ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΠΕΝΤΕΚΑΙΔΕΚΑΤΟΝ
Fifteenth Book
Fifteenth Book
Chapter 1
In this chapter, Eusebius provides a retrospective overview of his multi-volume project and sets the stage for its conclusion:
vs 1-3: He recalls how Books 1–3 exposed the pagan myths and physical allegories (physiologiai) of the poets and theologians; Books 4–6 dismantled pagan oracles and the false doctrine of fate (heimarmene).
vs 4-6: Books 7–9 presented Hebrew scripture and philosophy, while Books 10–13 demonstrated how Greek philosophers borrowed heavily from "barbarian" (Hebrew) sources—and where Plato agreed or disagreed with biblical truth. Book 14 exposed the internal contradictions and mutual refutations among the Greek philosophical sects.
vs 7-9: Eusebius outlines the purpose of Book 15: to bring the remaining "useless learning" (achrestomatheia) of the Peripatetics (Aristotle) and Stoics to light, completing his defense (apologia) for abandoning Greek culture in favor of Christian/Hebrew piety, before transitioning to his companion work, the Demonstratio Evangelica (Proof of the Gospel).
vs 10-13: He vows to survey the natural philosophy of Aristotle and the Stoics using their own internal critiques. Refusing to resort to personal slander against Aristotle's character, Eusebius explicitly chooses instead to quote the Peripatetic philosopher Aristocles of Messene (Book 7 of On Philosophy) to offer a fair defense of Aristotle's life before examining his doctrines.
| 1.1 Τὴν πολύθεον τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀπάντων πλάνην ἐν ἀρχαῖς τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Προπαρασκευῆς ἀπελέγξαι πρὸ πολλοῦ θέμενος ἐπὶ συστάσει καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναχωρήσεως, ἣν μετ’ εὐλόγου πεποιήμεθα, οὐ μόνον τοὺς μύθους, οὓς δὴ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων θεῶν παῖδες τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς θεολόγων τε καὶ ποιητῶν κεκωμῳδήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὰς σεμνοπρεπεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀπορρήτους φυσιολογίας, ἄνω που εἰς οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη πρὸς τῆς γενναίας φιλοσοφίας μετενηνεγμένας, πρώτιστα πάντων ἐν τρισὶ τοῖς πρώτοις συγγράμμασι διηρευνησάμην, καίτοι μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐν τούτοις χρῆναι σεμνολογεῖν τῶν δὴ θεολόγων αὐτῶν ἀποφηναμένων. | 1.1 Having long ago set it as my purpose at the beginning of the Evangelical Preparation to refute the polytheistic error of all the Gentiles, in order to establish and defend our departure from them—which we have made with good reason—I first of all investigated in the first three books not only the myths which the children of their own theologians and poets have dramatized concerning their gods, but also their solemn and secret physical theories, which noble philosophy transferred aloft into heaven and the parts of the cosmos, even though their own theologians declared that there was nothing solemn in these matters at all. |
| 1.2 τηρητέον γοῦν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα οἱ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς θεολόγων οὐδέν τι πλέον τῆς ἱστορίας εἰδότες, μόνοις δὲ τοῖς μύθοις προσανέχοντες ἐμαρτυρήθησαν· ὅθεν εἰκότως ἐν πάσαις πόλεσί τε καὶ κώμαις κατὰ τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν διηγήσεις θεῶν τελεταὶ καὶ μυστήρια σύμφωνα τοῖς τῶν προτέρων μυθικοῖς διηγήμασι παραδέδοται, ὡς εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν τῶν θεῶν γάμους καὶ παιδοποιίας, θρήνους τε καὶ μέθας, καὶ τῶν μὲν πλάνας, τῶν δ’ ἔρωτας, τῶν δὲ ὀργάς, τῶν δὲ ἑτέρας παντοίας συμφοράς τε καὶ περιστάσεις, ἀκολούθως τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιτάτων μνημονευομένοις, κατά τε τὰς τελετάς, ἔν τε τοῖς ὕμνοις, καὶ ταῖς εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς πεποιημέναις ᾠδαῖς παραλαμβάνειν. | 1.2 For it must be especially observed that the oldest of their theologians were shown to know nothing beyond history, clinging solely to myths. Hence, reasonably enough, in all cities and villages according to the ancient narratives, rites and mysteries of the gods have been handed down in agreement with the mythical tales of the ancients—so that even until now they receive the marriages and procreations of the gods, their lamentations and drunkenness, the wanderings of some, the loves of others, the wrath of others, and all kinds of other misfortunes and circumstances, in accordance with the things recorded by the most ancient writers, both in their rites and in their hymns and songs composed for the gods themselves. |
| 1.3 πλὴν ὅμως ἐκ περιουσίας καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν τὰς τετραγῳδημένας ἐν φυσικαῖς ἀποδόσεσι κομπείας τάς τε τῶν σοφιστῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων εὑρεσιλογίας εἰς φανερὸν ἤγαγον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν βοωμένων χρηστηρίων λόγον, τήν τε παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς διατεθρυλημένην περὶ εἱμαρμένης ψευδῆ δόξαν ἐν ἑτέροις τρισὶ τοῖς ἐξῆς μετὰ τὰ πρῶτα συγγράμμασι λευκοῖς τοῖς ἐλέγχοις ἀπεγύμνωσα, οὐ μόνοις τοῖς οἴκοθεν ἐπιχειρήμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς αὐτῶν μάλιστα τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων φωναῖς εἰς τὸν κατ’ αὐτῶν ἔλεγχον συγκεχρημένος. | 1.3 Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, I brought to light even those bombastic claims tragicomically presented in their physical interpretations, as well as the inventive subtleties of the sophists and philosophers. Furthermore, in another three books following the first, I exposed with clear refutations the doctrine concerning the famous oracles and the false opinion concerning fate (heimarmene) so widely voiced among the multitude—using not only arguments of my own, but especially employing the very words of the Greek philosophers for their refutation. |
| 1.4 μεταβὰς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια, τίσι ποτὲ λογισμοῖς τὴν ἐν τούτοις περιεχομένην δογματικὴν θεολογίαν, τήν τε κατὰ τούσδε ἱστορίαν ἅπασαν, καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν Ἑλλήνων μεμαρτυρημένην, ἐν ἰσαρίθμοις αὖ πάλιν λόγων συντάξεσι παρεστησάμην. | 1.4 Passing thence to the Hebrew oracles, I set forth in an equal number of books (Books 7–9) the rationale behind the dogmatic theology contained in them, as well as their entire history, which is attested even by the Greeks themselves. |
| 1.5 εἶθ’ ἑξῆς τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ἀπελέγξας τρόπον, ὅπως τε πάντα παρὰ βαρβάρων ὠφέληντο, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν οἴκοθεν σεμνὸν ἐπάγονται μάθημα, καὶ τήν γε τῶν χρόνων ἀντιπαράθεσιν, καθ’ οὓς Ἑλλήνων τε οἱ βοώμενοι Ἑβραίων τε οἱ προφῆται γεγόνασιν, εἰς φῶς ἀγαγών· αὖθις διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα τριῶν τὴν τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησιν εὐδοκίμων φιλοσόφων πρὸς Ἑβραίων δόξας συνδρομὴν ὑπέδειξα, αὐτὰς πάλιν τὰς οἰκείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν φωνὰς μάρτυρας ποιησάμενος. | 1.5 Then next, having refuted the Greek manner of life—showing how they benefited in all things from barbarians and brought forward no dignified learning of their own, and bringing to light the chronological comparison of the times in which the famous Greeks and the Hebrew prophets lived—I again demonstrated through the subsequent three books (Books 11–13) the agreement of the esteemed Greek philosophers with the doctrines of the Hebrews, making the men's own words my witnesses. |
| 1.6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἑτεροδοξοῦντας ἡμῖν τῶν παρ’ Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφῶν οἰκείους διεστῶτας ὑπό τε τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνατετραμμένους ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου συγγράμματι κατεφώρασα· διὰ τούτων ἁπάντων τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης τὸ κριτήριον ἀδέκαστον ἐπιδεικνὺς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, ἔργοις τε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, καὶ αὐτοῖς πράγμασι τὰς ἀποδείξεις τοῦ μὴ ἀσκόπως ἡμᾶς, κεκριμένῳ δὲ καὶ σώφρονι λογισμῷ πρὸ τῆς Ἑλλήνων τὴν Ἑβραίων ὁμοῦ παλαιὰν καὶ ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ εὐσέβειαν ἐπανῃρῆσθαι παρασχόμενος· ὃ καὶ συνέστη διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν φωνῶν παραθέσεως. | 1.6 Moreover, in the book prior to this one (Book 14), I exposed those Greek philosophers who hold views different from ours, showing that they disagree not only with us, but also among themselves, and have been overthrown by their own disciples. Through all these things, I demonstrated the unbiased nature of our judgment to my readers, providing proof by deeds, so to speak, and by actual facts that it was not without cause, but with tested and prudent reasoning, that we chose the ancient and true philosophy and piety of the Hebrews above that of the Greeks—which was established through the comparison of Greek texts. |
| 1.7 ἧς εἰσέτι δεῦρο τὸν ὕστατον ἐπέχοντες λόγον, πεντεκαιδίκατον ὄντα τῆς ἐν χερσὶ πραγματείας, τὸ λεῖπον τοῖς διεξωδευμένοις ἀποδώσομεν, τὰ σεμνὰ τῆς γενναίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίας ἔτι καὶ νῦν εἰς φῶς ἕλκοντες, πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀχρηστομάθειαν ἀπογυμνοῦντες, καὶ πάντων γε πρότερον παριστῶντες ὅτι μὴ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς θαυμαζομένων, ὀλιγωρίᾳ δὲ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνωφελοῦς σχολῆς, ἥκιστα αὐτῶν πεφροντίκαμεν, τῇ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀσκήσει τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀναθέντες ψυχάς. | 1.7 Clinging to this method down to the present final book—which is the fifteenth of the work in hand—we shall render what remains to complete our survey: bringing still further into the light the venerable teachings of the noble philosophy of the Greeks, and laying bare before the eyes of all the useless learning (achrestomatheia) within them, demonstrating above all that it was not out of ignorance of the things admired among them, but out of disregard for the unprofitable leisure within them, that we cared least for their views, devoting our souls to the practice of better things. |
| 1.8 τούτου δὴ οὖν σὺν θεῷ διὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡμῖν ἐπισφραγισθέντος, τὰ μὲν τῆς Προπαρασκευῆς ἐνταῦθά μοι περιγραφήσεται· μεταβὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐντελεστέραν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Ἀποδείξεως, ἀπὸ τοῦ λείποντος τῆς καθ’ ἡμῶν κατηγορίας σκέμματος τὴν καταρχὴν τῆς δευτέρας ἐπισυνάψω πραγματείας. | 1.8 Therefore, when this task has been sealed for us with God's help through the truth, the scope of the Preparation will be concluded here. Passing then to the more complete subject of the Evangelical Proof (Demonstratio Evangelica), I shall join the beginning of the second treatise onto the remaining point of accusation against us. |
| 1.9 ἦν δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιμεμφόμενον ἡμῖν, ὅτι δὴ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια τῶν πατρίων προτιμήσαντες οὐ τὸν ὅμοιον τῷ Ἰουδαίων βίον ζηλοῦντες προειλόμεθα· πρὸς ὃ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ παρόντος λόγου συμπλήρωσιν, θεοῦ συνεργοῦντος, ἀπαντῆσαι πειράσομαι. ταύτῃ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τοῖς πρώτοις τὰ δεύτερα ὥσπερ ὑφ’ ἑνὶ δεσμῷ συμπλακέντα μίαν τὴν καθόλου διάνοιαν τοῦ παντὸς ἀποτελέσειν λόγου. | 1.9 Now, this accusation blamed us because, although we preferred the Hebrew oracles to our ancestral traditions, we did not choose to imitate a life similar to that of the Jews. God willing, I shall attempt to answer this after completing the present book. For in this way I believe the second part, joined as if by a single bond to the first, will complete the single overall design of the whole work. |
| 1.10 τό γε μὴν παρόν, ἐπειδὴ πέφηνεν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου συγγράμμασιν ἡ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφία τοτὲ μὲν τοῖς Ἑβραίων συμφωνοῦσα λόγοις, τοτὲ δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς διεστῶσα, ἐν οἷς ἐλήλεγκται καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν διαφωνοῦσα· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς δὴ φυσικοὺς ἐπικληθέντας φιλοσόφους, τά τε τῆς Πλάτωνος διαδοχῆς καὶ τὰ κατὰ Ξενοφάνην τε καὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ ἔτι Πύρρωνα καὶ τοὺς τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσηγουμένους τούς τε ἄλλους ἐξῆς ἅπαντας, ὧν τὰς δόξας ὁ προλαβὼν ἀπήλεγξε λόγος, τοῖς Ἑβραίων ὁμοῦ καὶ τοῖς Πλάτωνος δόγμασιν αὐτῇ τε ἀληθείᾳ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἱστάμενα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν βέλεσιν ἀπενηνεγμένα· | 1.10 For the present, however: since in the preceding books Platonic philosophy has been shown at times agreeing with the Hebrew oracles, and at times dissenting from them—in which points it has also been proven to disagree with itself; and since the doctrines of the other so-called natural philosophers (both the successors of Plato and those around Xenophanes, Parmenides, Pyrrho, and those who introduced the suspension of judgment, as well as all the rest in sequence whose opinions the preceding discourse refuted) stand in opposition both to the Hebrew and Platonic doctrines and to truth itself, having carried off their refutation by their own weapons; |
| 1.11 ὥρα καὶ τὸν ἄλλον τῦφον τῶν ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους τῶν τε Στωϊκῶν φιλοσόφων ἄνωθεν ὡς ἀπὸ σκηνῆς κατοπτεῦσαι, καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δὲ πᾶσαν φυσιολογίαν τῶν τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνατεινομένων συνιδεῖν, ὡς ἂν μάθοιμεν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖσδε σεμνολογούμενα, τά τε πρὸς αὐτοὺς αὖ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἀντιλεγόμενα. | 1.11 It is now time to observe from above, as if from a stage, the rest of the pomp of Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers, and to view all the remaining natural philosophy of those who lift up their eyebrows—so that we may learn both the things grandly spoken by them and the counterarguments brought against them in turn by their own followers. |
| 1.12 οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀναχωρήσεως τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν κεκριμένον εὐλόγου πάσης ἀπολύοιτ' ἂν κατηγορίας, ὅτι δὴ μὴ ἀγνοίᾳ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς σεμνῶν, ἐξητασμένῃ δὲ καὶ βεβασανισμένῃ κρίσει, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς νενομισμένοις βαρβάροις ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ εὐσέβειαν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἁπάντων προτετιμήκαμεν. | 1.12 For thus our decision to depart from them would be acquitted of every charge of reasonable criticism, demonstrating that it was not through ignorance of their dignified traditions, but by an examined and tested judgment, that we preferred the truth and piety among those considered barbarians above all Greek learning. |
| 1.13 ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους. ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν τὸν βίον τἀνδρὸς διαβεβλήκασι, φιλόσοφοι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ἀφανεῖς τινες ἦσαν καὶ οὗτοι· ἐμοὶ δ' οὐ φίλον τὸν ἄνδρα οὐδ' αὐταῖς ἀκοαῖς ἀνέχεσθαι κακῶς πρὸς τῶν οἰκείων ἀγορευόμενον. διόπερ τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐκθήσομαι ἀπολογίας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀριστοκλέους τοῦ Περιπατητικοῦ, ὃς ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφει· | 1.13 I shall begin, then, with the affairs of Aristotle. Now, others have slandered the man's life—and these were philosophers not lacking in prominence. But it is not pleasing to me to tolerate the man being spoken ill of by his own associates, even to my ears. Wherefore I shall set forth rather the defenses on his behalf from the writings of Aristocles the Peripatetic, who writes the following concerning him in the seventh book of his work On Philosophy:" |
Chapter 2
In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting directly from Book 7 of Aristocles the Peripatetic’s On Philosophy to defend Aristotle against various biographical slanders circulated by rival philosophers, sophists, and rhetoricians:
vs 1-8: Aristocles systematically catalogues and refutes the salacious allegations made against Aristotle by Epicurus (that he squandered his inheritance, served as a soldier, and became a drug-peddler), Timaeus (that he opened a low-class medical shop), Aristoxenus (that he set up a rival school while Plato was traveling), Alexinus (that Alexander rejected Aristotle for Nicagoras), Eubulides (that he wrote bad poetry, quarreled with Philip, and destroyed Plato's books), Demochares (that he betrayed Stagira and Athens to Macedon), Cephisodorus (that he was a luxurious glutton), and Lycon the Pythagorean (that he offered blasphemous sacrifices for his deceased wife, bathed in warm oil to sell it afterward, and fled to Chalcis with 74 bronze pots).
vs 9-11: Aristocles points out that these critics were all jealous sophists whose writings have mostly perished, whose claims contradict each other, and who fabricated stories out of envy for Aristotle's intellect and royal friendships.
vs 12-15: He addresses the two most persistent accusations: that Aristotle ungratefully broke with Plato, and that he flattered the tyrant Hermias by marrying his adopted daughter Pythias. Quoting the lost work of Apellicon and Aristotle's own letters to Antipater, Aristocles explains that Aristotle married Pythias out of noble loyalty to the memory of Hermias after his execution. After her death, he married Herpyllis, who bore him his son Nicomachus.
vs 16: Eusebius concludes the direct quote from Aristocles and transitions from Aristotle’s biography to an examination of Peripatetic doctrine.
| 2.1 «Πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιστολῇ, νέον μὲν ὄντα καταφαγεῖν αὐτὸν τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ στρατεύεσθαι συνῶσαι, κακῶς δὲ πράττοντα ἐν τούτοις ἐπὶ τὸ φαρμακοπωλεῖν ἐλθεῖν, ἔπειτα ἀναπεπταμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος περιπάτου πᾶσι παραβαλεῖν αὐτόν; | 2.1 "For how could it be possible, as Epicurus says in his Letter on Occupations, that while Aristotle was a young man he devoured his paternal estate, and was then forced into military service; and that, faring poorly in this, he took up the trade of selling drugs; and then, when Plato's Peripatos was open to all, he joined himself to it? |
| 2.2 ἢ πῶς ἄν τις ἀποδέξαιτο Τιμαίου τοῦ Ταυρομενίτου λέγοντος ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἀδόξου θύρας αὐτὸν ἰατρείου καὶ τὰς τυχούσας ὀψὲ τῆς ἡλικίας κλεῖσαι; | 2.2 Or how could anyone accept Timaeus of Tauromenium when he claims in his Histories that Aristotle closed the doors of an obscure medical clinic and ordinary shops late in life? |
| 2.3 τίς δ’ ἂν πεισθείη τοῖς ὑπ’ Ἀριστοξένου τοῦ μουσικοῦ λεγομένοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἐν γὰρ τῇ πλάνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ φησὶν ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ ἀντοικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τινας Περίπατον ξένους ὄντας. οἴονται οὖν ἔνιοι ταῦτα περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγειν αὐτόν, Ἀριστοξένου διὰ παντὸς εὐφημοῦντος Ἀριστοτέλην. | 2.3 And who would be persuaded by what Aristoxenus the Musician says in his Life of Plato? For he claims that during Plato's absence and travels, certain foreigners rose up against him and built a rival Peripatos. Some people, therefore, suppose that he is saying these things about Aristotle, even though Aristoxenus everywhere speaks well of Aristotle. |
| 2.4 καταγέλαστα δ’ εἰκότως εἶναι φαίη τις ἂν καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τὰ Ἀλεξίνου τοῦ ἐριστικοῦ. ποιεῖ γὰρ Ἀλέξανδρον παῖδα διαλεγόμενον τῷ πατρὶ Φιλίππῳ, καὶ διαπτύοντα μὲν τοὺς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λόγους, ἀποδεχόμενον δὲ Νικαγόραν, τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐπικληθέντα. | 2.4 One might also reasonably say that the memoirs of Alexinus the disputant (Eristic) are laughable. For he depicts Alexander as a boy conversing with his father Philip, despising the teachings of Aristotle, but accepting Nicagoras, who was nicknamed Hermes. |
| 2.5 καὶ Εὐβουλίδης δὲ προδήλως ἐν τῷ κατ’ αὐτοῦ βιβλίῳ ψεύδεται, πρῶτον μὲν ποιήματα ψυχρὰ προφερόμενος, ὡς γεγραφότων ἄλλων περὶ τοῦ γάμου καὶ τῆς πρὸς Ἑρμείαν οἰκειότητος αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα Φιλίππῳ φάσκων αὐτὸν προσκόψαι, καὶ τελευτῶντι Πλάτωνι μὴ παραγενέσθαι, τά τε βιβλία αὐτοῦ διαφθεῖραι. | 2.5 Eubulides also manifestly lies in his book against him: first by bringing forward frigid poems, as though others had written them concerning Aristotle's marriage and his friendship with Hermias; and next by asserting that Aristotle offended Philip, was absent at Plato's death, and destroyed Plato's books. |
| 2.6 τὴν μὲν γὰρ Δημοχάρους κατηγορίαν κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων τί χρὴ λέγειν; οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κακῶς εἴρηκεν. ἔτι γε μὴν αὐτὰς τὰς διαβολὰς σκοπῶν ἄν τις ληρεῖν αὐτὸν φαίη. λέγει γὰρ ἐπιστολὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἁλῶναι κατὰ τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Στάγειρα τὴν πατρίδα προδοῦναι Μακεδόσιν αὐτόν· ἔτι δὲ κατασκαφείσης Ὀλύνθου μηνύειν ἐπὶ τοῦ λαφυροπωλίου Φιλίππῳ τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους τῶν Ὀλυνθίων. | 2.6 And as for the accusation of Demochares against the philosophers, what need is there to speak of it? For he spoke ill not only of Aristotle, but of all the others as well. Furthermore, if one considers the slanders themselves, one would say he was talking nonsense. For he says that letters of Aristotle against the city of Athens were intercepted, and that he betrayed his native city Stagira to the Macedonians; and moreover, that after Olynthus was razed to the ground, he pointed out the wealthiest of the Olynthians to Philip at the sale of the plunder. |
| 2.7 ἠλίθια δὲ διαβέβληκεν αὐτὸν καὶ Κηφισόδωρος, ὁ Ἰσοκράτους μαθητής, τρυφερὸν καὶ τένθην καὶ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι. | 2.7 Cephisodorus, too, the disciple of Isocrates, has foolishly defamed him, calling him luxurious, a glutton, and other such things. |
| 2.8 πάντα δ’ ὑπερπαίει μωρίᾳ τὰ ὑπὸ Λύκωνος εἰρημένα, τοῦ λέγοντος εἶναι Πυθαγορικὸν ἑαυτόν. φησὶ γὰρ θύειν Ἀριστοτέλην θυσίαν τετελευτηκυίᾳ τῇ γυναικὶ τοιαύτην ὁποίαν Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ Δήμητρι, καὶ ἐν ἐλαίῳ θερμῷ λουόμενον τοῦτο δὴ πιπράσκειν· ἡνίκα δὲ εἰς Χαλκίδα ἀπῄει, τοὺς τελώνας εὑρεῖν ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ λοπάδια χαλκᾶ τέτταρα καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα. | 2.8 But the statements made by Lycon, who claims to be a Pythagorean, surpass all in folly. For he says that Aristotle offered a sacrifice for his deceased wife of the kind that the Athenians offer to Demeter, and that after bathing in warm oil he used to sell it; and that when he departed for Chalcis, the customs officials found seventy-four bronze dishes in his boat. |
| 2.9 καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι διαβαλόντες Ἀριστοτέλην τοσοῦτοι γεγόνασιν· ὧν οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἦσαν χρόνους, οἱ δὲ μικρὸν ὕστερον ἐγένοντο· πάντες δὲ σοφισταὶ καὶ ἐριστικοὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, ὧν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰ βιβλία τέθνηκε τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγονότας, εἶτα δὲ τὰ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων εἰρημένα λέγοντας, παντάπασιν ἐᾶν δεῖ χαίρειν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς μηδ’ ἐντετυχηκότας τοῖς βιβλίοις αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοσχεδιάζοντας, ὁποῖοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ λέγοντες τριακοσίας ἔχειν λοπάδας αὐτόν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν εὑρεθείη περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἰρηκὼς τῶν τότε ὄντων ὅτι μὴ Λύκων. οὗτος μέντοι, καθάπερ ἔφην, εἴρηκεν εὑρῆσθαι λοπάδια πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα. | 2.9 And these are nearly all who were the first to defame Aristotle—some of whom lived at the same time, while others arose shortly thereafter. All of them were sophists, disputants, and rhetoricians, whose names and books have died even more completely than their bodies. As for those born later who merely repeat what was said by those men, we must completely dismiss them—especially those who have not even encountered their books, but invent stories on the spot, like those who claim that he possessed three hundred dishes! For no one among the contemporaries of that time could be found to have said any such thing about him except Lycon—and he, as I said, claimed that seventy-five dishes were found. |
| 2.10 οὐ μόνον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαβεβληκότων τεκμήραιτό τις ἄν, ὅτι ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κἀκ τοῦ μὴ πάντας τὰ αὐτὰ διαβάλλειν, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστον ἴδιά τινα λέγειν· ὧν εἴπερ ἦν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ἀληθές, ἐχρῆν δήπου οὐχ ἅπαξ αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τότε ἀπολωλέναι. | 2.10 Not only from the dates and from the characters of his accusers could one infer that all these assertions are false, but also from the fact that they do not all make the same accusations, but each one invents his own peculiar stories. If even one of these claims had been true, he surely ought to have been ruined by his contemporaries not just once. |
| 2.11 φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καθάπερ πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει συνέβη, διά τε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς φιλίας καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὑπεροχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν τότε σοφιστῶν φθονεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὲ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας μὴ εἰς τοὺς διαβάλλοντας ἀποβλέπειν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας καὶ ζηλοῦντας αὐτόν· μακρῷ γὰρ πλείους καὶ βελτίους εὑρεθεῖεν ἂν οὗτοί γε. | 2.11 It is clear, therefore, that just as happened to many others, so also Aristotle was envied by the sophists of his day because of his friendships with kings and because of his intellectual preeminence. Those of sound mind ought not to look only at his accusers, but also at those who praise and emulate him—for these would be found far more numerous and far better men. |
|
2.12
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα προδήλως πέπλασται· δύο δὲ ταῦτα δοκεῖ πιστεύεσθαι, δι’ ἃ ψέγουσί τινες αὐτόν· ἓν μέν, ὅτι Ἑρμείου γήμαι φύσει μὲν ἀδελφήν, θετὴν δὲ θυγατέρα Πυθιάδα, κολακεύων αὐτόν·
(Θεόκριτος γοῦν ὁ Χῖος ἐποίησεν ἐπίγραμμα τοιοῦτον· «Ἑρμείου εὐνούχου τε καὶ Εὐβούλου τόδε δούλου μνῆμα κενὸν κενόφρων θῆκεν Ἀριστοτέλης· ὃς διὰ τὴν ἀκρατῆ γαστρὸς φύσιν εἵλετο ναίειν ἀντ’ Ἀκαδημείας Βορβόρου ἐν προχοαῖς.») ἕτερον δέ, ὅτι ἠχαρίστησε Πλάτωνι. |
2.12
Now, the other accusations are clearly fabrications. But two matters seem to gain credence, for which some people blame him: one, that he married Pythias, who was by nature the sister and by adoption the daughter of Hermias, out of flattery toward him;
(At any rate, Theocritus of Chios composed the following epigram: 'To Hermias the eunuch and slave of Eubulus, this empty monument was erected by empty-minded Aristotle; who, because of the uncontrollable nature of his belly, chose to dwell in the outlets of Borborus [Mud] instead of the Academy.') And the second accusation is that he was ungrateful to Plato. |
| 2.13 περὶ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμείου καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ συγγεγράφασι καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀπελλικῶν, οὗ τοῖς βιβλίοις ὁ ἐντυχὼν πεπαύσεται βλασφημῶν αὐτούς. | 2.13 Concerning Hermias and Aristotle’s friendship with him, many others have written, and especially Apellicon, by reading whose books one will cease from blaspheming them. |
| 2.14 περὶ δὲ τοῦ γάμου τοῦ Πυθιάδος ἀποχρώντως αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ἐπιστολαῖς ἀπολελόγηται. τεθνεῶτος γὰρ Ἑρμείου, διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὔνοιαν ἔγημεν αὐτήν, ἄλλως μὲν σώφρονα καὶ ἀγαθὴν οὖσαν, ἀτυχοῦσαν μέντοι διὰ τὰς καταλαβούσας συμφορὰς τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτῆς.» | 2.14 Concerning his marriage to Pythias, he himself has sufficiently defended it in his letters to Antipater. For after Hermias died, Aristotle married her out of goodwill toward him—she being otherwise modest and good, but unfortunate on account of the calamities that had overtaken her brother." |
|
2.15
Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς·
«Μετὰ δὲ τὴν Πυθιάδος τῆς Ἑρμείου τελευτὴν Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγημεν Ἐρπυλλίδα Σταγειρῖτιν, ἐξ ἧς υἱὸς αὐτῷ Νικόμαχος ἐγένετο. τοῦτον δέ φασιν ὀρφανὸν τραφέντα παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ καὶ δὴ μειρακίσκον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ.» |
2.15
Then next:
"After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stagira, from whom he had a son, Nicomachus. They say that he was raised as an orphan under Theophrastus and died in war while still a youth." |
| 2.16 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τῆς δηλωθείσης Ἀριστοκλέους ἐκκείσθω γραφῆς· ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὴν δογματικὴν Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίαν θεωρῆσαι καιρός. | 2.16 Let these matters be set forth, then, from the cited work of Aristocles; and now it is time to consider the dogmatic philosophy of Aristotle itself. |
Chapter 3
In this short chapter, Eusebius draws a direct contrast between the ethical doctrines of Moses, the Hebrew prophets, and Plato on one hand, and Aristotle on the other:
Hebrew & Platonic View: Moses, the prophets, and Plato taught that true happiness (eudaimonia) consists in the knowledge and friendship of God through piety and virtue—which alone is the cause of all true goods.
