμώλια γάρ μοι ὀπηδεῖ,' τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διαλυμήνασθαι πάσας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑαυτῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπίστευεν αὐτοῖς ἔργῳ διδάσκουσιν ὡς εἰς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δέοιντο.	^17.5 Therefore, those who slander the senses—if they were truly convinced that they possess them in vain—ought first to quote what Pandarus says in Homer regarding his bows: 'Straightway then may a stranger's hand cut off my head if I do not throw these weapons into the glaring fire, snapping them with my hands, for they follow me empty as wind!'—and after saying this, destroy all their own senses! For in this way one might believe them as they showed by deed that they had no need of them.
^17.6 νυνὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀτοπώτατόν ἐστι· ἀχρήστους γὰρ ἀποφαίνοντες αὐτὰς τῷ λόγῳ τοῖς ἔργοις τὰ μάλιστα χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν αὐταῖς.	^17.6 As it stands, however, this is the most absurd thing of all: while demonstrating by reason that the senses are useless, they continue in practice to use them to the absolute utmost!
^17.7 ὅ γέ τοι Μέλισσος ἐθέλων ἐπιδεικνύναι διότι τῶν φαινομένων καὶ ἐν ὄψει τούτων οὐδὲν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, διὰ τῶν φαινομένων ἀποδείκνυσιν αὐτῶν· φησὶ γοῦν, 'εἰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶν, τὸ δὲ τεθνηκὸς, καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα φασὶν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, εἶναι ἐχρῆν καὶ τὸ ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μεταπίπτειν, μηδὲ γίνεσθαι ἕτερον, ἀλλ' εἶναι ὅμοιον οἷόν περ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. νῦν δὲ φαμὲν ὀρθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ συνιέναι· δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλακὸν, καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν σκληρόν.'	^17.7 Melissus, at any rate, wishing to demonstrate that none of these phenomena and visible things truly exist, demonstrates it through these very phenomena! He says, at least: 'For if water, air, fire, iron, and gold exist, and one thing is living and another dead, and black and white, and all other things that humans say are real—and if we see and hear correctly—then reality ought to be such as it first seemed to us to be, and not shift nor become different, but remain each thing just as it is. But now we claim to see, hear, and understand correctly, yet it seems to us that hot becomes cold, cold becomes hot, hard becomes soft, and soft becomes hard.'
^17.8 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως ἐπύθετό τις ἄν· ἆρ' οὖν ὅτι ὃ νῦν θερμόν ἐστι κἄπειτα τοῦτο γίνεται ψυχρὸν οὐκ αἰσθόμενος ἔγνως; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὅπερ γὰρ ἔφην, εὑρεθείη ἂν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναιρῶν καὶ ἐλέγχων διὰ τὸ μάλιστα πιστεύειν αὐταῖς.	^17.8 When he says these and many other such things, someone might very reasonably ask: 'Did you not learn that what is now hot then becomes cold by perceiving it through your senses?' And likewise concerning the other things. For as I said, he will be found doing nothing other than doing away with and refuting the senses precisely by trusting them the most!
^17.9 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι σχεδὸν ἱκανὰς ἤδη δεδώκασιν εὐθύνας· ἐξίτηλοί γε τοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς εἰ μηδὲ ἐλέχθησαν τὸ παράπαν. ἤδη μέντοι θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων παραλαμβάνοντας.»	^17.9 However, such arguments have already paid a sufficient penalty; indeed, they have faded away as though they had never been spoken at all. Now, therefore, let us confidently declare that those who take both the senses and reason together for the knowledge of reality are practicing philosophy correctly."
^17.10 Τοιοίδε μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Ξενοφάνην, ὃς δὴ λέγεται συνακμάσαι τοῖς ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν. Ξενοφάνους δὲ ἀκουστὴς γέγονε Παρμενίδης· τούτου Μέλισσος, οὗ Ζήνων, οὗ Λεύκιππος, οὗ Δημόκριτος, οὗ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Νεσσᾶς· τοῦ δὲ Νεσσᾶ Μητρόδωρος, οὗ Διογενὴς, οὗ Ἀνάξαρχος. Ἀναξάρχου δὲ γνώριμος γέγονε Πύρρων, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ τῶν Σκεπτικῶν ἐπικληθέντων διατριβὴ συνέστη· οὓς καὶ αὐτοὺς μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ παράπαν μήτ' ἐν αἰσθήσει μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ καταληπτὸν ὁριζομένους, ἐπέχοντας δ' ἐν πᾶσιν, ὅπως ἀπήλεγχον οἱ ἀντιδοξάζοντες μαθεῖν πάρεστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγράμματος ὧδέ πη πρὸς λέξιν ἔχοντος·	^17.10 Such, then, were those around Xenophanes, who is said to have flourished alongside the followers of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Parmenides was a pupil of Xenophanes; Melissus of Parmenides; Zeno of Melissus; Leucippus of Zeno; Democritus of Leucippus; Protagoras and Nessas of Democritus; Metrodorus of Nessas; Diogenes of Metrodorus; and Anaxarchus of Diogenes. Pyrrho became an acquaintance of Anaxarchus, and from him arose the school of the so-called Sceptics. How those who held opposing views refuted these Sceptics—who defined nothing at all as graspable either in sensation or in reason, but suspended judgment on all things—can be learned from the indicated treatise, which runs word-for-word as follows:

Chapter 18

☜ ☞

In this famous chapter, Eusebius quotes the Aristotelian philosopher Aristocles of Messene to refute Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Cyrenaic Hedonism:

18.1–18.4: Introduces Pyrrho of Elis and his disciple Timon of Phlius, presenting the fundamental core of Pyrrhonism: since things are indifferent (adiaphora), unmeasurable (astathmeta), and undecidable (anepikrita), neither our senses nor opinions are true or false. Thus, we must withhold judgment (epochē), leading first to non-assertion (aphasia) and then to tranquility (ataraxia).

18.5–18.25: Aristocles systematically refutes this position by pointing out its internal self-contradictions:

1) If everything is indifferent, Sceptics have no basis for criticizing others or claiming Pyrrho was wiser.

2) Their total inaction and claim of "knowing nothing" while writing treatises, lecturing, and avoiding real-world dangers (like dogs or cliffs) proves they rely on knowledge and perception in practice while denying it in theory.

3) The Sceptic self-refutation dynamic—claiming the argument "sweeps itself away like a purgative drug"—is rejected because unlike a drug, an argument must remain in the soul as a lasting conviction.

18.26–18.30: Provides critical biographical anecdotes regarding Pyrrho (fleeing a dog, getting angry over sacrificial provisions), Timon (a former theater dancer writing satirical Silloi), and Aenesidemus (who recently revived this "nonsense" in Alexandria).

18.31–18.32: Shifts to Aristippus of Cyrene, his daughter Arete, and his grandson Aristippus "the Mother-Taught" (Metrodidaktos), examining the Cyrenaic doctrine that only subjective feelings/passions (pathē) are comprehensible, classifying existence into pain (storm), pleasure (gentle wave), and neutrality (calm sea).