Peripatetic View: Aristotle departed from this consensus by asserting that virtue alone is insufficient for happiness without bodily health/well-being (eupatheia) and external riches (ektos periousia).
Transition: Eusebius notes that Plato’s own disciples forcefully opposed and refuted Aristotle's doctrine on this point, setting up the subsequent direct quotations from Academic philosophers.
| 3.1 Μώσεως καὶ τῶν παρ’ Ἑβραίοις προφητῶν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ γνῶσίν τε καὶ φιλίαν δι’ εὐσεβείας συντελουμένην ὑποθεμένων, εὐσέβειάν τε εἶναι ἀληθῆ διδαξάντων τὴν διὰ πάσης ἀρετῆς τῷ θεῷ εὐαρέστησιν, (ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν, ἐπὶ μόνῳ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ τὰ πάντα κεῖσθαι καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα τοῖς θεοφιλέσι χορηγεῖσθαι) τοῦ τε Πλάτωνος τὰ συνῳδὰ τούτοις ὁριζομένου καὶ τέλος εὐδαιμονίας τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποφαινομένου, τὴν ἑτέραν ὁδεύσας ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐκ ἄλλως εὐδαίμονά τινά φησιν ἔσεσθαι ἢ καὶ διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος εὐπαθείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς περιουσίας, ὧν ἄνευ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν. πρὸς ὃν ὅπως ἐνέστησαν διεψευσμένην αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἀπελέγχοντες οἱ Πλάτωνος γνώριμοι πάρεστι μαθεῖν διὰ τούτων· |
3.1
"Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews laid down that the end of a blessed life is the knowledge and friendship of the God of all things, brought to fulfillment through piety, and they taught that true piety is pleasing God through every virtue—for this is the cause of all goods, since all things depend on God alone and all things are supplied by Him to those who are dear to God. Plato also defined matters in harmony with these teachings and declared virtue to be the goal of happiness.
Aristotle, however, taking the opposite path, asserts that a person cannot otherwise be happy unless it be also through the well-being of the body and an abundance of external goods, without which even virtue is of no benefit. How the disciples of Plato stood against him, refuting his notion as false, it is now possible to learn through the following passages:" |
Chapter 4
In this excerpt from Atticus, the Platonist author launches a polemic against Aristotle and the Peripatetic school regarding the nature of eudaimonia (happiness):
The Core Conflict (4.1–4.5): Atticus argues that while philosophy promises human happiness, Aristotle fundamentally broke from Plato by rejecting the self-sufficiency of virtue. By requiring external fortune (wealth, high birth, bodily health) for happiness, Aristotle lowered philosophy's scope from noble heights to earthly, trivial matters—an opposition Atticus illustrates using Homeric and fable imagery (the fox trying to reach the eagle's high crag).
Pedagogical & Ethical Consequences (4.6–4.16): Atticus asserts that Peripatetic ethics cannot inspire youth or elevate the soul toward the divine. By treating virtue as fragile and easily ruined by misfortune (like autumn leaves or a fleeting hour's weather), Aristotle degrades virtue to the level of mere external goods. In contrast, Platonic virtue guarantees true happiness even amidst the direst torments (the rack, pitch, and cross).
Irreconcilable Division (4.17–4.21): Atticus dismisses Aristotle’s elaborate classifications of goods (moral, bodily, external; ends vs. means; categories) as irrelevant technicalities that obscure the main issue. He concludes—quoting Homer's Achilles—that just as there are no faithful oaths between lions and men, there can be no harmony between Plato and Aristotle on the supreme doctrine of happiness.
| 4.1 Τῆς γὰρ συμπάσης φιλοσοφίας κοινῇ τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπισχνουμένης, τριχῆ δὲ διαιρουμένης κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ποιητικὴν διανέμησιν, τοσοῦτον ἀποδέων ἐν τούτοις τοῦ διδάσκειν τι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ὀφθήσεται ὥστε, πλειόνων ὄντων οἳ διαφέρονται Πλάτωνι, μάλιστα ἐναντιούμενος αὐτὸς φανεῖται. | 4.1 "For while the whole of philosophy in common among all philosophers promises human happiness—though it is divided three ways according to the division of the nature of the universe—the Peripatetic will be seen so far lacking in teaching anything of Plato’s doctrines that, among the many who differ from Plato, he himself will appear as the most opposed. |
| 4.2 καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα παραλλαγὴν ἐποιήσατο, μὴ τηρήσας τὸ μέτρον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, μηδὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τοῦτο συγχωρήσας, ἀλλ’ ἀπολισθὼν τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἡγησάμενος αὐτῇ προσδεῖν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τύχης, ἵνα μετὰ τούτων ἕλῃ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· εἰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ληφθείη, ὡς ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἐφικτὸν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μεμψάμενος. | 4.2 And first of all, he made his divergence from Plato concerning the commonest, greatest, and most vital point, by failing to maintain the true measure of happiness, and by refusing to grant that virtue is self-sufficient for this end. Instead, he slipped away from the power belonging to virtue, believing that it requires the additions of chance so that, together with these, it might attain happiness—while if virtue were taken by itself, he criticized it as incapable and unable to achieve happiness. |
| 4.3 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγεννὲς καὶ διημαρτημένον τῆς γνώμης ἐν τούτῳ τε κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐ τοῦ παρόντος δεικνύναι καιροῦ· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οἶμαι πρόδηλον, ὅτι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἴσων ὄντων οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ κατ’ Ἀριστοτέλην, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν βοῶντος ἑκάστοτε καὶ κηρύττοντος ὅτι εὐδαιμονέστατος ὁ δικαιότατος, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέποντος ἕπεσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἂν μὴ καὶ γένος εὐτυχήσῃ καὶ κάλλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρυσόν, ὅς «καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμόνδ’ ἴεν, ἠΰτε κούρη», ἀνάγκη κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ τέλους καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσαν φιλοσοφίαν διάφορον εἶναι. | 4.3 Now, to demonstrate the ignoble and completely mistaken character of his view in this and in other matters is not the business of the present occasion; but this much, I think, is obvious: since the goal and happiness are neither equal nor the same according to Plato and according to Aristotle—the former shouting out at every opportunity and proclaiming that the most righteous person is the most happy, while the latter does not permit happiness to follow virtue unless one also enjoys good birth, beauty, and even gold (who 'having gold came to war, like a girl' [Hom. Il. 2.872])—it is inevitable that according to this difference in the end, the philosophy leading to it must also be different. |
| 4.4 μιᾷ γὰρ ὁδῷ βαδίζοντα, ἥτις ἄγειν πέφυκεν ἐπί τι τῶν μικρῶν καὶ ταπεινῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ ἐν ὕψει κείμενα. ὁρᾷς ἵν’ ἐκεῖνος ὑψηλὸς πάγος, τρηχύς τε καὶ παλίγκοτος, ἐν τῷ κάθηται σὴν ἐλαφρίζων μάχην; | 4.4 For walking on one path, which is by nature suited to lead to something small and lowly, it is impossible to reach the greater things that lie on high. Do you see where that high crag lies, rough and hostile, upon which he sits, lightening your battle? |
| 4.5 ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν ὑψηλὸν πάγον τὸ δριμὺ καὶ πανοῦργον ἐκεῖνο θηρίον ἀνελθεῖν ἀδύνατον· ἵνα δὲ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔλθῃ τοῖς ἀετοῦ γεννήμασιν ἀλώπηξ, ἢ τύχῃ τινὶ δεῖ χρησαμένους ἐκείνους πονηρᾷ καταπεσεῖν εἰς γῆν τῶν οἰκείων αὐτοῖς φθαρέντων, ἢ φύσασαν αὐτήν, ἃ μὴ πέφυκε φύειν, λαιψηρὰ κυκλῶσαι πτερά, καὶ οὕτως ἀρθεῖσαν ἐκ γῆς ἀναπτέσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὑψηλὸν πάγον. ἕως δ’ ἑκάτερον ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας μένει τάξεως, οὐκ ἔνι κοινωνία τοῖς γῆς πρὸς τὰ οὐρανοῦ θρέμματα. | 4.5 It is impossible for that sharp and cunning beast [the fox] to climb up to this high crag; and for a fox to reach the same place as the offspring of an eagle, either those eagles must meet with some bad luck and fall to the earth, their wings destroyed, or the fox herself, growing swift wings—which nature did not design her to grow—must lift herself from the earth and fly up to the high crag. But as long as each remains in its own proper rank, there can be no fellowship between the creatures of the earth and the offspring of heaven. |
| 4.6 Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει· Τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως ἐχόντων, καὶ πειρωμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἕλκειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς ἄνω που πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον προσοικειοῦντος μὲν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ καλῷ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀναπείθοντος ὑπερφρονεῖν, φράσον ἡμῖν, ὦ Περιπατητικέ, πῶς ἐκδιδάξεις ταῦτα; πῶς ὁδηγήσεις ἐπ’ αὐτὰ τοὺς φιλοπλάτωνας; | 4.6 And after other remarks he adds: These things being so, while Plato attempts to draw the souls of the young upward somewhere toward the divine, and in this manner aligns them with virtue and the noble, persuading them to look down upon all other things, tell us, O Peripatetic, how will you teach these things? How will you guide lovers of Plato toward them? |
| 4.7 ποῦ σοι τῆς αἱρέσεως τοσοῦτον ὕψος λόγων ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἀλωαδῶν φρόνημα κτήσασθαι καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανὸν ὁδὸν ζητεῖν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ᾤοντο ὀρῶν ἀναθέσει δύνασθαι γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ’ ἄρ’ ἦν ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων γινόμενον, ὥς φησι Πλάτων; | 4.7 Where in your school is there such height of discourse as to acquire the spirit of the Aloadae and seek the path to heaven—which they thought could happen by piling up mountains, but which actually occurs, as Plato says, by stripping away human pursuits? |
| 4.8 τίς οὖν ἡ παρὰ σοῦ πρὸς ταῦτα τοῖς νέοις βοήθεια; καὶ πόθεν τις ὁ τῆς ἀρετῆς συναγωνιστὴς λόγος; ἐκ ποίων γραμμάτων Ἀριστοτέλους; τίνος τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ; ἐκ ποίων γραφῶν; δίδωμι γάρ σοι κἂν ψεύδεσθαι θέλῃς, μόνον τι νεανικόν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ’ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν οὔτ’ ἂν ἐπιτρέψαι σοι τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῆς αἱρέσεως οὐδείς. | 4.8 What help then comes from you to the young in these matters? And from where will come any argument that fights on behalf of virtue? From what writings of Aristotle? From which of his followers? From what works? For I give you leave even if you wish to lie, provided it be something bold! But indeed, you have nothing to say, nor would any of the leaders of your school permit you to do so. |
| 4.9 αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι, μικρόν τι καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ δημῶδες περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς φρονοῦσι, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἄν τις καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ ἀπαίδευτος καὶ μειράκιον καὶ γυνή. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διάδημα, ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον τὸ [ἀρχαῖον καὶ] βασιλικόν, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔχει λαβοῦσα ἀναφαίρετον ἡ ἀρετή, (ἐπεὶ οὐ «παλινάγρετον, ὅττι κεν οὗτος τῇ κεφαλῇ ἐπινεύσῃ»), τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τολμῶσιν. | 4.9 At any rate, the treatises of Aristotle on these subjects, entitled Eudemian, Nicomachean, and Great Ethics, hold a small, mean, and vulgar view concerning virtue—no greater than what any ordinary, uneducated person, youth, or woman might hold. For the diadem, so to speak, and the ancient royal scepter which virtue holds as an unalienable gift from Zeus (since 'it cannot be revoked, whatever he nods assent to with his head' [Hom. Il. 1.526]), this they dare to strip away from her! |
| 4.10 οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπουσιν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας, ὁμοίαν δὲ αὐτὴν καθιστᾶσι πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ γένει καὶ ὑγιείᾳ καὶ κάλλει, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κοινὰ τῆς κακίας. ὡς γὰρ τούτων ὁτιοῦν παρὸν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς οὐκ αὔταρκες εὐδαίμονα τὸν κεκτημένον ἀποφῆναι, καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ χωρὶς τούτων οὐχ ἱκανὴ ποιῆσαι τὸν ἔχοντ’ αὐτὴν εὐδαίμονα. | 4.10 For they do not permit her to make people happy, but they reduce her to the same level as wealth, reputation, high birth, health, beauty, and whatever else is common to vice. For just as any one of these things, when present without virtue, is not self-sufficient to render its possessor happy, so in the very same way virtue without these is said to be insufficient to make the one who possesses it happy. |
| 4.11 πῶς οὖν οὐ καθῄρηται καὶ καταβέβληται τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀξίωμα; ναί· ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἀρετήν φασιν. τί δὴ τοῦτο; καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑγίειαν τοῦ πλούτου· ἀλλὰ τό γε χωρὶς ἀλλήλων μὴ ἀρκεῖν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πᾶσι κοινόν. | 4.11 How then has the dignity of virtue not been torn down and cast to the ground? 'Yes,' they say, 'but we claim that virtue far excels all other goods.' Why so? For health also excels wealth! But the fact that each, apart from the other, is not sufficient for happiness is common to them all. |
| 4.12 ὁπόταν οὖν τις ἐκ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καὶ ταύτης τῆς αἱρέσεως διδάξειε τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ζητοῦντα, εὐδαίμονά φησιν ἐπὶ τροχὸν οὐκ ἀναβαίνειν, οὐδὲ ὁ ταῖς Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις συνεχόμενος δύναιτ’ ἂν εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος εἶναι. | 4.12 Whenever someone, educated in these doctrines and this school, teaches a person seeking the whole of human good within the soul itself, he asserts that a happy man does not mount upon the wheel of torture, nor could a man bound fast by the misfortunes of Priam be happy and blessed. |
| 4.13 τὸν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα τοιούτοις τισὶ περιπεσεῖν οὐκ ἀπεικός. τούτοις δὲ ἕπεται τὸ μήτε ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκ παντὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσι μήτ’, εἰ γένοιτο, παραμένειν ἀεί. «Φύλλα τὰ μέν τ’ ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ’ ὕλη τηλεθόωσα φύει· ὣς ἀνδρῶν γενεὴ ἡ μὲν φύει, ἡ δ’ ἀπολήγει.» | 4.13 And yet it is not unlikely that a person possessing virtue might fall into such calamities. From this it follows that happiness neither invariably accompanies those who possess virtue nor, if it should arise, does it remain forever: 'As are the leaves, such is the race of men. Some leaves the wind scatters on the ground, but the wood in bloom shoots forth others; so the generation of men grows, while another ceases.' [Hom. Il. 6.146–149]. |
| 4.14 ἔτι σοι τὸ παράδειγμα μικρὸν καὶ ἄτολμον, ὦ ποιητά· «ἔαρος δ’ ἐπιγίνεται ὥρη.» πολὺς ὁ μεταξὺ χρόνος καὶ ᾧ μὴ γίνεται. εἰ θέλεις ἀκριβῶς τὸ ἐπίκηρον καὶ σαθρὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γενεᾶς ἀπεικάσαι, παράβαλλε τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους εὐδαιμονίαν. ῥᾷον τῶν φύλλων αὕτη καὶ φύεται καὶ ἀπολείπει, οὐκ ἀναμένουσα περιτελλόμενον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, οὐδ’ αὐτοετεί, οὐδ’ αὐτομηνί, ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς ἡμέρας, αὐτῆς ὥρας καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυται. | 4.14 Yet your comparison is still small and timid, O poet! You say: 'and the season of spring comes on.' That is a long time in between, during which it does not occur! If you wish to portray accurately the perishable and rotten nature of the human race, compare it to Aristotle's idea of happiness! This happiness sprouts and fails more easily than leaves, not waiting for the revolving year, nor for a full year, nor even a full month, but in the very same day, the very same hour, it comes into being and perishes! |
| 4.15 πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπολλύντα, καὶ πάντα ἐκ τῆς τύχης. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τοῦ σώματος κῆρες, μυρίαι δὲ αὗται, καὶ πενία καὶ ἀτιμία, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐταρκεῖ, τὰ τῆς φίλης ἀρετῆς πρὸς βοήθειαν οὐχ ἱκανά· τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακοδαιμονίαν εἴργειν, τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν διασώζειν ἀσθενής. | 4.15 And many are the things that destroy it, all stemming from fortune: the plagues of the body—and these are myriads—poverty, dishonor, and all such things. And against none of these is the power of beloved virtue self-sufficient to help; it is too weak to ward off misery or to preserve happiness. |
| 4.16 τούτοις οὖν τις ἐντραφείς, καὶ τούτοις ἀρεσκόμενος τοῖς λόγοις, τίνα τρόπον ἢ αὐτὸς συνᾴσεται τοῖς Πλάτωνος, ἢ ἄλλους πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐπιρρώσει ποτέ; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν τις ἐκ τούτων ὁρμώμενος παραδέξαιτο τὰ Ἡράκλεια καὶ θεῖα ἐκεῖνα δόγματα, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ πάγκαλον χρῆμα ἀρετή, καὶ οὔτε ποτε ἐνδέουσα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν οὔτε ποτὲ αὐτῆς ἀφαιρουμένη, ἀλλὰ κἂν πενία, κἂν νόσος, κἂν ἀδοξία, κἂν βάσανοι, κἂν πίττα καὶ σταυρός, κἂν τὰ ἐκ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἅμα πάντα ἐπιρρυῇ, ἔτι ὁ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος. | 4.16 If someone is brought up on these doctrines and takes pleasure in these words, in what way will he either himself agree with Plato or ever encourage others toward his teachings? For there is no way that anyone starting from these Peripatetic principles could accept those heroic and divine doctrines—that virtue is a powerful and all-glorious thing, neither ever lacking for happiness nor ever stripped of it; but even if poverty, disease, dishonor, tortures, pitch, cross, and all the tragedies of the stage at once pour over him, the righteous man remains happy and blessed! |
| 4.17 ὑπὸ κήρυκι γοῦν αὐτῷ τῷ μεγαλοφωνοτάτῳ κηρύττει, καθάπερ ἀθλητήν τινα νικηφόρον, τὸν δικαιότατον, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν εὐδαιμονέστατος, ὁ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τὸν καρπὸν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δρεπόμενος. διαίρει τοίνυν, εἰ βούλει, καὶ ποίκιλλε τριχῆ καὶ τετραχῆ καὶ πολλαχῆ τὰ ἀγαθὰ διαστελλόμενος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. οὐ δή ποθ’ ἡμᾶς δι’ αὐτῶν προσάξεις τῷ Πλάτωνι. | 4.17 Indeed, Plato proclaims the most righteous man under the herald's call of his own most powerful voice, like a victorious athlete, declaring that he is the most happy, reaping the fruit of happiness from righteousness itself. Divide, then, if you wish, and multiply three-fold, four-fold, or many-fold the distinction of goods; for these things contribute nothing to the matter at hand, nor will you ever bring us to Plato by means of them! |
| 4.18 τί γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡς φῄς, τὰ μὲν τίμια, καθάπερ οἱ θεοί, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετά, ὡς αἱ ἀρεταί, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, ὡς πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς, τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα, ὡς αἱ θεραπεῖαι; τί δ’, εἰ ταῦτα ἐλάττονι διαιρέσει διαστελλόμενος λέγοις τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι τέλη, τὰ δὲ οὐ τέλη; τέλη μὲν ὀνομάζων ὧν χάριν τὰ ἄλλα, οὐ τέλη δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα λαμβανόμενα; | 4.18 For what if, as you say, some goods are honorable, like the gods; others praiseworthy, like the virtues; others powers, like wealth and strength; and others useful, like medical treatments? What if, making a lesser division, you should say that some goods are ends and others not ends—naming 'ends' those things for whose sake other things are chosen, and 'not ends' those taken for the sake of other things? |
| 4.19 τί δ’, εἰ μάθοι τις ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ οὐ πᾶσιν; ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ψυχῆς ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ σώματος, τὰ δ’ ἐκτός; ἢ πάλιν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν δυνάμεις, τὰ δὲ διαθέσεις καὶ ἕξεις, ἄλλα δὲ ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ τέλη, τὰ δὲ ὕλαι, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα; κἂν τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας παρὰ σοῦ μάθῃ τις δεκαχῆ διανέμειν τἀγαθόν, τί ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος γνώμην τὰ διδάγματα; | 4.19 Or what if one should learn that some goods are simply good, while others are not good for all; or that some belong to the soul, some to the body, and others are external; or again that some goods are powers, others dispositions and habits, others activities, others ends, others materials, and others instruments? Even if someone should learn from you to distribute the good ten-fold according to the ten categories, what do these teachings have to do with the mind of Plato? |
| 4.20 ἕως οὗ γὰρ σὺ μὲν εἴτε ὁμωνύμως εἴτε ὅπως βούλει λαλῶν ἀγαθὰ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλ’ ἄττα πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖα παραλαμβάνεις, τὸ ἱκανὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρούμενος, Πλάτων δ’ ἐκ περιουσίας περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖ τὸ ἔκπλεον εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμῖν εἴη κατὰ τοῦτο κοινόν· ἄλλων σοι δεῖ λόγων, ἄλλων τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος. | 4.20 For as long as you—speaking either homonymously or however you please—introduce other things besides virtue as necessary for happiness, taking away the self-sufficiency of virtue, while Plato, out of sheer abundance, inquires about other things while already possessing fullness of happiness from virtue itself, there can be nothing in common between you! You need one set of arguments, and those who follow Plato need another. |
| 4.21 ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια πιστά, οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει φιλία περὶ τοῦ κορυφαινοτάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δόγματος. διαμπερὲς γάρ, εἰ μὴ κακὰ φρονέουσιν ἀλλήλοις, τά γε ὑπεναντία περὶ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο διαφερόντων φαίνονται λέγοντες. | 4.21 For 'as there are no faithful oaths between lions and men, nor do wolves and lambs hold a common heart' [Hom. Il. 22.262–263], so there is no friendship between Plato and Aristotle regarding the supreme and most vital doctrine of happiness. For continuously, even if they do not harbor malicious intent toward one another, they appear to say directly opposite things concerning the matters that pertain to this goal." |
Chapter 5
In this chapter, Eusebius (quoting the Platonist Atticus) contrasts the biblical and Platonic view of divine providence (pronoia) with the Peripatetic view:
Platonic vs. Peripatetic View (5.1–5.3): Moses, the prophets, and Plato held that God actively oversees all creation, ordering all things down to human affairs. Aristotle, however, restricted the divine sphere strictly to the sublunary boundary (up to the moon), leaving terrestrial human affairs unguided and subject to blind nature or chance.
Ethical Danger (5.4–5.6): Atticus argues that denying providence removes fear of divine justice, thereby encouraging lawlessness and injustice. Without divine oversight or post-mortem accountability, moral constraint crumbles.