^18.1 «Ἀναγκαίως δ’ ἔχει πρὸ παντὸς διασκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν γνώσεως· εἰ γὰρ αὖ μηδὲν πεφύκαμεν γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκοπεῖν.	^18.1 "It is necessary before all else to examine our own power of knowledge; for if we are by nature incapable of knowing anything, there is no longer any need to inquire about other things."
^18.2 ἐγένοντο μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς οἱ ἀφέντες τήνδε τὴν φωνὴν, οἷς ἀντείρηκεν Ἀριστοτέλης. ἴσχυσε μέντοι τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ Πύρρων ὁ Ἠλεῖος· ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ καταλέλοιπεν, ὁ δὲ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ, τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι.	^18.2 "Now among the ancients, too, there were some who uttered this phrase, whom Aristotle answered. Pyrrho of Elis also grew influential saying such things, although he himself left nothing in writing; but his disciple Timon says that he who intends to be happy must look to these three things: first, what things are like by nature; second, in what manner we ought to be disposed toward them; and finally, what will result for those who are so disposed."
^18.3 τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν ἐπ’ ἴσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα, διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι, περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν.	^18.3 "Things themselves, Timon says Pyrrho declared, are equally indifferent, unmeasurable, and undecidable; for this reason neither our senses nor our opinions speak truth or tell lies. Therefore, we ought not to put our trust in them, but be without opinions, uninclined, and unwavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not."
^18.4 τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν, Αἰνησίδημος δὲ ἡδονήν.»	^18.4 "For those who are thus disposed, Timon says the result will be first speechlessness (aphasia), and then freedom from disturbance (ataraxia); but Aenesidemus says pleasure."
^18.5 «Τὰ μὲν οὖν κεφάλαια τῶν λεγομένων ἐστὶ ταῦτα· σκεψώμεθα δ' εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα πάντα φασὶν εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κελεύουσι μηδενὶ προστίθεσθαι, μηδὲ δοξάζειν, εἰκότως ἂν, οἶμαι, πύθοιτό τις αὐτῶν, ἆρά γε διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ διαφέρειν αὐτὰ νομίζοντες ἢ οὔ; πάντως γὰρ, εἰ μὲν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνοιεν ἄν. ὥστε ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοῖς εἶναί τινας τοὺς τὰ ψευδῆ περὶ τῶν ὄντων δοξάζοντας· αὐτοὶ τοίνυν εἶεν ἂν οἱ τἀληθῆ λέγοντες· οὕτω δὲ εἴη ἂν ἀληθές τι καὶ ψεῦδος. εἰ δ' οὐχ ἁμαρτάνομεν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ ὄντα διαφέρειν οἰόμενοι, τί παθόντες ἐπιπλήττουσιν ἡμῖν; αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοιεν ἂν ἀξιοῦντες μὴ διαφέρειν αὐτά.	^18.5 "These, then, are the main points of what they say; let us examine whether they speak correctly. Since they say that all things are equally indifferent, and for this reason bid us to assent to nothing nor hold opinions, one might reasonably ask them, I think: Do those who believe things differ commit an error, or do they not? For in every way, if they commit an error, they would not be conceiving things correctly. Thus they are forced to admit that there are some people who hold false opinions about existing things—and they themselves would be those who speak the truth! In this way, there would be something true and something false. But if we, the many who believe that things differ, do not err, why in the world do they rebuke us? For they themselves would be in error in claiming that things do not differ!
^18.6 καὶ μὴν εἰ καὶ δοίημεν αὐτοῖς ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα πάντα εἶναι, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν διαφέροιεν οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τῶν πολλῶν. τίς οὖν εἴη ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ σοφία; καὶ διὰ τί Τίμων τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις λοιδορεῖται πᾶσι, Πύρρωνα δ' ὑμνεῖ μόνον;	^18.6 Furthermore, even if we were to grant them that all things are equally indifferent, it is clear that they themselves would not differ from the many at all. What then would be their wisdom? And why does Timon revile all others, yet sing praises of Pyrrho alone?
^18.7 ἔτι γε μὴν εἰ ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα πάντα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ μηδὲν δοξάζειν, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ ταῦτα διαφέροι· λέγω δὲ τὸ διαφέρειν ἢ μὴ διαφέρειν, καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν ἢ μὴ δοξάζειν. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ, ὥς φησι Τίμων, διὰ τί ναί καὶ διὰ τί οὔ, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ διὰ τί; φανερὸν οὖν ὡς ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ζητεῖν· ὥστε παυσάσθωσαν ἐνοχλοῦντες. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε μεμήνασι πόρρω τέχνης ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν διακελευόμενοι μὴ δοξάζειν, ἅμα δὲ κελεύοντες αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ λέγοντες ὡς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι δέοι, κἄπειτα ἀποφαινόμενοι· καὶ ἀξιοῦσι μὲν μηδενὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, πείθεσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς κελεύουσιν· εἶτα λέγοντες μηδὲν εἰδέναι πάντας ἐλέγχουσιν ὡς εὖ εἰδότες.	^18.7 Moreover, if all things are equally indifferent, and because of this one ought to form no opinions, then these very things themselves would not differ—I mean differing or not differing, and holding opinions or not holding opinions. For why are such things any more so than not so? Or, as Timon says, 'Why yes, and why no, and the very why itself?' It is clear, then, that inquiry is done away with; so let them stop bothering us! For as it is, they are raving far outside their art: at once commanding us not to form opinions, while simultaneously bidding us to do this very thing; saying that one ought to declare nothing about anything, and then declaring things! They expect us to assent to nothing, yet command us to obey them; and then, claiming to know nothing, they refute everyone as if they knew full well.
^18.8 ἀνάγκη τε τοὺς φάσκοντας ὡς ἄδηλα πάντα εἴη δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ σιωπᾶν ἢ ἀποφαίνεσθαί τι καὶ λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοιεν, δῆλον ὅτι πρός γε τοὺς τοιούτους οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴη λόγος· εἰ δ’ ἀποφαίνοιντο, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως πὼς ἢ εἶναί τι φαῖεν ἂν ἢ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἀμέλει νυνί φασιν ὡς εἴη πάντα ἄγνωστα καὶ νομιστὰ πᾶσι.	^18.8 And it is necessary for those who assert that all things are non-evident to do one of two things: either remain silent or declare and speak something. If they keep quiet, it is obvious that no argument could be made against such men; but if they make declarations, they would surely say in some way or another either that something is or is not—just as, to be sure, they now say that all things are unknown and matters of mere convention to everyone.
^18.9 ὡς δ’ οὐδὲν τοῦτο τοίνυν ὁ ἀξιῶν ἤτοι δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἔνεστιν αὐτὸ συνεῖναι λεγόμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὐ δηλοῖ, καθάπαξ οὐδεὶς οὐδ’ οὕτω πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη λόγος. εἰ δὲ σημαίνοι, πάντως ἢ ἄπειρα λέγοι ἂν ἢ πεπερασμένα· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄπειρα, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἂν εἴη λόγος πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀπείρου γὰρ γνῶσις οὐκ ἔστι· πεπερασμένων δὲ ὄντων τῶν δηλουμένων ἢ ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ὁρίζει τι καὶ κρίνει. πῶς οὖν ἄγνωστα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα πάντα εἴη ἄν; εἰ δὲ φαίη ταὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἔσται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐρεῖ τι καὶ οὐκ ἐρεῖ, καὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος ἀναιρήσει λόγον, ἔτι δὲ ὁμολογῶν ψεύδεσθαι πιστεύειν ἑαυτῷ φησι δεῖν.	^18.9 Now he who asserts 'this is nothing' either clarifies the matter so that what is said can be understood, or he does not. If he does not clarify it, then once again no argument can be made against such a person. But if he signifies something, he must speak either of infinite things or finite things: if infinite, there is still no argument against him, for there is no knowledge of the infinite; but if the things signified are finite or even one single thing, he who says this defines and judges something! How, then, could all things be unknown and undecidable? And if he should say that the same thing both is and is not, first of all the same thing will be both true and false; secondly, he will speak and not speak, destroying argument by using argument; and further, while admitting that he lies, he claims we ought to trust him!
^18.10 ἄξιον δὲ ζητῆσαι πόθεν καὶ μαθόντες ἄδηλα πάντα φασὶν εἶναι. δεῖ γὰρ εἰδέναι πρότερον αὐτοὺς τί δή ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ δῆλον· οὕτω γοῦν ἂν ἔχοιεν λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἴη τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα. πρῶτον γὰρ εἰδέναι χρὴ τὴν κατάφασιν, εἶτα τὴν ἀπόφασιν. εἰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ δῆλον, οὐκ ἂν εἰδεῖεν οὐδὲ τί τὸ ἄδηλον.	^18.10 It is also worth asking from where they learned that all things are non-evident. For they must first know what on earth 'evident' is; for only so could they say that things are not of such a kind. For one must first know the affirmation before the negation. If they are ignorant of what the evident is like, they would not even know what the non-evident is.
^18.11 ὁπόταν γε μὴν Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῇ ὑποτυπώσει τοὺς ἐννέα διεξίῃ τρόπους (κατὰ τοσούτους γὰρ ἀποφαίνειν ἄδηλα τὰ πράγματα πεπείραται) πότερον αὐτὸν φῶμεν εἰδότα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀγνοοῦντα; φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ζῷα διαφέρει, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ, καὶ αἱ πόλεις, καὶ οἱ βίοι, καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ οἱ νόμοι· καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δέ φησιν ἡμῶν ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ ἔξωθεν λυμαινόμενα τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀποστήματα, καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κινήσεις· ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, καὶ ἐγρηγορότας καὶ κοιμωμένους, καὶ ὑγιαίνοντας καὶ νοσοῦντας· οὐδενός τε ἡμᾶς ἁπλοῦ καὶ ἀκραιφνοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.	^18.11 Whenever Aenesidemus in his Outline goes through the nine tropes (for by so many has he attempted to show that things are non-evident), shall we say that he speaks them as one who knows or as one who is ignorant? For he says that animals differ, and we ourselves, and cities, lifestyles, customs, and laws; and he says our senses are weak, and that many external things ruin our knowledge—such as distances, magnitudes, and motions; and further, that the young and the old, the awake and the sleeping, the healthy and the sick are not disposed alike; and that we grasp nothing pure and unmixed.
^18.12 πάντα γὰρ εἶναι συγκεχυμένα καὶ πρός τι λεγόμενα. ταῦτα δὲ, φημὶ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κομψολογοῦντα αὐτὸν ἡδέως ἄν τις ἤρετο, πότερον εὖ εἰδὼς λέγοι διότι τὰ πράγματα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ἢ ἀγνοῶν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ᾔδει, πῶς ἂν ἡμεῖς αὐτῷ πιστεύοιμεν; εἰ δ’ ἐγίνωσκε, κομιδῇ τις ἦν ἠλίθιος ἅμα μὲν ἄδηλα πάντα ἀποφαινόμενος, ἅμα δὲ τοσαῦτα λέγων εἰδέναι.	^18.12 For all things are confused and relative. One would gladly ask him as he utters these and such clever speeches: Does he speak knowing full well that things are in this condition, or being ignorant? If he did not know, how could we trust him? But if he knew, he was utterly foolish—declaring all things non-evident on the one hand, and saying he knew so many things on the other!
^18.13 καὶ μὴν ὁπότε γε τοιαῦτα διεξίοιεν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐπαγωγήν τινα λέγουσι, δεικνύντες ὁποῖ’ ἄττα εἴη τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται πίστις. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτῇ συγκατατίθενται, δῆλον ὅτι δοξάζουσιν· εἰ δ’ οὐ πιστεύουσιν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡμεῖς προσέχειν αὐτοῖς βουληθείημεν.	^18.13 Moreover, whenever they go through such arguments, they offer nothing other than an induction, showing what the phenomena and particular details are like; and such a thing is and is called a conviction (pistis). If, then, they assent to it, it is clear that they hold opinions; but if they do not trust it, neither would we wish to pay them any attention!
^18.14 ὅ γε μὴν Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι διηγεῖται, μακρόν τινα κατατείνας λόγον, ὡς ἐντύχοι τῷ Πύρρωνι βαδίζοντι Πυθοῖδε παρὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου, καὶ τίνα διαλεχθεῖεν ἀλλήλοις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ εὐλόγως ἄν τις αὐτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφοντι παραστὰς εἴποι, τί, ὦ πονηρὲ, ἐνοχλεῖς σεαυτῷ ταῦτα συγγράφων καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα διηγούμενος; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνέτυχες αὐτῷ ἢ οὐκ ἐνέτυχες, καὶ διελέχθης ἢ οὐ διελέχθης;	^18.14 Timon, at any rate, in his Python, drawing out a long narrative, relates how he met Pyrrho walking to Delphi near the sanctuary of Amphiaraus, and what they discussed with one another. Would not someone reasonably stand by him as he wrote these things and say: 'Why, wretched man, do you trouble yourself writing these things and narrating what you do not know? For why did you meet him any more than you didn't meet him, or converse with him any more than you didn't converse?'
^18.15 αὐτός τε ἐκεῖνος ὁ θαυμαστὸς Πύρρων ἆρά γε ᾔδει τὸ διὰ τί βαδίζοι Πύθια θεασόμενος; ἢ καθάπερ οἱ μεμηνότες ἐπλανᾶτο κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν; ἡνίκα δὲ ἤρξατο κατηγορεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτῶν, ἆρά γε φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ μὴ, καὶ τὸν Τίμωνα παθεῖν τι καὶ συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ἢ μὴ προσέχειν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπείσθη, πῶς ἀντὶ χορευτοῦ φιλόσοφος ἐγένετο καὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα διετέλεσε θαυμάζων; εἰ δὲ συγκατετίθετο τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τις, αὐτὸς μὲν φιλοσοφῶν, ἡμᾶς δὲ κωλύων.	^18.15 And did that marvelous Pyrrho himself know why he was walking to view the Pythian games? Or did he wander along the road like a madman? And when he began to accuse men of their ignorance, shall we say he spoke the truth or not, and that Timon experienced something and assented to his words, or paid no attention? If he was not persuaded, how did he become a philosopher instead of a dancer and continue admiring Pyrrho? But if he assented to what was said, he would be absurd—philosophizing himself, while preventing us!
^18.16 ἁπλῶς δὲ θαυμάσαι τις ἂν οἱ Τίμωνος σίλλοι καὶ αἱ κατὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων βλασφημίαι, καὶ αἱ μακραὶ στοιχειώσεις εἰς Αἰνησίδημον, καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄχλος τῶν λόγων τί δήποτε βούλεται αὐτοῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενοι κρείττους ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάσεσθαι ταῦτα γεγράφασι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντας οἴονται δεῖν ἐλέγχειν ὅπως παυσώμεθα φλυαροῦντες, βούλονται δηλονότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι καὶ ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι τοιαῦτα εἴη τὰ πράγματα καθάπερ ἀξιοῖ Πύρρων. ὥστε εἰ πεισθείημεν αὐτοῖς, ἐκ χειρόνων βελτίους ἂν γενοίμεθα, κρίναντες τὰ συμφορώτερα καὶ τοὺς ἄμεινον λέγοντας ἀποδεξάμενοι.	^18.16 In short, one might wonder what Timon's lampoons (Silloi), his slanders against all men, his long elementary treatises to Aenesidemus, and all such crowd of words are trying to achieve! For if they have written these things thinking they will render us better, and for this reason think they must refute everyone so we may stop talking nonsense, they clearly wish us to know the truth and to understand that things are such as Pyrrho claims. Thus, if we were persuaded by them, we would become better instead of worse, having judged what is more expedient and accepted those who speak better.
^18.17 πῶς οὖν ἐπ’ ἴσης ἀδιάφορα τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα δύναιτ’ ἂν εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἀσυγκατάθετοι καὶ ἀδόξαστοι γενοίμεθ’ ἄν; εἰ δ’ οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐστι τῶν λόγων, τί ἡμῖν ἐνοχλοῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τί Τίμων φησὶν 'οὐκ ἂν δὴ Πύρρωνί γ’ ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος;' οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον Πύρρωνα θαυμάσαι τις ἂν ἢ τὸν Κόροιβον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τὸν Μελητίδην, οἳ δὴ δοκοῦσι μωρίᾳ διενεγκεῖν.	^18.17 How then could things possibly be equally indifferent and undecidable? And how could we become withholding of assent and opinionless? But if there is no benefit to their words, why do they bother us? Or why does Timon say, 'No other mortal could contend with Pyrrho'? For one would no more admire Pyrrho than that Coroebus or Meletides, who are thought to have excelled in foolishness!
^18.18 ἐνθυμεῖσθαι μέντοι χρὴ καὶ ταῦτα. ποῖος γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πολίτης, ἢ δικαστὴς, ἢ σύμβουλος, ἢ φίλος, ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος; ἢ τί τῶν κακῶν οὐ τολμήσειεν ἂν ὁ μηδὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς οἰόμενος εἶναι κακὸν, ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἢ δίκαιον, ἢ ἄδικον; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἂν, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους δεδοίκασι καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι· πῶς γὰρ οἵ γε ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀτάραχοι, καθάπερ αὐτοί φασιν, ὄντες;	^18.18 However, one must also keep these things in mind: What kind of citizen, judge, counselor, friend, or simply human being would such a person become? Or what evil would he not dare to do who thinks nothing is truly evil, or shameful, or just, or unjust? For no one could claim that such men fear the laws and punishments; for how could they, being dispassionate and undisturbed, as they themselves say?
^18.19 ὅ γέ τοι Τίμων ταῦτα καὶ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Πύρρωνος· 'ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ' ἀδάμαστον πᾶσιν ὅσοι δαμνᾶτε βροτῶν ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐκ παθέων, δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.'	^18.19 Timon, at least, says these things about Pyrrho: 'Such a man I saw, unboastful and unsubdued, over all mortals whom you subdue—unspoken and spoken light-headed tribes of peoples, weighed down on this side and that by passions, opinion, and futile law-making.'
^18.20 ὁπόταν μέντοι φῶσι τὸ σοφὸν δὴ τοῦτο, ὅτι δέοι κατακολουθοῦντα τῇ φύσει ζῆν καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι, μηδενὶ μέντοι συγκατατίθεσθαι, πάνυ τινές εἰσιν εὐήθεις. εἰ γὰρ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ, τούτῳ γοῦν αὐτῷ δεῖ συγκαταθέσθαι καὶ ὑπολαβεῖν οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτό. τί δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσι δεῖ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ οὐ δεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας γε δὴ μηδὲν, μηδὲ ἔχοντάς τι ὅτῳ κρινοῦμεν;	^18.20 When, however, they utter this 'wise' saying—that one ought to live following nature and customs, yet assenting to nothing—they are exceedingly simple-minded. For if to nothing else, one must at least assent to this very statement and suppose that it is so! And why should one follow nature and customs any more than not, when we know nothing at all, nor have anything by which we shall judge?
^18.21 ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ καὶ παντάπασίν ἐστιν ἠλίθιον, ἐπειδὰν λέγωσιν ὅτι καθάπερ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα συνεκκρίνει μετὰ τῶν περιττωμάτων καὶ ἑαυτὰ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ πάντα ἀξιῶν εἶναι λόγος ἄδηλα μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖ καὶ ἑαυτόν. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐλέγχοι, ληροῖεν ἂν οἱ χρώμενοι τούτῳ. βέλτιον οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδὲ τὸ στόμα διαίρειν.	^18.21 For that other argument is altogether foolish when they say that, just as purgative medicines purge themselves along with bodily wastes, in the same way the argument asserting all things to be non-evident destroys itself along with everything else! For if it refutes itself, those who use it are talking nonsense. It would be better, therefore, for them to keep quiet and not even open their mouths!
^18.22 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅμοιον ἔχει τι τὸ καθαρτικὸν φάρμακον καὶ ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάρμακον ἐκκρίνεται κἀν τοῖς σώμασιν οὐχ ὑπομένει, τὸν μέντοι λόγον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ πιστευόμενον ἀεί· μόνος γὰρ οὗτος εἴη ἂν ὁ ποιῶν ἀσυγκαταθέτους.	^18.22 Furthermore, a purgative medicine and their argument have no similarity at all. For the medicine is excreted and does not remain in bodies, whereas the argument must reside in souls as the same, continuously believed argument; for this alone would be what makes men withhold assent.
^18.23 ὅτι δ’ οὐκ οἴονται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι καὶ ὡδὶ καταμάθοι τις ἄν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι. τὸ δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι γνωρίζειν τι ἦν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ πιστεύει τῇ αἰσθήσει πᾶσι φανερόν· ἀκριβέστερον γὰρ θέλων ἰδεῖν ἀπέψησε τὼ ὀφθαλμὼ καὶ προσῆλθεν ἐγγύτερον καὶ ἐπηλυγάσατο.	^18.23 And that they do not believe a human being can be without opinions, one might also learn as follows: it is impossible for one who perceives not to perceive. And perceiving was recognizing something. That he also trusts perception is manifest to all: for wishing to see more accurately, he wipes his eyes, comes closer, and shades his vision!
^18.24 καὶ μὴν ἡδόμενοί γε καὶ πονοῦντες ἴσμεν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν καιόμενον ἢ τεμνόμενον ἀγνοεῖν. τὰς δὲ δὴ μνήμας καὶ τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τίς οὐκ ἂν φαίη μεθ’ ὑπολήψεως γίγνεσθαι; περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν, τί λέγοι τις ἄν; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦν τούτων, εἰ μὴ ἐπεφύκειμεν ὑπολαμβάνειν. ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἐῶ τἄλλα· τοῖς μέντοι λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων ἐάν τε πιστεύωμεν, ἐάν τε ἀπιστῶμεν, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει δοξάζειν πάντη τε καὶ πάντως.»	^18.24 And indeed, when experiencing pleasure or pain, we know it; for it is impossible for one being burned or cut to be unaware of it. And who would not say that memories and recollections occur with mental conceiving? As for common notions—such as that a thing of a certain kind is a human being—and further concerning sciences and arts, what could anyone say? For none of these would exist if we were not naturally suited to form conceits. But I pass over the rest: whether we trust or distrust what is said by these men, it is completely and in every way necessary to hold opinions."
^18.25 «Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀμήχανόν ἐστι φιλοσοφεῖν τρόπον τοῦτον φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ὡδὶ κατίδοιμεν ἄν. εἰ γὰρ αὖ τῷ ὄντι τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα εἴη, τί λοιπὸν ἀλλ’ ἢ καθάπερ ἐν ὕπνῳ ζῆν ἡμᾶς εἰκῆ καὶ ἐμπλήκτως; ὥστε φλυαροῖεν ἂν οἱ νομοθέται καὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ παιδεύοντες. ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, μόνοι μέντοι τετυφῶσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ μεμηνέναι μανίαν ἐρρωμένην οἱ ταῦτα ληροῦντες.	^18.25 "That it is impossible to philosophize in this manner is clear; and that it is both against nature and against laws we might see as follows. For if things were truly of such a kind, what remains but for us to live at random and impetuously as if in sleep? Thus lawgivers, generals, and teachers would be talking nonsense. But to me, all other men seem to live according to nature, whereas those who talk this drivel alone are puffed up with pride, or rather mad with a powerful madness!
^18.26 οὐχ ἥκιστα μέντοι τοῦτο καταμάθοι τις ἂν κἀκεῖθεν. Ἀντίγονος γοῦν ὁ Καρύστιος κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς γενόμενος χρόνους καὶ ἀναγράψας αὐτῶν τὸν βίον φησὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα διωκόμενον ὑπὸ κυνὸς ἀναφυγεῖν ἐπί τι δένδρον, σκωπτόμενον δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων εἰπεῖν ὡς χαλεπὸν εἴη ἄνθρωπον ἐκδῦναι. Φιλίστης δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ θυούσης, ἔπειτα τῶν φίλων τινὸς ὑποσχομένου τὰ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν καὶ μὴ παρασχομένου, τοῦ μέντοι Πύρρωνος πριαμένου καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντος, ἐπειδήπερ ὁ φίλος ἔλεγεν ὡς οὐ ποιήσαιτο σύμφωνα τοῖς λόγοις οὐδ' ἄξια τῆς ἀπαθείας, εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν, 'ἐν γοῦν γυναικὶ οὐ δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι.' καίτοι δικαίως ἂν εἶπεν ὁ φίλος ὅτι, 'ὦ μάταιε, καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ κυνὶ καὶ πᾶσιν, εἴ τι δή σοι τῶν λόγων τούτων ἐστὶν ὄφελος.'»	^18.26 Nor least of all might one learn this from the following: Antigonus of Carystus, living around the same times and recording their lives, says that Pyrrho, being pursued by a dog, fled up a tree; and when mocked by those present, he said it was hard to strip off the human being! And when his sister Philista was offering sacrifice, and one of his friends promised the items for the sacrifice but failed to provide them, Pyrrho bought them himself and was indignant; when his friend said he was not acting in accordance with his words nor worthy of dispassion, Pyrrho said, 'One ought not to make a display of dispassion in the case of a woman!' Yet his friend might rightly have said: 'O foolish man, both in the case of a woman and a dog and all things—if there is any use at all to you in these words of yours!'"
^18.27 «Ὀρθῶς δ' ἔχει μαθεῖν καὶ τίνες οἱ ζηλώσαντες αὐτὸν ἐγένοντο καὶ τίνας ἐξήλωσεν αὐτός. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πύρρων Ἀναξάρκου τινὸς ἐγένετο μαθητὴς, ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦν ζωγράφος, οὐδ' οὕτως εὐτυχὴς, ἔπειτα τοῖς Δημοκρίτου βιβλίοις ἐντυχὼν χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε εὗρεν οὔτε συνεγράψατο, κακῶς δὲ πάντας εἶπε καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους· αὐτὸς δ' ὕστερον τοῦτον τὸν τῦφον περιβαλλόμενος καὶ καλῶν ἄτυφον ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ κατέλιπεν.	^18.27 "It is right also to learn who became his imitators and whom he himself emulated. Pyrrho became a disciple of a certain Anaxarchus, who was at first a painter—and not a very successful one at that—and later, encountering the books of Democritus, found nothing useful nor wrote anything, but spoke evil of everyone, both gods and men. Afterwards, wrapping himself in this arrogance (tuphos) and calling himself unarrogant (atuphos), he left nothing in writing.
^18.28 ἐγένετο δὲ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων Φλιάσιος, ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐχόρευεν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ἔπειτα δ' ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ συνέγραψεν ἀργαλέας παρῳδίας καὶ βωμολόχους, ἐν αἷς βεβλασφήμηκε πάντας τοὺς πώποτε φιλοσοφήσαντας. οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τοὺς σίλλους γράψας καὶ λέγων· 'σχέτλιοι ἄνθρωποι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἷον, τοίων ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν πέπλασθε, καὶ ἄνθρωποι κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί.'	^18.28 Timon of Phlius became his disciple, who at first danced in theaters, but later encountering Pyrrho, composed painful and coarse parodies in which he slandered all who ever philosophized. For he was the one who wrote the Silloi, saying: 'Wretched humans, evil reproaches, mere bellies, out of such strifes and groanings were you molded, humans full like skin-bags of empty conceit!'
^18.29 μηδενὸς δ' ἐπιστραφέντος αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰ μηδὲ ἐγένοντο τὸ παράπαν, ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τῇ κατ' Αἴγυπτον Αἰνησίδημός τις ἀναζωπυρεῖν ἤρξατο τὸν ὕθλον τοῦτον. καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ μὲν κράτιστοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν τὴν ὁδὸν βεβαδικότων ταύτην εἰσὶν οὗτοι.	^18.29 Since no one paid any attention to them, as if they had never existed at all, yesterday and the day before in Alexandria near Egypt, a certain Aenesidemus began to rekindle this drivel! And these are practically those who seem to be the strongest of those who have walked this path.
^18.30 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην εἴτε αἵρεσιν εἴτε ἀγωγὴν λόγων εἴτε ὅπη καὶ ὅπως ἐθέλει τις καλεῖν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν ὀρθὴν εἶναι φαίη δῆλον. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίαν οἴομαι δεῖν ὀνομάζειν αὐτὴν, ἀναιροῦσάν γε δὴ τὰς τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρχάς.»	^18.30 That no right-thinking person would say such a sect—or system of arguments, or whatever one wishes to call it—is correct, is clear. For my part, I do not even think it right to name it philosophy, since it does away with the very principles of philosophizing."
^18.31 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ Πύρρωνα φιλοσοφεῖν νομιζομένους. συγγενῆ δ' αὐτοῖς εἴη ἂν καὶ τὰ ἀντιλεγόμενα πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ Ἀρίστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον, μόνα λέγοντας εἶναι τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. Σωκράτους δ' ἑταῖρος ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἦν, ὁ τὴν καλουμένην Κυρηναϊκὴν συστησάμενος αἵρεσιν, ἀφ' ἧς τὰς ἀφορμὰς Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τέλους ἔκθεσιν εἴληφεν. ἦν δ' ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ὑγρὸς πάνυ τὸν βίον καὶ φιλήδονος· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μὲν οὗτος ἐν τῷ φανερῷ περὶ τέλους διελέξατο, δυνάμει δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλεγεν ἐν ἡδοναῖς κεῖσθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ λόγους περὶ ἡδονῆς ποιούμενος εἰς ὑποψίαν ἦγε τοὺς προσιόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ λέγειν τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν.	^18.31 These things, then, are aimed at those who are thought to philosophize according to Pyrrho. Akin to them are the arguments directed against the followers of Aristippus of Cyrene, who say that sensations (pathē) alone are comprehensible. Aristippus was a companion of Socrates who established the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epicurus took his starting points for his exposition of the supreme end (telos). Aristippus was very loose in his lifestyle and fond of pleasure; he did not speak openly about the end, but implicitly declared that the substance of happiness lies in pleasures. For always making speeches about pleasure, he led those who approached him to suspect that he called living pleasantly the end.
^18.32 τούτου γέγονεν ἀκουστὴς σὺν ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ Ἀρήτη· ἥτις γεννήσασα παῖδα ὠνόμασεν Ἀρίστιππον, ὃς εἰσαχθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς εἰς λόγους φιλοσοφίας μητροδίδακτος ἐκλήθη· ὃς καὶ σαφῶς ὡρίσατο τέλος εἶναι τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἡδονὴν ἐντάττων τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν. τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι· ἑτέραν δὲ καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιουμένην· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονὴν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν, καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὖσαν. τούτων δ' οὖν καὶ ἔφασκε τῶν παθῶν μόνων ἡμᾶς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, πρὸς οὓς ἀντιλέλεκται ταῦτα.	^18.32 Among others, his daughter Arete became his hearer; having born a son, she named him Aristippus, who, being introduced by her to philosophical discourses, was called 'Mother-Taught' (Metrodidaktos). He explicitly defined the end as living pleasantly, placing pleasure in motion. For he said there are three states in our constitution: one in which we feel pain, like a storm at sea; another in which we feel pleasure, compared to a smooth wave (for pleasure is a smooth motion, compared to a favorable wind); and the third is a middle state, in which we feel neither pain nor pleasure, being similar to a calm sea. Of these feelings (pathē) alone, then, he claimed we have perception; and against these men these arguments have been stated.

Chapter 19

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting the Aristotelian philosopher Aristocles of Messene to dismantle Cyrenaic Subjectivism and Protagorean Relativism:

19.1–19.7: Aristocles refutes the Cyrenaic claim that only subjective feelings or internal affections (pathē) are comprehensible. He argues that this view reduces human beings to a state of near-stupor (as if crushed by a lethargic coma) where they cannot identify the external causes of pain or pleasure (e.g., whether fire or iron is burning/cutting them). He shows that asserting "I am being burned" (egō kaiomai) is an act of rational judgment (logos), not merely a passive feeling (pathos). To experience a feeling, one must implicitly grasp the subject, the object, time, place, and identity. Denying this eliminates intentional action, self-awareness, human identity, and practical life, reducing humans below the level of flies or gnats.

19.8–19.10: Shifts focus to the opposite extreme—those who claim that we must trust all bodily senses blindly:

MetrodDynamic of Chios (student of Democritus): Held the atomist principles of the Full and the Void, but famously opened his work On Nature with extreme skepticism ("None of us knows anything, not even this very thing, whether we know or do not know"), which Aristocles notes provided bad precedent for Pyrrho before asserting that "everything is whatever one might conceive it to be."

Protagoras of Abdera: Noted for his agnosticism regarding the gods ("I cannot know whether they exist or what they are like in form"), leading to his banishment by the Athenians and the public burning of his books.

^19.1 «Ἑξῆς δ' ἂν εἶεν οἱ λέγοντες μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά· τοῦτο δ' εἶπον ἔνιοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς Κυρήνης. οὗτοι δ' ἠξίουν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κάρου πιεζόμενοί τινος, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τὸ παράπαν, εἰ μή τις παραστὰς αὐτοὺς παίοι καὶ κεντῴη· καιόμενοι γὰρ ἔλεγον ἢ τεμνόμενοι γνωρίζειν ὅτι πάσχοιέν τι· πότερον δὲ τὸ καῖον εἴη πῦρ, ἢ τὸ τέμνον σίδηρος, οὐκ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.	^19.1 "Next in order would be those who say that feelings (pathē) alone are comprehensible; and some of those from Cyrene expressed this view. These men claimed—just as if they were weighed down by a kind of lethargic coma—that they knew nothing at all unless someone stood over them and struck or pricked them! For when they were being burned or cut, they said they recognized that they were experiencing something; but whether the burning thing was fire or the cutting thing was iron, they could not say.
^19.2 τοὺς δὴ ταῦτα λέγοντας εὐθὺς ἔροιτό τις ἂν εἰ δὴ τοῦτο γοῦν ἴσασιν αὐτοὶ, διότι πάσχουσι καὶ αἰσθάνονται. μὴ εἰδότες μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' εἰπεῖν δυνηθεῖεν ἂν ὅτι μόνον ἴσασι τὸ πάθος· εἰ δ' αὖ γνωρίζουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά. τὸ γὰρ "ἐγὼ καίομαι" λόγος ἦν καὶ οὐ πάθος.	^19.2 Now one might immediately ask those who say these things whether they know at least this much: that they are experiencing something and perceiving. For if they do not know, they would not even be able to say that they know feeling alone; but if, on the other hand, they do recognize it, then feelings alone would not be comprehensible! For the statement 'I am being burned' was a rational judgment (logos), not a passive feeling (pathos).
^19.3 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη γε τρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. ὁ τοίνυν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος τοῦ πάθους πάντως αἰσθάνοιτ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι μὲν εἰ τύχοι, θερμαίνεται γνωριεῖ, πότερον δ' αὐτὸς ἢ ὁ γείτων, ἀγνοήσει· καὶ νῦν ἢ πέρυσι, καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ ζῶν ἢ τεθνεὼς, ἔτι δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ λίθος.	^19.3 Furthermore, these three things necessarily co-exist: the feeling itself, that which acts (to poioun), and that which experiences (to paschon). Therefore, he who apprehends the feeling would surely also perceive that which experiences. For he will not, if it so happens, recognize that heating occurs, yet be ignorant of whether it is himself or his neighbor; or whether it is now or last year, and in Athens or in Egypt, and whether he is alive or dead, and moreover whether he is a human being or a stone!
^19.4 οὐκοῦν εἴσεται καὶ ὑφ' ὅτου πάσχει· καὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλους γνωρίζουσι καὶ ὁδοὺς καὶ πόλεις καὶ τὴν τροφήν· οἵ τ' αὖ τεχνῖται τὰ ἐργαλεῖα τὰ αὐτῶν οἴδασι, καὶ οἱ ἰατροὶ καὶ ναυτικοὶ σημειοῦνται τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ τῶν θηρίων οἱ κύνες εὑρίσκουσι τοὺς στίβους.	^19.4 Therefore he will also know by what he is experiencing it. For indeed human beings recognize one another, roads, cities, and food; and craftsmen, for their part, know their own tools, and physicians and navigators read the signs of future events, and among wild beasts, dogs find tracks!
^19.5 ἔτι γε μὴν ὁ πάσχων τι πάντως ἢ ὡς οἰκείου τινὸς ἢ ὡς ἀλλοτρίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται. πόθεν οὖν ἔξει λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτο μέν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ, τοῦτο δὲ πόνος; ἢ ὅτι γευόμενος ἢ ὁρῶν ἢ ἀκούων πάσχοι τι; καὶ τῇ μὲν γλώσσῃ γευόμενος, τοῖς δ' ὄμμασιν ὁρῶν, τοῖς δ' ὠσὶν ἀκούων; ἢ πῶς ἴσασιν ὅτι τοδὶ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι χρὴ, τοδὶ δὲ φεύγειν; εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τούτων γνοῖεν, οὐχ ἕξουσιν ὁρμὴν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν· οὕτω δ' οὐδ' ἂν ζῷα εἶεν. γελοῖοι γάρ εἰσιν, ὁπότε λέγοιεν ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν, οὐ μὴν ἴσασί γε πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον. οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδ' εἰ ἄνθρωποι πεφύκασιν, οὐδ' εἰ ζῶσιν, ἔχοιεν ἂν εἰπεῖν· οὐκοῦν οὐδ' εἰ λέγουσί τι καὶ ἀποφαίνονται.	^19.5 Moreover, he who experiences something apprehends it in every way either as an experience belonging to himself or as belonging to another. From where, then, will he be able to say that this is pleasure and that is pain? Or that in tasting, seeing, or hearing he experiences something? And that he tastes with the tongue, sees with the eyes, and hears with the ears? Or how do they know that this thing ought to be chosen and that thing avoided? If they should know none of these things, they will have neither impulse nor desire; and in this way they would not even be living creatures! For they are ridiculous whenever they say that these things happen to them, yet they do not know how or in what manner. For such men could not even say whether they are human beings by nature, nor whether they are alive; consequently, neither could they say whether they are speaking something and declaring an opinion.
^19.6 πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους τίς ἂν εἴη λόγος; θαυμάσαι μέντοι τις ἂν εἰ ἀγνοοῦσι πότερον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἰσιν ἢ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· πολλῷ δὲ θαυμασιώτερον εἰ οὐκ οἴδασι, καὶ ταῦτα φάσκοντες φιλοσοφεῖν, ἆρά γε τὰ τέτταρα πλείονά ἐστιν ἢ τὰ τρία, καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο πόσα ἐστίν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁπόσους ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν χειρῶν δακτύλους οὗτοί γε δύνανται εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ πότερον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἷς ἐστιν ἢ πλείους.	^19.6 Against such men as these, what argument could there be? One might indeed wonder if they are ignorant of whether they are on earth or in heaven; but it is far more wonderful if they do not know—and that while claiming to philosophize!—whether four is more than three, and how much one and two make. For these men are not even able to say how many fingers they have on their hands, nor whether each of them is one or several!
^19.7 ὥστε οὐδὲ τοὔνομα τὸ ἴδιον εἰδεῖεν ἂν, οὐδὲ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸν Ἀρίστιππον. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τίνας φιλοῦσιν ἢ μισοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τίνων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· οὐδ' εἰ γελάσαιεν ἢ δακρύσαιεν ἕξουσιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τόδε μὲν εἴη γελοῖον, τὸ δὲ λυπηρόν. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐδὲ τί νυνὶ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς συνίασιν. οὐδὲν οὖν οἵ γε τοιοῦτοι διαφέροιεν ἂν ἐμπίδων ἢ μυιῶν, καίτοι κἀκεῖνα γνωρίζει τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν.»	^19.7 So they would not even know their own name, nor their homeland, nor Aristippus! Consequently, neither do they know whom they love or hate, nor what they desire; nor if they should laugh or weep will they be able to say that this thing is laughable and that thing painful. It is clear, then, that they do not even understand what we are saying right now! Such men as these, therefore, would differ in no way from gnats or flies—and yet even those creatures recognize what is according to nature and contrary to nature."
^19.8 Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους εἰ καὶ μυρία λέγειν ἔνεστιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ γε καὶ ταῦτα. ἕπεται τούτοις συνεξετάσαι καὶ τοὺς τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίσαντας, καὶ πάντα χρῆναι πιστεύειν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσιν ὁρισαμένους, ὧν εἶναι Μητρόδωρον τὸν Χῖον καὶ Πρωταγόran τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην.	^19.8 Against those who are thus disposed, even if ten thousand things could be said, these are indeed sufficient. It follows next after these to examine also those who walked the opposite path, defining that one must trust all the senses of the body, among whom were Metrodorus of Chios and Protagoras of Abdera.
^19.9 τὸν μὲν οὖν Μητρόδωρον Δημοκρίτου ἔφασαν ἀκηκοέναι, ἀρχὰς δ' ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν ὂν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν εἶναι. γράφων γέ τοι περὶ φύσεως εἰσβολῇ ἐχρήσατο τοιαύτῃ· 'οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδὲν οἶδεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πότερον οἴδαμεν, ἢ οὐκ οἴδαμεν.' ἥτις εἰσβολὴ κακὰς ἔδωκεν ἀφορμὰς τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένῳ Πύρρωνι. προβὰς δέ φησιν ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶν, ὃ ἄν τις νοήσαι.	^19.9 Now Metrodorus, they said, was a hearer of Democritus, and declared the principles to be the Full and the Void—of which the former is Being, and the latter Non-Being. At any rate, in writing On Nature he used such an opening: 'None of us knows anything, not even this very thing, whether we know or do not know.' This opening gave bad starting points to Pyrrho, who came after these events. Moving forward, however, Metrodorus says that 'everything is whatever one might conceive it to be.'
^19.10 τὸν δὲ Πρωταγόραν λόγος ἔχει κεκλῆσθαι ἄθεον. γράφων γέ τοι καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ θεῶν εἰσβολῇ τοιᾷδε ἐχρήσατο· 'περὶ μὲν οὖν θεῶν οὐκ οἶδα οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ κωλύοντά με ἕκαστον τούτων εἰδέναι.' τοῦτον Ἀθηναῖοι φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες τὰς βίβλους αὐτοῦ δημοσίᾳ ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἀγορᾷ κατέκαυσαν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οἵδε μόναις δεῖν ἔφασαν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι πιστεύειν, τὰς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντιρρήσεις θεασώμεθα.	^19.10 And as for Protagoras, account holds that he was called an atheist. At any rate, writing himself On the Gods, he used such an opening: 'Concerning the gods, I am able to know neither that they exist nor what they are like in form; for many are the things that prevent me from knowing each of these things.' The Athenians, having punished him with exile, burned his books publicly in the middle of the agora. Since these men said that one must trust the senses alone, let us behold the refutations against them.

Chapter 20

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius continues citing the Aristotelian philosopher Aristocles of Messene to dismantle Protagorean relativism and total sensationalism:

20.1–20.8: Aristocles examines Protagoras's famous maxim that "man is the measure of all things" (homo mensura), tracing its poetic antecedents to Heraclitean flux (evoked by Homer’s Oceanus). He systematically refutes this position:

1) If every individual's perception is the measure of truth, why choose a human as the measure rather than a pig or a baboon (kynokephalos)?

2) It destroys wisdom and teaching, since no one can correct or instruct anyone else if all opinions are equally true.

3) It leads to self-contradiction: if someone perceives Protagoras's doctrine to be false, then by his own logic, it is false.

4) It obliterates basic distinctions: virtue and vice, reality and unreality, and logical necessity become identical.

20.9–20.12: He critiques those (such as the Epicureans) who claim that all perceptions and impressions (phantasiai) are true:

1) Sensory instruments (like balances, lathes, eyes, or ears) can be defective, misaligned, or subject to illusion (e.g., an oar appearing bent in water).

2) Equating all impressions as true forces one to validate the hallucinations of the insane or sensory misperceptions.

3)Critically, reality determines our impression (to enantion gar... hyp' ekeinōn autoi diatithemetha pōs); our subjective impression does not create external reality.

20.13–20.14: Eusebius transitions from this refutation of Protagoras to introduce Epicurus, noting his lineage from Aristippus and the Cyrenaics (reducing everything to pleasure and sensory affection) and highlighting his philosophical background (connected to Xenocrates, Democritus, and Nausiphanes).