Aristotle Compared with Epicurus (5.7–5.14): Atticus treats Aristotle as practically equivalent to Epicurus on this point. While Epicurus placed the gods outside the cosmos (intermundia) to excuse their neglect, Aristotle left the gods within the heavenly spheres while severing their active care for humanity. Atticus asserts that both thinkers pay mere lip-service to the existence of the gods out of fear or public decorum, effectively preaching atheism.
| 5.1 Πάλιν Μώσεως καὶ τῶν παρ’ Ἑβραίοις προφητῶν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐν τούτοις συμφώνως, τὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων προνοίας λόγον εὐκρινῶς διατεθειμένων, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μέχρι σελήνης στήσας τὸ θεῖον τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη περιγράφει τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ διοικήσεως· ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ ἀπελέγχεται πρὸς τοῦ δηλωθέντος, ὧδέ πῃ διεξιόντος· | 5.1 Again, while Moses and the prophets among the Hebrews, and indeed Plato in agreement with them on these matters, laid down in clear terms the doctrine concerning the providence of all things, Aristotle stopped the divine sphere at the moon, cutting off the remaining parts of the cosmos from God's administration. On these grounds he is refuted by the aforementioned author [Atticus], who sets out the argument as follows: |
| 5.2 «Ὄντος δ’ ἔτι μεγίστου καὶ κυριωτάτου τῶν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελούντων τοῦ περὶ τῆς προνοίας πείσματος, ὃ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ὀρθοῖ, εἴ γε μὴ μέλλομεν ἀγνοεῖν πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν· ὁ μὲν Πλάτων εἰς θεὸν καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα ἀνάπτει. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχοντα εὐθείᾳ περαίνειν περιπορευόμενον. καὶ αὖ πάλιν φησὶν αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀγαθῷ δὲ μηδένα φθόνον ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ μηδενός. τούτου δὲ ἐκτὸς ὄντα πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν, εἰς τάξιν ἄγοντα ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελούμενον καὶ πάντα κατὰ δύναμιν κοσμοῦντα πεφροντικέναι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.» | 5.2 "Now, since conviction concerning providence is the greatest and most essential factor contributing to happiness, and is that which especially keeps human life upright—unless we are to remain ignorant whether 'the race of earth-born men ascends a higher wall by justice or by crooked deceits' [Pindar, Fr. 213]—Plato connects all things to God and derives all things from God. For he says that God, possessing the beginning, middle, and end of all existing things, completes His course directly in accordance with nature as He moves round. And again he says that God is good, and that in one who is good no envy ever arises about anything; and being free of envy, He makes all things as good as possible, bringing them into order out of disorder. And taking thought for all things and ordering all things according to His power, He has care also for human beings. |
| 5.3 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα· «Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πλάτων οὕτως. ὁ δὲ τὴν δαιμονίαν ταύτην φύσιν ἐκποδὼν ποιούμενος, καὶ τήν γε εἰσαῦθις ἐλπίδα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτέμνων, τήν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τῶν κρειττόνων εὐλάβειαν ἀφαιρούμενος, τίνα πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἔχει κοινωνίαν; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐφ’ ἃ βούλεται Πλάτων παρακαλέσαι καὶ πιστώσαιτο τὰ εἰρημένα; | 5.3 And shortly after: 'And Plato holds this view. But he who removes this divine nature out of the way, cutting off the future hope of the soul and taking away present reverence toward the higher powers, what fellowship has he with Plato? Or how could he encourage anyone toward Plato’s objectives or confirm the things that have been said? |
| 5.4 πᾶν γὰρ τοὐναντίον συνεργὸς ἂν οὗτός γε καὶ συναγωνιστὴς τῶν ἐθελόντων ἀδικεῖν φανείη. πᾶς γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος ὢν καὶ ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ὀρέξεσι κατεσχημένος, ἂν καταφρονήσῃ τῶν θεῶν καὶ μηδὲν νομίσῃ πρὸς αὐτόν, ἅτε πόρρω μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπῳκισμένος ἐν τῷ ζῆν, ἀποθανὼν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔτι ὤν, ἕτοιμος ἂν ἔλθοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. | 5.4 For quite the contrary, he would appear as a collaborator and champion of those who wish to act unjustly. For every person, being human and held fast by human appetites, if he comes to despise the gods and considers that they have nothing to do with him—inasmuch as he is removed far from them during life and after death ceases even to exist—will readily turn to indulging his desires. |
| 5.5 πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἄν γε ἀνθρώπους δέῃ λανθάνειν· οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκ παντὸς λαθεῖν ζητεῖν, ὅπου γέ τις τῶν πεφωρακότων κρατεῖν δυνατός ἐστιν. ὥστε ἕτοιμόν τι χρῆμα πρὸς ἀδικίαν ἡ τῆς προνοίας ἀπόγνωσις. | 5.5 For to gain confidence that one’s wrongdoing will lie hidden is not impossible, provided one needs only to hide from human beings; and indeed, it is not even strictly necessary to seek concealment if one has the power to overcome those who catch him. Thus, despair of providence is a ready incentive to wrongdoing. |
| 5.6 ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ χρηστός ἐστιν, ὅστις τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῖν προτείνας ὡς ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν ἄδειαν παρασχόμενος, ἔτι μηχανὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν πορίζειν οἴεται, ὅμοιόν τι ποιῶν ἰατρῷ τὴν μὲν ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ κάμνοντος βοήθειαν παρέντι, μετὰ θάνατον δὲ πλέκειν τινὰς μηχανὰς πειρωμένῳ πρὸς σωτηρίαν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. | 5.6 For that philosopher must be exceedingly naive who, having held up pleasure to us as the good and provided immunity from the gods, still thinks he can devise some mechanism to keep men from acting unjustly. He does something similar to a physician who neglects to treat the patient while he is still alive, but after death tries to construct various mechanisms to save the deceased! |
| 5.7 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ Περιπατητικός. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἡ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν σπουδὴ ὡς ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὅτι κήδοιτο ἀπιστία τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐπιρρώννυσι. τί οὖν, φήσαι τις ἄν, ἐν ταὐτῷ τάττεις Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ἐπίκουρον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον. | 5.7 The Peripatetic acts in a very similar way to this. For it is not so much zeal for pleasure as disbelief in the idea that the divine cares for us that empowers injustice. 'What then?' someone might ask, 'Do you place Aristotle and Epicurus in the same rank?' Most certainly, at least with regard to the issue before us! |
| 5.8 τί γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἢ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ θεῖον ἐξοικίσασθαι καὶ μηδεμίαν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίαν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἢ ἐν κόσμῳ τοὺς θεοὺς καθείρξαντα τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πραγμάτων ἀποστῆσαι; κατ’ ἴσον γὰρ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ἐκ θεῶν ἀμελὲς εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἴση τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἄδεια· τὸ δὲ ἐκείνων μενόντων κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἡμᾶς τι χρηστὸν ἀπολαύειν μάλιστα μὲν κοινὸν καὶ ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων, ἤδη δὲ ταύτῃ γε καὶ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον ὄνησις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ θεῶν γίνεται. | 5.8 For what difference does it make to us whether one banishes the divine from the cosmos and leaves us no fellowship with it, or confines the gods within the cosmos but removes them from the affairs upon earth? For among both thinkers, neglect of human beings by the gods is equal, and equal is the immunity granted to wrongdoers from the gods! And as for their remaining in heaven while we enjoy some good from them, this is mostly common even to irrational animals and inanimate objects—and indeed, in this way, even according to Epicurus, benefit comes to human beings from the gods. |
| 5.9 τὰς γοῦν βελτίονας ἀπορροίας αὐτῶν φασι τοῖς μετασχοῦσι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν παραιτίας γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὔτε τοῦτον οὔτε ἐκεῖνον δίκαιον ἐν προνοίας ἀριθμεῖσθαι λόγῳ. εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον τὸ τῆς προνοίας οἴχεται, καίτοι τῶν θεῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν πᾶσαν κηδεμονίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν εἰσφερομένων, οὕτως ἂν οἴχοιτο καὶ κατ’ Ἀριστοτέλην τὸ τῆς προνοίας, εἰ καὶ τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἐν τάξει τινὶ καὶ κόσμῳ διοικεῖται. | 5.9 At any rate, they say that the better emanations from the gods become the causes of great goods for those who partake in them. But it is not right to reckon either this man or that man under the account of providence! For if providence perishes according to Epicurus—even though, according to him, the gods bring to bear every care for the preservation of their own proper goods—so also providence would perish according to Aristotle, even if things in heaven are administered in a certain order and harmony. |
| 5.10 πρόνοιαν γὰρ ζητοῦμεν ἡμῖν διαφέρουσαν, ἧς οὐ μέτεστι τῷ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε ἥρωας μήτε ὅλως ἐπιδιαμένειν δύνασθαι τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεχωρηκότι. | 5.10 For we are seeking a providence that matters to us, in which he has no share who grants neither that daemons nor heroes exist, nor that souls are able to survive at all. |
| 5.11 ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἐμοὶ κριτῇ καὶ αἰσχυντηλότερον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ πεποιηκέναι· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπογνοὺς δύνασθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς ἀνθρώπων κηδεμονίας εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθόντας αὐτοῖς καθάπερ εἰς ἀλλοδαπὴν ἀπῴκισε καὶ ἔξω που τοῦ κόσμου καθίδρυσε, τὸ ἀπάνθρωπον αὐτῶν τῇ ἀποστάσει καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἅπαντ’ ἀκοινωνίᾳ παραιτούμενος. | 5.11 And to my judgment, Epicurus seems to have acted with a bit more shame. For as though despairing of the gods being able to refrain from caring for humans if they came near them, he relocated them to a foreign land, as it were, settling them somewhere outside the cosmos—excusing their lack of humanity by their distance and complete lack of communion with all things. |
| 5.12 ὁ δὲ περιττὸς ἡμῖν οὗτος τῆς φύσεως εὑρετὴς καὶ τῶν θείων πραγμάτων ἐπιγνώμων ἀκριβὴς ὑπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα ὑποθεὶς εἴασεν ἀτημέλητα καὶ ἀφρόντιστα, φύσει καὶ οὐ θεοῦ λογισμῷ διοικούμενα. ὅθεν εἰκότως ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔγκλημα ἐκφύγοι, ὃ κατ’ Ἐπικούρου τινὲς μαντεύονται, ὡς ἄρα μὴ κατὰ γνώμην, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δέος τοῖς θεοῖς κατένειμεν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χώραν ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ θέαν. | 5.12 But this extraordinary discoverer of nature and accurate knower of divine matters, having placed human affairs right under the very eyes of the gods, left them untended and unthought-of, administered by nature and not by divine reason. Whence he himself could not reasonably escape even that accusation which some guess against Epicurus: that not out of genuine conviction, but out of fear of men, he assigned a place to the gods in the universe like seating in a theater! |
| 5.13 τεκμήριον δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς γνώμης τἀνδρός, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἀφεῖλε τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνέργειαν, ἐξ ἧς μόνης τὸ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ἔμελλε τὴν δικαίαν πίστιν ἕξειν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ποιεῖ. ἀποστήσας γὰρ καὶ παραδοὺς ὄψει μόνῃ τὴν πίστιν πραγμάτειαν κρίνειν ἀσθενεῖ τὰ ἐκ τοσοῦδε διαστήματος τάχ’ ἂν αἰδοῖ δοκοίη λέγειν ἐνταῦθα εἶναι θεούς. | 5.13 And they make it a proof of the man's real mind that he took away their activity toward us—from which activity alone belief in the existence of the gods was going to hold just conviction. For Aristotle does this very same thing. For having removed them and surrendered conviction to sight alone—a weak business for judging things at so great a distance—he might seem to say out of modesty that there are gods in that place. |
|
5.14
οὐ γὰρ ἀπολιπὼν ἔξω τι τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς προσαγαγὼν τοὺς θεούς, ἀνάγκην ἔσχεν ἢ παντάπασιν ἄθεος εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ τὴν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀπολιπεῖν θεοὺς δόξαν ἀνασώζειν, ἐνταῦθά που τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποικίσας. ὁ δὲ τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων ἀκρίβειαν παραιτησάμενος τῇ ἀμιξίᾳ ἔοικεν εὐσχημόνως ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς θεοῖς.»
Ταῦτα ὁ Ἀττικὸς πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην χρεοκοποῦντα τὸν περὶ προνοίας λόγον. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς ἔτι καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς εἰρημένοις προστίθησι, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτεινόμενος μὴ βουλόμενον γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον. |
5.14
For since he neither left the gods outside the cosmos nor brought them near to things on earth, he was forced either to confess himself completely godless or to preserve the appearance of leaving gods by settling them somewhere in that region. But he who excuses the oversight of higher powers through their non-involvement seems under a decorous cover to disbelieve in the gods.'
These are the words of Atticus against Aristotle for whittling away the doctrine of providence. And the same author further adds the following to what has been said, directing his argument against the same man for refusing to accept that the world was generated." |
Chapter 6
In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting the Platonist philosopher Atticus, turning from divine providence (pronoia) to the unbegotten (agenēton) nature of the world.
Moses, Plato, and Aristotle (6.1–6.3): Moses and Plato agree that the world was generated (genēton) by God as its Creator and Builder. Aristotle broke with this tradition, asserting that the universe is uncreated and eternal. Atticus notes that even some self-proclaimed Platonists try to harmonize Plato with Aristotle by claiming Plato’s cosmological creation account was non-literal.
Platonic Creation and Divine Power (6.4–6.7): Citing the Timaeus, Atticus highlights that Plato explicitly described God bringing pre-existent disorder into order and reassuring the created gods that though they are subject to dissolution by nature, His sovereign will guarantees their immortality.
Refutation of Aristotle’s Logic (6.8–6.11): Atticus refutes the Aristotelian premise that "whatever is generated must perish, and whatever is imperishable must be unbegotten." He argues that Aristotle ignores the primary, supreme cause: God's omnipotent will. If God wills that a created thing be preserved, His power is more than sufficient to sustain it endlessly.
The Creator Analogy and Final Verdict (6.12–6.17): Human artisans (builders, shipwrights) can bring new things into being and restore aging structures. It is absurd to grant human crafts the power of generation while stripping the Sovereign Craftsman (pambasileus kai aristotechnēs) of the power to create and preserve His work. Human cities outlast their human builders; surely God’s creations outlast all decay so long as He wills them to stand. Atticus concludes that Aristotle and his followers cannot teach the truth about the cosmos because they deny its very creation.
| 6.1 Πάλιν Μώσεως γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ὁρισαμένου, ποιητήν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῖς ὅλοις τὸν θεὸν ἐπιστήσαντος, τοῦ τε Πλάτωνος τὰ ἴσα Μωσεῖ φιλοσοφοῦντος, τὴν ἐναντίαν κἀν τούτῳ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁδεύσας ἀπελέγχεται πρὸς τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγραφέως, ὧδε πρὸς ῥῆμα γράφοντος· | 6.1 Again, while Moses defined the cosmos as generated, establishing God as the Maker and Craftsman of all things, and while Plato philosophized in terms equal to Moses, Aristotle—travelling the opposite path in this matter as well—is refuted by the aforementioned author [Atticus], who writes word for word as follows: |
| 6.2 «Πρῶτον δὴ περὶ γενέσεως κόσμου σκοπῶν, καὶ τὸ τῆς προνοίας τὸ μέγα τοῦτο καὶ πολυωφελὲς δόγμα πάντα ζητεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμενος, καὶ λογισάμενος ὅτι τῷ μὴ γενομένῳ οὔτε τινὸς ποιητοῦ οὔτε τινὸς κηδεμόνος πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι καλῶς χρεία, ἵνα μὴ ἀποστερήσῃ τὸν κόσμον τῆς προνοίας ἀφεῖλε τὸ ἀγέννητον αὐτοῦ. | 6.2 "First of all, then, considering the generation of the cosmos, and holding it necessary to examine everything concerning this great and most beneficial doctrine of providence, and reasoning that for that which is unbegotten there is no need of any maker or any guardian to bring it properly into being, he [Plato], so as not to deprive the cosmos of providence, removed its unbegotten status. |
| 6.3 παραιτούμεθα δὲ νῦν μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἡμῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἑστίας εἶναι, οἷς ἀρέσκει καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν κόσμον ἀγέννητον εἶναι. δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἡμῖν συγγνώμην νέμειν, εἰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων Πλάτωνι πιστεύομεν οἷς αὐτὸς Ἕλλην ὢν Ἕλληνας ἡμᾶς σαφεῖ καὶ τρανῷ τῷ στόματι διείλεκται. | 6.3 And we ask now that those from our own hearth—who are pleased to hold that according to Plato, too, the cosmos is unbegotten—not stand in our way. For they are right to grant us pardon if, concerning the views of Plato, we trust the very words in which he, being a Hellene speaking to us as Hellenes, has spoken with a clear and distinct mouth. |
| 6.4 παραλαβὼν γάρ, φησίν, ὁ θεὸς πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, πλημμελῶς δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον, εἰς τάξιν ἦγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος τοῦτο ἐκείνου πάντως ἄμεινον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ὅτι μὴ δι’ αἰνιγμάτων, μηδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χρείᾳ τὴν γένεσιν παρεδέξατο, δηλοῖ δι’ ὧν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ τῶν πάντων διείλεκται περὶ τούτου μετὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργίαν. | 6.4 For he says that God, having taken over all that was visible—not at rest, but moving discordantly and disorderly—brought it into order out of disorder, deeming this altogether better than that. And even more so, that he accepted generation not through riddles, nor out of a need for plain clarity, he makes evident through the words which the Father of all addressed to him concerning this after the creation of the universe. |
| 6.5 ἐπειδὴ γάρ, φησί, γεγένησθε, (λέγει δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς) ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτι μὴν δὴ λυθήσεσθε τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως τυχόντες. | 6.5 'For since you have been brought into being,' He says (and He is speaking to the gods), 'you are not immortal nor altogether indissoluble, yet you shall by no means be dissolved, having obtained My will.' [Plato, Timaeus 41a–b] |
| 6.6 ἀλλ’, ὅπερ ἔφην, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἔνδον ἡμῖν ὑποφθεγγομένους, ἅτε φίλους ὄντας, φιλίως τε καὶ μεθ’ ἡσυχίας πραέσιν ἐλέγχοις διακριθεῖμεν ἄν. ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ τούτους Ἀριστοτέλης μεταθεῖναι, τῇ μὲν κατηγορίᾳ τοῦ δόγματος ἀντισχεῖν ἀδυνατήσαντας, τὸ δὲ ἁλῶναι δόξαν ὡς ψεῦδος οὐ βουληθέντας ἀναθεῖναι Πλάτωνι. | 6.6 But, as I was saying, toward those within our circle who whisper against us—since they are friends—we might come to a friendly and quiet resolution through gentle arguments. For it seems Aristotle converted even these men, who were unable to withstand the accusation brought against the doctrine, yet were unwilling to accept the reputation of having caught Plato in a falsehood. |
| 6.7 κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκοήν, ἀξιοῦντος Πλάτωνος τὸν κόσμον γεγονέναι κάλλιστον ἔργον ὑπὸ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν δημιουργῶν, καὶ περιθέντος τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ποιητῇ δύναμιν δι’ ἧς καὶ οὐκ ὄντα πρότερον ἐποίησε τὸν κόσμον, καὶ ποιήσας εἰσαεὶ βουλόμενός γε σῶον διαφυλάξει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ γεννητοῦ καὶ ἀφθάρτου κατ’ αὐτὸν ὑποκειμένου τοῦ κόσμου, τίς ἡμῖν τῶν Περιπατητικῶν ταῦτα βεβαιοῖ;» | 6.7 But according to our hearing, when Plato asserts that the cosmos came into being as a most beautiful work by the best of craftsmen, and when he attributes to the Maker of the universe power through which He made the cosmos when it did not exist before, and having made it, He wills ever to preserve it safe—and when on this view the cosmos is posited by him as both generated and incorruptible—which of the Peripatetics confirms these things for us?" |
| 6.8 Δεῖ δὲ παραμυθήσασθαι τὸν συναγωνιστὴν τούτων, ὅτι οὐ πάντως, εἴ τι γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο φθαρῆναι, πάλιν δ’ οὐδ’ εἴ τι μὴ φθαρήσεται, τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον ἀγέννητον εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ μίαν αἰτίαν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου συγχωρητέον οὔτε τῷ γενομένῳ τὴν εἰς ὄλεθρον μεταβολὴν ἀβοήθητον καταλειπτέον. | 6.8 Now we must reassure their fellow combatant that it is by no means necessary that if something has come into being, it must perish; nor again, if something will not perish, is it necessary that it be unbegotten. For we must neither grant that the unbegotten is the sole cause of incorruptibility, nor abandon that which has come into being without help to destruction. |
| 6.9 πόθεν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους λάβωμεν βοήθειαν εἰς ταῦτα, ἀνδρὸς οὐ τηνάλλως οὐδὲ καθ’ αὑτὸν περαίνοντος τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὀρθοῦ πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐναντιουμένου, καὶ τό τε γενόμενον εἰς ἀνάγκην τοῦ ἀπολέσθαι περιιστάντος, τό τε μὴ ἀπολλύμενον ἐκ μόνου τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι λέγοντος κρατύνεσθαι τὸ ἄφθαρτον, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἀπολείποντος αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ᾗ χρώμενος ἀγαθόν ἄν τι ποιήσαι; ὃ γὰρ οὔπω πρότερον γέγονε, τοῦτο, φησίν, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. | 6.9 Whence, then, may we receive help for these things from the writings of Aristotle—a man who does not construct his argument on these matters at random or by himself, but opposes Plato directly, bringing that which has come into being under the necessity of perishing, and stating that the imperishable is established as incorruptible solely from not having come into being, while leaving no power to God by which He might do something good? For that which has not yet come into being previously, this, he says, could not come into being. |
| 6.10 τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀποδεῖ διὰ τούτων βοηθεῖν τῷ Πλάτωνος λόγῳ ὥστε ἤδη τινὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνα ἐσπουδακότων φοβήσας, οἷς εἶπεν, ἀπέστησε τοῦ δόγματος, οὐ δυνηθέντας συνιδεῖν ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἦν ἄνευ θεοῦ βουλήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπινοῆσαι οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον ἄφθαρτον οὔτε τὸ μὴ φθαρησάμενον γεννητὸν ὄν. | 6.10 And so far is he from helping the argument of Plato through these statements, that having frightened even some of those who devoted themselves to Plato by what he said, he led them away from the doctrine—they being unable to comprehend that according to the very nature of things without God’s will and power, it was impossible to conceive either that what has come into being is incorruptible, or that what does not perish is generated. |
| 6.11 ὅταν δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην τις αἰτίαν ἐπιστήσῃ τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ, δεῖ ταύτην ἡγεμόνα τῶν πάντων λαβόντα μηδὲν αὐτὴν τῶν ἄλλων αἰτίαν ἀποφαίνειν χείρονα. γελοῖον γὰρ διότι μὲν γέγονέ τι, διὰ τοῦτο φθαρῆναι, εἰ δὲ ὁ θεὸς βούλεται, μὴ φθαρῆναι, καὶ διότι μέν τι ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν ἔχειν ἰσχὺν τοῦ μὴ φθαρῆναι, τὴν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ βούλησιν ἐνδεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον τηρῆσαί τι τῶν γενομένων. | 6.11 When, however, one sets over all things the supreme cause which comes from God, taking this as the guide of all, one ought to declare it inferior to no other cause. For it is ridiculous to say that because something has come into being, it must on that account perish, but if God wills, it will not perish; and that because something is unbegotten it possesses the strength not to perish, but the will from God falls short when it comes to keeping something created in an incorruptible state! |
| 6.12 καὶ ὁ μὲν οἰκοδόμος ἱκανὸς οὐκ οὖσαν οἰκίαν κατασκευάσασθαι, ἱκανὸς δέ τις καὶ ἀνδριάντα μὴ ὄντα πρότερον ὄντα ποιῆσαι, καὶ ναῦν ἄλλος ἐξ ὕλης ἀργοῦ τεκτηνάμενος παρέσχε τοῖς δεομένοις, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν ἕκαστος, ὅσοι γε τὰς ποιητικὰς μετίασι τέχνας, δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχουσιν, ὥς τι τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἄγειν εἰς οὐσίαν, ὁ δὲ παμβασιλεὺς καὶ ἀριστοτέχνης οὐδ’ ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνου τεχνίτου δυνάμεως μεθέξει, ἄμοιρος δ’ ἡμῖν πάσης ἔσται γενέσεως; οὔκ, ἐάν γε καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ θείας αἰτίας ἐπιλογισμὸν οἰοί τε ὦμεν λαβεῖν. | 6.12 And while a builder is able to construct a house that did not exist, and someone is able to make a statue that was not previously in existence, and another, having fashioned a ship from raw timber, supplies it to those in need—and each of the other artisans, as many as pursue the productive arts, have this power, so as to bring something from non-existence into being—shall the All-King and Master-Craftsman not share in even as much power as a human artisan, and shall He be for us devoid of all generative power? Not if we are able to grasp even a small calculation of divine causation! |
| 6.13 ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μὲν ἱκανὸς καὶ βουληθῆναι τὰ καλά, (ἀγαθὸς γάρ, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς φθόνος περὶ οὐδενός) τηρῆσαι δὲ καὶ διαφυλάξαι τὰ γενόμενα οὐ δυνατός; καὶ μὴν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τεχνῖται πρὸς ἄμφω ἱκανοί. ὁ γοῦν οἰκοδόμος καὶ ὁ ναυπηγὸς οὐ μόνον καινὰς κατασκευάζονται ναῦς καὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ὑπὸ χρόνου διαφθειρομέναις ἱκανοὶ βοηθεῖν, ἕτερα τῶν πεπονημένων ἀντικαθιστάντες αὐταῖς· | 6.13 Is He able to make and to will good things (for He is good, and in one who is good there is no envy concerning anything), but unable to preserve and safeguard the things that have come into being? And yet the other artisans are capable of both! The house-builder, at any rate, and the shipwright not only construct new ships and houses, but are also capable of repairing those damaged by time, substituting other parts for those that have worn out. |
| 6.14 ὥστε καὶ τῷ θεῷ πάντως τό γε τοσοῦτον συγχωρητέον. ὁ γάρ τις ὅλον ποιῆσαι δυνατός, τοῦτο πῶς ἂν ἐκ μέρους ἀδύνατος εἴη ποιεῖν; καὶ γενέσθαι τοίνυν τι δεῖ καινόν, εἴπερ μέλλοι τις ὅλως ποιητής, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον πρὸς ἅπαν διασώζεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ εὖ γενόμενον ἐθέλειν λύειν κακοῦ. | 6.14 So that at least this much must certainly be granted to God as well. For how could He who is able to make a whole thing be unable to make it in part? There must, therefore, come into being something new if anyone is to be a creator at all, and the noble work must be saved through everything; for to wish to undo what has been made well belongs to an evil nature. |
| 6.15 μείζων δὲ ἄλλος εἰς σωτηρίαν τῶν γενομένων δεσμὸς οὐκ ἔστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως. ἢ ἀνθρωπίνης μὲν σπουδῆς καὶ βουλήσεως μεταλαβόντα πολλά, καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἔργα, μένει χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον γενόμενα μηκέτ’ ὄντος τοῦ θελήσαντος, τὰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μετασχόντα γνώμης καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γενόμενα, ταῦτα δὲ ἄρα παρόντος τοῦ ποιήσαντος οἰχήσεται καὶ οὐ παραμενεῖ; | 6.15 And there is no greater bond for the preservation of created things than the will of God! Or shall many things—nations and cities and works—having received a share of human zeal and will, remain for an immeasurable time once brought into being, even when he who willed them is no longer present, while those things which have shared in the mind of God, and have come into being through Him and by Him, shall these, forsooth, depart and not abide while their Maker is present? |
| 6.16 τίνος αἰτίας βιασαμένης τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γνώμην; πότερον τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκης; ἀλλ’ αὐτή γε τῷ προσέσθαι τὸ κοσμηθῆναι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ προσωμολόγησεν ἧτταν. ἀλλ’ ἔξωθέν τινος αἰτίας ἀνταγωνιζομένης τῷ θεῷ; ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἐστὶν οὔτε ἐν οἷς ἔφθη κρατήσας καὶ κοσμήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔτι ἄξιον ἐν τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐλαττοῦν τινος, εἴ γε μὴ παντάπασι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς μεγίστης καὶ θειοτάτης δυνάμεως διαλεγόμενοι. | 6.16 What cause forcing the mind of God? Was it the necessity arising from created things themselves? But that necessity itself, by accepting to be brought into order, confessed its defeat at the hands of God! Or was it some external cause contending against God? But there is none; nor in those things which God has already mastered and ordered is it fitting to diminish Him in any way—unless we are completely oblivious to ourselves when speaking about the greatest and most divine power! |
|
6.17
ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον ἐοίκαμεν ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἐκφέρεσθαι. δῆλον μὲν καὶ ὃ προὐθέμεθα, ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἶεν διδάσκαλοι περὶ κόσμου γενέσεως οἱ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένεσιν ἀπολιπόντες αὐτῷ.»
Καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων πέμπτης οὐσίας, ἣν εἰσηγήσατο Ἀριστοτέλη, ταῦτα παραθετέον· |
6.17
In fact, we seem to be carried away by eagerness into the argument about truth. What we set before ourselves is also clear: that those who do not even leave a generation to the cosmos at the beginning could not be teachers concerning its generation."
Indeed, concerning the fifth essence of bodies introduced by Aristotle, the following remarks should also be set alongside these: |
Chapter 7
In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting the Platonist Atticus, addressing Aristotle’s doctrine of the fifth element (aither or quintessence):
The Four Elements vs. The Fifth Element (7.1–7.3): Moses, Plato, and earlier philosophers agreed on four fundamental physical elements: fire, earth, air, and water. Atticus accuses Aristotle of inventing a fifth, non-sensible element purely out of intellectual pride (perittoteros phaneisthai) rather than empirical observation. By assigning to this fifth element properties that strip it of all tangible physical qualities (neither heavy nor light, neither hot nor cold, neither moist nor dry), Aristotle effectively asserts a "body that is not a body" (sōma ou sōma).
Philosophical Pastiche & Sculpture Analogy (7.4–7.6): Atticus compares Aristotle’s fifth element to a sculptor who splices together disparate, incompatible parts of different statues (taking Zeus's head, Ares's belt, Poseidon's chest) to claim an original work. Aristotle took Plato’s description of incorporeal, immutable Intelligible Reality (ousia noētē) and merged it with Plato’s description of celestial bodies, constructing a logical absurdity: an "impassible/immutable physical body" (sōma apathes).
The Incompatibility of Body and Impassibility (7.7): Atticus concludes that while a composite statue is merely aesthetically ugly, a physical body that cannot undergo change or passion is an ontological impossibility. Matter is inherently subject to change (treptē); therefore, anything truly impassible (apathes) must be incorporeal (asōmaton) and completely separate from matter.
| 7.1 «Περὶ γοῦν τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων σώματα συνέστηκε, Πλάτων μὲν ἑπόμενος τῇ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐναργείᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τέσσαρά τε ἔφησεν εἶναι ταῦτα ὁμολογούμενα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συγκρινομένων τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα γεννᾶσθαι· Ἀριστοτέλης δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐλπίσας περιττότερος φανεῖσθαι τῷ φρονεῖν εἴ τι σῶμα ἐκ περιττοῦ προσθείη, προσκατηρίθμησε τοῖς φαινομένοις τέτταρσι σώμασι τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν, πάνυ μὲν λαμπρῶς καὶ φιλοδώρως τῇ φύσει χρησάμενος, μὴ συνιδὼν δὲ ὅτι οὐ νομοθετεῖν δεῖ φυσιολογοῦντα, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξιστορεῖν. | 7.1 "Concerning, at any rate, the so-called elements—from which primary components physical bodies are composed—Plato, following the clear evidence regarding them, just as those before him did, declared that these are confessedly four: fire, earth, air, and water; and that when these are combined, all other things are produced. But Aristotle, as it seems, hoping to appear extraordinarily superior in intelligence if he should add some element beyond the usual, numbered alongside the four visible bodies a fifth essence—using nature in a very lavish and generous manner, yet failing to realize that one who studies nature ought not to lay down laws, but rather to report the facts of nature itself. |
| 7.2 εἰς τοίνυν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ τέτταρας εἶναι τὰς πρώτας τῶν σωμάτων φύσεις, ἧς δὴ χρεία τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἂν συντελοῖ τι ὁ Περιπατητικός, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν καὶ μόνος ἐναντιοῖτ’ ἄν. λεγόντων γοῦν ἡμῶν ὅτι πᾶν σῶμα ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ ξηρόν, ἢ μαλακὸν ἢ σκληρόν, ἢ κοῦφον ἢ βαρύ, ἢ ἀραιὸν ἢ πυκνόν, καὶ εὑρισκόντων ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἕτερόν τι εἴη τὸ μεθέξον τούτων τινὸς παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα· (εἰ μὲν γὰρ θερμόν, ἢ πῦρ ἢ ἀήρ· εἰ δὲ ψυχρόν, ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ξηρόν, πῦρ ἢ γῆ· εἰ δὲ ὑγρόν, ὕδωρ ἢ ἀήρ· καὶ εἰ μὲν μαλακόν, ἀὴρ ἢ πῦρ· εἰ δὲ σκληρόν, ὕδωρ ἢ γῆ· καὶ κοῦφον μὲν καὶ ἀραιόν, οἷον πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· βαρὺ δὲ καὶ πυκνόν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ.) καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἁπασῶν τῶν ἁπλῶν δυνάμεων κατανοούντων ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταῦτά τι σῶμα ἕτερον· οὗτος ἀνθίσταται μόνος, φάσκων δύνασθαι σῶμα εἶναι τούτων ἄμοιρον· σῶμα δὲ μήτε βαρύ, μήτε κοῦφον, μήτε μαλακόν, μήτε σκληρόν, μήτε ὑγρόν, ἀλλὰ μήτε ξηρόν, μονονουχὶ λέγων σῶμα οὐ σῶμα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄνομα καταλέλοιπεν αὐτῷ, τὰς δὲ δυνάμεις, δι’ ὧν σῶμα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πάσας ἀφῄρηκεν. | 7.2 Therefore, toward the proof that the primary natures of physical bodies are four—a proof required by Platonists—the Peripatetic would not only contribute nothing, but would be almost the only opponent. When we say, for instance, that every body is either hot or cold, moist or dry, soft or hard, light or heavy, rare or dense; and when we find that there is no other body that could partake of any of these except the four: (for if hot, it is either fire or air; if cold, water or earth; if dry, fire or earth; if moist, water or air; if soft, air or fire; if hard, water or earth; light and rare, such as fire and air; heavy and dense, water and earth); and when from all the other simple qualities we observe that there can be no other body besides these—he alone stands in opposition, claiming that a body can exist devoid of these: a body that is neither heavy nor light, neither soft nor hard, neither moist nor dry, virtually saying 'a body that is not a body!' For he has left it the name, but stripped away all the powers through which a body naturally comes to be. |
| 7.3 ἢ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἅπερ αὐτὸς λέγει πείθων ἀφαιρήσεται τῆς Πλάτωνος γνώμης, ἢ τὰ Πλάτωνος βεβαιούμενος τῶν αὐτῷ δοκούντων ἀποστήσεται· ὥστε οὐδαμῇ χρήσιμος πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος. | 7.3 Either, then, by persuading us of the things he himself says, he will strip us of Plato's judgment, or by confirming the teachings of Plato, he will abandon his own opinions; so that he is in no way useful toward the doctrines of Plato. |
| 7.4 ἔτι ὁ μὲν Πλάτων πάντα τὰ σώματα, ἅτε ἐπὶ μιᾶς ὁμοίας ὕλης θεωρούμενα, βούλεται τρέπεσθαι μεταβάλλειν τε εἰς ἄλληλα· ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον πάντως ἀξιοῖ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ εὐκαταφρονήτου τινὸς πράγματος γεννητὴς εἶναι δοκῇ, περιττὸν μὲν καὶ ἴδιον παντάπασι λέγων οὐδέν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐπ’ ἄλλων ἑωραμένα καλῶς μεταφέρων ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν ὕστερον γενομένων ἀνδριαντοποιῶν. | 7.4 Furthermore, Plato wills that all bodies, inasmuch as they are observed upon one and the same underlying matter, undergo change and alter into one another. But Aristotle claims an essence above the other bodies that is altogether impassible, incorruptible, and unchangeable—so that he might not seem to be the inventor of something easily despised—saying nothing that is genuinely novel or original, but wrongly transferring to improper subjects things well observed by Plato regarding other matters, just like some later sculptors. |
| 7.5 ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ ἀπομιμησάμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδρὸς κεφαλήν, ἄλλου δὲ τὸ στέρνον, ἑτέρου δὲ τὴν ζώνην, εἰς ταὐτὸν συνθέντες ἐνίοτε μὴ προσήκοντα πράγματα ἀλλήλοις ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς ὥς τι πεποιηκότες ἴδιον· καὶ ὄντως τὸ μὲν ὅλον, ὃ δή τις ἂν ἀσυμμέτρως ἔχειν αἰτιάσαιτο, ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, τὰ δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ συνηρανισμένα καί τι καλὸν ἔχοντα οὐκ αὐτῶν. | 7.5 For those artists, having copied the head of one man, the chest of another, and the belt of a third, and having joined together into the same work things that do not belong to one another, persuaded themselves that they had made something original! And in truth the whole work—which anyone might accuse of being out of proportion—is theirs, but the parts compiled within it that possess beauty belong to others. |
| 7.6 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη ἀκούων Πλάτωνος ὅτι ἐστί τις οὐσία νοητὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἀσώματός τε καὶ ἀχρώματος καὶ ἀναφής, οὔτε γινομένη οὔτε φθειρομένη οὔτε τρεπομένη οὔτε μεταβαλλομένη, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα, πάλιν δ’ αὖ περὶ τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἀκούων, ὡς ὄντα θεῖα καὶ ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ ἐστι σώματα, συνέθηκε καὶ συνεκόλλησεν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πράγματα μὴ συνᾴδοντα· παρ’ ὧν μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι σῶμα, παρ’ ὧν δὲ τὸ ἀπαθὲς εἶναι λαβών, σῶμα ἀπαθὲς ἐτεκτήνατο. | 7.6 In the very same way, Aristotle, hearing from Plato that there is an intelligible essence, in itself incorporeal, uncolored, and intangible, neither coming into being nor perishing, neither turning nor changing, but always in the same state and manner; and hearing again on the other hand concerning celestial things that they are divine, incorruptible, and impassible bodies—joined and glued together from both sources things that do not harmonize! For taking from the one source the property of being a body, and from the other the property of being impassible, he constructed an 'impassible body.' |
|
7.7
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀνδριάντων, εἰ καὶ μὴ καλὸν τὸ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων, οὔτι γε ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. διδάσκει γοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ Ὅμηρος· ὄμματα γάρ, φησί, καὶ κεφαλὴν ἴκελος Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ, Ἄρεϊ δὲ ζώνην, στέρνον δὲ Ποσειδάωνι. [Hom. Il. 2.478–479] τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀπαθὲς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. παθητῇ γὰρ καὶ τρεπτῇ συνδεδεμένον φύσει ἀνάγκην ἔχει συμπαθεῖν ᾧ συνέζευκται. εἰ δέ τι ἀπαθὲς εἴη, τοῦτο ἀφειμένον καὶ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πάσχοντος εἶναι δεῖ· ὥστε χωρὶς ἂν εἴη τῆς ὕλης, ἧς κεχωρισμένον ἀσώματον ἀναγκαίως ὁμολογοῖτ’ ἄν.»
Ἔτι καὶ τούτοις πρόσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις διαφέρεσθαι τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην παρίστησιν· |
7.7
Now in the case of statues, even if a composite of different models is not beautiful, it is certainly not impossible to make. Homer, at any rate, teaches such things: 'In eyes and head like unto Zeus who delights in thunder, in belt to Ares, and in chest to Poseidon.' [Hom. Il. 2.478–479]. But an 'impassible body' could never come to be! For being bound to a nature that is passive and subject to change, it has a necessity to suffer along with that to which it is yoked. And if something were impassible, it must be set free and liberated from that which suffers; so that it would exist apart from matter—separated from which, it must necessarily be confessed to be incorporeal."
Furthermore, let us pay attention to the mind of these passages, in how many other ways he demonstrates that Aristotle differs from Plato: |
Chapter 8
In this chapter, Eusebius continues citing the Platonist Atticus, detailing specific astronomical and cosmological contradictions between Plato and Aristotle:
Composition and Movement of Heavenly Bodies (8.1–8.6): Plato held that celestial bodies are composed predominantly of fire, derive their light from fire, and possess an inherent self-motion (axial rotation/spinning) appropriate to their ensouled nature, in addition to their orbital motion. Aristotle denied that the heavens or stars contain fire or light from fire, stripped the stars of self-motion (reducing their movement to the passive carrying motion of their spheres), and dismissed their apparent spinning as a visual illusion (pathos tēs hēmeteras opseōs).
The Fifth Element and Circular Motion (8.7–8.10): While Plato attributed circular motion to the Soul (psychē), Aristotle invented a fifth physical body specifically to possess circular motion inherently. Atticus critiques this mechanics: bodies without weight or lightness have no inherent impulse (rhopē) to initiate motion, and a body permanently remaining in its natural location would logically remain at rest rather than revolve perpetually.
Absolute Direction and Weight (8.11–8.13): Plato argued that "up/down" and "heavy/light" are purely relative terms based on an element's motion toward or away from its natural place, denying absolute cosmic top or bottom. Aristotle directly opposed this by asserting absolute cosmic directions: defining the center as absolutely "down" (and anything moving toward it as "heavy") and the perimeter as absolutely "up" (and anything moving toward it as "light").
Eusebius's Conclusion (8.13): Eusebius notes that Moses and the Hebrew scriptures refrain from meddling in these speculative cosmological debates (ouden polypragmonei), as such physical theories contribute nothing to moral life or virtue.
| 8.1 «Ἔπειτα τούτοις ἑπόμενα πολλά, ἐν οἷς διαφέρονται. ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἔχειν, ὁ δὲ μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι τοῖς οὐρανίοις πυρός. καὶ ὁ μέν φησιν ἀνάψαι τὸν θεὸν φῶς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ πρὸς γῆν περιόδῳ, ἵν’ ὅτι μάλιστα εἰς ἅπαντα φαίνοι τὸν οὐρανόν, περὶ ἡλίου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποφαινόμενος· ὁ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ ἐθέλων πῦρ εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, τὸ δὲ φῶς εἰδὼς πῦρ καθαρόν, ἤ τι πυρὸς ὄν, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει φῶς περὶ αὐτὸν ἀνῆφθαι. | 8.1 "There are next many consequences following these matters in which they disagree. For the one [Plato] says that celestial things have their principal form from fire, whereas the other [Aristotle] says that celestial things have no share whatever in fire. And the one says that God lit a light in the second orbit relative to the earth so that it might shine as much as possible throughout the whole heaven—making such a declaration concerning the sun; whereas the other, inasmuch as he does not wish the sun to be fire, and knowing that light is pure fire (or something belonging to fire), does not permit light to be kindled in it. |
| 8.2 ἔτι ὁ μέν, κατ’ εἶδος ἀφθαρσίαν ἀπονέμων τοῖς κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἅπασιν, ἀποχωρήσεις τινὰς αὐτῶν καὶ προσχωρήσεις συμμέτρους φησὶ γίνεσθαι· (ἀναγκάζουσι δὲ αὐτὸν λέγειν ταῦτα, τὰς μὲν ἀποκρίσεις, αἵ τε ἀκτῖνες τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ θερμότητες κατὰ ἀπόρρυσιν αὐτοῦ γινόμεναι· τὰς δὲ προσκρίσεις, ἡ ἴση τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτοῦ φάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἤθελεν ἴσα φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν ἀνθ’ ὧν ἀφίησι λαμβάνοντα·) | 8.2 Furthermore, the one [Plato], while assigning incorruptibility in form to all celestial bodies, says that certain symmetrical departures and additions take place among them; (and the emissions force him to say these things—namely, the rays of the sun and heat coming about through its discharge—and the additions are evidenced by the equal appearance of its size; for he would not want it to appear equal if it received nothing in return for what it releases); |
| 8.3 ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης πάντῃ μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας αὐτὰ βούλεται, μήτε τινὸς αὐτοῖς ἀποχωροῦντος μήτε προσιόντος. | 8.3 whereas Aristotle wishes them to remain entirely in the selfsame essence, with nothing departing from them and nothing approaching them. |
| 8.4 ἔτι ὁ μὲν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ κινήσει τῶν ἄστρων, καθ’ ἣν ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις ἐνδεδεμένοι κινοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἀστέρες οἵ τε ἀπλανεῖς καὶ οἱ πλανώμενοι, καὶ ἑτέραν αὐτοῖς κίνησιν ἀποδίδωσιν, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἄλλως καλλίστην εἶναι συμβέβηκε καὶ προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν τῇ φύσει τοῦ σώματος· (σφαιρικοὶ γὰρ ὄντες εἰκότως σφαιρικὴν ἄν τινα κίνησιν ἕκαστος κινοῖτο περιδινούμενος·) ὁ δὲ καὶ ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς κινήσεως αὐτούς, ἣν ὡς ἔμψυχοι κινοῦνται, μόνην δὲ ἀπολείπει τὴν ὑπ’ ἄλλων τῶν περιεχόντων ὥσπερ ἀψύχοις συμβαίνουσαν. | 8.4 Furthermore, in addition to the common movement of the stars—according to which all the stars, both fixed and wandering, move bound within their spheres—the one [Plato] also assigns to them another movement, which indeed happens to be the finest in all respects and proper to the nature of their body; (for being spherical, each would reasonably move with a spherical motion, spinning on its own axis); whereas the other [Aristotle] strips them even of this motion by which they move as ensouled beings, leaving only that motion imparted by the surrounding spheres, as occurs to inanimate objects. |
| 8.5 καὶ δὴ καί φησι τὴν γινομένην φαντασίαν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων ὡς κινουμένων πάθος εἶναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ὄψεως ἀδυνατούσης καὶ ὡσπερεὶ σειομένης, ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐκ εἶναι· ὥσπερ Πλάτωνος ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς κινήσεως πίστιν λαμβάνοντος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ διδάσκοντος ὅτι ἀνάγκη τούτων ἕκαστον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα καὶ σῶμα κινεῖσθαι τὴν ἰδίαν κίνησιν· (πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἄψυχον, ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἔμψυχον·) κινούμενον δέ, ἅτε θεῖον ὄν, τὴν καλλίστην κινεῖσθαι κίνησιν· καλλίστης δ’ οὔσης τῆς ἐν κύκλῳ κινήσεως, ταύτῃ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι. | 8.5 And indeed he [Aristotle] even says that the impression made upon us of the stars as moving [spinning] is an affection of our sight when failing and as it were shaking, but is not the truth—as though Plato derived his belief concerning their movement from this sensory impression, and not from the reason which teaches that every one of these, being a living creature and having both soul and body, must move with its own proper motion; (for every body whose motion comes from without is inanimate, but that whose motion comes from within and from itself is ensouled); and moving, inasmuch as it is divine, it must move with the finest motion; and since motion in a circle is finest, it moves in this way. |
| 8.6 ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου μαρτυροῖτο ἂν ὡς ἀληθεύουσα, οὐ μὴν αὐτὴ παρέσχε τὴν πίστιν τῆς κινήσεως. περὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἐν κύκλῳ τινὶ γίνεται νικώμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας οὐκ ἔσχεν ἀντειπεῖν Πλάτωνι, παρεῖχε δὲ κἀνταῦθα διαφορὰν αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν τοῦτο εὕρημα τοῦ σώματος. | 8.6 And sense-perception might testify to the conclusions of reason as speaking truth, but it certainly did not provide the initial conviction of the motion. Concerning the motion of the universe, that it does not take place in a circle, Aristotle, overcome by clear evidence, could not contradict Plato; but even here this fine invention of his—the fifth body—provided him with a point of difference. |
| 8.7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων, ὄντων τεττάρων σωμάτων καὶ πάντων φύσει κινουμένων ἁπλῆν καὶ εὐθεῖαν κίνησιν, πυρὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐκτός, γῆς δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ κίνησιν ἀπέδωκε τῇ ψυχῇ· ὁ δ’, ᾗπερ ἄλλῳ σώματι ἄλλην, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν κύκλῳ, καθάπερ σωματικήν τινα, τῷ πέμπτῳ προσένειμε σώματι, πάντ’ εὐκόλως αὑτὸν ἐξαπατήσας. | 8.7 For Plato, there being four bodies and all naturally moving with a simple and straight motion—fire toward the outside, earth toward the center, and the others toward the middle—assigned circular motion to the soul; but Aristotle, just as he assigned a different motion to a different body, so also assigned circular motion, as if it were a physical body, to the fifth body, easily deceiving himself in every way. |
| 8.8 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐπ’ εὐθείας κινουμένοις αἱ βαρύτητες καὶ κουφότητες τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως παρείχοντο, τὸ δὲ πέμπτον σῶμα, μήτε βάρους μετέχον μήτε κουφότητος, ἀκινησίας μᾶλλον αἴτιον ἂν εἴη· | 8.8 For to those bodies moving in a straight line, heaviness and lightness provided the origin of motion; but the fifth body, participating in neither heaviness nor lightness, would rather be a cause of immobility; |
| 8.9 οὐ τῆς ἐν κύκλῳ κινήσεως τοῖς ἐπ’ εὐθείας κινουμένοις τὸ σχῆμα τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ’ ἡ ῥοπή· σῶμα οὐ μόνον ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν ὁμοίου τινὸς οὐχ ἕξει πῇ κλιθῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐν κύκλῳ περιτεθὲν ὁποίῳ τινὶ οὐχ ἕξει τῆς ἐπί τι κλίσεως αἰτίαν, «εἴτ’ ἴωσιν πρὸς ἠῶ τ’ ἠέλιόν τε, εἴτ’ ἐπ’ ἀριστερά» [Hom. Il. 12.239–240], εἴτε πρόσω εἴτ’ ὀπίσω. | 8.9 for shape is not the cause of circular motion for things that move in a straight line, but rather weight/inclination (rhopē); a body placed not only in the middle of a uniform medium will have no inclination where to lean, but placed in a circle of any sort will have no cause for inclination toward any side, 'whether they go toward the east and the sun, or toward the left' [Hom. Il. 12.239–240], or forward or backward. |
| 8.10 ἔτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἐξωσθεῖσι τῶν οἰκείων τόπων παρέχει τὸ κινεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀφ’ αὑτῶν ἡ πρὸς τούτους ἀναφορά· τῷ πέμπτῳ δὲ ἐκείνῳ, μηδέποτε ἐκβαίνοντι τῶν αὐτοῦ τόπων, μένειν ἂν προσήκοι. | 8.10 Furthermore, for the other bodies, when forced out of their proper places, their return to these places provides the cause for moving again of themselves; but for that fifth body, which never departs from its own places, it would be proper to remain at rest. |
| 8.11 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ὑπεξαιρουμένου τοῦ πέμπτου, φαίνεται φιλονεικῶν Ἀριστοτέλη μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν Πλάτωνι. ζητήσαντος γὰρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰ ἔστι φύσει βαρὺ σῶμα ἢ φύσει κοῦφον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω σχέσιν ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι, σκεψαμένου εἴτε ἐστί τι κάτω φύσει καὶ ἄνω, εἴτε μή, καὶ ἀποδείξαντος ἀκριβῶς ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰς τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς τοὺς τόπους οἰκειότητας τὸ κάτω λέγοιτο ἑκάστοις ἐφ’ ὃ φέροιντο, ἄνω δὲ ἑκάστοις τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀφ’ οὗ ἀναχωροῖεν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν σχέσιν καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον διανείμαντος καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ἀποδείξαντος ὅτι μήτε τὸ μέσον μήτε τὸ πέριξ αὐτῶν εὔλογον ἄνω τι ἢ κάτω λέγεσθαι· | 8.11 And concerning the other bodies, even excluding the fifth, Aristotle clearly contentious strives not to say the same things as Plato. For when Plato investigated whether there is a body heavy by nature or light by nature, and since these were said according to their relationship to 'up' and 'down,' having examined whether there is anything 'down' or 'up' by nature or not, and having demonstrated precisely that according to the affinity of bodies for their proper places, 'down' is said for each relative to where they are naturally carried, and 'up' relative to the foreign place from which they depart, and having assigned 'heavy' and 'light' according to that same relation, and in addition to this having demonstrated that it is unreasonable for either the center or the perimeter of them to be called 'up' or 'down' absolutely— |
| 8.12 ὅδε ἀντιτίθησι, πανταχόθεν καταβάλλειν δεῖν ἡγούμενος τὰ ἐκείνου, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενον βαρὺ λέγειν βιάζεται, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πέριξ κοῦφον· καὶ τὸν μὲν τόπον τὸν ἐν μέσῳ κάτω φησί, τὸν δὲ πέριξ ἄνω.» | 8.12 this man opposes him, thinking he must overthrow Plato's views from all sides, and forces himself to call that which moves toward the center 'heavy,' and that which moves toward the perimeter 'light'; and he says the place in the middle is 'down,' and the perimeter 'up.'" |
| 8.13 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν κόσμου, καὶ ἐξ ὧν οὗτος, καὶ τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστήκατον. ταῦτα μὲν οἵδε. Μώσης δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια τούτων οὐδὲν πολυπραγμονεῖ· καὶ εἰκότως, ὅτι μηδὲ πρὸς βίου κατόρθωσιν τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἀσχολουμένοις λυσιτελεῖν ἐνομίσθη. | 8.13 So far apart stand they from one another concerning the universe, and the elements from which it is composed, and celestial matters. Such are the views of these men. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews meddle in none of these things—and reasonably so, because occupation with such matters was not considered to contribute anything toward the right ordering of life. |
Chapter 9
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Atticus criticizing Aristotle's doctrine of the soul (psychē):
The Centrality of Immortality in Platonism (9.1–9.5): Plato's whole philosophical system (ethics, physics, epistemology) relies on the immortality and divinity of the soul. Ethics relies on the soul's divine capacity for virtue; physics relies on the soul managing and directing matter; epistemology relies on learning being recollection (anamnēsis). Stripping the soul of immortality destabilizes Platonism entirely.