^20.1 «Γεγόνασι δέ τινες οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις μόναις δεῖν πιστεύειν. ἔνιοι μέντοι φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον αἰνίττεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο πάντων ἀποφαίνοντα τὸν Ὠκεανὸν ἀρχὴν, ὡς ἐν ῥύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων· ὧν δ' ἴσμεν ἔοικε μὲν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγειν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἄντικρύς γε Πρωταγόρας ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης.	^20.1 "Now there have been certain thinkers who claimed that one ought to trust sensation and mental impressions (phantasiai) alone. Indeed, some say that Homer also hinted at such a view by declaring Oceanus to be the origin of all things, implying that things are in a state of flux. Among those whom we know, Metrodorus of Chios seems to say this same thing, but Protagoras of Abdera says it outright.
^20.2 οὗτος γὰρ ἔφη μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δ' οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁποῖα γὰρ ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μηδὲν ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι διισχυρίσασθαι.	^20.2 For Protagoras declared that 'man is the measure of all things—of the things that are, that they are; and of the things that are not, that they are not'; for in whatever way things appear to each person, such they also are, and concerning other matters we are able to affirm nothing with certainty.
^20.3 πρὸς δὲ τούτους εἴποι τις ἂν ἃ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ· πρῶτον μὲν, τί δήποτε, τοιούτων γε δὴ τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων, ἠξίωσαν εἶναι μέτρον τῆς ἀληθείας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὐ σῦν ἢ κυνοκέφαλον; ἔπειτα δὲ πῶς ἔλεγον εἶναι σοφοὺς ἑαυτοὺς, εἰ δὴ πᾶς τις αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μέτρον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ πῶς ἐλέγχουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, εἴπερ ἑκάστῳ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν; ἀγνοοῦμέν τέ τινα, καίτοι πολλάκις αἰσθανόμενοι, καθάπερ ἐπειδὰν τῶν βαρβάρων ἀκούωμεν;	^20.3 Against these thinkers, one might say the very things that Plato also said in the Theaetetus: First of all, why in the world—if things are indeed like this—did they claim that man is the measure of truth, and not a pig or a baboon? Secondly, how could they say that they themselves were wise, if indeed everyone is himself the measure of truth for himself? Or how do they refute others, if indeed what appears to each person is true? And do we not remain ignorant of certain things, even though we frequently hear them through sensation—just as whenever we hear foreigners speaking?
^20.4 ὅ γε μὴν θεασάμενος ὁτιοῦν, εἶτα μεμνημένος, οἶδε μὲν, αἰσθάνεται δ' οὐκέτι. καὶ εἰ θατέρῳ μὲν ὀφθαλμῷ μύσαι, θατέρῳ δ' ὁρῴη, δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸ καὶ εἴσεται καὶ οὐκ εἴσεται.	^20.4 Furthermore, he who has seen anything whatever and then remembers it, knows it on the one hand, but no longer perceives it through sensation on the other. And if someone should close one eye and see with the other, it is clear that he will both know and not know the very same thing at the same time.
^20.5 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ φαίνεται τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πάντων πραγμάτων μέτρον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη.	^20.5 In addition to these points, if that which appears to each person is also true, but what is said by those thinkers does not appear true to us, then it would also be true that man is not the measure of all things!
^20.6 καὶ μὴν οἵ γε τεχνῖται τῶν ἀτέχνων διαφέρουσι καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἀπείρων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον προορᾷ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι κυβερνήτης καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ στρατηγός.	^20.6 And surely craftsmen differ from those without skill, and the experienced from the inexperienced; and for this reason a helmsman, a physician, and a general foresee what is going to happen to a greater degree.
^20.7 ἁπλῶς τε ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοί γε τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν. οὕτω δ' ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸ καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ταὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ταὐτὸ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος καὶ ξύλον· ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ φαίνεται ταὐτὸ τῷδὲ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, τῷδὲ δὲ ξύλον.	^20.7 Simply put, these men do away with the greater and the lesser, the necessary and the contingent, that which is according to nature and that which is contrary to nature. In this way, the same thing would be both being and non-being; for nothing prevents the same thing from appearing to be to some people, and appearing not to be to others. Thus a human being and a log of wood would be the same thing; for sometimes the same object appears to one person as a human being, and to another as a log of wood!
^20.8 ἅπας τε λόγος ἀληθὴς ἂν εἴη, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ψευδής· καὶ οἱ βουλευόμενοι καὶ δικάζοντες οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν οὐδὲν ποιεῖν. καὶ τὸ δεινότατον, ἔσονται γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ σπουδαῖοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ καὶ ταὐτὸ κακία καὶ ἀρετή. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτά τις ἂν ἔχοι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ πλειόνων λόγων πρὸς τοὺς οὐκ οἰομένους ἔχειν νοῦν καὶ λόγον.»	^20.8 Every argument would be true, and on account of this, every argument would also be false; and those who deliberate and judge in court would be able to accomplish nothing. And what is most terrible of all, the very same people will be both noble and wicked, and vice and virtue will be the same thing! One could say many other such things; but in truth, there is no need for further arguments against those who do not consider themselves to possess mind and reason."
^20.9 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς «Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔτι νῦν εἰσί τινες οἱ πᾶσαν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ λέγοντες εἶναι, μικρὰ καὶ περὶ τούτων εἴπωμεν. ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοί γε δεδοικέναι μήποτε, εἰ ψευδεῖς εἴποιεν αἰσθήσεις εἶναί τινας, οὐκ ἂν σχοῖεν τὸ κριτήριον καὶ τὸν κανόνα βέβαιον οὐδ' ἐχέγγυον· οὐχ ὁρῶσι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιεν οὕτω γε καὶ τὰς δόξας ἁπάσας ἀληθεῖς ἀποφαίνοντες· πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ταύταις πεφύκαμεν κρίνειν· καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς.	^20.9 Then next he says: "Since even now there are still some who say that every single impression (phantasia) is true, let us say a few things about them as well. For these men seem to fear lest, if they should say that certain sensations are false, they would no longer possess a criterion and a rule that is stable or trustworthy. But they fail to see that in this way they would inadvertently declare all opinions to be true as well; for by nature we judge many things by opinions too, yet they nonetheless claim that some opinions are true and others false.
^20.10 ἔπειτα δὲ σκοπῶν ἴδοι τις ἂν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων ἀεὶ καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἀψευδὲς οὐδὲν, οἷον λέγω ζυγὸν, ἢ τόρνον, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὡδὶ μὲν ἔχον ὑγιές ἐστιν, ὡδὶ δὲ μοχθηρόν· καὶ τουτονὶ μὲν χρώμενον τὸν τρόπον ἀληθεύει, τουτονὶ δὲ ψεύδεται. καὶ μὴν εἴ γε πᾶσα αἴσθησις ἀληθὴς ἦν, οὐκ ἔδει τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν αὐτάς. ἄλλαι γάρ εἰσιν ἐγγύθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν, καὶ νοσούντων καὶ ἐρρωμένων, καὶ τεχνιτῶν καὶ ἀτέχνων, καὶ φρονίμων καὶ ἀφρόνων. τὰς δὲ δὴ τῶν μεμηνότων παντάπασιν ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον λέγειν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν παρορώντων καὶ παρακουόντων· εὔηθες γὰρ ἂν ἦν τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ὁ παρορῶν ἤτοι ὁρᾷ ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· φαίη γὰρ ἄν τις ὅτι ὁρᾷ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς.	^20.10 Furthermore, upon examination, one would see that among other instruments of judgment none is always and completely infallible—such as a balance, or a lathe, or any such tool; rather, each of them when in this condition is sound, but in that condition is defective, and when used in this manner it tells the truth, but in that manner it deceives. And indeed, if every sensation were true, they ought not to differ so greatly from one another; for sensations differ when taken from near at hand or from far off, of the sick and the healthy, of experts and the unskilled, of the wise and the foolish. And to say that the impressions of the insane are true, or those of people who missee or mishear, would be completely absurd; for it would be silly to claim that he who missees either sees or does not see, since one would say that he sees indeed, but not correctly.
^20.11 ὁπόταν μέντοι φῶσιν ὡς ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὖσα ἄλογος οὐδὲν προστίθησιν οὐδ' ἀφαιρεῖ, φαίνονται τἀμποδὼν οὐχ ὁρῶντες· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἐρετμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, κἀπὶ τῶν γραφῶν καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀπατῶσα. διὸ καὶ μεμφόμεθα πάντες ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐ τὸν νοῦν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν φαντασίαν. ἐλέγχει γὰρ ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἅπασαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν εἶναι. τὴν γὰρ ἡμετέραν, δι' ἣν οὐκ οἰόμεθα πᾶσαν εἶναι τοιαύτην, ψευδῆ πάντως ἀποφαίνει. συμβαίνει τοίνυν αὐτοῖς ἅπασαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ λέγειν εἶναι.	^20.11 Whenever, however, they claim that sensation, being non-rational, neither adds nor subtracts anything, they fail to see what is right before their eyes; for in the case of an oar in water, and in paintings, and in ten thousand other examples, sensation is the very thing that deceives us. On this account, in such matters we all blame not our mind, but our impression (phantasia). For the argument refutes itself when it claims that every impression is true; for it declares our own impression—by which we do not think that every impression is true—to be entirely false! It turns out, therefore, that they are saying every impression is both true and false.
^20.12 καθόλου δὲ ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀξιοῦντες ὁποῖα ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα καὶ εἶναι. τοὐναντίον γὰρ, ὁποῖα πέφυκε, τοιαῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐχ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ποιοῦμεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἐκείνων αὐτοὶ διατιθέμεθά πως. ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖον εἴη ἂν εἰ διανοηθείημεν ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται, σκύλακας ἢ χιμαίρας, ἀξιοῦν εὐθὺς εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φαντάζεσθαι καθάπερ εὐτρεπῆ παρεστῶτα.»	^20.12 In general, they err in claiming that whatever way things appear to us, such they also are. For on the contrary, in whatever way things are by nature, in such way do they appear; we do not make them to be as they are, but rather we ourselves are disposed in a certain way by them. For it would be ridiculous if we, having imagined in our minds—just like painters and sculptors—puppies or chimeras, should demand that these things immediately exist, and on account of this envision them as standing ready right before us."
^20.13 Διότι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ δῆλον ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αὖθις οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστίππου διαδοχῆς ὁρμώμενοι πάντα ἡδονῆς ἐξῆπτον καὶ αἰσθήσεως, μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτὰ καὶ τέλος ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὁριζόμενοι.	^20.13 That those who claim every sensation and every impression to be true do not speak correctly is clear from these points. But despite these matters being so, those around Epicurus, setting out again from the succession of Aristippus, attached everything to pleasure and sensation, defining feelings (pathē) alone as comprehensible and pleasure as the end of goods.
^20.14 λέγεται δὲ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὸ μέν τινων μηδενὸς ἀκηκοέναι, ἐντυχεῖν δὲ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν συγγράμμασιν· ὑπό τινων δ' ὅτι ἤκουσε Ξενοκράτους, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ Ναυσιφάνους τοῦ Πύρρωνος γενομένου γνωρίμου. τίνα δὴ οὖν τὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντειρημένα τυγχάνει θεασώμεθα.	^20.14 Now Epicurus is said by some to have been a student of no one, but to have encountered the writings of the ancients; while by others he is said to have heard Xenocrates, and later also Nausiphanes, who became a pupil of Pyrrho. Let us observe, then, what arguments have been advanced against him as well.

Chapter 21

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In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting Aristocles of Messene, who turns his critique directly toward Epicurean ethics and epistemology regarding pleasure (hēdonē) and pain (ponos):

21.1–21.2: Aristocles notes that while knowledge is twofold (concerning objective reality vs. what is choice-worthy and to be avoided), Epicureans position pleasure and pain as the primary starting points and criteria for action. He counters that pathos (feeling) cannot serve as a criterion for good and evil; feeling merely demonstrates its own existence, while determining whether an experience is fitting, choice-worthy, or harmful requires a higher judging authority—namely, reason (logos).

21.3–21.4: He highlights an internal inconsistency in Epicureanism: Epicureans themselves do not pursue every pleasure nor avoid every pain. They calculate quantity—enduring smaller pains to secure greater pleasures or abstaining from present pleasures to prevent worse pains. This quantitative calculation is strictly an operation of logos, proving that reason, not sensation/feeling, is the true criterion.

21.5: He distinguishes between cognitive states and affective states. Sensation (aisthēsis) and imagination (phantasia) act as mirrors reflecting external reality (pros ta exō). By contrast, feelings (pathē) like pleasure and pain are internal alterations (tropai kai alloiōseis) dependent on our subjective state (hōs an hēmeis echōmen).

21.6–21.7: Aristocles concludes that sound philosophy requires using both sensation and mind (nous). He illustrates this with an hunting analogy: sensation functions like nets (arkys/diktya), while mind and reason act as tracking hounds (kynes stibeuontes). He warns that it would be disastrous for human beings to abandon the divine judge—mind—in favor of irrational pleasures and pains.

^21.1 «Ἐπειδή ἐστι γνῶσις διττὴ, ἡ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡμῖν αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν, ἔνιοί φασι τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ κριτήριον ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον· ἔτι γέ τοι καὶ νῦν τοιαῦτά τινα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον· ἀναγκαίως οὖν ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτου σκέψασθαι.	^21.1 "Since knowledge is twofold—the one concerning real things, and the other concerning what is to be chosen and avoided by us—some claim that we possess pleasure and pain as the starting point and criterion of choice and avoidance. Indeed, even now those of Epicurus's school say things of this sort; it is necessary, therefore, to examine this matter as well.
^21.2 τοσούτου τοίνυν ἔγωγε δέω λέγειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ κανόνα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ πάθος, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κριτηρίου δεῖσθαι. διότι μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑαυτὸ δείκνυσιν, ὁποῖον δ' ἐστὶν ἑτέρου δεῖ τοῦ κρίνοντος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἢ ἀλλότριον ἡ αἴσθησις λέγει, πότερον δ' αἱρετὸν ἢ φευκτὸν ὁ λόγος.	^21.2 Now, for my part, I am so far from saying that feeling (pathos) is the starting point and rule of good and evil, that it seems to me this very thing stands in need of a criterion. For while it demonstrates that it exists by itself, what kind of thing it is requires another judging agent. For if sensation states whether something is congenial or foreign, it is reason (logos) that determines whether it is choice-worthy or to be avoided.
^21.3 αὐτοί γε τοί φασιν οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ πάντα πόνον ἐκτρέπεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ συμβέβηκε καὶ μάλα εἰκότως. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κριτήρια καὶ ἑαυτὰ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ κρινόμενα, τὸ μέντοι πάθος ἑαυτὸ μόνον. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἔχει μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτοί. καίπερ γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλγηδόνα κακὸν, ὅμως οὐκ ἀεί φασι δεῖν τὴν μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ φεύγειν· μετρεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιῷ.	^21.3 Indeed, they themselves say that they do not embrace every pleasure nor turn away from every pain. And this happens quite reasonably; for criteria demonstrate both themselves and the things being judged, whereas feeling demonstrates only itself. And that this is so, they themselves bear witness; for despite claiming that all pleasure is good and all pain bad, they nevertheless say that one ought not always to choose the former nor avoid the latter, for these things are measured by quantity and not by quality.
^21.4 δῆλον οὖν ὡς τό γε ποσὸν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ὁ λόγος κρίνει· τὸ γὰρ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὑπομεῖναι τούσδε τινὰς τοὺς πόνους, ὅπως ἡσθείημεν ἡδονὰς μείζους, καὶ τὸ συμφέρει τῶνδέ τινων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ἀλγηδόνας χαλεπωτέρας· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὁ λόγος ὁ κρίνων ἐστίν.	^21.4 It is clear, then, that nothing other than reason judges quantity. For the principle that it is better to endure certain pains in order that we might enjoy greater pleasures, and that it is advantageous to abstain from certain pleasures so that we might not suffer more severe pains—in all these things, it is reason that is the judge.
^21.5 τὸ δ' ὅλον αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι καθαπερεὶ κάτοπτρα καὶ εἰκόνες ἐοίκασι τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι· τὰ μέντοι πάθη καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ οἱ πόνοι τροπαὶ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. ταύτῃ δὲ αἰσθανόμενοι μὲν καὶ φαντασιούμενοι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω βλέπομεν, ἡδόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἀλγοῦντες ἐπιστρέφομεν ἐπὶ μόνους ἑαυτούς. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν τὰ ἔξω ποιεῖ· καὶ ὁποῖα ἂν ᾖ ἐκεῖνα, τοιαύτας ἀπεργάζεται καὶ τὰς φαντασίας, τὰ δὲ πάθη ποιὰ ἄττα γίνεται δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς ἔχωμεν.	^21.5 In short, sensations and mental impressions resemble mirrors and images of external things; feelings, however—both pleasures and pains—are turns and alterations of ourselves. In this way, when we perceive and form impressions, we look toward external things; but when we feel pleasure and pain, we turn back upon ourselves alone. For external objects produce our sensations, and whatever nature those objects have, such also do they render our impressions; but our feelings become of a certain quality on account of ourselves, and according to how we are conditioned.
^21.6 διὸ ταῦτα ποτὲ μὲν ἡδέα, ποτὲ δ' ἀηδῆ φαίνεται, καὶ ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν μᾶλλον, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἧττον. ὧν οὕτως ἐχόντων εὑρήσομεν, εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν σκοπεῖν, ἄριστα τὰς τῆς γνώσεως ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθεμένους ὁπόσοι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὸν νοῦν παραλαμβάνουσιν.	^21.6 Therefore, these feelings appear at one time pleasant, and at another unpleasant, and sometimes more so, and sometimes less. These things being so, we shall find, if we care to examine it, that those lay down the best principles of knowledge who adopt both the senses and the mind (nous).
^21.7 ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ταῖς ἄρκυσι καὶ τοῖς δικτύοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις θηράτροις, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῖς κυσὶ τοῖς στιβεύουσι καὶ μεταθέουσιν. αὐτῶν μέντοι τούτων ἄμεινον φιλοσοφεῖν οἴεσθαι χρὴ τοὺς μήτε ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ὡς ἔτυχε, χρωμένους μήτε τὰ πάθη παραλαμβάνοντας ἐπὶ τὴν τἀληθοῦς διάγνωσιν. ἢ δεινόν γ' ἂν εἴη πεφυκότας ἀνθρώπους ἡδοναῖς καὶ πόνοις ἀλόγοις ἐπιτρέπειν ἑαυτοὺς, ἀφέντας τὸν θειότατον κριτὴν νοῦν.» Ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀριστοκλέους.	^21.7 For sensation resembles snare-nets, casting-nets, and other such hunting devices; while mind and reason resemble the hounds that track and run down the game. One must hold, however, that those philosophize better than these thinkers who neither use the senses haphazardly nor employ feelings for the discernment of truth. Or indeed, it would be a terrible thing if human beings by nature were to entrust themselves to irrational pleasures and pains, abandoning that most divine judge, the mind." These extracts are from the writings of Aristocles.

Chapter 22

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In this chapter, Eusebius shifts from Aristocles to quote directly from the climax of Plato's Philebus (65a–67b), followed by a brief transitional concluding formula:

22.1–22.5: Socrates and Protagoras (Platonic interlocutor Protagoras/Protarchus) evaluate Pleasure (hēdonē) versus Mind (nous) against three divine goods: Truth (alētheia), Measure (metriotēs), and Beauty (kallos). They conclude that Mind is intimately akin to Truth, whereas Pleasure is boastful, deceitful (notably in sexual contexts), and lacking measure.

22.6–22.10: Socrates presents the famous fivefold ranking of the Good in human life:

First: Measure, the moderate, and the timely (metron, metrion, kairion).

Second: Proportion, beauty, perfection, and sufficiency (symmetron, kalon, teleion, hikanon).

Third: Mind and wisdom (nous, phronēsis).

Fourth: Soul's own sciences, arts, and correct opinions (epistēmai, technai, doxai orthai).

Fifth: Pure, painless pleasures accompanying knowledge and sense perceptions (hēdonai alypoi, katharai).

22.11–22.16: Citing Orpheus ("In the sixth generation end the order of song"), Socrates brings the inquiry to a close. While neither pure Pleasure nor pure Mind constitutes the Absolute Good (since both lack total self-sufficiency), Mind is infinitely closer to the nature of the winning Good, leaving Pleasure demoted to a distant fifth place. Socrates rejects popular hedonism based on animal instincts.

22.17: Eusebius appends his transitional closing, announcing that he will next present excerpts from Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria ("of the Christian philosophy"), from his work On Nature (Peri physeōs), refuting Epicurean atomism and hedonism.

^22.1 «Καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον ξυγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν. — Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις; — Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονὴν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.	^22.1 "Let us then judge each of the three individually against Pleasure and Mind; for we must see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as being more akin. — Are you speaking of Beauty, Truth, and Measure? — Yes. First then, lay hold of Truth, Protarchus, and having laid hold of it, look at the three—Mind, Truth, and Pleasure—and after holding back for a long time, answer yourself whether Pleasure or Mind is more akin to Truth.
^22.2 — Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ; πολὺ γὰρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων τὸ ἀλαζονέστατον· ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, αἱ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδομένων νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων· νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.	^22.2 — What need is there of time? For I think they differ immensely! For Pleasure is the most boastful of all things; and as the saying goes, even in the pleasures of sex, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury has received forgiveness from the gods, as though pleasures, like children, possess not even the slightest particle of mind. Mind, however, is either the same as Truth or of all things the most similar to it and the truest.
^22.3 — Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψῃ, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως, ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται; — Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρότερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρότερον οὐδ' ἄν ἕν ποτε.	^22.3 — Next, then, will you examine Measure in the same way, whether Pleasure possesses more of Wisdom, or Wisdom more of Pleasure? — You have set forth a question that is easy to examine! For I think one could find nothing among existing things that is by nature more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy, whereas nothing could ever be more measured than mind and knowledge.
^22.4 — Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὅμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλέον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον; — Ἆρ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον; — Ὀρθῶς.	^22.4 — Well said! Nevertheless, state the third point as well. Has Mind received a larger share of Beauty for us than the class of Pleasure, so that Mind is more beautiful than Pleasure, or the opposite? — Why, Socrates, did anyone ever, either awake or in a dream, see or conceive of wisdom and mind as ugly in any way whatsoever—whether coming to be, or existing, or about to be? — Rightly spoken.
^22.5 — Ἡδονὰς δέ γε δήπου, καὶ ταύτας σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.	^22.5 — But as for pleasures, especially the greatest ones, whenever we see anyone enjoying them, we see either the ridiculousness that accompanies them or the most shameful behavior; and we ourselves are ashamed, and as far as possible we hide and conceal them, giving all such things over to the night, as though light ought not to see them!
^22.6 — Πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ᾑρῆσθαι φύσιν. — Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.	^22.6 — Everywhere then, Protarchus, you will proclaim, sending messengers near and far and declaring to those present, that Pleasure is not a possession of the first rank, nor yet of the second; but first, somehow, around Measure, the Moderate, the Timely, and all such things as eternal nature must be thought to have chosen. — So it appears, at least, from what has now been said.
^22.7 — Δεύτερον μὲν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενέσεως αὖ ταύτης ἐστί. — Ἔοικε γοῦν.	^22.7 — Second, around Proportion, Beauty, Perfection, Sufficiency, and all things belonging to this class. — So it seems, at least.
^22.8 — Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις. — Ἴσως.	^22.8 — Third then, according to my prophecy, if you place Mind and Wisdom, you would not stray very far from the truth. — Perhaps.
^22.9 — Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέτταρα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ; — Τάχ' ἄν.	^22.9 — Are not fourth, then, those things which we laid down as belonging to the soul itself—sciences, arts, and what were called correct opinions—are not these the four additions to the three, if indeed they are more akin to the Good than to Pleasure? — Perhaps so.
^22.10 — Πέμπτας τοίνυν ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμας, ταῖς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας; — Ἴσως.	^22.10 — Fifth then, those pleasures which we defined as painless, calling them pure pleasures of the soul itself accompanying sciences, and those following sense perceptions? — Perhaps.
^22.11 — «Ἕκτῃ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ,» φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς, «καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς.» ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. — Οὐκοῦν χρή.	^22.11 — 'In the sixth generation,' says Orpheus, 'cease the order of song.' And indeed our discourse seems likely to have ceased at the sixth judgment. After these things, nothing remains for us except, as it were, to put a head on what has been said. — Indeed we must.
^22.12 — Ἴθι δὴ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν. — Ποῖον δή; — Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἔθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ. — Τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.	^22.12 — Come then, calling the same argument to witness for the third time to the Savior, let us go over it. — What argument? — Philebus posited that the Good for us is pleasure in its entirety and completeness. — You mean, Socrates, as it seems, that we must repeat from the beginning the argument mentioned just now.
^22.13 — Ναί· τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νῦν διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ. — Ἦν ταῦτα.	^22.13 — Yes; let us hear what comes after this. For I, perceiving the very things I have now gone through, and being disgusted with the argument of Philebus—and not his alone, but that of ten thousand others often—said that Mind is far better and superior to Pleasure for the life of human beings. — That was so.
^22.14 — Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο. — Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν. — Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατα τούτοιν οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἀνεφάνη. — Ἀληθέστατα.	^22.14 — Suspecting, however, that there were many other things as well, I said that if any of these should appear better than both, I would contend on behalf of Mind against Pleasure for the second place, and Pleasure would be deprived even of second place. — You said so indeed. — And after these things, most sufficiently of all, neither of these two appeared to be self-sufficient. — Most true.
^22.15 — Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ, μηδὲ τἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ μηδέτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι στερομένων αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως; — Ὀρθότατα. — Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τινὸς κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γ' αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ. — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;	^22.15 — Was not Mind, then, completely set aside in this argument, as was Pleasure, neither of them being the Good itself, since they are deprived of self-sufficiency and the power of the adequate and complete? — Most correctly. — But another having appeared superior to each of these two, Mind has now been shown to be ten thousand times more akin and attached to the form of the victor than Pleasure! — How could it not be?
^22.16 — Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ὡς νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις. — Ἔοικεν. — Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων. — Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες.»	^22.16 — Therefore, fifth in rank according to this judgment, as the argument has now declared, would be the power of Pleasure. — So it seems. — But not first, not even if all the cattle, horses, and all other beasts should say so by pursuing enjoyment! Trusting in them, as diviners trust birds, the majority judge pleasures to be sovereign for our living well; and they consider the loves of beasts to be authoritative witnesses rather than the arguments delivered from time to time under the inspiration of the philosophical Muse. — Most truly, Socrates, we all now say that what you have spoken is true!"
^22.17 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. ἐγὼ δέ σοι καὶ Διονυσίου, τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίας ἐπισκόπου ἀνδρὸς, ἀπὸ τῶν Περὶ φύσεως βραχέα τῶν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον ἀντειρημένων παραθήσομαι. σὺ δὲ λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι τὰς οὕτως ἐχούσας αὐτοῦ φωνάς·	^22.17 Thus far Plato. Now I shall also present to you a few short extracts from the works On Nature by Dionysius, a man who was a bishop of the philosophy according to Christ, written in refutation of Epicurus. Take them and read his words, which run as follows:

Chapter 23

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In this chapter, Eusebius introduces a citation from Dionysius of Alexandria's anti-Epicurean treatise On Nature (Peri physeōs):

23.1: Dionysius sets up the core cosmological question: Is the universe a single, unified whole (as held by Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Heraclitus), or dual, or composed of infinitely many uncreated, unprovidential particles?

23.2–23.3: He describes atomism—the view held by Democritus and Epicurus that an infinite number of indivisible bodies move randomly through an infinite void, colliding and interlocking to form worlds. Dionysius notes their key difference: Epicureans hold all atoms to be microscopic/imperceptible, whereas Democritus allowed for very large atoms.

23.4: He lists alternative terminologies for indivisible particles used by other thinkers: Diodorus Cronus called them "partless bodies" (amerē), while Heraclides Ponticus and Asclepiades the physician referred to them as "masses" (ongkoi). Eusebius concludes the introduction by noting that Dionysius proceeds to systematically dismantle this doctrine.

^23.1 «Πότερον ἕν ἐστι συναφὲς τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς σοφωτάτοις Ἑλλήνων Πλάτωνι καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ φαίνεται, ἢ δύο, ὡς ἴσως τις ὑπέλαβεν, ἢ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρα, ὥς τισιν ἄλλοις ἔδοξεν, οἳ πολλαῖς τῆς διανοίας παραφοραῖς καὶ ποικίλαις προφοραῖς ὀνομάτων τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπεχείρησαν κατακερματίζειν οὐσίαν, ἄπειρόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀπρονόητον ὑποτίθενται;	^23.1 "Is the universe a single, interconnected whole—as it appears both to us and to the wisest of the Greeks, such as Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Heraclitus—or two, as perhaps someone might have supposed, or even many and infinite, as it seemed to certain others, who through many aberrations of thought and varied uses of names attempted to chop into pieces the essence of the universe, laying down an infinite, unbegotten, and unprovided-for reality?
^23.2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους προσειπόντες ἄφθαρτά τινα καὶ σμικρότατα σώματα πλῆθος ἀνάριθμα, καί τι χωρίον κενὸν μέγεθος ἀπεριόριστον προβαλόμενοι, ταύτας δή φασι τὰς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένας αὐτομάτως τε συμπιπτούσας ἀλλήλαις διὰ ῥύμην ἄτακτον καὶ συμπλεκομένας διὰ τὸ πολυσχήμονας οὔσας ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω τόν τε κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν.	^23.2 For some, naming as 'atoms' certain imperishable and microscopic bodies infinite in number, and projecting an empty space of unlimited size, say that these atoms, carried along at random in the void, collide with one another spontaneously through an disorderly impetus, and become intertwined because, being varied in shape, they catch hold of one another, thus bringing to completion both the cosmos and the things in it—or rather, infinite cosmoi.
^23.3 ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης προστάται Ἐπίκουρός τε καὶ Δημόκριτος γεγόνασι· τοσοῦτον δὲ διεφώνησαν, ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐλαχίστας πάσας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπαισθήτους, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστας εἶναί τινας ἀτόμους ὁ Δημόκριτος ὑπέλαβεν. ἀτόμους δὲ εἶναί φασιν ἀμφότεροι καὶ λέγεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα.	^23.3 The champions of this opinion were Epicurus and Democritus. They differed, however, to this extent: Epicurus held that all atoms are extremely small and for this reason imperceptible, whereas Democritus supposed that some atoms are even extremely large. Both, however, say that they are called 'atoms' (indivisibles) on account of their unbreakable solidity.
^23.4 οἱ δὲ τὰς ἀτόμους μετονομάσαντες ἀμερῆ φασιν εἶναι σώματα, τοῦ παντὸς μέρη, ἐξ ὧν ἀδιαιρέτων ὄντων συντίθεται τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύεται. καὶ τούτων φασὶ τῶν ἀμερῶν ὀνοματοποιὸν Διόδωρον γεγονέναι· ὄνομα δὲ, φασὶν, αὐτοῖς ἄλλο Ἡρακλείδης θέμενος ἐκάλεσεν ὄγκους, παρ' οὗ καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐκληρονόμησε τὸ ὄνομα.» Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐξῆς ἀνασκευάζει τὸ δόγμα διὰ πολλῶν, ἀτὰρ καὶ διὰ τούτων·	^23.4 Others, giving a new name to atoms, say that there are 'partless' (amerē) bodies, parts of the universe, out of which (since they are indivisible) all things are composed and into which they are dissolved. And they say that Diodorus was the coiner of the term 'partless'; but Heraclides gave them another name and called them 'masses' (ongkoi), from whom Asclepiades the physician also inherited the term." Having said these things, Eusebius continues: "Next he refutes the doctrine through many arguments, and especially through the following:"

Chapter 24

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In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting Dionysius of Alexandria's argument against Epicurean atomism:

24.1–24.5: Dionysius argues that ordered, beautiful creations cannot result from blind, random collisions of atoms. He uses analogies from human craft—a loom weaving cloth, masons constructing a house, and shipbuilders or cartwrights assembling vessels—to demonstrate that purposeful tools collapse into chaos without an organizing intelligence.

24.6–24.8: He mocks the idea of atoms acting as skilled artisans (e.g., weavers wiser than spiders) and points out the absurdity of claiming that orderly celestial movements arise from disorderly chaotic motion.

24.9–24.11: He questions how a single, uniform substance (indivisible physical atoms) can yield such vast differences in permanence and longevity—ranging from immortal gods/celestial bodies to long-lived trees/animals down to short-lived humans—addressing and refuting the Epicurean response regarding interlocking atomic structures (pilēmata).

24.12–24.15: He satirizes the "democracy of atoms," asking how unguided particles could voluntarily organize into the exact specific configurations of the sun, moon, and distinct stars, citing Paul (1 Cor. 15:41) on celestial distinctions.

24.16–24.22: He points to daily solar cycles, rainfall, seasons, and the orderly march of constellations as undeniable evidence of divine providence (citing Psalm 104:23, Sirach 16:26–27, and Amos 3:3), arguing that even two strangers cannot walk together by chance, let alone countless stars.

24.23: Eusebius concludes the chapter by noting that Dionysius went on to prove teleology through the elements, animals, and human anatomy, brief excerpts of which he will provide next.