Aristotle’s Critique and Dicaearchus (9.6–9.12): Aristotle, far from honoring the soul as Plato did (as an unbegotten principle and divine ruler), stripped it of all independent existence, self-motion, and primary operations—denying that the soul itself deliberates, remembers, or thinks, attributing those actions instead to the composite human being (ho anthrōpos) while treating the soul as inert. This led his pupil Dicaearchus to abolish the existence of the soul altogether.
The "Active Intellect" (Nous) Ambiguity (9.13–9.14): Atticus dismisses Aristotle’s claim that the intellect (nous) is divine and immortal. He compares Aristotle’s obscure descriptions of nous entering from the outside (epeiskrinomenos) to a cuttlefish (sēpia) squirting ink to hide from criticism. Furthermore, while Plato held that nous cannot exist apart from soul, Aristotle separated nous from the soul, granting immortality only to an isolated intellect while leaving the individual soul to perish with the body.
| 9.1 «Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τί καὶ λέγοιμεν ἄν; δῆλα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη σχεδὸν καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἅπασιν, ὅτι Πλάτων μὲν ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολείπει, καὶ πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου λόγους πεποίηται, ποικίλως καὶ παντοίως ἀποδεικνὺς ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή. | 9.1 "Concerning the soul, what indeed can we say? For these things are plain not only to philosophers, but by now almost to all ordinary people as well: that Plato leaves the soul immortal, and has composed many arguments concerning this, demonstrating in various and manifold ways that the soul is immortal. |
| 9.2 πολλὴ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐσπουδακόσι περὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἡ φιλοτιμία γέγονε, συναγωνιζομένοις τῷ τε δόγματι καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὸ συνέχον τὴν πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν τἀνδρὸς τοῦτ’ ἔστιν. | 9.2 And great ambition has arisen among those who have devoted themselves to Plato's works, contending together in support of the doctrine and of Plato. For this is virtually the binding core of the man's entire school of thought. |
| 9.3 ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἠθικῶν δογμάτων ὑπόθεσις ἐπηκολούθησε τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίᾳ, τὸ μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν καὶ νεανικὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖον σῶσαι δυνηθείσης, τά τε τῆς φύσεως πράγματα πάντα κατὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διοίκησιν ἔσχε τὸ καλῶς διοικεῖσθαι δύνασθαι. | 9.3 For the foundational premise of his ethical doctrines follows upon the immortality of the soul—because the grand, brilliant, and vigorous quality of virtue was able to be saved through the soul's divine nature; and all the affairs of physics obtained their capacity to be governed well in accordance with the soul's administration. |
| 9.4 «ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσα,» φησί, «παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ ἄλλοτ’ ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γινομένη.» [Plat. Phaedr. 246b] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς σοφίας εἰς τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνῆπται τῷ Πλάτωνι. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως οἴεται δύνασθαι σώζεσθαι καὶ ζήτησιν καὶ μάθησιν, ἐξ ὧν ἐπιστήμη γίνεται. | 9.4 'For all soul,' he says, 'cares for all that is inanimate, and traverses the whole heaven, coming to be in different forms at different times.' [Plat. Phaedr. 246b]. Furthermore, the concerns of knowledge and wisdom are tied by Plato to the immortality of the soul. For all learning is recollection, and he thinks that neither inquiry nor learning—from which knowledge arises—can otherwise be preserved. |
| 9.5 εἰ δὲ μή ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, οὐδὲ ἀνάμνησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ μάθησις. πάντων οὖν τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων ἀτεχνῶς ἐξηρτημένων καὶ ἐκκρεμαμένων τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν θειότητός τε καὶ ἀθανασίας, ὁ μὴ συγχωρῶν τοῦτο τὴν πᾶσαν ἀνατρέπει φιλοσοφίαν Πλάτωνος. | 9.5 And if the soul is not immortal, neither is recollection. And if not this, neither is learning. Therefore, since all of Plato's doctrines are absolutely dependent upon and suspended from the divinity and immortality of the soul, he who does not grant this overturns the entire philosophy of Plato. |
| 9.6 τίς οὖν ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἐγχειρήσας ἀντιτάξασθαι ἀποδείξεσι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀφελέσθαι τῆς ἀθανασίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πάσης δυνάμεως; τίς δ’ ἕτερος πρὸ Ἀριστοτέλους; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ἐπιδιαμένειν συνεχώρησαν, οἱ δ’, εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο, δύναμίν γε ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ κίνησίν τινα καὶ ἔργα καὶ πράξεις ἀπένειμαν τῇ ψυχῇ· | 9.6 Who, then, is the first who attempted to set himself in opposition to these proofs, and to strip the soul of immortality and of all its other power? Who else before Aristotle? For among the others, some conceded that it survives, and others, even if not that, assigned to the soul at least a power in the body, a certain movement, works, and actions. |
| 9.7 ὁ δέ, ὅσῳπερ Πλάτων ἀπεσέμνυνε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρᾶγμα, ἀρχὴν γενέσεως καὶ θεοῦ παίδευμα καὶ τῶν ἁπάντων προστάτιν ἀποφηνάμενος, τοσῷδε ἐφιλονείκησε καθελεῖν καὶ ἀτιμάσαι καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν μηδὲν ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχήν. | 9.7 But he [Aristotle], to the same degree that Plato exalted the matter of the soul—declaring it to be the principle of generation, the pupil of God, and the ruler of all things—so zealously strove to pull down, dishonor, and reduce the soul to virtually nothing! |
| 9.8 οὔτε γὰρ πνεῦμα οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε ὅλως σῶμα, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀσώματον, οἷον εἶναί τε ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀκίνητον εἶναι καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄψυχον. οἷον γὰρ τόδε ἐτόλμησεν, ἢ καὶ ἀπηναγκάσθη, ὡς καὶ τὰς πρωτουργοὺς κινήσεις ἀφελέσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, τὸ διανοηθῆναι, τὸ προσδοκῆσαι, τὸ μνημονεῦσαι, τὸ λογίσασθαι; | 9.8 For he claims it is neither spirit, nor fire, nor body at all—nor even incorporeal in such a way as to exist by itself and move, nor even as much as to be motionless upon the body and, so to speak, inanimate! For what a daring thing he attempted (or was compelled to do), so as to strip even its primary motions from the soul: deliberating, thinking, expecting, remembering, reasoning! |
| 9.9 οὐ γὰρ ψυχῆς ταῦτά φησι τὰ κινήματα ὁ τῆς φύσεως, ὥς φασι, γραμματεύς. πάνυ γοῦν οὗτός ἐστι πιστός, ὡς συνεικέναι τι περὶ τῶν ἐκτός, ὁ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς τοσοῦτον διημαρτηκὼς ὡς μηδ’ ὅτι διανοεῖται παρακολουθεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνεργῶν, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἀκίνητος. [cf. Aristot. De An. 408b] | 9.9 For this 'scribe of nature'—as they call him—says these are not movements of the soul! Surely he is very trustworthy to understand anything about external things, who has so completely missed the mark regarding his own soul as not even to comprehend that he is thinking! For he says it is not the soul, but the human being who performs each of these acts, while the soul itself is motionless. [cf. Aristot. De An. 408b] |
| 9.10 τούτῳ τοιγαροῦν ἑπόμενος Δικαίαρχος, καὶ τἀκόλουθον ἱκανὸς ὢν θεωρεῖν, ἀνῄρηκε τὴν ὅλην ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀφανές ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ δῆλον, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν διά γε τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνέργειαν δοίημεν εἶναι ψυχήν· αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὐτῆς ἀφανοῦς οὔσης ἀναγκάζειν ἡμᾶς δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖν. | 9.10 Following him, therefore, Dicaearchus—being capable of perceiving the logical consequence—abolished the whole real existence (hypostasis) of the soul. For that the soul is something invisible and unseen is clear, so that we would not grant that the soul exists merely on account of sensory activity; but its movements, invisible though it is, seem to compel us to confess that the soul is something. |
| 9.11 ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπας τις συνιέναι δοκεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ καθ’ ὃν δήποτε τρόπον διανοεῖσθαι. ὅταν γὰρ ἴδωμεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰς τούτου δυνάμεις καὶ ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνεργείας, ὡς οὐ σώματος [οὔσας], δίδομεν εἶναί τι ἐν ἡμῖν ἕτερον τὸ βουλευόμενον· τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. ἐπεὶ πόθεν ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπιστεύσαμεν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς; | 9.11 For these things everyone seems to understand as belonging to the soul: deliberating, considering, and thinking in whatever manner. For whenever we see the body and its powers, and consider such activities as not belonging to the body, we grant that there is something else within us that deliberates—and that this is the soul. For from what other source did we come to believe concerning the soul? |
| 9.12 ἂν οὖν τις ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ψυχὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα ἀφελόμενος ἑτέρῳ τινὶ προσάψῃ πράγματι, οὔτε ὅθεν οὖσα ἐμφαίνεται καταλέλοιπεν οὔτε ὅ τι χρήσιμος ἂν εἶναι δοκοίη. τίς οὖν ἡ βοήθεια τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι θέλοντι παρὰ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποκτιννύντος; τίς δὲ ἡ διδασκαλία τοῦ τρόπου τῆς κινήσεως, καθ’ ὃν αὐτοκίνητον αὐτήν φαμεν, παρὰ τῶν μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτῇ κίνησιν νεμόντων; | 9.12 If someone, then, taking away these very things by which the soul most reveals itself, attaches them to some other entity, he leaves neither the basis from which its existence is revealed, nor anything for which it might seem useful! What help, then, is there for one who wishes the soul to be immortal from the man who slays the soul? And what teaching is there concerning the mode of its motion—according to which we call it self-moving—from those who do not grant it motion in any way at all? |
| 9.13 ναί· ἀλλὰ κατά γε τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ νοῦ φήσαι τις ἂν αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν Πλάτωνι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πᾶσαν βούλεται τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τόν γε νοῦν ὁμολογεῖ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι. τίς μὲν οὖν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁ νοῦς, ὅθεν ὤν, καὶ πόθεν ἐπεισκρινόμενος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ποῦ πάλιν ἀπαλλαττόμενος, αὐτὸς ἂν εἰδείη· εἰ γέ τι συνίησιν ὧν λέγει περὶ τοῦ νοῦ, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄπορον τοῦ πράγματος τῷ ἀσαφεῖ τοῦ λόγου περιστέλλων ἐξίσταται τὸν ἔλεγχον, ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ δυσθήρευτον ἐκ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ ποριζόμενος. | 9.13 Yes—but regarding the immortality of the Intellect (Nous), someone might say that he shares Plato's view! For even if he does not wish the entire soul to be immortal, he confesses that the Intellect is divine and imperishable. Now, what the Intellect is in its essence and nature, whence it comes, from where it enters into human beings from outside, and where it departs again—he himself might know! That is, if he understands anything of what he says about the Intellect, and is not merely dodging refutation by shielding the difficulty of the subject with the obscurity of his language—like cuttlefish procuring hard-to-catch status from the darkness! |
|
9.14
πάντως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαφέρεται Πλάτωνι. ὁ μὲν γάρ φησι νοῦν ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι συνίστασθαι, ὁ δὲ χωρίζει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν. καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὁ μὲν μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῷ δίδωσιν, ὡς ἄλλως οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁ δέ φησιν αὐτῷ μόνῳ χωριζομένῳ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο περιγίνεσθαι. καὶ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἐκβαίνειν, ὅτι Πλάτωνι τοῦτο ἤρεσε, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἀπορρήγνυσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἠνάγκασεν, ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἔγνω Πλάτων τὸ τοιοῦτο.»
Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀττικός. συνάψω δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ Πλωτίνου τόνδ’ ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον· |
9.14
At any rate, even in these matters he differs from Plato. For Plato says it is impossible for Intellect to subsist without soul, whereas Aristotle separates Intellect from soul. And as for immortality, Plato grants it to Intellect along with the soul (as not being possible otherwise), whereas Aristotle says this belongs to Intellect alone when separated from the soul. And while he did not deem it right for the soul to depart from the body—because this pleased Plato—he forced the Intellect to break off from the soul, because Plato judged such a thing impossible."
Such are the statements of Atticus. And I shall join to them also those of Plotinus, which are of the following character: |
Chapter 10
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plotinus (Enneads IV.7.8.5) arguing against the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the entelechy (the actualization/form) of an organic body:
Inadequacy of Physical Form (10.1–10.3): If the soul were simply the form of a composite body—like the shape of a statue impressed on bronze—it would divide when the body divides, fail to withdraw during sleep, and preclude internal conflict between reason and desire. Under such a model, only sensation might occur, making it impossible to account for rational thought (noēsis).
Failure Across Soul Faculties (10.4–10.7): Neither the rational, sensory, nor vegetative faculties fit the definition of an inseparable entelechy. Memory holds impressions without the physical object; desires exist for things unrelated to bodily needs; and in plants, the life-force condenses into the roots or seeds and expands outward, demonstrating independence from the fixed whole of the physical mass.
Substantiality and True Being of the Soul (10.8–10.9): Because soul can transition between different living bodies (in transmigration/metamorphosis), its existence does not depend on being anchored in one body. Body does not generate soul. Rather, soul is a true immaterial substance (ousia), whereas bodies belong merely to the realm of physical becoming (genesis), deriving temporary existence through participation in true Being.
| 10.1 «Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὧδ’ ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται· τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἴδους τάξιν ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος, οὐδὲ ᾗ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ, ὀργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. | 10.1 "Now one might examine the concept of 'entelechy'—how it is spoken of regarding the soul: that the soul holds the rank of form in the composite living being relative to the ensouled body as matter—not as form of just any body, nor qua body, but of a natural, organic body having life potentially. |
| 10.2 εἰ μὲν οὖν ᾗ παραβέβληται ὡμοίωται, ὡς μορφὴ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς χαλκόν· καὶ διαιρουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἀποκοπτομένου τινὸς μέρους μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκοπέντος ψυχῆς μόριον εἶναι, τήν τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀναχώρησιν μὴ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ δεῖ προσφυᾶ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν οὗ ἐστιν εἶναι· τῷ δ’ ἀληθεῖ μηδὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι. | 10.2 If, then, it resembles that to which it is compared—like the shape of a statue relative to the bronze—then as the body is divided, the soul would be divided along with it; and when a part is cut off, a fraction of soul would remain with the severed portion; nor would there be any withdrawal during sleep, if indeed the entelechy must be attached to that of which it is the entelechy—or in truth, sleep could not even occur! |
| 10.3 καὶ μὴν ἐντελεχείας οὔσης, οὐδὲ ἐναντίωσιν λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν· ἓν δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν δι’ ὅλου πεπονθέναι τὸ πᾶν οὐ διαφωνοῦν ἑαυτῷ. αἰσθήσεις δὲ μόνον δυνατὸν ἴσως γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ νοήσεις ἀδύνατον. διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλην ψυχὴν τὸν νοῦν εἰσάγουσιν, ὃν ἀθάνατον τίθενται. | 10.3 Furthermore, if it were an entelechy, there could be no opposition of reason against desire; for the whole would suffer one and the same affection throughout, not being in discord with itself. Sensation alone might perhaps be possible, but rational thoughts (noēseis) would be impossible. Which is why they themselves introduce another soul—the Intellect (Nous)—which they declare to be immortal. |
| 10.4 τὴν οὖν λογιζομένην νῦν ψυχὴν ἄλλως ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὐδ’ ἡ αἰσθητική, εἴπερ καὶ αὕτη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρα ἕξει· εἰ δὲ μή, οὕτως ἐνέσονται ὡς μορφαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες· ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δέχεσθαι, εἰ οὕτως ἐνεῖεν. οὐκ ἄρα οὖσα ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. | 10.4 It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which now reasons be an entelechy in some other sense than this manner, if one must use this term at all. Nor can the sensory soul—if indeed it retains impressions of sensible objects when they are absent—retain them along with the body; otherwise, they would reside within like physical forms and images, but it is impossible to receive them in any other way if they resided in that manner. Therefore, it is not an inseparable entelechy. |
| 10.5 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν μὴ σιτίων, μηδὲ ποτῶν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλων παρὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν, μήποτε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐντελέχεια ἀχώριστος ᾖ. | 10.5 Furthermore, not even the desiring part—when desiring things other than food or drink, but things distinct from bodily needs—is itself an inseparable entelechy. It remains, then, that the vegetative part might seem to present a question as to whether it might, after this manner, be an inseparable entelechy. |
| 10.6 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ παντὸς φυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν, καὶ αὐξανομένου τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κάτω ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν φυτῶν, ἡ ψυχὴ δηλονότι ἀπολιποῦσα τὰ ἄλλα μέρη εἰς ἕν τι συνεστάλη· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐστὶ πρὶν αὐξηθῆναι τὸ φυτὸν ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὄγκῳ. | 10.6 Yet not even this appears to be the case. For if the principle of every plant is centered around the root, and when the rest of the body grows and extends downwards in many plants, the soul clearly leaves the other parts and shrinks into one single place—therefore, it was not in the whole as an inseparable entelechy! For again, before the plant grows, the soul resides in a tiny mass. |
| 10.7 εἰ οὖν καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον ἔρχεται ἐκ μείζονος φυτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου ἐπὶ πᾶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ὅλως χωρίζεσθαι; πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ ἀμερὴς οὖσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο μεριστή; ἥ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου ζῴου ἄλλο γίνεται· πῶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἑνός; | 10.7 If, then, it enters into a tiny space from a larger plant, and expands from a small space into the whole, what prevents it from separating entirely? And how could that which is impartible become a partible entelechy of a partible body? Furthermore, the same soul comes to be another creature from a previous one; how then could the soul of the former become that of the next, if it were the entelechy of a single individual? |
| 10.8 φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζῴων εἰς ἄλλα ζῷα. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναί τινος τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐσία, οὐ παρὰ τὸ ἐν σώματι ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ’ οὖσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι, οἷον ζῴου, οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γεννήσει. | 10.8 This is evident from creatures that transform into other creatures. Therefore, the soul does not possess its being by virtue of being the form of something, but it is an essence (ousia)—receiving its existence not from being established in a body, but existing prior to becoming a body (such as that of a living creature); body will not generate soul! |
|
10.9
τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα μήτε πάθος σώματος, πρᾶξις δὲ καὶ ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὐσία παρὰ τὰ σώματα οὖσα, ποία τίς ἐστιν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἥν φαμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσία, πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν εἶναι λέγοιτ’ ἄν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν, μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος σωζόμενον, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνῃ.»
Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ Πλωτίνου διήλθομεν, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον καὶ τὰ Πορφυρίου ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Βόηθον περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρημένα· |
10.9
What, then, is its essence? If it is neither body nor an affection of body, but activity and production, with many things residing both in it and originating from it—being an essence apart from bodies—what sort of essence is it? Is it not clear that it is that which we call True Substance (ontōs ousia)? For all that is corporeal may be said to be becoming (genesis), but not substance—coming to be and perishing, never truly existing, but preserved through participation in True Being, to whatever extent it may participate in it."
And since we have traversed the writings of Plotinus, it is not out of place to inspect also the statements made by Porphyry in his work Against Boethus On the Soul: |
Chapter 11
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Porphyry’s treatise Against Boethus On the Soul, delivering a targeted critique of Aristotle's definition of the soul as an immobile entelechy alongside rival physicalist views:
Inadequacy of an Immobile Entelechy (11.1): Porphyry argues that if the soul were completely motionless, it could not account for divine inspiration (enthousiasmos), prophetic foresight, or internal mental acts (deliberations, thoughts, and wills) that originate within the soul rather than the body.
Analogy of Presence and Illumination (11.2–11.3): Comparing the soul to physical qualities like weight misrepresents its true status. The soul animating a body is like fire heating water or the sun illuminating air: the resulting quality in the body (empsychia, warmth, light) is merely an effect (presence), not the animating principle itself.
Critique of Materialist Theories (11.4): Porphyry dismisses competing physicalist views—such as the soul being a spirit (pneuma), a "smart fire" forged by air cooling, an aggregate of atoms, or a body-generated phenomenon—as disgraceful. Echoing Plato’s Laws, he rejects any theory that derives soul from matter, affirming instead that the soul is a self-moving substance (autokinētos ousia).
| 11.1 «Πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐντελέχειαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπόντα καὶ ἀκίνητον παντελῶς οὖσαν κινεῖν ὑπειληφότα ῥητέον, πόθεν οἱ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ τοῦ ζῴου μηδὲν μὲν συνιέντος ὧν ὁρᾷ τε καὶ λέγει, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ μὴ ἐνεστὸς βλεπούσης καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ κινουμένης, πόθεν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου συστάσεως αἱ τῆς ὡς ζῴου ψυχῆς βουλαί τε καὶ σκέψεις καὶ θελήσεις, ῥοπαὶ οὖσαι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οὐ τοῦ σώματος;» | 11.1 "In reply to him who declared the soul to be an entelechy and conceived it as imparting motion while being entirely motionless itself, we must ask: whence come the ecstatic possessions of the living creature when it understands nothing of what it sees and speaks, while the soul beholds both the future and that which is not present, moving in uniform fashion? And whence, in the constitution of the living creature, arise the counsels, considerations, and volitions of the soul qua living creature—which are inclinations belonging to the soul and not to the body? |
| 11.2 Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Τὸ δὲ βαρύτητι ἀπεικάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ποιότησι μονοειδέσι καὶ ἀκινήτοις σωματικαῖς, καθ’ ἃς ἢ κινεῖται ἢ ποιόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐκπεπτωκότος ἦν τέλεον ἢ ἑκόντος ἢ ἄκοντος τῆς ψυχικῆς ἀξίας, καὶ οὐδαμῶς καθεωρακότος ὡς παρουσίᾳ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωτικὸν γέγονε τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, ὡς πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμὸν τὸ παρακείμενον ὕδωρ, ψυχρὸν ὂν καθ’ ἑαυτό· καὶ ἡλίου ἀνατολῇ πεφώτισται τὸ γοῦν αἰθέριον φῶς καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, σκοτεινὸς ὢν ἄνευ τῆς τούτου ἐκλάμψεως. | 11.2 Then next he adds: 'To liken the soul to weight or to uniform and immobile bodily qualities—according to which the underlying subject either moves or is qualified—belongs to someone who has fallen completely away (whether willingly or unwillingly) from the dignity of the soul, and who has in no way perceived that the body of the living creature becomes living by the presence of the soul, just as nearby water becomes hot by the presence of fire (being cold of itself), and the air is illuminated by the rising of the sun, being dark without its radiance. |
| 11.3 ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἡ θέρμη τοῦ ὕδατος ἡ θερμότης ἦν τοῦ πυρὸς οὔτε τὸ πῦρ, οὔτε τὸ ἐναέριον φῶς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἐμψυχία—ἥτις ἔοικε τῇ βαρύτητι καὶ τῇ περὶ σῶμα ποιότητι—ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι καταταχθεῖσα, δι’ ἣν καὶ πνοῆς τινος ζωτικῆς μετέσχε τὸ σῶμα.» | 11.3 Yet neither was the warmth in the water the heat of the fire, nor was it the fire itself; nor is the light in the air the light of the sun itself. In like manner, neither is the ensouled state (empsychia) of the body—which resembles weight and physical qualities—the actual soul stationed within the body, through which the body comes to participate in a certain vital breath.' |
|
11.4
Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς μεθ’ ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει·
«Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὅσα περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήκασιν ἄλλοι αἰσχύνην ἡμῖν φέρει. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ; πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνης γέμων ὁ πνεῦμά πως ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἀποδιδούς, ἢ πῦρ νοερόν, τῇ περιψύξει καὶ οἷον βαφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομωθέν, ὅ τε ἀτόμων ἄθροισμα θεὶς ἢ ὅλως ἀπὸ σώματος αὐτὴν γεννᾶσθαι ἀποφαινόμενος;»
ὃν δὴ λόγον ἐν Νόμοις [Plat. Leg. 10.889a] ἀσεβῆ εἶναι ἀπεφήνατο. αἰσχύνης οὖν πάντες οὗτοι πλήρεις λόγοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ λέγοντι «αὐτοκίνητον οὐσίαν» οὐκ ἄν τις, φησίν, αἰσχυνθείη. |
11.4
Then next, after other matters, he adds:
'All the other things, then, that others have said about it bring us shame! For how is that doctrine not shameful which sets down the soul as an entelechy of a natural, organic body? And how is that account not full of shame which defines it as having the nature of spirit (pneuma), or as an intellectual fire ignited or tempered by the chilling and dipping-like action of the air, or that which sets it down as a collection of atoms, or in general asserts that it is generated from body?'
A doctrine which Plato in the Laws [10.889a] declared to be impious! Therefore, all these accounts are full of shame; but concerning the one who calls the soul 'a self-moving substance' (autokinētos ousia), one would not, he says, be ashamed!" |
Chapter 12
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Atticus criticizing Aristotle's division of causality and denial of a single cosmic soul:
Platonic Cosmic Soul vs. Aristotelian Division (12.1–12.2): Plato held that a rational soul permeates all things, governs the cosmos, and is identical with Nature (physis), guaranteeing that all things occur according to divine providence (pronoia). Aristotle rejects this unified view, dividing causality into separate realms: fate (heimarmenē) for celestial matters, nature (physis) for the sublunary realm, and human prudence/soul for human affairs.