^24.1 «Πῶς αὐτῶν ἀνασχώμεθα τυχηρὰ λεγόντων εἶναι συμπτώματα τὰ σοφὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ καλὰ δημιουργήματα; ὧν ἕκαστόν τε καθ' ἑαυτὸ γενόμενον ὤφθη τῷ προστάξαντι γενέσθαι καλὸν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁμοίως ἅπαντα· ‘καὶ εἶδε γάρ,’ φησίν, ‘ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησε, καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν.’	^24.1 "How can we tolerate them when they claim that wise and therefore beautiful creations are accidental occurrences? Each of these, when brought into being by itself, was seen by Him who commanded it to be made to be good, and likewise all of them together. For scripture says: 'And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good.'
^24.2 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μικρῶν τῶν συνήθων καὶ παρὰ πόδας νουθετοῦνται παραδειγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν δύνανται μανθάνειν ὅτι χρειῶδες μὲν καὶ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ἔργον οὐδὲν ἀνεπιτηδεύτως οὐδὲ συμβατικῶς ἀπεργάζεται, ἀλλὰ χειρουργούμενον εἰς τὴν πρέπουσαν ὑπηρεσίαν καταρτίζεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς ἄχρηστον μεταπίπτῃ καὶ ἀνωφελές, τότε διαλυόμενον ἀορίστως καὶ ὡς ἂν τύχῃ διασκίδναται, ἅτε μηκέτι μεταχειριζομένης μηδὲ διαταττούσης αὐτὸ τῆς σοφίας, ᾗ τοῦ συνεστάναι τοῦτο ἔμελεν.	^24.2 Yet they are not even admonished by small, common, everyday examples right before their feet, from which they might learn that no useful or beneficial work is produced casually or by chance, but is fashioned by hand to fit its proper service. But whenever it falls into uselessness and unprofitability, it is then dissolved indeterminately and scattered at random, since wisdom no longer manages or directs that which once cared for its coherence.
^24.3 ἱμάτιόν τε γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς ἱστουργοῦ συνισταμένων τῶν στημόνων οὐδὲ τῆς κρόκης αὐτομάτως παρεμπλεκομένης ἀνυφαίνεται· εἰ δὲ κατατριβείη, τὰ λακισθέντα διαρριπτεῖται ῥάκη. οἰκία τε ἀνοικοδομεῖται καὶ πόλις οὐ τοὺς μέν τινας δεχομένη θεμελίοις αὐτομολοῦντας λίθους, τοὺς δὲ ἀναπηδῶντας εἰς τὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ χώραν ὁ τοιχοδόμος τοὺς εὐθέτους ἐπιφέρει· καὶ καταρριφθείσης δέ, ὡς ἂν παρείκῃ, κατενεχθεὶς ἕκαστος ἀπεσφάλη.	^24.3 For a garment is not woven without a weaver through warp threads setting themselves up or woof threads intertwining automatically; and if it should wear out, the tattered rags are thrown away. Nor is a house or a city built by receiving some stones that desert into the foundations on their own and others that leap up onto the courses; rather, the builder lays appropriate stones in place. And when it is pulled down, each fallen stone slips away wherever it happens to land.
^24.4 καὶ κατασκευαζομένης νεὼς οὐχ ἡ μέν τις ὑπέβαλεν ἑαυτὴν τρόπις, ὁ δὲ κατὰ μέσην ἑαυτὸν ἱστὸς ὤρθωσε, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ξύλων ἣν ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ θέσιν κατέλαβεν· οὐδὲ τὰ λεγόμενα ἑκατὸν τῆς ἁμάξης ξύλα καθ' ὃν εὗρε κενὸν τόπον ἕκαστον συνεπάγη, ἀλλ' ὁ τέκτων ἑκατέρας συνεκόμισε καίριον· εἰ δὲ διαλυθείη ἡ ναῦς ἐνθαλασσεύουσα, ἢ φερομένη κατὰ γῆν ἅμαξα, ὅπη τύχῃ τὰ ξύλα τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς συντόνου ῥύμης διασπείρεται.	^24.4 And when a ship is constructed, it is not that a keel lays itself down, or a mast erects itself in the middle, or that each of the other timbers occupies whatever position it happened to take on its own. Nor do the so-called 'hundred timbers' of a cart assemble themselves into whatever empty space each finds; rather, the carpenter brings together what is suitable for both. But if the ship breaks up at sea, or the cart breaks down on land, the timbers are scattered wherever chance dictates—some by the waves, others by the forceful impact.
^24.5 οὕτως ἂν ἁρμόζοι λέγειν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους, ἀργὰς μενούσας καὶ ἀχειροποιήτους καὶ ἀχρήστους, εἰκῆ φέρεσθαι. ὁράτωσαν γὰρ τὰς ἀθεάτους ἐκεῖνοι καὶ τὰς ἀνοήτους νοείτωσαν, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκείνῳ, ὃς φανερωθὲν ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖ· ‘τὸ ἀκατέργαστόν σου εἶδον οἱ ὀφθαλμοί μου.’	^24.5 Thus it would be fitting to say to them that their atoms too, remaining inert, uncrafted, and useless, are carried along at random. Let them look at those invisible things and comprehend those imperceptible ones—not like him who, when this was revealed to him by God, confessed to Him: 'Your eyes saw my unformed substance.'
^24.6 ὅταν δὲ καὶ ἅ φασιν ἐξ ἀτόμων ὑφάσματα γίνεσθαι τὰ εὐήτρια, ταῦθ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀσόφως καὶ ἀναισθήτως αὐτουργεῖσθαι λέγωσι, τίς ἀνέξεται τὰς ἀτόμους ἀκούων ἐρίθους, ὧν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης ἐστὶ σοφώτερος χειροτεχνῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ;	^24.6 And when they claim that fine-woven fabrics are made from atoms, produced by them without wisdom or perception, who will tolerate hearing that atoms are weavers—when even a spider is a wiser craftsman, spinning out of itself?
^24.7 ἢ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οἶκον τὸν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς συνεστῶτα, καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ πλῆθος τῆς ἐπιφαινομένης αὐτῷ σοφίας καλούμενον κόσμον, ὑπὸ τῶν σὺν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ φερομένων ἀτόμων κεκοσμῆσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι κόσμον ἀκοσμίαν;	^24.7 Or that this vast house composed of heaven and earth, called a cosmos on account of the magnitude and abundance of wisdom displayed in it, was adorned by atoms floating along with no order (kosmos), so that order (kosmos) arose from disorder (akosmia)?
^24.8 πῶς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐτάκτους ἐξ ἀτάκτου προάγεσθαι φορᾶς; πῶς δὲ τὴν παναρμόνιον τῶν οὐρανίων χορείαν ἐξ ἀμούσων καὶ ἀναρμόστων συνᾴδειν ὀργάνων;	^24.8 And how could orderly movements and paths be produced from disorderly motion? How could the all-harmonious choral dance of the heavenly bodies sing in unison from unmusical and discordant instruments?
^24.9 Τίνα δὲ τρόπον, μιᾶς οὔσης καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἁπασῶν οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, πλὴν τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὥς φασι, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων, τὰ μέν ἐστι θεῖα καὶ ἀκήρατα καὶ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτοὶ φήσαιεν ἄν, σώματα, ἢ μακραίωνά γε κατὰ τὸν οὕτως ὀνομάσαντα, φαινόμενά τε καὶ ἀφανῆ· φαινόμενα μὲν ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἀστέρες γῆ τε καὶ ὕδωρ, ἀφανῆ δὲ θεοί τε καὶ δαίμονες καὶ ψυχαί; ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ θέλοντες ὑπάρχειν ἀρνήσασθαι δύνανται.	^24.9 And in what manner—since all atoms have one and the same essence and the same imperishable nature, except for their sizes and shapes, as they say—are some bodies divine, uncorrupted, and eternal (as they themselves would say) or at least long-lived (according to him who so named them), both visible and invisible: visible ones like the sun, moon, stars, earth, and water; invisible ones like gods, daemons, and souls? For these they cannot deny exist, even if they wished to.
^24.10 τὰ δὲ μακροβιώτατα ζῷά τε καὶ φυτά· ζῷα μὲν ἔν τε ὄρνισιν, ὥς φασιν, ἀετοὶ κόρακές τε καὶ φοίνικες· ἔν τε χερσαίοις ἔλαφοί τε καὶ ἐλέφαντες καὶ δράκοντες· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐνύδροις τὰ κήτη· δένδρα δὲ φοίνικες καὶ δρύες καὶ περσέαι· καὶ τῶν γε δένδρων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀειθαλῆ, ἃ καὶ καταριθμήσας τις εἶπεν εἶναι τεσσαρακαίδεκα· τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἀνθεῖ καὶ φυλλορροεῖ· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν τε φυομένων καὶ τῶν γεννωμένων ἐστὶν ὠκύμορα καὶ βραχυτελῆ, ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς εἶπέ τις ἁγία περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφή· ‘βροτὸς γὰρ γεννητὸς γυναικὸς ὀλιγόβιος.’	^24.10 And what about the longest-lived animals and plants? Animals among birds, as they say, like eagles, ravens, and the phoenix; among land animals, stags, elephants, and serpents; among aquatic creatures, whales; and among trees, palms, oaks, and perseas. Indeed, some trees are evergreen—which someone enumerated as being fourteen in number—while others bloom and shed leaves seasonally. Yet most living and born things are short-lived and brief, among which is man, as a certain holy scripture says of him: 'For man born of woman is short-lived.'
^24.11 ἀλλὰ τοὺς συνδέσμους φήσουσι τῶν ἀτόμων διαλλάττοντας αἰτίους γίνεσθαι τῆς περὶ τὴν διαμονὴν διαφορᾶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν πεπυκνῶσθαι καὶ κατεσφίγχθαι λέγειν, ὥστ' αὐτὰ παντελῶς δυσαπάλλακτα γεγονέναι πιλήματα, τὰ δὲ μανοτέραν καὶ χαλῶσαν τὴν συνάφειαν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἐσχηκέναι, ὡς ἢ θᾶττον ἢ μὴ μετὰ πολὺ τῆς κολλήσεως αὐτῶν ἀφίστασθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοιῶνδε καὶ ὧδέ πως ἐσχηματισμένων, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἑτεροίως διακειμένων συμμεμίχθαι.	^24.11 Yet they will claim that differing atomic bonds cause this variation in durability: saying that some are condensed and tightly bound by them so as to become completely unbreakable feltings, while others have a looser and slacker joining of atoms to a greater or lesser degree, so that they detach from their gluing either quickly or not long after; and that some are mixed from shapes of one kind, and others from different shapes arranged differently.
^24.12 Τίς οὖν ὁ φυλοκρινῶν συναγείρων τε καὶ ἀναχέων καὶ τάσδε μὲν οὕτω συντάττων εἰς ἥλιον, τάσδε δὲ ὡδί, ἵνα ἡ σελήνη γένηται, καὶ ἑκάστας συμφέρων κατὰ τὴν οἰκειότητα πρὸς ἑκάστου φαῦσιν ἀστέρος; οὔτε γὰρ αἱ ἡλιακαὶ τοσαίδε καὶ τοιαίδε καὶ ὧδέ πως ἑνωθεῖσαι πρὸς ἐργασίαν σελήνης ἂν καταβεβήκεσαν, οὔτε αἱ τῶν σεληνιακῶν ἀτόμων πλεκτάναι γεγόνασί ποτε ἥλιος· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Ἀρκτοῦρος, εἰ καὶ λαμπρός ἐστι, τὰς Ἑωσφόρου μεγαλοφρονήσαιτό ποτε ἂν ἀτόμους ἔχειν, οὐδὲ Ὠρίωνος αἱ Πλειάδες. καλῶς γὰρ ὁ Παῦλος διέστειλεν εἰπών· ‘ἄλλη δόξα ἡλίου καὶ ἄλλη δόξα σελήνης καὶ ἄλλη δόξα ἀστέρων· ἀστὴρ γὰρ ἀστέρος διαφέρει ἐν δόξῃ.’	^24.12 Who, then, is the one sorting into tribes, gathering together, and pouring out—arranging these atoms in this way to form the sun, and those in that way to make the moon, bringing each together according to its suitability for the light of each star? For neither would solar atoms, so many and of such kind united in this way, have descended to create the moon, nor have the entanglements of lunar atoms ever become the sun. Neither would Arcturus, bright though it is, ever boast of having the atoms of the Morning Star, nor the Pleiades those of Orion. For Paul distinguished well when he said: 'There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory.'
^24.13 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπαίσθητος αὐτῶν ὡς ἀψύχων ἡ σύμπηξις ἐγένετο, ἐπιστήμονος αὐταῖς ἔδει δημιουργοῦ· εἰ δὲ ἀπροαίρετος καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην, ὡς ἀλόγων, ἡ σύνερξις, σοφός τις αὐτὰς ἀγελάρχης συνελαύνων ἐπεστάτησεν· εἰ δὲ ἑκουσίως ἐθελουργῆσαι συγκέκλεινται, θαυμάσιός τις αὐτῶν ἀρχιτέκτων ἐργοδοτῶν προηγήσατο· ἢ καθάπερ εὔτακτος στρατηγὸς οὐ συγκεχυμένην εἴασε τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ πάντας ἀναμίξ, ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει μὲν τὴν ἵππον, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοὺς ὁπλίτας, τούς τε ἀκοντιστὰς καθ' ἑαυτούς, καὶ χωρὶς τοὺς τοξότας, καὶ τοὺς σφενδονήτας ἔνθα ἐχρῆν διετάξατο, ἵνα ἀλλήλοις οἱ ὁμόσκευοι συμμαχοῖεν.	^24.13 If their joining occurred unconsciously, as inanimate things, they required an intelligent craftsman; if their gathering was unchosen and by necessity, as irrational things, a wise herd-leader must have driven and directed them; if they were penned together voluntarily to work willingly, a marvelous master builder guided them by assigning work—just as an orderly general does not leave an army confused and mixed together, but arranges the cavalry in one section, the heavy infantry separately, the javelin-throwers by themselves, the archers apart, and the slingers where needed, so that troops with identical equipment may assist one another.
^24.14 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο χλεύην οἴονται τὸ παράδειγμα διὰ τὸ μεγάλων σωμάτων με πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα ποιεῖσθαι σύγκρισιν, ἐπὶ τὰ σμικρότατα μεταβησόμεθα.»	^24.14 And if they consider this example a joke because I compare large bodies to microscopic ones, we shall pass on to the smallest things."
^24.15 Εἶτα τούτοις ἐξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Εἰ δὲ μήτε λέξις μήτε ἐκλογὴ μήτε τάξις αὐταῖς ἄρχοντος ἐπικέοιτο, αὐταὶ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν αὑτὰς ἐκ τῆς πολλῆς κατὰ τὴν ῥύσιν τύρβης διευθύνουσαι, καὶ τὸν πολὺν τῶν συμπτώσεων διεκπερῶσαι κυδοιμόν, αἱ ὅμοιαι πρὸς τὰς ὁμοίας οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄγοιντο, συντρέχοιεν δὲ καὶ συναγελάζοιντο γνωρίζουσαι τὰς συγγενεῖς, θαυμαστή γε τῶν ἀτόμων ἡ δημοκρατία, δεξιουμένων τε ἀλλήλας τῶν φίλων καὶ περιπλεκομένων, εἰς μίαν τε κατασκηνοῦν συνοικίαν ἐπειγομένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀποτετορνευμένων αὐτομάτων εἰς ἥλιον φωστῆρα μέγαν, ἵνα ποιήσωσι τὴν ἡμέραν, τῶν δὲ εἰς πολλὰς ἴσως πυραμίδας ἀστέρων ἀναπεφλεγμένων, ἵνα καὶ ὅλον στεφανώσωσι τὸν οὐρανόν, τῶν δὲ περιτεταγμένων, ἵνα αὐτὸν εἰκῆ στερεώσωσι καὶ καμαρώσωσι τὸν αἰθέρα εἰς τὴν τῶν φωστήρων ἐπιβάθραν, ἐπιλέξωνταί τε ἑαυταῖς αἱ συνωμοσίαι τῶν χυδαίων ἀτόμων μονάς, καὶ διακληρώσωνται τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰς οἴκους ἑαυταῖς καὶ σταθμούς.	^24.15 Then immediately following these things Eusebius adds: "If neither choosing, nor selecting, nor arranging by a ruler were imposed upon them, but they directed themselves on their own out of the great turmoil of their flux, passing through the vast tumult of collisions—if like were brought to like not by God (as the poet says), but ran together and flocked together recognizing their kinsmen, then truly wonderful is this democracy of atoms! Friends greet and entwine one another, hastening to dwell in a single habitation: some spontaneously turning themselves into the sun, a great light to make the day; others flaring up into many pyramids of stars to crown the whole heaven; others surrounding it to fortify and arch the ether at random as a threshold for the luminaries—and the conspiracies of common atoms choose habitations for themselves, dividing the heaven by lot into homes and stations for themselves!
^24.16 Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ φανερὰ ὁρῶσιν οὗτοι οἱ πολλοῦ γε δέουσι συνορᾶν καὶ τὰ ἀφανῆ. ἐοίκασι γὰρ μηδὲ ἀνατολὰς ἐποπτεύειν τεταγμένας καὶ δύσεις μήτε τῶν ἄλλων μήτε τὰς ἐκπρεπεστάτας ἡλίου, μηδὲ χρῆσθαι ταῖς δι' αὐτῶν δεδωρημέναις ἀνθρώποις ἐπικουρίαις, ἀναπτομένῃ μὲν εἰς ἐργασίαν ἡμέρᾳ, ἐπηλυγαζούσῃ δὲ νυκτὶ πρὸς ἀνάπαυλαν. ‘ἐξελεύσεται γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,’ φησίν, ‘ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν αὑτοῦ ἕως ἑσπέρας.’	^24.16 Yet these people do not even see obvious things—they who fall so far short of perceiving invisible things! They seem neither to observe the ordained risings and settings of other stars nor the most splendid ones of the sun, nor to make use of the help granted to humans through them—day kindled for labor, night shadowing for rest. For scripture says: 'Man shall go forth to his work and to his labor until evening.'
^24.17 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἀνακύκλησιν αὐτοῦ, καθ' ἣν ὡρισμένας ὥρας καὶ καιροὺς καὶ εὐκαίρους τροπὰς ἀπαρατρέπτους ἀποτελεῖ, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ἀτόμων ὁδηγούμενος. ἀλλὰ κἂν μὴ θέλωσιν οἱ δείλαιοι, ὡς δ' οὖν πιστεύουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ‘μέγας κύριος ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν λόγοις αὐτοῦ κατέσπευσε πορείαν.’	^24.17 Nor do they consider his other circuit, according to which he brings about fixed hours, seasonal cycles, and unalterable solstices, guided by the very atoms of which he is made. But even if those wretches refuse to believe it, as the righteous believe: 'Great is the Lord who made him, and at His words he hastens his course.'
^24.18 ἄτομοι γὰρ ὑμῖν φέρουσιν, ὦ τυφλοί, καὶ ὑετούς, ἵνα ἡ γῆ τροφὰς ὑμῖν τε καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῆς ζῴοις ἀνῇ; θέρος τε ἐπάγουσιν, ἵνα καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ δένδρων εἰς τρυφὴν καρποὺς λάβητε; καὶ διὰ τί μὴ ταῖς ἀτόμοις προσκυνεῖτε καὶ θύετε ταῖς ἐπικάρποις; ἀχάριστοί γε μηδὲ ἀπαρχὰς αὐταῖς ὀλίγας τῶν πολλῶν δωρεῶν, ἃς παρ' αὐτῶν ἔχετε, ἀφιεροῦντες.	^24.18 Do atoms bring you rains, O blind ones, so that the earth may yield food for you and all living creatures upon it? Do they bring summer so that you may receive tree fruits for luxury? Why then do you not worship and sacrifice to the fruitful atoms? Ungrateful creatures, not even consecrating to them a few firstfruits from the many gifts you receive from them!
^24.19 ὁ δὲ πολυεθνὴς καὶ πολυμιγὴς δῆμος τῶν ἀστέρων, οὓς αἱ πολυπλανεῖς καὶ ἀεὶ διαρριπτούμεναι συνέστησαν ἄτομοι, χώρας ἑαυτοῖς κατὰ συνθήκας ἀπεδάσαντο, ὥσπερ ἀποικίαν ἢ συνοικίαν ἀνελόμενοι, μηδενὸς οἰκιστοῦ μηδὲ οἰκοδεσπότου προεστηκότος· καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς πλησιοχώρους γειτνιάσεις ἐνωμότως καὶ μετ' εἰρήνης φυλάττουσιν, οὐχ ὑπερβαίνοντες οὓς κατειλήφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρους, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλίδων ἀτόμων νομοθετούμενοι.	^24.19 And the multi-ethnic, mixed host of the stars—which the far-wandering and ever-scattered atoms composed—divided territories among themselves by agreement, taking up a colony or settlement as it were, with no founder or master of the house presiding. And they maintain neighboring relations with their neighbors under oath and in peace, not exceeding the boundaries they occupied from the beginning, as if legislated by sovereign atoms.
^24.20 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἐκεῖναι· πῶς γὰρ αἱ μηδ' οὖσαι; ἀλλὰ θείων λογίων ἐπακούσατε· ‘ἐν κρίσει κυρίου τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ ποιήσεως αὐτῶν διέστειλε μερίδας αὐτῶν· ἐκόσμησεν εἰς αἰῶνα τὰ ἔργα αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἰς γενεὰς αὐτῶν.’	^24.20 Yet those atoms do not rule—for how could things that do not even exist? Rather, listen to the divine oracles: 'In the judgment of the Lord are His works from the beginning, and from their creation He divided their portions; He arranged His works forever, and their rule unto their generations.'
^24.21 Ἢ τίς οὕτως εὔτακτος πεδιάδα γῆν διώδευσε φάλαγξ, οὐ προθέοντος οὐδενός, οὐκ ἐκτρεπομένου, οὐκ ἐμποδοστατοῦντος, οὐκ ἀπολειπομένου τῶν συμπαρατεταγμένων, ὡς ἰσόστοιχοι καὶ συνασπιδοῦντες ἀεὶ προΐασιν, ὁ συνεχής τε καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἀόχλητός τε καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστος τῶν ἄστρων στρατός;	^24.21 Or what army in array ever marched across a level plain so orderly—no one running ahead, no one turning aside, no one obstructing, no one falling behind fellow soldiers in line—moving forward as equal ranks shielding one another, like the continuous, unbroken, undisturbed, and unhindered army of the stars?
^24.22 ἀλλ' ἐγκλίσεσι καὶ ταῖς εἰς πλάγιον ἐκνεύσεσι γίνονταί τινες αὐτῶν ἄδηλοι τροπαί. καὶ μὴν ἀεὶ καιροφυλακοῦσι καὶ προορῶνται τὰς χώρας, ὅθεν ἕκαστος οἱ τούτοις προσεσχηκότες. εἰπάτωσαν οὖν ἡμῖν οἱ τῶν ἀτόμων τομεῖς καὶ τῶν ἀμερῶν μερισταὶ καὶ τῶν ἀσυνθέτων συναγωγεῖς καὶ τὰ ἄπειρα περινοοῦντες, πόθεν ἡ κυκλοφορικὴ τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ περιοδία, οὐχ ἑνὸς παραλόγως ἀτόμων πήγματος οὕτω σφενδονηθέντος, ἀλλὰ τοσούτου κυκλικοῦ χοροῦ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν ἴσα βαίνοντος καὶ συμπεριδινουμένου, πόθεν ἀδιάτακτοι καὶ ἀπροαίρετοι καὶ ἀγνῶτες ἀλλήλων συνέμποροι παμπληθεῖς συνανεστράφησαν. καλῶς τε ὁ προφήτης ἐν τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις καὶ ἀνενδείκτοις ἔταξε τὸ ξένους κἂν δύο συνδραμεῖν· ‘εἰ πορεύσονται,’ φησί, ‘δύο ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐὰν μὴ γνωρίσωσιν ἑαυτούς;’»	^24.22 Yet by inclinations and sideways swervings, some of their turnings become unseen; and yet they always watch the seasons and foresee their positions, as those who attend to them know. Let the splitters of atoms, the dividers of indivisibles, the gatherers of uncompounded particles, and those who ponder infinite space tell us: whence comes the circular rotation and orbit of the heavenly bodies—not of a single mass of atoms foolishly hurled forth in this way, but of so great a circular dance treading equally in rhythm and swirling around together? Whence did disordered, unchoosing, mutually ignorant travelers come together in such vast multitudes? Well did the prophet rank it among impossibilities and impossibilities for even two strangers to run together: 'Shall two walk together,' he says, 'unless they know one another?'"
^24.23 Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν μυρία τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἐπαγαγὼν ἐξῆς κατασκευάζει διὰ πλειόνων τὸ πρόβλημα ἀπό τε τῶν κατὰ μέρος στοιχείων τοῦ παντός, ἀπό τε τῶν ἐν τούτοις παντοδαπῶν ζῴων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοὐνθρώπου φύσεως. ἐξ ὧν ἔτι βραχέα τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσθεὶς καταπαύσω τὸν παρόντα λόγον.	^24.23 Having said these things and added countless others following them, Eusebius continues: "He establishes the proposition at greater length from the individual elements of the universe, from the varied animals in them, and indeed from human nature itself. Adding a few brief excerpts from these to what has been said, I shall bring the present discourse to a close."

Chapter 25

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Dionysius of Alexandria's final teleological argument against Epicurus:

25.1–25.4: Dionysius criticizes atomists for failing to examine their own human origin. Quoting Job 10:8–12 ("Your hands shaped me... Did you not pour me out like milk?"), he highlights how embryonic development—from seed to skin, flesh, bones, and sinews—demonstrates providential design down to functional and aesthetic details (such as hair for protection and a beard for dignity).

25.5–25.7: He inventories human anatomy and physiology: the head as an acropolis housing the brain, guarded by the senses; hands for crafts; feet for travel; and the stomach distributing nourishment.

25.8–25.11: He contrasts those who recognize divine design with atomists who attribute the human body (skēnos) to random collisions. He notes that if mindless atoms cannot even craft a clay statue or melt a gold idol, they certainly could not produce living, breathing human prototypes.

25.12–25.14: He ridicules the notion that soul, mind, reason, and human intellect were granted by mindless atoms, mockingly concluding that if atomism were true, the "Muse-like atoms" would be the real originators of poetry, music, and science—and that Epicurus's actual gods are banished to infinite chaos.

^25.1 «Καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοὺς οὔτε τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοὺς ὁρῶσιν. εἰ γάρ τις τῶν ἀρχηγετῶν τοῦ τῆς ἀσεβείας ταύτης δόγματος ἑαυτὸν ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅθεν ἀνελογίζετο, ἐφρόνησεν ἂν ἅπερ συνῃσθημένος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ εἶπεν ἂν οὐ πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν ἑαυτοῦ· ‘αἱ χεῖρές σου ἔπλασάν με καὶ ἐποίησάν με·’ καὶ προσεπεξειργάσατο ἂν ὡς τὸν θαυμάσιον τῆς ποιήσεως ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον· ‘ἢ ὥσπερ γάλα με ἤμελξας, ἐτύρευσας δέ με ἴσα τυρῷ; δέρμα καὶ κρέας με ἐνέδυσας, ὀστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις με ἔνειρας; ζωὴν δὲ καὶ ἔλεος ἔθου παρ' ἐμοί, ἡ δὲ ἐπισκοπή σου ἐφύλαξέ μου τὸ πνεῦμα.’	^25.1 "And they see neither themselves nor the things concerning themselves. For if any of the ringleaders of this impious doctrine had reflected upon himself—who he is and whence he came—he would have thought as one conscious of himself, and would have said not to the atoms, but to his own Father and Creator: 'Your hands formed me and made me.' And he would have elaborated further on the marvelous manner of his creation: 'Did You not pour me out like milk, and curdle me like cheese? You clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews; You granted me life and mercy, and Your visitation preserved my spirit.'
^25.2 πόσας γὰρ ἀτόμους ὁ Ἐπικούρου πατὴρ καὶ ποταπὰς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προέχεεν, ὅτ' ἀπεσπέρμαινεν Ἐπίκουρον; καὶ πῶς εἰς τὴν μητρῴαν αὐτοῦ καταβληθεῖσαι γαστέρα συνεπάγησαν, ἐσχηματίσθησαν, ἐμορφώθησαν, ἐκινήθησαν, ηὐξήθησαν; καὶ πολλὰς ἡ βραχεῖα ῥανὶς τὰς Ἐπικούρου ἀτόμους προσκαλεσαμένη τὰς μὲν ἐπημφίεσεν αὐτῶν δέρμα καὶ σάρκα γενομένας, ταῖς δὲ ὀστωθείσαις ἠνώρθωται, ταῖς δὲ συνεδέθη νευρορραφουμένη;	^25.2 For how many atoms, and of what sort, did the father of Epicurus pour out from himself when he begot Epicurus? And how, when cast into his mother's womb, were they compacted, shaped, formed, moved, and grown? And how did a small drop, inviting many atoms to form Epicurus, clothe some as skin and flesh, stand erect by making others into bone, and bind others together by stitching them with sinews?
^25.3 τά τε ἄλλα πολλὰ μέλη καὶ σπλάγχνα καὶ ἔγκατα καὶ αἰσθητήρια τὰ μὲν ἔνδοθεν, τὰ δὲ θύραθεν ἐφήρμοσε, δι' ὧν ἐζῳογονήθη τὸ σῶμα; ὧν οὐδὲν ἀργὸν οὐδὲ ἀχρεῖον προσετέθη, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ φαυλότατα, μήτε τρίχες μήτε ὄνυχες, πάντα δέ, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ τῆς συστάσεως ὄφελος, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάλλος τῆς ὄψεως συντελεῖ.	^25.3 And how did it fit together all the other various limbs, viscera, entrails, and sense organs—some within, others without—through which the body was quickened? Of these, nothing idle or useless was added, since not even the most insignificant parts, neither hair nor nails, are without purpose; rather, all things contribute, some to the benefit of the body's structure, others to the beauty of its appearance.
^25.4 οὐ γὰρ τῆς χρείας μόνης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὥρας ἐπιμελὴς ἡ πρόνοια. ἔρυμα μὲν γὰρ καὶ σκέπασμα πᾶσι τῆς κεφαλῆς ἡ κόμη, εὐπρέπεια δὲ ὁ πώγων τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. τήν τε τοῦ ὅλου σώματος τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου φύσιν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἀναγκαίων πάντων ἥρμοσε, καὶ τοῖς μέλεσι πᾶσι τήν τε πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίαν περιέβαλε καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου χορηγίαν ἐπεμέτρησεν.	^25.4 For Providence is mindful not only of utility, but also of elegance. Hair is a shelter and covering for the head of all, while a beard is a dignified ornament for the philosopher. Providence fitted together the nature of the entire human body out of all its necessary parts, bestowing upon all limbs mutual fellowship and measuring out the nourishment supplied by the whole.
^25.5 ὧν τὰ μὲν ὁλοσχερῆ καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἐκ τῆς πείρας ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν πρόδηλα· κεφαλῆς ἡγεμονία, καὶ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ὥσπερ ἄρχοντα ἐν ἀκροπόλει, τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡ δορυφορία· προσιοῦσαι μὲν ὄψεις, ἀναγγέλλουσαι δὲ ἀκοαί, ἐδωδὴ ὥσπερ φορολογοῦσα, ὄσφρησις καθάπερ ἀνιχνεύουσα καὶ διερευνωμένη, καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ πᾶν διατάττουσα τὸ ὑπήκοον.	^25.5 Some of these things are evident as a whole even to ordinary people from their practical experience: the supremacy of the head, and around the brain—like a ruler on an acropolis—the bodyguard of the senses: sight approaching, hearing reporting, food paying tribute as it were, smell tracking and searching out, and touch regulating all that is subject to it.
^25.6 (κεφαλαιωδῶς γὰρ νῦν ὀλίγα τῶν τῆς πανσόφου προνοίας ἔργων ἐπιδραμούμεθα, μετ' ὀλίγον ἀκριβέστερον τοῦ θεοῦ διδόντος ἐπεξεργασόμενοι, ὅταν πρὸς τὸν δοκοῦντα λογιώτερον ἀποτεινόμεθα.)	^25.6 (For we shall now run briefly over a few works of all-wise Providence, and shortly, God willing, we shall work them out more precisely when we turn our discourse toward him who seems more eloquent.)
^25.7 χειρῶν διακονία, δι' ὧν ἐργασίαι τε παντοῖαι καὶ πολυμήχανοι τελοῦνται τέχναι ταῖς κατὰ μέρος δυνάμεσιν εἰς μίαν συνεργίαν διηρθρωμένων, ὤμων τε ἀχθοφορίαι, καὶ κατοχαὶ δακτύλων, ἀγκώνων τε καμπαί, πρός τε τὸ σῶμα εἴσω στρεφόμεναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀπονεύουσαι, ἵνα ἐφέλκεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπωθεῖσθαι δύνωνται· ποδῶν ὑπηρεσία, δι' ὧν πᾶσα ἡμῖν ὑποπέπτωκεν ἡ περίγειος κτίσις, βάσιμος ἡ γῆ, πλωτὴ ἡ θάλασσα, περάσιμοι οἱ ποταμοί, καὶ πάντων πρὸς πάντα ἐπιμιξία· γαστὴρ ταμιεῖον τροφῶν, πᾶσι τοῖς συντεταγμένοις μέλεσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἐν μέτρῳ τὸ σιτηρέσιον διανέμουσα καὶ τὸ περιττεῦον ἐκτιθεμένη· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δι' ὅσων ἐμφανῶς ἡ διοίκησις τῆς ἀνθρωπείου μεμηχάνηται διαμονῆς, ὧν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἔχοντες οἱ σοφοὶ τὴν χρῆσιν οὐκ ἴσχουσι τὴν γνῶσιν.	^25.7 Consider the service of the hands, through which crafts of all kinds and ingenious skills are performed, with individual faculties articulated into a single cooperation; the burden-bearing of the shoulders, the grasp of the fingers, the bends of the elbows—turning inward toward the body and bending outward so as to pull in and push away; the service of the feet, through which all earthly creation has been brought into subjection to us—the earth made walkable, the sea navigable, the rivers fordable, and intercommunication established for all people; the stomach as a storehouse of food, distributing rations in due measure from itself to all orderly arranged limbs and expelling what is superfluous; and all the other mechanisms through which the management of human survival is clearly engineered—the use of which the wise share equally with the foolish, though lacking true understanding.
^25.8 οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἣν ἂν οἰηθῶσιν ἀθεότητα τὴν ἐπιστημονικωτάτην περὶ πάντων καὶ τὴν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς εὐεργετικωτάτην ἀναφέρουσιν οἰκονομίαν, κρείττονος καὶ θείας ὄντως φρονήσεως τε καὶ δυνάμεως ἔργον αὐτὴν εἶναι πιστούμενοι· οἱ δὲ συντυχίᾳ καὶ συμπτώσει τῶν ἀτόμων ἀσκόπως τὴν θαυμασιωτάτην καλλιεργίαν ἀνατιθέασι.	^25.8 For some attribute this most skillful economy regarding all things and most beneficial dispensation toward themselves to whatever godlessness they choose, trusting that it is the work of a superior and truly divine wisdom and power; whereas others mindlessly attribute this most wondrous craftsmanship to the chance and collision of atoms.
^25.9 τὴν δὲ ἐνεργεστέραν ἔτι τούτων ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐνδοσθίων διάθεσιν ἰατροὶ μὲν ἀκριβῶς διερευνησάμενοι καὶ καταπλαγέντες ἐξεθείασαν τὴν φύσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὕστερον ὡς ἂν οἷοί τε γενώμεθα κἂν ἐπιπολῆς ἀναθεωρήσωμεν.	^25.9 As for a still more energetic examination of these matters and the arrangement of the internal organs, physicians have thoroughly investigated them and, struck with awe, glorified nature; and we ourselves later, so far as we are able, shall inspect them at least on the surface.
^25.10 καθόλου δὲ καὶ συλλήβδην ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ σκῆνος τίς τοιοῦτον ἐσκηνοποίησεν, ὑψηλόν, ὄρθιον, εὔρυθμον, εὐαίσθητον, εὐκίνητον, εὐεργόν, παντουργόν; ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων ἄλογος, φασί, πληθύς. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰκόνα πηλίνην ἐκεῖναι συνελθοῦσαι πλάσαιεν, οὐδ' ἀνδριάντα λίθινον ξέσαιεν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴδωλον ἀργυροῦν ἢ χρυσοῦν χωνεύσασαι προαγάγοιεν·	^25.10 In general and in sum: who pitched this entire tent (skēnos) to be tall, upright, well-proportioned, sensitive, nimble, active, and versatile? 'The irrational multitude of atoms,' they say. Yet those atoms, coming together, could not even mold an image of clay, nor carve a stone statue, nor cast and produce a silver or golden idol.
^25.11 ἀλλὰ τέχναι καὶ χειρουργίαι τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων εὕρηνται σωματουργοί. ὧν δὲ ἀπεικασίαι καὶ σκιαγραφίαι δίχα σοφίας οὐκ ἂν γένοιντο, πῶς τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ πρωτότυπα τούτων αὐτομάτως συμβέβηκε;	^25.11 Rather, arts and manual crafts for making these have been invented by human sculptors. If copies and sketches cannot come into being without wisdom, how could their real, living originals happen automatically?
^25.12 ψυχὴ δὲ καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος πόθεν ἐγγέγονε τῷ φιλοσόφῳ; ἢ παρὰ τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ ἀνοήτων καὶ ἀλογίστων ἀτόμων ταῦτ' ἠρανίσατο, κἀκείνων αὐτῷ τι ἑκάστη νόημα καὶ δόγμα ἐνέπνευσεν;	^25.12 And whence came soul, mind, and reason to the philosopher? Did he collect these from inanimate, mindless, and irrational atoms, each of them breathing into him some thought or doctrine?
^25.13 καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ Ἠσιόδου μῦθος τὴν Πανδώραν φησὶν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, οὕτως ἡ σοφία τοὐνδρὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων συνετελέσθη; καὶ ποίησιν δὲ πᾶσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν, ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ γεωμετρίαν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, οὐκέτι θεῶν εὑρήματα καὶ παιδεύματα φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες εἶναι, μόναι δὲ γεγόνασιν ἔμπειροι καὶ σοφαὶ πάντων αἱ ἄτομοι μοῦσαι.	^25.13 And just as Hesiod's myth says Pandora was fashioned by the gods, was the man's wisdom thus constructed by atoms? Shall the Greeks no longer say that all poetry, all music, astronomy, geometry, and the other sciences are the inventions and teachings of the gods, but that the atomic Muses alone have become experienced and wise in all things?
^25.14 ἡ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων Ἐπικούρου θεογονία τῶν μὲν ἀπείρων κόσμων ἐξόριός ἐστιν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἄπειρον ἀκοσμίαν πεφυγάδευται.»	^25.14 For the Epicurean theogony born of atoms is exiled from infinite worlds and banished into infinite disorder."