Necessity of a Single Governing Power (12.3): Atticus argues that without a single ensouled power traversing, binding, and holding the universe together, the cosmos cannot be governed well or rationally. Viewing the cosmos as ordered without a unifying soul is as foolish as expecting a city to thrive without political unity.
Arbitrary Terminology without Substance (12.4): Aristotle admits that the principle of motion governs all things, yet refuses to call this principle "soul." Even though he attributes the rational design of "doing nothing in vain" to Nature (which is properly the work of a wise soul), he refuses Nature the title of "soul"—foolishly relying on nominal labels rather than actual powers.
| 12.1 «Ἔτι τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος τὴν ψυχὴν διακοσμεῖν τὰ πάντα διήκουσαν διὰ πάντων, καὶ ταύτην ὑφ’ ἧς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ διοικεῖσθαι συγχωροῖεν ἂν ἕκαστα, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἢ ψυχήν, καὶ δηλονότι ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλογον, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συνάγοντος ὅτι πάντα κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται, εἴ γε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· πρὸς οὐδὲν τούτων ἡμῖν Ἀριστοτέλους ὁμολογεῖ. | 12.1 "Furthermore, while Plato states that the soul orders all things, pervading through all things—and that this is the very power by which all other thinkers would grant individual things are governed, Nature being nothing other than soul (and clearly a soul that is not irrational), concluding from these premises that all things happen according to Providence if indeed they happen according to Nature—Aristotle agrees with us on none of these points! |
| 12.2 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ψυχήν, καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆν ὑπὸ μὲν φύσεως διοικεῖσθαι. εἶναι γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων αἰτίαν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὑποτίθησι, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σελήνην τὴν φύσιν, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων φρόνησιν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ ψυχήν· τὸ μὲν γλαφυρὸν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαιρέσεσι παρεχόμενος, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐ συνορῶν. | 12.2 For he claims that Nature is not soul, and that earthly affairs are governed merely by nature. For he posits different and distinct causes for each set of things: laying down Fate as the cause for celestial entities, Nature for sublunary things, and human prudence, foresight, and soul for human affairs—offering a subtle ingenuity in such divisions, while failing to observe what is necessary. |
| 12.3 εἰ γὰρ μὴ μία τις εἴη δύναμις ἔμψυχος διήκουσα διὰ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πάντα συνδοῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα, οὔτ’ ἂν εὐλόγως τὸ πᾶν οὔτε καλῶς διοικούμενον εἶναι δύναιτο. τῆς δ’ αὐτῆς ἦν ἄρα ἀβλεψίας καὶ πόλιν ἐλπίσαι ποτὲ καλῶς χωρὶς ἑνώσεως διαγενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε ἡγήσασθαι πάγκαλον τῷ λόγῳ διαφυλάξειν, οἷόν περ φαίνεται, μὴ συνδήσαντα καὶ συναρμόσαντα ἑνός τινος ὁμοίου κοινωνίᾳ. | 12.3 For if there were not a single ensouled power pervading through the entirety of things, binding all together and sustaining them, the universe could be governed neither rationally nor beautifully. Indeed, it belongs to the very same blindness to hope that a city could ever endure in good order without unity, and to suppose that this whole universe could maintain its absolute beauty of structure (such as it appears to be) without having bound and fitted it together by communion with a single like principle! |
| 12.4 καὶ τοιοῦτον μέν τι πρᾶγμα τὸ διοικοῦν ἕκαστα εἶναί φησιν, οἷον ἀρχὴν εἶναι κινήσεως, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ψυχὴν οὐ βούλεται· καίτοι καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι τοῖς κινουμένοις ἅπασιν ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἡ ψυχή. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἔργον εἴη ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ φρονίμου τὸ μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ἀνατίθησι τῇ φύσει, τοῦ δὲ ὀνόματος αὐτῇ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ μεταδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων, τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβανομένων.» | 12.4 And while he asserts that the thing governing each entity is of such a nature as to be the principle of motion, he refuses to acknowledge that this principle is soul—even though Plato himself demonstrates that for all things moved, the soul is the principle and fountainhead of motion! And that work which would belong properly to a rational and wise soul—namely, doing nothing in vain—he assigns instead to Nature, yet does not share with Nature the name of 'soul,' as though things were defined by their names rather than by their inherent powers!" |
Chapter 13
In Praeparatio Evangelica 15.13, Eusebius quotes Atticus criticizing Aristotle's total rejection of Plato's Theory of Forms (Ideas), before transitioning into a historical sketch of the Stoic lineage:
Aristotle’s Rejection of the Forms (13.1–13.4): Atticus accuses Aristotle of desecrating the highest pinnacle of Platonism—the realm of intelligible and eternal Forms—by relying on his own earthly, petty sharpness. Incapable of beholding true Being, Aristotle dared to call the highest realities "drivel, twaddle, and nonsense" (lēroi, teretismata, phlyaria). Yet the Forms remain the essential foundation of Platonic ethics, physics, and epistemology; removing them destroys the core of Plato’s system.
The Forms as Divine Thoughts and Archetypes (13.5): Plato understood God as the Father, Craftsman, and Ruler who looks to eternal, incorporeal paradigms—His own eternal thoughts—when shaping the material world. True knowledge, wisdom, and human beatitude consist in contemplating these archetype Forms.
Transition to the Stoic Lineage (13.6–13.9): Concluding the excerpts from Atticus, Eusebius turns to the Stoic school. He traces their intellectual ancestry starting from Socrates to Antisthenes (who declared madness preferable to pleasure), to Diogenes the Cynic, to Crates, to Zeno of Citium (founder of Stoicism), down through Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and the subsequent Stoic heads known for their rigorous lives and logic.
| 13.1 «Tὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον καὶ τὸ κῦρος τῆς Πλάτωνος αἱρέσεως, ἡ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν διάταξις, ἠτίμασται καὶ προπεπηλάκισται καὶ παντοίως, τό γε ἐξὸν ἐπ’ Ἀριστοτέλει, περιύβρισται. οὐ γὰρ δυνάμενος ἐννοῆσαι διότι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ θεῖα καὶ περιττὰ τῶν πραγμάτων παραπλησίου τινὸς δυνάμεως εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν δεῖται, τῇ δ’ αὑτοῦ λεπτῇ καὶ ταπεινῇ δριμύτητι πιστεύων, ἥτις διαδῦναι μὲν τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πραγμάτων καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀλήθειαν ἰδεῖν ἐδύνατο, τῆς δ’ ὄντως ἀληθείας ἐποπτεῦσαι τὸ πεδίον οὐχ οἵα τε ἦν, αὑτῷ κανόνι καὶ κριτῇ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν χρησάμενος, ἀπέγνω τινὰς εἶναι ἰδίας φύσεις, οἵας Πλάτων ἔγνω, λήρους δὲ καὶ τερετίσματα καὶ φλυαρίας ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν τὰ τῶν ὄντων ἀνώτατα. | 13.1 "Now the chief head and supreme authority of Plato's school—the ordering of the intelligible realm—has been dishonored, dragged through the mud, and in every way (so far as lay in Aristotle's power) outrageously abused! For being unable to comprehend that great, divine, and extraordinary reality requires a power of like nature for its recognition, but trusting instead in his own petty and low sharpness—which was able to penetrate earthly affairs and discern the truth in them, yet was incapable of contemplating the plain of True Reality—he used himself as the ruler and judge of things above him, and denied that there exist certain distinct real natures such as Plato recognized; and he even dared to call the highest of all beings 'drivel, twaddle, and nonsense'! |
| 13.2 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄκρον τε καὶ ἔσχατον τῶν Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν νοητὴν ταύτην καὶ ἀίδιον οὐσίαν τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν, ἔνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος τῇ ψυχῇ πρόκειται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετασχὼν καὶ ἐφικόμενος αὐτῆς πάντως εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειφθεὶς καὶ ἀδυνατήσας θεωρὸς γενέσθαι πάντως ἄμοιρος εὐδαιμονίας καταλείπεται. | 13.2 Now the absolute summit and ultimate end of Plato's philosophical doctrines is this concerning the intelligible and eternal essence of the Ideas, wherein lies the ultimate struggle and labor laid before the soul. For he who participates in it and attains to it is in every way blessed; but he who falls short and is unable to become a spectator of it is left utterly devoid of beatitude. |
| 13.3 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Πλάτων τε πανταχῇ διαγωνίζεται, δεικνὺς τὴν ἰσχὺν τούτων τῶν φύσεων· οὔτε γὰρ ὧντινωνοῦν ἀποδοῦναί φησιν οἷόν τε εἶναι καλῶς, ἂν μὴ τούτων μεθέξῃ, οὔτε γνῶσίν τινος ἀληθοῦς, ἂν μὴ τῇ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀναφορᾷ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ λόγου μετέσεσθαί τισιν, εἰ μὴ τὴν τούτων οὐσίαν ὁμολογήσειαν· | 13.3 And on this account Plato contends everywhere, demonstrating the power of these natures; for he asserts that it is impossible to give a good account of any things whatsoever unless one participates in these, nor can there be true knowledge of anything except by reference to them; nor, indeed, can men participate in rational discourse unless they acknowledge the essence of these Forms. |
| 13.4 οἵ τ’ αὖ τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος συνιστάναι ἐγνωκότες τὸν πλεῖστον ἀγῶνα τῶν λόγων ἐν τούτῳ τίθενται πάνυ ἀναγκαίως. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ Πλατωνικὸν ἀπολείπεται, εἰ μὴ τὰς πρώτας καὶ ἀρχικωτάτας φύσεις ταύτας συγχωρήσεταί τις αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν οἷς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχει. | 13.4 And again, those who have resolved to defend Plato's doctrines place the greatest struggle of their arguments in this point out of sheer necessity. For nothing of Platonism remains left if one does not grant them these primary and most sovereign natures on Plato's behalf; for these are the very things in which he chiefly surpasses all others. |
| 13.5 νοήσας γὰρ θεὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν ἀπάντων πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν καὶ δεσπότην καὶ κηδεμόνα, καὶ γνωρίζων ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην πρότερον νοῆσαι τοῦτο ὃ μέλλει δημιουργήσειν, εἶθ’ οὕτω τῷ νοηθέντι κατόπιν ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων προσάγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα—ταὐτὸν δή, τὰ τοῦ θεὸν νοήματα πρεσβύτερα τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ τῶν γενομένων παραδείγματα, ἀσώματα καὶ νοητά, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα ἀεί, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρώτως αὐτὰ ὄντα, παραίτια δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἕκαστα οἷά περ ἐστί, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ ὁμοιότητα—συνιδὼν ὁ Πλάτων ὄντα οὐ ῥᾷστα ὀφθῆναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ σαφῶς δηλωθῆναι δυνάμενα, αὐτὸς ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν καὶ φρονῆσαι καὶ παρασκευάσαι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπακολουθήσειν πραγματευσάμενος ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὑτοῦ φιλοσοφίαν εἰς τοῦτο συνταξάμενος, περὶ ταῦτά φησι καὶ τὴν τούτων νόησιν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, δι’ ἧς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος καὶ ἡ μακαριστὴ βιοτὴ παραγίνεται.» | 13.5 For having conceived God as Father, Craftsman, Master, and Guardian over these things, and knowing from His works that the Artisan first conceives that which He is about to fashion, and only then brings the resemblance into material reality according to that concept—that is to say, that the thoughts of God are older than created things, being the incorporeal and intelligible archetypes of created things, existing always in the same state and manner, being themselves primary existences, and the secondary causes for all other things existing in such wise as each is by virtue of likeness to them—Plato, beholding that these things are not easily seen, nor indeed able to be clearly expressed in words, laboured as far as was possible to speak and think concerning them, and to prepare those who were to follow him, arranging his entire philosophy toward this end; and he asserts that true wisdom and knowledge are centered upon these Forms and the contemplation of them, through which the ultimate end of man and the blessed life are obtained.' |
| 13.6 Τοσαῦτα ὁ Ἀττικός. παρῆν δὲ καὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείω ἐκ τῆς δηλωθείσης παραθέσθαι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς γραφῆς· πλὴν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκτεθεῖσιν ἀρκεσθέντες μεταβησόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν. | 13.6 So far Atticus. And it was possible to set forth even more than these excerpts from the indicated writing of the man; nevertheless, being satisfied with what has been set out, we shall pass on to the school of the Stoics. |
| 13.7 Σωκράτους τοίνυν ἀκουστὴς ἐγένετο Ἀντισθένης, Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα, ὃς ἔφη τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς γνωρίμοις μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν. | 13.7 Now Antisthenes became a hearer of Socrates—a man Heracleitean in his disposition, who declared that it is better to go mad than to experience pleasure! Wherefore he exhorted his disciples never to stretch out so much as a finger for the sake of pleasure. |
| 13.8 τούτου δὲ ἀκουστὴς γέγονε Διογενὴς ὁ κύων, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς θηριωδέστατα φρονεῖν δόξας πολλοὺς ἐπηγάγετο. τοῦτον Κράτης διεδέξατο· Κράτητος δὲ ἐγένετο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁ τῆς τῶν Στωϊκῶν φιλοσόφων αἱρέσεως καταστὰς ἀρχηγός. | 13.8 And Diogenes the Dog [the Cynic] became a hearer of Antisthenes; and he himself, appearing to hold a most beast-like philosophy, attracted many followers. Crates succeeded him; and Zeno of Citium became a pupil of Crates, who established himself as the founder of the school of Stoic philosophers. |
| 13.9 Ζήνωνα δὲ Κλεάνθης διεδέξατο, Κλεάνθην δὲ Χρύσιππος, τοῦτον δὲ Ζήνων ὁ ἕτερος καὶ οἱ καθεξῆς. λέγονται δ’ οὗτοι πάντες διαφερόντως καὶ βίου στερροῦ καὶ διαλεκτικῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. τά γέ τοι τῆς κατ’ αὐτοὺς φιλοσοφίας δόγματα ὧδέ πως ἔχει· | 13.9 Cleanthes succeeded Zeno, Chrysippus succeeded Cleanthes, and Zeno the younger succeeded him, along with those who followed in sequence. And all these are said to have taken extraordinary care both of a rigorous life and of logic. At any rate, the doctrines of their philosophy are roughly as follows:" |
Chapter 14
In this chapter, Eusebius introduces the foundational cosmological principles (dogmata) of the Stoics:
Fire and Material Principles (14.1): Like Heraclitus, the Stoics posited fire as the primary element of all things. Like Plato, they divided principles into matter (hylē, the passive principle) and God (theos, the active principle). However, unlike Plato (who held that the primary active cause is incorporeal), the Stoics maintained that both the active (to poioun) and passive (to paschon) principles are physical bodies (sōmata).
Conflagration and Seminal Reasons (14.2): The universe undergoes periodic conflagrations (ekpyrōsis) according to fixed cycles of Fate, after which it is ordered anew. This primary fire contains the "seminal reasons" (logoi spermatikoi) and causes of all past, present, and future things.
Fate, Law, and Cosmic Order (14.2): The interconnection and sequence of these cause-principles constitute inexorable Fate (heimarmenē), Truth, and Law, by which the entire cosmos is perfectly governed, much like a well-ordered commonwealth (politeia).
| 14.1 «Στοιχεῖον εἶναί φασι τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ’ ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεόν, ὡς Πλάτων. ἀλλ’ οὗτος ἄμφω σώματά φησιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, ἐκείνου τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν αἴτιον ἀσώματον εἶναι λέγοντος. | 14.1 "They [the Stoics] say that the element of existing things is fire, just as Heraclitus did, and that its principles are matter and God, as Plato said. But this school asserts that both are bodies—both the active agent (to poioun) and the passive recipient (to paschon)—whereas Plato said that the primary active cause is incorporeal. |
| 14.2 ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ κατά τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους ἐκπυροῦσθαι τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, εἶτ’ αὖθις πάλιν διακοσμεῖσθαι. τὸ μέντοι πρῶτον πῦρ εἶναι καθαπερεί τι σπέρμα, τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων· τὴν δὲ τούτων ἐπιπλοκὴν καὶ ἀκολουθίαν εἱμαρμένην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ νόμον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἀδιάδραστόν τινα καὶ ἄφυκτον. ταύτῃ δὲ πάντα διοικεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον ὑπέρευ, καθάπερ ἐν εὐνομωτάτῃ τινὶ πολιτείᾳ.» | 14.2 And furthermore, according to certain fated periods of time, the entire cosmos undergoes conflagration, and is then ordered anew. Moreover, the primary fire is like a kind of seed, containing the rational principles (logoi) of all things and the causes of things past, present, and future. And the interconnection and sequence of these causes is Fate, Knowledge, Truth, and an inescapable and inevitable Law of existing things. By this law, all things throughout the cosmos are governed exceedingly well, just as in a most excellently ordered commonwealth." |
Chapter 15
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Arius Didymus's Epitome outlining core Stoic pantheism, cosmology, and theology:
Cosmic Pantheism & Definitions (15.1–15.4): The Stoics define the entire cosmos (and its individual parts) as God—a unified, finite, eternal, living entity with no internal void. The term "cosmos" is used in three senses: as God formed from all substance, as the physical system of heaven, air, earth, sea, and their inhabitants, or as the common home/city (politeia) of gods and humans.
Providence and Divine Names (15.5–15.6): Gods and humans share a fellowship (koinōnia) based on Reason (logos), which is Law by nature. All lower nature exists for their sake. God is called Zeus (as the cause of life), Fate (Heimarmenē, as unalterable causal sequence), Adrasteia (inecapable destiny), and Providence (Pronoia, as beneficial ordering).
Location of the Cosmic Ruling Center (Hēgemonikon) (15.7–15.8): Stoics differed on the seat of the cosmic mind: Cleanthes held it to be the Sun; others placed it in the Earth; Chrysippus identified it with the purest, most mobile Aether that drives the cosmic revolution.
Transitional Note (15.9): Eusebius closes the quotation from Arius Didymus and announces a return to Porphyry's Against Boethus On the Soul to further critique Stoic theology.
| 15.1 «Ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν· τοῦτον δὲ ἕνα μόνον εἶναί φασι καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ θεόν. ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ πάντα περιέχεσθαι τὰ σώματα, κενὸν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν αὐτῷ. τὸ γὰρ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην διάταξιν ἔχον. | 15.1 "They call the whole cosmos together with its own parts 'God'; and they say that this God is single and finite, a living being, eternal, and divine. For within this all bodies are contained, and there is no void within it. For that which is qualified out of all substance is called the cosmos, having such an arrangement according to its cosmic ordering. |
| 15.2 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν προτέραν ἀπόδοσιν ἀΐδιον τὸν κόσμον εἶναί φασι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν γεννητὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν κατὰ περιόδους ἀπείρους γεγονυίας τε καὶ ἐσομένας. | 15.2 Wherefore according to the former definition they say that the cosmos is eternal, but according to its cosmic ordering it is generated and subject to change according to infinite periods that have been and will be. |
| 15.3 καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πάσης οὐσίας ποιὸν κόσμον ἀΐδιον εἶναι καὶ θεόν· λέγεσθαι δὲ κόσμον σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσεων· λέγεσθαι δὲ κόσμον καὶ τὸ οἰκητήριον θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γενομένων. | 15.3 And the cosmos qualified out of all substance is eternal and God; but 'cosmos' is also spoken of as the system composed of heaven, air, earth, sea, and the natures within them; and 'cosmos' is further spoken of as the dwelling-place of gods and humans and of the things brought into being for their sake. |
| 15.4 ὃν γὰρ τρόπον πόλις λέγεται διχῶς, τό τε οἰκητήριον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνοικούντων σὺν τοῖς πολίταις σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων. | 15.4 For in the manner that 'city' is spoken of in two ways—both as the dwelling-place and as the system composed of its inhabitants together with the citizens—so also the cosmos is, as it were, a city composed of gods and humans, the gods holding the rulership and humans being subject to them. |
| 15.5 κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα γεγονέναι τούτων ἕνεκα. οἷς ἀκολούθως νομιστέον προνοεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντα θεόν, εὐεργετικὸν ὄντα καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον, δίκαιόν τε καὶ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετάς. | 15.5 And a fellowship exists between them on account of their sharing in Reason (logos), which is Law by nature; and all other things were brought into being for their sake. Consequently, one must consider that the God governing all things exercises providence over human beings, being beneficent, good, lover of humanity, righteous, and possessing all the virtues. |
| 15.6 διὸ δὴ καὶ Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιος ἡμῖν ἐστί. καθ’ ὅσον δὲ εἰρομένῳ λόγῳ πάντα διοικεῖ ἀπαραβάτως ἐξ ἀιδίου, προσονομάζεσθαι Εἱμαρμένην· Ἀδράστειαν δέ, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν· Πρόνοιαν δ’, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα. | 15.6 Wherefore also the cosmos is called Zeus, because he is the cause of life (zēn) for us. And insofar as he governs all things unalterably in a connected series from eternity, he is named Fate (Heimarmenē); and Adrasteia, because nothing is able to escape him; and Providence (Pronoia), because he dispenses each thing toward utility. |
| 15.7 ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρων ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πλεῖστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, ἡμέραν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ποιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὥρας. | 15.7 Now regarding the ruling center (hēgemonikon) of the cosmos, Cleanthes held that it was the sun, because it is the greatest of the stars and contributes most to the governance of all things, producing day and year and the other seasons. |
| 15.8 τισὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔδοξε γῆν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου. Χρυσίππῳ δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον, ἅτε πάντων εὐκινητότατον ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιάγοντα τοῦ κόσμου φοράν.» | 15.8 So to certain members of the school it seemed that the earth is the ruling center of the cosmos; but Chrysippus held it to be the purest and most unmixed Aether, inasmuch as it is the most easily moved of all things and drives the whole revolution of the cosmos." |
| 15.9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπιτομῆς Ἀρείου Διδύμου προκείσθω· πρὸς δὲ τὴν περὶ θεοῦ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξαν ἀπαρκεῖ παραθέσθαι τὰς Πορφυρίου λέξεις ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Βόηθον ἀντιγραφεῖσιν αὐτῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς τοῦτον ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον· | 15.9 Let these excerpts, then, be set forth from the Epitome of Arius Didymus; but to address the Stoic opinion concerning God, it suffices to set alongside them the words of Porphyry in those passages written by him against Boethus On the Soul, which run as follows: |
Chapter 16
In this chapter, Porphyry critiques the Stoic definition of God as an eternal "intellectual fire" (pyr noeron):
The Stoic Contradiction (16.1): The Stoics define God as eternal fire, yet assign to this fire the destructive, consuming properties of ordinary physical fire (tō hēmin synegnōsmēnōi). In doing so, they reject Aristotle’s doctrine of an incorruptible fifth element (aether) distinct from earthly fire.
Irrational Dogmatism (16.2): When challenged to explain how dynamic physical fire could remain eternal without consuming itself or requiring fuel, the Stoics offer no logical distinction for divine fire. Instead, they demand blind acceptance (alōgōi pistei), claiming that this fire undergoes cyclical extinguishing and rekindling while somehow remaining eternal. Porphyry concludes by dismissing their blind inconsistency and disdain for ancient philosophical rigor.
| 16.1 «Τὸν δὲ θεὸν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι πῦρ νοερὸν εἰπόντες ἀίδιον καταλείπειν, καὶ φθείρειν μὲν πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπινέμεσθαι, ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν πῦρ οἷον τὸ ἡμῖν συνεγνωσμένον, ἀντιλέγειν τε Ἀριστοτέλει, παραιτουμένῳ τὸν αἰθέρα ἐκ πυρὸς λέγειν τοιούτου. | 16.1 "They [the Stoics] do not hesitate, after calling God an 'intellectual fire,' to leave him as eternal, while simultaneously asserting that he destroys and consumes all things—treating this fire as if it were identical in nature to the ordinary fire familiar to us. Thus they gainsay Aristotle, who refused to describe the aether as consisting of such fire. |
| 16.2 ἀπαιτούμενοι δὲ πῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπιδιαμένει πῦρ, ἀλλοῖον μὲν πῦρ οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι, τὸ τοιοῦτον δ’ εἰπόντες καὶ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς εἰποῦσιν ἀξιώσαντες, τῇ ἀλόγῳ ταύτῃ πίστει ἐπισυνάπτουσιν ὅτι καὶ ἀίδιόν ἐστι πῦρ, ἐκ μέρους καὶ τὸ αἰθέριον σβέννυσθαι καὶ ἀνάπτεσθαι τιθέντες. ἀλλὰ τὴν τούτων πρὸς μὲν τὰ αὑτῶν ἀβλεψίαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν ῥᾳθυμίαν τε καὶ καταφρόνησιν, τί ἄν τις ἐπιὼν ἐπὶ πλέον μηκύνοι;» | 16.2 And when called to account as to how such a fire can endure permanently, they do not claim that it is a different kind of fire; rather, having called it such and demanding that men believe them on their mere word, they attach to this irrational faith the assertion that this fire is also eternal—positing that even the aethereal fire is extinguished and rekindled in turn. But as for their blindness regarding their own doctrines, and their laxity and contempt toward the teachings of the ancients—why should anyone go on at greater length to expose it?" |
Chapter 17
In this chapter, Porphyry presents a Platonist critique against the Stoic materialist view of True Being (To On):
Refutation of the Four Elements and Matter (17.1–17.4): Neither the four physical elements (fire, earth, air, water) nor prime matter (hylē) can constitute true Being. The elements are mutually convertible and subject to generation and decay. Matter itself is in constant flux like a rushing river—infinite, indefinite, irrational, and unknowable. Being fundamentally chaotic and lacking stability, matter cannot be true Being.
The Need for an Incorporeal Sustaining Principle (17.5–17.8): Physical bodies are by nature dead, inert, and constantly disintegrating. They require a sustaining, cohesive cause to keep them from dissolving. If that binding cause were itself a physical body, it too would require a savior to keep it from falling apart. Therefore, only an incorporeal nature (to asōmaton)—which is unchangeable, ungenerated, and free from bodily passions—can sustain physical existence and claim the title of True Being.
| 17.1 «Ἀλλὰ τί δή ἐστι τὸ ὄν; ἆρα ταυτὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ τέτταρα, ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι δύο μεταξὺ φύσεις; ἆρα οὖν δὴ τὰ ὄντα ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ξυλλήβδην ἢ καθ’ ἕν γέ τι αὐτῶν; καὶ πῶς, ἅ γέ ἐστι καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ παλινάγρετα, εἴ γε ἔστιν ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γινόμενα, καὶ ἐπαλλασσόμενα, καὶ μήτε στοιχεῖα ὑπάρχοντα μήτε συλλαβάς; | 17.1 "But what, indeed, is True Being (To On)? Is it these four elements—earth, fire, and the other two intermediate natures [air and water]? Are these existing things, then, True Being, either collectively or individually one by one? And how could they be, since they are both generated and reversible, if indeed we can observe them arising out of one another, interchanging, and being neither basic elements nor simple syllables? |
| 17.2 σῶμα μὲν ταυτὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν. ἀλλ’ ἄρα ταυτὶ μὲν οὔ, ἡ δ’ ὕλη δύναται εἶναι ὄν; ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀδύνατον, ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ μένειν. ποταμὸς γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ῥοώδης καὶ ὀξύρροπος, βάθος καὶ πλάτος καὶ μῆκος ἀόριστος καὶ ἀνήνυτος. | 17.2 Thus, as physical body, these things could not be True Being. But if not these, can matter (hylē) itself be True Being? Nay, this above all is impossible, owing to its inability to remain stable. For matter is a flowing and fast-rushing river, indefinite and endless in depth, breadth, and length. |
| 17.3 καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· Ὥστε καλῶς ὁ λόγος εἴρηκε, φάς, εἰ ἔστιν ἄπειρος ἡ ὕλη, ἀόριστον εἶναι αὐτήν· εἰ δὲ ἀόριστος, ἄλογος· εἰ δὲ ἄλογος, ἄγνωστος. ἄγνωστον δέ γε οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἄτακτον· ὡς τεταγμένα γνωσθῆναι πάνυ δήπουθεν ἂν εἴη ῥᾴδια· τὸ δὲ ἄτακτον οὐχ ἕστηκεν· ὅ τι δὲ μὴ ἕστηκεν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὄν. | 17.3 And shortly after he adds: So the argument was right in saying that if matter is infinite, it is indefinite; and if indefinite, irrational; and if irrational, unknowable. And being unknowable, it must of necessity be chaotic; for ordered things would surely be quite easy to know, whereas that which is chaotic does not stand firm, and that which does not stand firm cannot be True Being. |
| 17.4 τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ὅπερ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡμολογησάμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ταυτὶ πάντα συνενεχθῆναι τῷ ὄντι ἀθέμιστον εἶναι. δοξάτω μάλιστα μὲν πᾶσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ’ ἐμοί. οὐκοῦν φημὶ τὴν ὕλην οὔτε αὐτὴν οὔτε τὰ σώματα εἶναι ὄν. | 17.4 And this was precisely what we agreed upon among ourselves in what went before—that it is unlawful to attribute all these characteristics to True Being. Let this be the opinion preferably of all men, but if not, at least of myself. I say, therefore, that neither matter itself nor physical bodies are True Being. |
| 17.5 τί οὖν δή; ἦ ἔχομεν παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ὅλων; ναί· τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ποικίλον, εἰ τόδε πρῶτον μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἅμα πειραθείημεν διαλεγόμενοι. | 17.5 What then? Do we have alongside these anything else in the nature of the universe? Yes; there is no difficulty in stating this, if we first attempt to examine it among ourselves in conversation. |
| 17.6 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι φύσει τεθνηκότα καὶ νεκρὰ καὶ πεφορημένα καὶ οὐδ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ μένοντα, ἆρ’ οὐχὶ τοῦ καθέξοντος αὐτοῖς δεῖ; παντὸς μᾶλλον. | 17.6 Since physical bodies are by nature subject to death, corpse-like, swept along, and never remaining in the same state, do they not stand in need of something to hold them together? Most assuredly! |
| 17.7 εἰ μὴ τύχοι δὲ τούτου, ἄρα μείνειεν ἄν; παντὸς ἧττον. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ κατασχῆσον; εἰ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο εἴη σῶμα, Διὸς σωτῆρος δοκεῖ ἂν ἐμοὶ δεηθῆναι αὐτὸ παραλυόμενον καὶ σκιδνάμενον. | 17.7 And if they should fail to obtain this, could they possibly remain? Least of all! What, then, is that which will hold them together? If this binding principle were itself a body, it seems to me it would stand in need of Zeus the Savior, as it too dissolved and scattered! |
| 17.8 εἰ μέντοι χρὴ αὐτὸ ἀπηλλάχθαι τῆς τῶν σωμάτων πάθης, ἵνα κἀκείνοις κεκυημένοις τὴν φθορὰν ἀμύνειν δύνηται καὶ κατέχῃ, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ μόνον γε τὸ ἀσώματον· αὕτη γὰρ δὴ φύσεων πασῶν μόνη ἕστηκε, καὶ ἔστιν ἀραρυῖα καὶ οὐδὲν σωματική. οὔτε γοῦν γίνεται οὔτε αὔξεται οὔτε κίνησιν κινεῖται ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καλῶς δίκαιον ἐφάνη πρεσβεῦσαι τὸ ἀσώματον.» | 17.8 If, however, it must be delivered from the passion of physical bodies, in order that it may ward off destruction from those things pregnant with decay and hold them together, it seems to me to be nothing other than the incorporeal alone. For this nature alone of all natures stands firm, is fixed, and is in no way corporeal. It neither comes into being, nor grows, nor undergoes any other motion; and for these reasons it rightly appeared just to accord the primacy to the incorporeal." |
Chapter 18
In this chapter, Eusebius continues citing Porphyry's analysis of Stoic cosmology, focusing on ekpyrōsis and school lineage).
Cosmic Conflagration & Reconstitution (18.1–18.3): The earliest Stoics taught that the entire cosmos resolves into aethereal fire at vast periodic intervals.
Redefinition of "Destruction" (phthora) (18.2): Chrysippus and the early Stoics did not use the term "destruction" in its absolute, literal sense during cosmic conflagration (ekpyrōsis). Instead, they used "destruction" as a synonym for natural, cyclical transformation (metabolē), wherein all substance turns into fire like a cosmic seed before re-establishing the ordered universe (diakosmēsis).
School Succession & Dissent (18.3): While the founders (Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus) embraced this doctrine, later leaders diverged—notably Zeno of Tarsus (the pupil and successor of Chrysippus), who suspended judgment (epechein) regarding the doctrine of total conflagration.
|
18.1
«Ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης ἐξαιθεροῦσθαι πάντα, κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας εἰς πῦρ αἰθερῶδες ἀναλυομένων πάντων.»
Καὶ ἑξῆς ἐπάγει· |
18.1
"It is the doctrine of the oldest members of this school that all things are turned into aether, all things being resolved at certain immensely long periods into aethereal fire."
And next he adds: |
| 18.2 «Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον ὅτι Χρύσιππος ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ ταύτην παρείληφε τὴν σύγχυσιν· ἀδύνατον γάρ· ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀντὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς λεγομένην. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ περιόδους τῆς μεγίστης γινομένης φθορᾶς κυρίως παραλαμβάνουσι τὴν φθοράν οἱ τὴν εἰς πῦρ ἀνάλυσιν τῶν ὅλων δογματίζοντες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσιν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν μεταβολῆς χρῶνται τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τῆς φθορᾶς. | 18.2 "From these points it is clear that Chrysippus did not assume this confusion in the case of substance—for that is impossible—but rather used the term as equivalent to transformation. For those who dogmatize the resolution of all things into fire, which indeed they call conflagration (ekpyrōsis), do not use 'destruction' (phthora) in its strict sense for the periodic destruction of the cosmos; rather, they employ the designation 'destruction' in place of natural transformation. |
| 18.3 ἀρέσκει γὰρ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν εἰς πῦρ μεταβάλλειν, οἷον εἰς σπέρμα, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου αὐτὴν ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν, οἵα τὸ πρότερον ἦν. καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ πρεσβύτατοι προσήκαντο, Ζήνων τε καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρύσιππος. τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου μαθητὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς Ζήνωνα φασὶν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων.» | 18.3 For it pleases the Stoic philosophers that all substance changes into fire, as into a seed, and that from this seed the cosmic order (diakosmēsis) is again completed just as it was before. And this doctrine was accepted by the first and oldest members of the school, Zeno [of Citium], Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. But they say that his pupil and successor in the leadership of the school, Zeno [of Tarsus], suspended judgment concerning the conflagration of all things." |
Chapter 19
In this chapter, (continuing the citation of Arius Didymus / Chrysippus on Stoic physics), the text describes the mechanics of the cosmic cycle (apokatastasis):
The Great Year and Universal Restoration (19.1–19.2): As the Universal Reason (koinos logos) and Common Nature expand, they eventually dry up all moisture and absorb all substance into fire. This marks the culmination of the Great Year (eniautos ho megistos), whereupon the cosmos is restored (apokatastasis) back to its origin. Nature then restarts the exact same sequence of events in an unceasing, eternal recurrence.
Uncreated Active and Passive Principles (19.3): This cyclical process requires two uncreated, imperishable principles: a underlying substance (ousia, matter) capable of receiving every transformation, and an uncreated active/crafting principle (to dēmiourgēsan) within the cosmos. Neither matter nor this active creative Nature can be destroyed from within or from without.
| 19.1 «Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος, καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα, ἐν τῇ πάσῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται, ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα λόγον καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ’ ὃν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις. | 19.1 "Advancing to such an extent, the Universal Reason (koinos logos) and Universal Nature, having grown greater and more expanded, finally dries up all things and absorbs them into itself, coming to be in all substance. It thus returns to the primary Reason mentioned before, and to that renewal which produces the Great Year, in which the restoration (apokatastasis) takes place from itself alone back into itself again. |
| 19.2 ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν, ἀφ’ ἧς διακοσμεῖσθαι ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο, κατὰ λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται, τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ ἀϊδίου γινομένων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ πᾶσαν οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ διοικοῦντος αὐτά. | 19.2 And having returned through an orderly sequence starting from the point at which it likewise began to structure the cosmos, it carries out the very same progression according to Reason, such cycles occurring unceasingly from eternity. For it is impossible for there to be a cause or origin for the whole of things, or for that which governs them. |
| 19.3 οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινομένοις ὑφεστάναι δεῖ, πεφυκυῖαν ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας, καὶ τὸ δημιουργῆσαν ἐξ αὐτῆς. οἵα γὰρ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τίς ἐστι φύσις δημιουργοῦσα, τοιούτου τινὸς κατ’ ἀνάγκην ὄντος καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀγεννήτου· γενέσεως γὰρ ἀρχὴν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως ταύτης. ὃν τρόπον δ’ ἀγέννητός ἐστι καὶ ἀναιρεθῆναι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν αὐτήν, οὔτε αὐτῆς ἐξ αὑτῆς οὔτε ἔξωθέν τινος ἀναιρήσοντος αὐτήν.» | 19.3 For there must be a underlying substance (ousia) for things that come into being, possessing a nature capable of receiving all transformations, as well as that which crafts out of it. For just as there is a certain crafting nature in us, so by necessity a principle of this kind exists uncreated within the cosmos; for it is impossible for there to be a beginning of generation for this Nature. And in the same way that it is uncreated, so too is it impossible for it to be destroyed, with nothing destroying it either from within itself or from without." |
Chapter 20
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Arius Didymus’s epitome of Stoic philosophy to detail Stoic pneumatology and psychology:
20.1: Zeno’s definition of human seed as a detachment/portion of the soul and a blend of ancestral qualities, which grows in the womb when animated by the female spirit.
20.2–20.3: Cleanthes’ presentation of Zeno’s view that the soul is an exhalation (anathymiasis) like Heraclitus’s flux, capable of receiving sensory impressions (typōseis) in its governing part (hēgemonikon).
20.4–20.5: The existence of a cosmic soul within the ether and surrounding atmosphere, to which individual souls are attached, along with differing Stoic views on the soul’s persistence after death.
20.6–20.7: The Stoic doctrine that souls are generated and corruptible, surviving temporary separation from the body—virtuous souls until the cosmic conflagration (ekpyrōsis) and foolish souls for a limited time—while irrational animal souls perish instantly with the body.
20.8: Eusebius’s editorial wrap-up identifying Arius Didymus as his source and introducing Longinus as a critic of these Stoic tenets.
| 20.1 «Τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ὃ μεθίησιν ἄνθρωπος πνεῦμα μεθ’ ὑγροῦ, ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα, καὶ τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων κέρασμα καὶ μίγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν συνεληλυθός· ἔχον γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὅλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦτο, ὅταν ἀφεθῇ εἰς τὴν μήτραν, συλληφθὲν ὑπ’ ἄλλου πνεύματος, μέρος ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ θήλεος καὶ συμφυὲς γενόμενον, κρυφθέν τε φύει κινούμενον καὶ ἀναρριπιζόμενον ὑπ’ ἐκείνου, προσλαμβάνον ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ αὐξάνον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ.» | 20.1 Zeno says that seed is that which a human releases—a breath (pneuma) together with moisture, a portion and offshoot of the soul, and a compound and mixture of the seed of one’s ancestors gathered together from the parts of the soul. For having the very same generative principles (logoi) as the whole, when this seed is deposited into the womb, it is received by another breath—a part of the female’s soul—and becomes united with it. Hidden away, it grows as it is set in motion and fanned into flame by that breath, continually drawing in moisture and increasing by its own power. |
| 20.2 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· «Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς Κλεάνθης μὲν τὰ Ζήνωνος δόγματα παρατιθέμενος πρὸς σύγκρισιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φυσικούς φησιν ὅτι Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἴσθησιν, ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος. βουλόμενος γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοεραὶ ἀεὶ γίνονται, εἴκασεν αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς, λέγων οὕτως· “ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ· καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται.”» | 20.2 And shortly after, he adds: “Concerning the soul, Cleanthes—setting forth Zeno’s doctrines in comparison with the other natural philosophers—says that Zeno defines the soul as sensation or exhalation (anathymiasis), just as Heraclitus did. For wishing to demonstrate that souls, when exhaled, continually become intelligent, he likened them to rivers, speaking thus: ‘Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and ever-different waters flow; and souls likewise are exhaled from moist elements.’” |
| 20.3 «Ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων, αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι τυποῦσθαί γε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις. ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστι.» | 20.3 “Zeno, therefore, declares the soul to be an exhalation similarly to Heraclitus; and he says it is capable of sensation for this reason: because its governing part (hēgemonikon) is able to receive impressions (typousthai) from real and existing things through the sensory organs, and to accept these imprints. For these faculties belong peculiarly to the soul.” |
| 20.4 Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερα· «Εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα, καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζῴοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχάς.» | 20.4 And after other matters: “They say that there is a soul in the universe—which they call ether—and air encircling the earth and sea, along with the exhalations arising from them; and that all remaining souls are attached to this one, both as many as are in living creatures and as many as are in the surrounding atmosphere. For the souls of those who have died endure.” |
| 20.5 «Ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου ἀΐδιον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ ἐκείνῃ. ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν ἑαυτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἴσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή.» | 20.5 “Some, however, say that while the soul of the universe is eternal, the remaining souls merge into that cosmic soul upon death. Every soul possesses within itself a governing element, which indeed constitutes life, sensation, and impulse (hormē).” |
| 20.6 Καὶ ἔτι μετ’ ὀλίγα· «Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γεννητήν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν· οὐκ εὐθὺς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ’ ἑαυτήν· τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς πῦρ ἀναλύσεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσούς τινας χρόνους.» | 20.6 And again after a short space: “They say that the soul is generated and corruptible, yet it does not perish immediately upon being released from the body; rather, it persists by itself for certain periods of time—the soul of the virtuous until the resolution of all things into fire (ekpyrōsis), and the soul of the foolish for a limited time.” |
| 20.7 «Τὸ δὲ διαμένειν τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω λέγουσιν, ὅτι διαμένομεν ἡμεῖς ψυχαὶ γινόμενοι τοῦ σώματος χωρισθέντος καὶ εἰς ἐλάττω μεταβαλόντος οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς. τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασι.» | 20.7 “And they speak of souls enduring in this sense: that we endure by becoming souls when separated from the body, the substance of the soul having changed into a less dense form. But the souls of the foolish and of irrational animals perish together with their bodies.” |
| 20.8 Τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ τῆς Στωϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγματα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀρείου Διδύμου συνειλεγμένα. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς ἄτοπον τῶν ἀνδρῶν δόξαν ἀπαρκεῖ τὰ παρὰ Λογγίνῳ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς συντόμως ἀντειρημένα διὰ τούτων. | 20.8 Such are the doctrines of the Stoic philosophy collected from the Epitomes of Arius Didymus. Against the absurd opinion of these men concerning the soul, the brief refutation provided by our contemporary Longinus will suffice through the following words: |
Chapter 21
In this chapter, Longinus forcefully refutes all materialist views of the soul, targeting Stoics like Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as well as Epicurus:
Inadequacy of Physical Blends and Atoms (21.1–21.2): Longinus asserts that all thinkers who define the soul as a physical body are far from sound reasoning. Physical mixtures (kraseis) and elemental combinations can create endless material bodies, but they show no trace or proof of psychical functions. Finer breath (pneuma) or specific atomic shapes cannot account for impression (phantasia), memory, or wisdom (phronēsis). Even Homer’s magical self-moving tripods and golden maidens have more life than these random atomic grains or shore pebbles.
Critique of Stoic "Exhalation" (Anathymiasis) (21.3): Zeno and Cleanthes are justly condemned for insulting the soul by reducing both it and solid bodies to mere exhalation. An exhalation or smoke cannot preserve lasting memories, formulate rational impulses, or direct purposeful choices.
Theological Inconsistency: Reducing the divine soul (and God who pervades all things) to smoke and exhalation is absurd. Even pagan poets—inspired by common human intuition and the Muses—spoke far more reverently of the gods than the Stoics, who degraded the divine into air, breath, and nonsense. Eusebius concludes the citation by noting the end of Longinus’s passage and introducing Plotinus’s subsequent refutation.
| 21.1 «Συνελόντι δ’ εἰπεῖν, πόρρω μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀφεστηκέναι τοῦ τὰ δέοντα λογίζεσθαι πάντες ἐφεξῆς ὁπόσοι τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα ἀπεφήναντο. πῶς γὰρ ὅλως ἐγχωρεῖ παραπλήσιον εἶναί τινι τῶν στοιχείων τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν θεῖναι; ποῦ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς κράσεις καὶ μίξεις ἀνενεγκεῖν; αἳ κατὰ πολλοὺς γιγνόμεναι τρόπους ἄλλων μὲν ἀμυθήτων ἰδέας σωμάτων ἀπογεννᾶν πεφύκασιν, ἐν οἷς εἰ καὶ μὴ συνεχῶς, ἀλλ’ οὖν πόρρωθεν ἰδεῖν ἔνι τὴν τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα τῶν πρώτων ἀφορμήν. τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἴχνος οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τεκμήριον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εὑρίσκεται, κἂν εἰ φιλοτιμοῖτό τις, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἅπαντα λίθον κινεῖν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐρευνᾶν δύναμιν σώματος εἰς γένεσιν τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς πράξεων. | 21.1 "To sum it up briefly, all those in succession who have declared the soul to be a body seem to me to have fallen far short of calculating what is necessary. For how is it at all admissible to place the essence of the soul as something similar to any of the elements? Or how can it be referred to temperaments and mixtures? For these, occurring in many ways, are naturally fitted to generate shapes of countless other physical bodies—in which, even if not constantly, at least from afar one can discern the cause of the elements and the starting-point for secondary and tertiary formations derived from the primary ones. But of the things pertaining to the soul, no trace or proof is found in physical bodies, even if someone—like Epicurus and Chrysippus—should proudly try to leave no stone unturned and examine every power of body for the generation of the soul’s operations. |
| 21.2 τί γὰρ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος ἡμῖν λεπτότης πρὸ ἔργου γένοιτ’ ἂν εἰς φαντασίας καὶ λογισμούς; τί δέ; τῶν ἀτόμων σχῆμα τοσαύτην παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ τροπήν, ὥστε φρόνησιν γεννᾶν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέρου πλάσιν ἐγκαταμιχθῇ σώματος; οἶμαι μὲν ὡς οὐδ’ εἰ τῶν Ἡφαίστου τις ὢν τύχοι τριπόδων καὶ θεραπαινῶν, (ὧν φησιν Ὅμηρος τοὺς μὲν αὐτομάτους εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα δι’ αὑτῶν χωρεῖν, τὰς δὲ συνεργάζεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ μηδενὸς οἴων οἱ ζῶντες ἔχουσι πλεονεκτημάτων ἀπολείπεσθαι) μή τί γε δὴ τῶν ἐκ ταὐτομάτου ψηγμάτων, καὶ αὖ τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰγιαλῶν προσέοικε λίθοις, εἰς τὸ δύνασθαί τι περιττότερον ποιεῖν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. | 21.2 For how could the subtlety of breath (pneuma) be of any use to us for mental impressions (phantasiai) and reasonings? And what? Does the shape of atoms possess such power and variation beyond other things as to generate wisdom (phronēsis) when mixed into the formation of another body? I suppose that not even if one happened to be one of Hephaestus's tripods or golden handmaidens—of which Homer says that the former move automatically into the assembly of their own accord, while the latter work alongside their master, lacking none of the advantages that living beings possess—much less, surely, do random atomic grains, or again stones on the seashore, resemble anything capable of producing a higher degree of sensation! |
|
21.3
Ζήνωνι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κλεάνθει νεμεσήσειέ τις ἂν δικαίως οὕτω σφόδρα ὑβριστικῶς περὶ αὐτῆς διαλεχθεῖσι καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν φήσασι. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, κοινὸν ὅλως ἀναθυμιάσει καὶ ψυχῇ; ποῦ δὲ ἐγχωρεῖ νομίσαντας τούτῳ προσεοικέναι τήν τε ἡμετέραν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐσίαν, τοῦτο μὲν φαντασίας καὶ μνήμας οἵους τε εἶναι σώζειν διαρκεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ ὁρμὰς καὶ βουλήσεις τῶν λυσιτελούντων εἰς σύνεσιν πραγμάτων; ἦ τἄρα καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὸν διὰ πάντων παρήκοντα ὁμοίως ἐπιγείων τε καὶ οὐρανίων εἰς ἀναθυμίασιν καὶ καπνὸν καὶ τοιαύτην φλυαρίαν καταθήσομεν, καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς ποιητὰς αἰσχυνόμεθα, οἳ καίπερ ἀκριβῆ σύνεσιν τῶν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχοντες, ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ἐπινοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἐπιπνοίας τῶν Μουσῶν, ἣ κινεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ πέφυκε, σεμνότερα εἰρήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναθυμιάσεις, οὐδ’ ἀέρας, οὐδὲ πνεύματα καὶ λήρους;»
Ταῦτά σοι καὶ ὁ Λογγῖνος. ἐπάκουσον δὲ καὶ Πλωτίνου τὰ τοιάδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποτεινομένου· |
21.3
For one might justly be indignant with Zeno and Cleanthes for speaking so exceedingly insultingly about the soul, both affirming that the soul is the same thing as the exhalation (anathymiasis) of a solid body. For what, in the name of the gods, is there at all in common between an exhalation and a soul? And where is it admissible, while supposing our essence and that of other living creatures to resemble this exhalation, to think oneself able on the one hand to preserve lasting impressions and memories, and on the other hand to maintain impulses and volitions aimed at useful understanding in practical affairs? Shall we then indeed reduce both the gods and the Reason that pervades all things—earthly and heavenly alike—to exhalation, smoke, and such nonsense? Do we feel no shame even before the poets, who, although lacking precise knowledge of the gods, nevertheless—partly from the common intuition of humanity and partly from the inspiration of the Muses (which naturally moves them toward these same truths)—have spoken more reverently concerning them, and not of exhalations, nor airs, nor breaths and foolishness?"
These things, then, are from Longinus. Hear now also what Plotinus has to say when addressing the very same thinkers: |
Chapter 22
In this chapter, Eusebius gives a lengthy excerpt from Plotinus’s treatise On the Immortality of the Soul (Enneads IV.7.2–8.5). Plotinus systematically refutes materialist and physicalist theories of the soul (particularly those of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Pythagorean "harmony" theorists) to establish that the soul is an immaterial, immortal substance:
Partibility & Disintegration of Bodies (22.1–22.5): Physical bodies are intrinsically compound, divisible, and constantly changing. If the human soul were a body, it would fragment, dissipate, or require a prior ordering principle to give it form.
Refutation of Physical & Elemental Soul Models (22.6–22.10): The soul cannot be an elemental body (fire, air, water, earth) or a mixture (krasis) thereof. Inanimate elements cannot create life, nor can random combinations generate mind (nous) without a higher governing order.
Refutation of Atomism & Physical Compounds (22.11–22.16): The soul cannot consist of atoms or partless corpuscles. Aggregates cannot produce unified, sympathetic consciousness (sympatheia). Furthermore, physical breath (pneuma) and air are inherently diffuse and require the soul’s unifying force to hold a living organism together.
Refutation of Stoic "State" (Pōs Echon) & Physical Qualities (22.17–22.21): Stoic attempts to define the soul as a "disposed breath" (pneuma pōs echon) reduce to mere wordplay; a disposition is either nothing or an incorporeal formal principle (logos). Physical properties (heat, cold) can only produce single, uniform physical effects, whereas the soul directs contrasting, varied actions within a single organism.
Unity of Perception, Memory, and Growth (22.22–22.43): Sensory perception requires a unified, indivisible center—like the center of a circle—to synthesize input from multiple sense organs. If the soul were a material body subject to constant flux and replacement of particles, memory, continuous personal identity, and unified pain perception across different limbs would be impossible.
Incorporeality of Intellections & Virtues (22.44–22.51): Thinking (noēsis) grasps non-material, partless concepts (such as justice, beauty, and geometric truths). A extended, divisible body cannot grasp an unextended concept. Likewise, moral virtues (temperance, justice, courage) are incorporeal habits, not physical configurations or states of blood or air.
Incorporeal Powers & Causal Priority (22.52–22.63): Physical bodies act only through incorporeal powers (dynameis) and formal logos. Actuality precedes potentiality; hence Mind and Soul must precede body, rather than emerging late as an accidental byproduct of cooled air or random physical collisions.
Refutation of Soul as "Harmonia" (22.64–22.67): The soul is not a physical harmony or tuning (harmonia) of bodily hot/cold/dry/wet elements. A harmony is a passive, secondary attribute that cannot rule, fight against bodily desires, or create itself without a prior musician (the true soul).