Chapter 26

☜ ☞

In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting Dionysius of Alexandria's critique of Epicurus and Democritus, before concluding his excerpt:

26.1–26.3: Dionysius argues that work, oversight, and providence are not burdensome to noble and wise beings (whether noble humans or the gods), but rather a source of joy. He quotes Hesiod (Works and Days 413, 412) and Jeremiah (48:10 LXX) to emphasize that neglecting good work is a disgrace.

26.4–26.5: He turns to Democritus, citing his famous quote about preferring to find a single causal explanation (aetiology) over gaining the Persian kingdom. Dionysius mocks Democritus for attributing cosmic design to chance (tyche) while paradoxically quoting his Precepts (Hypothekai) to claim that humans merely invented the idol of Chance to excuse their own foolishness.

26.6–26.7: He notes that all beneficial professions (rulers, physicians, teachers) delight in their labor, and asks whether Epicurus or Democritus would dare claim that philosophy is painful—arguing that if intellectual labor is pleasant for humans, providential activity cannot be burdensome to God.

26.8–26.11: He ridicules Epicurus's theology. He asks how Epicurus could know gods exist in the void (intermundia) unless he peeked outside the cosmos. He exposes Epicurus's hypocrisy in swearing oaths by Zeus ("by Zeus!", "before the gods!") while denying the gods' providence, concluding that Epicurus only invented phantom gods out of fear of Athenian prosecution after the execution of Socrates.

26.12–26.13: Dionysius points to the creation of animals and the scriptures (Psalms and Sirach) as proof of divine oversight. Eusebius then concludes the chapter, noting that these excerpts were taken from Bishop Dionysius's work On Nature (Against Epicurus), and signals a transition to evaluating Aristotle and the Stoics.

^26.1 «Ἐργάζεσθαι δέ γε καὶ διοικεῖν καὶ προκήδεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀργοῖς καὶ ἄφροσι καὶ ἀσθενέσι καὶ κακούργοις ἴσως ἐπαχθῆ, οἷς ἐγκατέλεξεν ἑαυτὸν Ἐπίκουρος, τοιαῦτα φρονήσας περὶ τῶν θεῶν· τοῖς δὲ σπουδαίοις καὶ δυνατοῖς καὶ συνετοῖς καὶ σώφροσιν, οἵους εἶναι χρὴ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, (πόσῳ γε μᾶλλον τοὺς θεούς;) οὐχ ὅπως ἀηδῆ ταῦτα καὶ προσάντη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τερπνότατα, καὶ πάντων μᾶλλον ἀσπαστότατα, οἷς τὸ ἀμελὲς καὶ τὸ μέλλειν τι πράττειν τῶν χρηστῶν ὄνειδος, ὡς ἐκείνους τε ποιητὴς νουθετεῖ συμβουλεύων μηδ’ ἀναβάλλεσθαι ἔς τ’ αὔριον, καὶ προσεπαπειλῶν· ‘αἰεὶ δ’ ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ ἄτῃσι παλαίει.’	^26.1 "To labor, manage, exercise providence, and the like may perhaps be burdensome to the idle, foolish, weak, and wicked—among whom Epicurus numbered himself when he held such views about the gods. But to the earnest, capable, intelligent, and wise—such as philosophers ought to be (and how much more the gods!)—these duties are not unpleasant or disagreeable, but rather most delightful and desirable above all things. To such beings, negligence and delaying the execution of good deeds are a disgrace; as the poet admonishes them, advising not to put off until tomorrow, and threatening: 'The sluggard ever struggles with ruin.'
^26.2 ἡμᾶς τε σεμνότερον παιδεύει προφήτης, θεοπρεπῆ μὲν ὄντως ἔργα τὰ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ὑπάρχειν λέγων, τὸν δὲ ὀλιγωροῦντα τούτων ἐξάγιστον· ‘Ἐπικατάρατος γάρ,’ (φησίν,) ‘ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἔργα Κυρίου ἀμελῶς.’	^26.2 And a prophet instructs us more solemnly, stating that acts of virtue are truly godlike, while he who neglects them is accursed: 'For cursed,' he says, 'is he who does the work of the Lord negligently.'
^26.3 καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀμαθέσιν ἧστινοσοῦν τέχνης καὶ ἀτελεστέροις διὰ τὸ τῆς πείρας ἄηθες καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων ἀτριβὲς κάματος ἐγγίνεται ταῖς ἐπιχειρήσεσιν· οἱ δὲ προκόπτοντες, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι οἱ τέλειοι, ῥᾳδίως ἃ μετίασι κατορθοῦντες γάνυνται, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ εἰωθότα πράττοντες ἀνύειν καὶ τελεσιουργεῖν ἢ πάντα σφίσιν ὑπάρξαι τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθά.	^26.3 To those who are ignorant and unskilled in any art, labor arises in their endeavors due to unacquaintance with experience and lack of practice in work. But those who make progress, and even more so the perfected, rejoice when easily succeeding in what they pursue; they would rather choose to accomplish and complete their accustomed activities than to possess all human goods.
^26.4 Δημόκριτος γοῦν αὐτός, ὥς φασιν, ἔλεγε βούλεσθαι μᾶλλον μίαν εὑρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν Περσῶν βασιλείαν γενέσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μάτην καὶ ἀναιτίως αἰτιολογῶν, ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ κενῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ὑποθέσεως πλανωμένης ὁρμώμενος, καὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως οὐχ ὁρῶν, σοφίαν δὲ μεγίστην ἡγούμενος τὴν τῶν ἀσόφως καὶ ἠλιθίως συμβαινόντων κατανόησιν, καὶ τὴν τύχην τῶν μὲν καθόλου καὶ τῶν θείων δέσποιναν ἐφιστὰς καὶ βασιλίδα, καὶ πάντα γενέσθαι κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀποφαινόμενος, τοῦ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτὴν ἀποκηρύττων βίου καὶ τοὺς πρεσβεύοντας αὐτὴν ἐλέγχων ἀγνώμονας.	^26.4 Democritus himself, at any rate, as they say, used to claim that he would rather discover a single causal explanation than gain the kingdom of the Persians—and this while offering vain and causeless explanations! For he set out from an empty principle and a wandering hypothesis, failing to see the root and common necessity of the nature of things. He considered it the highest wisdom to understand things that happen foolishly and senselessly, establishing Chance (Tyche) as mistress and queen of universal and divine matters and asserting that all things happen according to it, yet banishing it from human life and exposing those who honor it as thoughtless.
^26.5 τῶν γοῦν Ὑποθηκῶν ἀρχόμενος λέγει· ‘Ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀνοίης.’ φύσει γὰρ γνώμη τύχῃ μάχεται· τὴν ἐχθίστην τῇ φρονήσει ταύτην αὐτὴν ἔφασαν κρατεῖν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες καὶ ἀφανίζοντες ἐκείνην ἀντικαθιστᾶσιν αὐτῆς. οὐ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐμφρονεστάτην ὑμνοῦσι τὴν τύχην.	^26.5 At the beginning of his Precepts, at least, he says: 'Men fashioned an idol of Chance as an excuse for their own foolishness.' For by nature, sound judgment conflicts with chance; yet they claimed that this very force, most hostile to prudence, holds sway—or rather, completely abolishing and destroying prudence, they substitute chance in its place. For they hymn not prudence as fortunate, but chance as most prudent.
^26.6 οἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν βιωφελῶν ἔργων ἐπιστάται ταῖς πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον ἐπικουρίαις ἀγάλλονται, ἐπαίνου τε ὀρέγονται καὶ κλέους ἐφ’ οἷς αὐτῶν προκάμνουσιν, οἱ μὲν τρέφοντες, οἱ δὲ κυβερνῶντες, οἱ δ’ ἰώμενοι, οἱ δὲ πολιτευόμενοι· οἱ δέ γε φιλόσοφοι καὶ σφόδρα παιδεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἀνθρώπους φρυάττονται.	^26.6 Now, those who oversee life-sustaining activities glory in helping their fellow men, desiring praise and renown for the tasks they perform—some feeding, others governing, others healing, and others leading civic life. But these philosophers, while attempting so loftily to educate men, puff themselves up with pride.
^26.7 ἢ τολμήσουσιν Ἐπίκουρος ἢ Δημόκριτος εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀσχάλλουσι φιλοσοφοῦντες; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ θυμηδίαν ταύτης ἂν ἑτέραν προθεῖντο. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν εἶναι φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ αἰδεσθήσονταί γε μὴ λέγειν ἥδιον αὑτοῖς εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν.	^26.7 Or will Epicurus or Democritus dare to say that they feel distress when practicing philosophy? They would certainly put forward no other joy above it! For even if they believe that the good is pleasure, they would at least be ashamed not to say that philosophizing is sweeter to them than anything else.
^26.8 τοὺς δὲ θεούς, περὶ ὧν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ᾄδουσι ‘δοτῆρας ἐάων,’ οὗτοι δὲ οἱ φιλόσοφοι μετὰ τωθείας εὐφημοῦσι, θεοὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἀδώρητοί τε καὶ ἀμέτοχοι· καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τεκμηριοῦνται θεοὺς εἶναι, μήτε παρόντας καὶ πράττοντάς τι ὁρῶντες, (ὡς οἱ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας θαυμάσαντες διὰ τὸ θέειν ἔφασαν κεκλῆσθαι θεούς,) μήτε τινὰ δημιουργίαν αὐτοῖς ἢ κατασκευὴν προσνέμοντες, ἵν' ἐκ τοῦ θεῖναι, τοῦτ’ ἔστι ποιῆσαι, θεοποιήσωσιν αὐτούς; (τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴς καὶ δημιουργὸς μόνος ἐστὶ θεός·) μήτε διοίκησιν ἢ κρίσιν ἢ χάριν αὐτῶν τινα πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐκτιθέμενοι, ἵνα φόβον ἢ τιμὴν ὀφλήσαντες προσκυνήσωμεν αὐτοῖς;	^26.8 As for the gods—whom the poets among them sing of as 'givers of good things,' while these philosophers praise them with mockery as gods unbestowing and unpartaking of any good—by what evidence do they prove that gods exist? They neither see them present nor performing any action (as those who marveled at the sun, moon, and stars claimed they were called 'gods' [theoi] from 'running' [thein]); nor do they ascribe to them any craftsmanship or creation, so as to divine-make (theopoiein) them from 'setting/making' (theinai/poiein)—for on account of this alone, in truth, the Maker and Creator of all is the only God! Nor do they set forth any governance, judgment, or favor from them toward humans, so that owing them fear or honor, we might worship them.
^26.9 Ἢ τοῦ κόσμου προκύψας Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οὐράνιον ὑπερβὰς περίβολον, ἢ διά τινων κρυφίων ἃς μόνος οἶδεν ἐξελθὼν πυλῶν, οὓς ἐν τῷ κενῷ κατεῖδε θεούς, καὶ τὴν πολλὴν αὐτῶν ἐμακάρισε τρυφήν; κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιθυμητὴς γενόμενος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ κενῷ ζηλωτὴς διαίτης, οὕτω πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ μακαρισμοῦ τούτου μετουσίαν ἐξομοιωθησομένους ἐκείνοις τοῖς θεοῖς παρακαλεῖ, συμπόσιον αὐτοῖς μακάριον, οὐχ ὅπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἢ τὸν Ὄλυμπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κενὸν συγκροτῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀτόμων τὴν ἀμβροσίαν αὐτοῖς παρατιθεὶς καὶ προπίνων αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ νέκταρ;	^26.9 Did Epicurus peer out of the cosmos and cross the heavenly vault, or did he exit through secret gates known only to him, so that he beheld the gods in the void and blessed their abundant luxury? And becoming enamored of pleasure from that sight and a zealot for their lifestyle in the void, does he thus invite everyone to share in this bliss—so that they may become like those gods, setting up a blessed banquet for them, not in heaven or Olympus as the poets do, but in the void, placing before them ambrosia made of atoms and drinking to them in nectar derived from them?
^26.10 καὶ δὴ καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνων τῶν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὅρκους τε καὶ ὁρκισμοὺς μυρίους τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ βιβλίοις ἐγγράφει, ὀμνύς τε συνεχῶς ‘μὰ Δία’ καὶ ‘νὴ Δία,’ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ πρὸς οὓς διαλέγοιτο ‘πρὸς τῶν θεῶν,’ οὔ τί που δεδιὼς αὐτὸς ἢ ἐκείνους τὴν ἐπιορκίαν, κενὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ ἄσημον ἐπιφθεγγόμενος τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ παράρτημα, οἷον εἰ καὶ χρέμπτοιτο καὶ πτύοι καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον στρέφοι καὶ τὴν χεῖρα κινοίη. τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀδιανόητος ἦν ἡ παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ματαία ὑπόκρισις ἡ τῶν θεῶν ὀνομασία.	^26.10 And indeed, he writes thousands of oaths and adjurations in his own books by those very gods who care nothing for us—swearing continuously 'by Zeus!' and 'yes, by Zeus!', and to those he meets or chats with, 'before the gods!' He does this not out of fear of perjury for himself or them, but uttering this as an empty, false, idle, and meaningless appendage to his words, just as if he were clearing his throat, spitting, turning his head, or moving his hand. For such was the mindless and futile pretense of naming the gods in his system.
^26.11 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν πρόδηλον, ὅτι μετὰ τὸν Σωκράτους θάνατον κατεπτηχὼς Ἀθηναίους ἵνα μὴ δοκοίη τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἦν ἄθεος, κενὰς αὐτοῖς ἀνυποστάτων θεῶν τερατευσάμενος ἐζωγράφησε σκιάς. οὔτε γὰρ εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνέβλεψε νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἵνα τῆς ἐναργοῦς ἄνωθεν φωνῆς ἀκούσῃ, ἧς ὁ προσεκτικὸς θεατὴς κατακούσας ἐμαρτύρησεν ὅτι ‘Οἱ οὐρανοὶ διηγοῦνται δόξαν θεοῦ, ποίησιν δὲ χειρῶν αὐτοῦ ἀναγγέλλει τὸ στερέωμα,’ οὔτε τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεῖδεν εἰς τοὔδαφος· ἔμαθε γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ‘τοῦ ἐλέους Κυρίου πλήρης ἡ γῆ,’ καὶ ὅτι ‘Κυρίου ἡ γῆ, καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς.’ καὶ μετέπειτα γάρ φησι· ‘Κύριος εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐπέβλεψε καὶ ἐνέπλησεν αὐτὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτοῦ· ψυχὴν παντὸς ζῴου ἐκάλυψε τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτῆς.’	^26.11 But this is obvious: after the death of Socrates, cowering in fear of the Athenians lest he appear to be what he actually was—an atheist—he falsely painted empty phantoms of non-existent gods for them. For he neither looked up into heaven with intellectual eyes to hear the clear voice from above—which the attentive observer hears and testifies: 'The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of His hands'—nor did he look down with his mind to the ground. For he would have learned that 'the earth is full of the mercy of the Lord,' and that 'the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof.' And later he says: 'The Lord looked upon the earth and filled it with His good things; He covered its surface with the soul of every living creature.'
^26.12 εἰ δὲ μὴ τυφλώττουσιν, ἐπισκεψάσθωσαν τὴν παμποίκιλον τῶν ζῴων πολυπλήθειαν, τὰ χερσαῖα, τὰ πτηνά, τὰ ἔνυδρα, καὶ κατανοησάτωσαν ὡς ἀληθὴς ἐπὶ τῇ πάντων κρίσει γέγονεν ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ πάντα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόσταξιν πέφηνε καλά.	^26.12 If they are not blind, let them observe the manifold variety of living creatures—those of the land, the air, and the water—and let them understand how true the testimony of the Master was at the judgment of all things, when everything appeared good according to His command.
^26.13 Ταῦτά μοι ἀπὸ πλείστων ἐξήνθισται τῶν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον Διονυσίῳ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκόπῳ πεποιημένων. μετελθεῖν δὲ καιρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρεσιν, τά τε λοιπὰ τῆς τῶν θαυμαστῶν φυσιολόγων ἐπιθεωρῆσαι, ὡς ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων ἀναχωρήσεως τὸν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀπολογισμὸν παράσχωμεν τοῖς φιλεγκλήμοσιν.»	^26.13 These excerpts have been culled by me from the extensive writings composed against Epicurus by Dionysius, our contemporary bishop. Now it is time to move on to the school of Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers, and to examine the remainder of the wonderful natural philosophers, so that we may offer our defense to the fault-finders for our departure from their views."

Eusebius of CaesareaPraeparatio EvangelicaBOOK 14

Eusebius of Caesarea
Praeparatio Evangelica
BOOK 14