Eusebius's Editorial Conclusion (22.68–22.69): Eusebius concludes his extensive citations from Plotinus against Stoic physicalism and prepares to transition to natural philosophy excerpts from Pseudo-Plutarch (Placita Philosophorum) regarding the sun and celestial bodies.
| 22.1 «Εἰ ἔστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκέδασιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰσαεὶ ἅπερ ἐστίν, αὐτὸς ὧδ’ ἄν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος. | 22.1 "Whether each one of us is immortal, or the whole perishes, or parts of us pass away into dispersion and corruption while other parts remain forever just as they are—one can learn this by investigating in accordance with nature. |
| 22.2 ἁπλοῦν μὲν δή τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχή, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἴτ’ οὖν ὡς ὄργανον ἡμῖν, εἴτε ἕτερον τρόπον προσηρτημένον, ἀλλ’ οὖν διῃρήσθω γε ταύτῃ, καὶ ἑκατέρου τὴν φύσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν καταθεατέον. | 22.2 Now, man cannot be a simple thing, but there is in him a soul, and he also possesses a body; whether as an instrument for us, or attached to us in some other way, let it at all events be divided in this manner, and we must inspect the nature and essence of each. |
| 22.3 Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα, καὶ αὐτὸ συγκείμενον, οὔτε παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύναται μένειν, ἥ τε αἴσθησις ὁρᾷ λυόμενόν τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοίους ὀλέθρους δεχόμενον, ἑκάστου γε τῶν ἐνόντων πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ φερομένου, φθείροντός τε ἄλλου ἕτερον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολλύντος, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ψυχὴ ἡ φίλα ποιοῦσα μὴ παρῇ τοῖς ὄγκοις. | 22.3 As for the body, being itself a composite, it cannot abide without a forming principle (logos), and sense perception sees it dissolving, melting away, and undergoing all kinds of destruction, since each of its inherent elements moves toward its own kind, one destroying another, changing into something else, and perishing—especially when the soul, which makes the bodily masses friendly to one another, is not present. |
| 22.4 κἂν μονωθῇ δὲ ἕκαστον γινόμενον, ἓν οὐκ ἔστιν, λύσιν δεχόμενον εἴς τε μορφὴν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἅτε σώματα ὄντα, τεμνόμενά τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ θραυόμενα, καὶ ταύτῃ φθορὰν ἂν ὑπομένοι. | 22.4 And even if each component should exist in isolation, it is not a unity, receiving resolution into form and matter, from which even simple bodies must necessarily derive their compositions. Having magnitude, inasmuch as they are bodies, they are cut and shattered into small fragments, and in this way undergo corruption. |
| 22.5 ὥστε εἰ μὲν μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἀθάνατοι· εἰ δ’ ὄργανον, ἔδει γε αὐτὸ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ δοθὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα, ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς πρὸς ὄργανον. ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός. | 22.5 So if this body is a part of us, we are not altogether immortal; but if it is an instrument, it must have been given for a certain time, being of such a nature. And the supreme entity—man himself—would be either the form in relation to the body as matter, or the user in relation to the instrument. In either case, the soul is man himself. |
| 22.6 Τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἢ σῶμα μὲν ὂν πάντως ἀναλυτέον· σύνθετον γὰρ πᾶν γε σῶμα· εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνην ἢ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἢ κατὰ ἄλλον σκεπτέον. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον εἰς ὅ τι δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὃ λέγουσι ψυχήν, ἀναλύειν. | 22.6 What nature, then, does the soul possess? If it is a body, it must certainly be dissolved, for every body is composite; but if it is not a body, but of another nature, that nature must be examined either in the same way or in another. First, we must examine into what this body—which they call soul—must be dissolved. |
| 22.7 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ψυχῇ πάρεστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μὲν ἐκ δύο σωμάτων ἢ πλειόνων εἴη, ἤτοι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, ἢ ἕκαστον ζωὴν σύμφυτον ἔχειν· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ μή, ἢ μηδέτερον ἔχειν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἑνὶ αὐτῶν προσείη τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη ψυχή. | 22.7 For since life is necessarily present in the soul, it is necessary that this body—the soul—if it consists of two or more bodies, must either have inherent life in both or in each, or one must have it and the other not, or neither. If life belongs to one of them, that one itself would be the soul. |
| 22.8 τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα, ζωὴν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ἔχον; πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ’ αὑτῶν· καὶ ὅτῳ τούτων πάρεστι ψυχή, τοῦτο ἐπακτῷ κέχρηται ζωῇ, ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι. οἷς δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι στοιχεῖα, τούτων ἕτερα σώματα, οὐ ψυχαὶ ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωήν, ἄτοπον. | 22.8 What body, then, could have life from itself? For fire, air, water, and earth are inanimates of themselves; and whichever of these receives the soul uses an imported life; and there are no other bodies besides these. Those which seem to some to be elements distinct from these were called bodies, not souls, nor as having life. But if the combination of them, when none has life, produced life, that is absurd. |
| 22.9 εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχει, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ νοῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὁπωσοῦν κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γενέσθαι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι τὸ τάξον καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἴτιον· ὥστε τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυχῆς. | 22.9 If each possesses life, even one would suffice; or rather, it is impossible for a heap of bodies to produce life and for mindless things to generate mind. And surely they will say that these elements were not blended at random. There must therefore be that which orders them and causes the blending; so this would hold the rank of soul. |
| 22.10 οὐ γὰρ ὅτι σύνθετον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ’ ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς. | 22.10 For there could be no composite, nor even any simple body among existing things, without a soul being present in the universe—if indeed a forming principle (logos) approaching matter makes a body, and logos could come from nowhere else than from a soul. |
| 22.11 Εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῆ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν λέγοι, τῇ ἐνώσει καὶ ὁμοιοπαθείᾳ ἐλέγχοιτ’ ἂν καὶ τῇ παραθέσει· μὴ δι’ ὅλου, οὐ γινομένου ἑνός, οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν, καὶ μὴ ἑνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων· ψυχὴ δὲ ἑαυτῇ συμπαθής· ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν σῶμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο. | 22.11 If anyone should say not this, but that atoms or partless corpuscles coming together make the soul, he would be refuted by their unification, sympathetic oneness (homoiopatheia), and juxtaposition; for a body does not become one through and through, nor sympathetic out of nonsympathetic parts, nor can physical bodies be unified—whereas the soul is in sympathetic unity with itself. Furthermore, from partless elements no body or magnitude could ever arise. |
| 22.12 καὶ μὴν εἰ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν ὅσον ὑλικὸν παρ’ αὑτοῦ ζωὴν ἔχειν οὐ φήσουσιν· (ὕλη γὰρ ἄποιον) τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένον ἐπιφέρειν τὴν ζωήν· εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν φήσουσι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ συναμφότερον, θάτερον δὲ τούτων ἔσται ἡ ψυχή· καὶ οὐκ ἔσται αὖ σῶμα, οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ αὐτό, ἢ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀναλύσομεν. | 22.12 And indeed, if the body is simple, they will not say that its material aspect has life from itself (for matter is without quality); but rather that its formal aspect, being ordered, introduces life. If they say this form is substance, and not the compound of both, then one of these will be the soul; and it will not, in turn, be a body—for it is not made of matter itself—or else we shall analyze it again in the same way. |
| 22.13 εἰ δὲ πάθημα τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὐσίαν φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐλήλυθε λεκτέον αὐτοῖς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη ἑαυτὴν μορφοῖ, οὐδὲ ἑαυτῇ ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι. δεῖ ἄρα τι εἶναι τὸ χορηγὸν ζωῆς, εἴτε τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ χορηγία, εἴθ’ ὁτῳοὺν τῶν σωμάτων, ἔξω ὂν καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωματικῆς φύσεως, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ ἂν εἴη σῶμα οὐδὲν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης. | 22.13 If they say it is an affection (pathema) of matter and not a substance, they must tell us whence this affection and life entered into matter; for matter certainly does not form itself, nor insert soul into itself. There must therefore be something that provides life, whether the provision is to matter or to any body whatsoever, existing outside and beyond physical nature—since no body could exist if soul-power were absent. |
| 22.14 ῥεῖ γάρ, καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, καὶ ἀπόλοιτ’ ἂν ὡς τάχιστα, εἰ πάντα σώματα εἴη, κἂν εἰ ὄνομα ἐνὶ αὐτῶν ψυχήν τις θεῖτο. τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν πάθοι τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν, ὕλης μιᾶς οὔσης αὐτοῖς. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ’ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ στήσεται ἐν ὕλῃ τὰ πάντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ μορφοῦντος αὐτήν. | 22.14 For body is in flux, and its nature is in motion, and it would perish as quickly as possible if all things were body, even if one were to give the name 'soul' to one of them. For it would suffer the same fate as the other bodies, there being one matter for them all. Or rather, nothing would even come to be, but all things would stand still in matter, there being nothing to give it form. |
| 22.15 τάχα δ’ ἂν οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ὕλη τὸ παράπαν εἴη. λυθήσεται δὲ καὶ τόδε τὸ ξύμπαν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ πιστεύσειε σώματος συνέρξει, διδοὺς αὐτῷ ψυχῆς τάξιν, μέχρι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀέρι καὶ πνεύματι σκεδαστοτάτῳ, καὶ τῷ ἓν εἶναι ἔχοντι οὐ παρ’ αὑτοῦ. πῶς γὰρ τεμνομένων τῶν πάντων σωμάτων ᾡτινιοῦν τις ἀνατιθεὶς τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ ποιήσει; | 22.15 Perchance matter itself would not exist at all. And this universe will be dissolved if one trusts it to a bodily binding force, assigning to it the rank of soul (merely up to the names) in air and most easily scattered breath (pneuma), which holds its being as 'one' not from itself. For how, when all bodies are divisible, could anyone, by entrusting this universe to any one of them, fail to make it foolish and swept along at random? |
| 22.16 τίς γὰρ τάξις ἐν πνεύματι δεομένῳ παρὰ ψυχῆς τάξεως, ἢ λόγος, ἢ νοῦς; ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὔσης ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν καὶ ζῴου ἑκάστου, ἄλλης παρ’ ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούσης, ταύτης δὲ μὴ παρούσης ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τάξει.» | 22.16 For what order is there in a breath that needs order from soul—or what reason, or mind? But when soul is present, all these serve it toward the constitution of each living being, power contributed from one to another toward the whole; but if soul is not present in the universe, these things would be nothing, let alone in order. |
| 22.17 «Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγόμενοι ὡς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρεῖττον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔννουν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς ἢ πνεύματος οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἱδρυθῆναι, δέον ζητεῖν ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἱδρύσουσιν, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἱδρῦσθαι. | 22.17 And they themselves testify, led by the truth, that there must be something prior to bodies superior to them, a form of soul, when they make the breath intelligent (ennoun) and fire intellectual (noeron)—as if without fire or breath the superior portion among beings could not exist, but sought a place to be established, whereas they ought to seek where to establish bodies, since these must be established in the powers of soul! |
| 22.18 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται, τὸ δὲ πολυθρύλητον αὐτοῖς πῶς ἔχει, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγουσιν, ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν πνεῦμα ψυχή, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δέ πως ἔχον πνεῦμα φήσουσι· τό πως ἔχον τοῦτο, καὶ ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν, ἢ μηδέν. | 22.18 If they place life and soul in nothing other than breath, what of their multi-vocal formula to which they flee when forced to positing another active nature beside bodies? If, then, not all breath is soul (since there are myriads of inanimate breaths), but they say it is breath 'disposed in a certain way' (pōs echon), shall they say this 'disposition' and state (schesis) is one of real beings, or nothing? |
| 22.19 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἴη μόνον, τὸ δέ πως ἔχον ὄνομα· καὶ οὕτω συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην· καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ θεὸν καὶ ὄνομα τὰ πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον. εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ σχέσις, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μέν, ἄυλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ μὴ πάλιν αὖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἴη τις, καὶ οὐ σῶμα, καὶ φύσις ἑτέρα. | 22.19 If it is nothing, it would be breath alone, and 'disposed in a certain way' merely a name; and thus it will turn out for them that they speak of nothing else than matter—and soul, god, and all things are names, while that alone is real. But if the state is one of real beings, and something other than the substrate and matter—in matter, yet immaterial itself by not being compounded again of matter—it would be a certain rational principle (logos), and not a body, but a different nature. |
| 22.20 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε οὐχ ἧττον φαίνεται ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι σῶμα ὁτιοῦν. ἢ γὰρ θερμόν ἐστιν ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν, ὑγρόν τε ἢ πεπηγός, μέλαν τε ἢ λευκόν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ποιότητες σωμάτων ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλοις. καὶ εἰ μὲν θερμόν, μόνον θερμανεῖ, ψυχρὸν δὲ μόνον ψύξει, καὶ κοῦφα ποιήσει τὸ κοῦφον προσγενόμενον καὶ παρόν, καὶ βαρυνεῖ τὸ βαρή, καὶ μελανεῖ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν λευκὸν ποιήσει. | 22.20 Furthermore, from the following it appears no less impossible for the soul to be any body whatsoever. For a body is either hot or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, and all other qualities of bodies in different things. And if it is hot, it will only heat; if cold, it will only cool; if light, it will make light what approaches and is present; if heavy, it will weigh down; if black, it will blacken; if white, it will whiten. |
| 22.21 οὐ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ψύχειν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ψυχροῦ θερμὰ ποιεῖν. ἀλλ’ ἥ γε ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν ζῴοις ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, τὰ μὲν πηγνῦσα, τὰ δὲ χέουσα, καὶ τὰ μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δὲ ἀραιά, μέλανα, λευκά, κοῦφα, βαρέα· καίτοι ἓν ἔδει ποιεῖν, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ποιότητά τε τὴν ἄλλην καὶ χρόαν, νῦν δὲ πολλά.» | 22.21 For it is not the function of fire to cool, nor of cold to make hot. But the soul produces different effects in different animals, and opposite effects in the same animal—freezing some things, melting others, making some dense, others rare, black, white, light, heavy; whereas it ought to produce only one effect according to the single quality and color of its body—yet now it produces many. |
| 22.22 «Τὰς δὲ δὴ κινήσεις πῶς διαφόρους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μίαν, μιᾶς οὔσης παντὸς σώματος κινήσεως; εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ οὐ σώματος ἡ προαίρεσις, οὐδὲ οἱ λόγοι διάφοροί γε ὄντες, ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ ἁπλοῦ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ μετὸν αὐτῷ τοιούτου γε λόγου, ἢ ὅσος δέδοται αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος θερμὸν αὐτὸ ἢ ψυχρὸν εἶναι. | 22.22 And how can its movements be various and not single, when every body has but one movement? But if some movements belong to it, while choice does not belong to a body, nor different rational principles (logoi) when the body is single and simple—having no share in such a logos except as much as has been given it by its creator to make it hot or cold... |
| 22.23 τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν χρόνοις αὔξειν, καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου μέτρου, πόθεν ἂν τῷ σώματι αὐτῷ γένοιτο; ᾧ προσήκει μὲν αὔξεσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀμοίρῳ τοῦ αὔξειν εἶναι, ἢ ὅσον παραληφθείη ἂν ἐν ὕλης ὄγκῳ ὑπηρετοῦν τῷ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὴν αὔξην ἐργαζομένῳ· | 22.23 And to increase over time, and up to a certain measure—whence could this belong to the body itself? It belongs to it to be increased, but it has no share in increasing, except as much as may be taken in a mass of matter serving that which produces increase through it. |
| 22.24 καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα οὖσα αὔξοι, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὴν αὔξεσθαι. προσθήκη δηλονότι ὁμοίου σώματος, εἰ μέλλει εἰς ἴσον ἰέναι τῷ αὐξομένῳ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἢ ἄψυχον σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψυχή, πόθεν καὶ πῶς εἰσιούσης καὶ πῶς προστιθεμένης; εἰ δὲ ἄψυχον τὸ προστιθέμενον, πῶς τοῦτο ψυχωθήσεται καὶ τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμογνωμονήσει καὶ ἓν ἔσται καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν τῷ πρώτῳ μεταλήψεται; ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὥσπερ ξένη ψυχὴ αὕτη ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα οἶδε; καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἡμῶν τὸ μέν τι ἀπορρεύσεται αὐτοῦ, τὸ δέ τι προσελεύσεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔσται τὸ αὐτό; | 22.24 For if the soul, being a body, should increase, it must also itself be increased—obviously by the addition of a similar body, if it is to reach equality with that which is increased by it. And either soul will be that which is added, or an inanimate body. If soul, whence and how does it enter and get added? But if the addition is inanimate, how will this become ensouled, share the same mind with the former, become one, and partake of the same opinions with the first? Will it not be like an alien soul in ignorance of what the other knows? And just as with the rest of our bodily mass, some of it will flow away and some flow in, and nothing will remain the same? |
| 22.25 πῶς οὖν ἡμῖν αἱ μνῆμαι; πῶς δὲ ἡ γνῶσις οἰκείων, οὐδέποτε τῇ αὐτῇ ψυχῇ χρωμένων; καὶ μὴν εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζόμενον εἰς πλείω, ἕκαστον μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τῶν μερῶν τῷ ὅλῳ· εἰ τοσόνδε μέγεθος ψυχή, ὃ ἂν ἔλαττον ᾖ, ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, ὥσπερ πᾶν ποσὸν ἀφαιρέσει τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρόσθεν ἠλλάξατο. | 22.25 How then do we have memories? How do we recognize familiars, when we never employ the same soul? And surely if it is a body, and the nature of body is to be divided into several parts, each of the parts is not the same as the whole; if soul is a magnitude of such size, whatever is less will not be soul, just as any quantity changes from being what it was before by subtraction. |
| 22.26 εἰ δέ τι τῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων τὸν ὄγκον ἐλαττωθὲν τῇ ποιότητι ταὐτὸν μένοι, ᾗ μὲν σῶμα, ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ ᾗ ποσόν, τῇ δὲ ποιότητι ἑτέρᾳ τῆς ποσότητος οὔσῃ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποσώζειν δύναται. | 22.26 If any extended thing, when its mass is diminished, should remain the same in quality—insofar as it is a body, it is different, and insofar as it is a quantity; but by its quality, which is different from quantity, it is able to preserve sameness. |
| 22.27 τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες; πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχή, οἵα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; | 22.27 What then will those say who declare the soul to be a body? First, concerning each part of the soul in the same body: is each part a soul such as the whole is? And again, a part of a part? |
| 22.28 οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· (καίτοι ἔδει γε, ποσοῦ τινος ὄντος) καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῇ, ὅπερ σώματι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. | 22.28 Magnitude, then, contributed nothing to its essence (and yet it ought to, if it were a quantity); and the whole is present in many places—which is impossible for a body—that the same whole should be in several parts, and the part be what the whole is. |
| 22.29 εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει. καὶ προσέτι, εἰ ψυχῆς ἑκάστης τὸ μέγεθος ὡρισμένον ἔσται ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττόν γε, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται. | 22.29 If they say that each of the parts is not a soul, soul will belong to them out of inanimate parts. And besides, if the magnitude of each soul is defined in both directions, either toward the smaller or toward the larger, it will not be a soul. |
| 22.30 ὅταν τοίνυν ἐκ συνόδου μιᾶς καὶ ἑνὸς σπέρματος δίδυμα γένηται γεννήματα, ἢ καί, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, πλεῖστα, τοῦ σπέρματος εἰς πολλοὺς τόπους μεριζομένου, οὗ δὴ ὅλον ἕκαστόν ἐστι, πῶς οὐ διδάσκει τοῦτο τοὺς βουλομένους μανθάνειν ὡς ὅπου τὸ μέρος ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ὅλῳ, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, ἄποσον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μένοι τὸ αὐτό, τοῦ ποσοῦ κλεπτομένου, ἅτε μὴ μέλον αὐτῷ ποσότητος καὶ ὄγκου, ὡς ἂν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἕτερόν τι οὔσης. ἄποσον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.» | 22.30 When, therefore, twins are born from a single intercourse and a single seed—or even, as in other animals, very many, the seed being divided into many places, of which each is a whole—how does this fail to teach those who wish to learn that where the part is the same as the whole, it has exceeded quantity in its essence, and is necessarily without quantity? For thus it can remain the same when quantity is subtracted, since quantity and mass are no concern to it, as its essence is something different. Soul, therefore, and its formal principles (logoi), are without quantity. |
| 22.31 «Ὅτι δὲ εἰ σῶμα εἴη ἡ ψυχή, οὔτε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὔτε τὸ νοεῖν, οὔτε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, οὔτε ἀρεταί ταί, οὔτε τι τῶν καλῶν ἔσται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴ τι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος, ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα εἴη, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι’ ἑνὸς ποικίλον, οἷον πρόσωπον. | 22.31 That if the soul were a body, neither perceiving, nor thinking, nor knowing, nor virtues, nor anything of noble things will exist, is clear from the following. If something is to perceive anything, it must itself be one, and apprehend everything with the same center—even if several inputs enter through many sense organs, or many qualities concerning one object, or a varied object through one, such as a face. |
| 22.32 οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός, ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι’ ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ δι’ ἀκοῆς, ἕν τι δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐλθόντων; δεῖ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὥσπερ κέντρον εἶναι, γραμμὰς δὲ συμβαλλούσας ἐκ περιφερείας κύκλου, τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι ἓν ὄντως. | 22.32 For one part is not of the nose, and another of the eye, but the same center grasps all together. And if one comes through the eyes and another through hearing, there must be a single center to which both go; or how could it say that these are different, unless the sensations came together to the same point? This must be like a center, and senses from all sides like lines converging from the circumference of a circle to terminate at this point, and that which apprehends must be truly one. |
| 22.33 εἰ δὲ διεστὼς τοῦτο γένοιτο, καὶ οἷον γραμμῆς ἐπ’ ἄμφω τὰ πέρατα αἱ αἰσθήσεις προσβάλλοιεν, ἢ συνδραμεῖται εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν, οἷον τὸ μέσον ἢ ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου αἴσθησιν ἕξει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἴσθοιο. | 22.33 If this center were separated, and as if at both ends of a line the sensations should strike, either they will run together into one and the same point again (such as the middle or another), or each of the two will have perception of each, as if I perceived one thing and you another. |
| 22.34 καὶ εἰ ἓν εἴη τὸ αἴσθημα, οἷον πρόσωπον, εἰς ἓν συναιρεθήσεται, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται· συναιρεῖται γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς κόραις· (ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τούτων ὁρῷτο;) ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἰόντα οἷον ἀμερῆ νοήματα γίνεσθαι. καὶ ἔσται ἀμερὲς τοῦτο, ἢ μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ συμμερίζοιτο ἄν, ὥστε ἄλλον ἄλλου μέρους καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἴσχειν. | 22.34 And if the percept is one, such as a face, it will be condensed into one, which is indeed apparent; for it is condensed even in the pupils themselves (or how could the greatest objects be seen through them?), so that going still more to the governing principle (hēgemonikon), they become like partless thoughts. And this center will be partless, or, being a magnitude, it would be divided along with it, so that one part of us grasps one part, and none of us has perception of the whole sense-object. |
| 22.35 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ διαιροῖτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἴσῳ ἐφαρμόσει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν παντὶ αἰσθητῷ. κατὰ πηλίκα οὖν ἡ διαίρεσις; ἢ εἰς τοσαῦτα διαιρεθήσεται, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχῃ εἰς ποικιλίαν τὸ εἰσιὸν αἴσθημα; | 22.35 For the whole is one; how indeed could it be divided? For what is equal will not fit onto what is equal, because the governing principle is not equal to every sense-object. According to what size, then, is the division? Or will it be divided into as many parts as the incoming perception has in number for its variety? |
| 22.36 καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ ἐκείνων τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μορίοις αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεται. ἢ ἀναίσθητα τὰ μέρη τῶν μορίων ἔσται; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ’ ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. | 22.36 And each of those parts of the soul will also perceive with its own particles. Or will the parts of the particles be imperceptive? That is impossible! But if anything perceives the whole, since magnitude is naturally divided into infinity, infinite perceptions will happen to occur for each sense-object, like infinite images of the same thing in our governing center. |
| 22.37 καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οἷον ἐν κηρῷ ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες, εἴτ’ οὖν εἰς αἷμα εἴτ’ οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐνσημαινομένων. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ καὶ εὔλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ, συγχυθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· | 22.37 And indeed, if that which perceives is a body, perception could occur in no other way than as impressions stamped from rings into wax, whether sensations are stamped into blood or into air. If then as in liquid bodies (which is reasonable), as into water, it will be confused, and there will be no memory; |
| 22.38 εἰ δ’ ἐμμενοῦσιν οἱ τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλους ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων κατεχόντων, ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται, ἢ γιγνομένων ἄλλων ἐκεῖνοι οἱ πρότερον ἀπολοῦνται, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ μνημονεύειν. εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ’ ἄλλοις, οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι.» | 22.38 But if the impressions remain, either it is impossible for others to be stamped while those hold possession (so there will be no other perceptions), or as others occur, those former ones will perish, so there will be no remembering. But if remembering is perceiving other things upon others without the former hindering, it is impossible for the soul to be a body. |
| 22.39 «Ἴδοι δ’ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀλγεῖν αἰσθήσεως τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ μὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁμολογήσουσιν ὡς περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν γίγνεται. ἄλλου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος μέρους, τοῦ πνεύματος τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὅλη ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. | 22.39 One might see this same truth also from the perception of pain. When a man is said to have a pain in his finger, the pain is indeed about the finger, but the perception of the pain—they will clearly agree—occurs around the governing center. The part in pain being one thing, the governing center of the breath perceives it, and the whole soul suffers the same thing. |
| 22.40 πῶς οὖν τοῦτο συμβαίνει; διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος, μεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ τούτου ἄλλῳ, ἕως οὗ πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο. | 22.40 How then does this happen? By transmission, they will say: the psychic breath around the finger suffering first, transmitting to the next, and this to another, until it reaches the governing center. |
| 22.41 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἰ τὸ πρῶτον πόνου ᾔσθετο, ἄλλην τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ δευτέρου εἶναι, καὶ εἰ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου γε ἄλλην, καὶ πολλὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀπείρους τὴν περὶ ἑνὸς ἀλγήματος γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων πασῶν ὕστερον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ ταύτας. | 22.41 It is necessary, then, if the first part felt the pain, that the perception of the second be different; and if perception is by transmission, that of the third also be different, and many—indeed infinite—perceptions occur concerning a single pain, and that the governing center perceive after all these, and perceive its own pain beside these! |
| 22.42 Τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἑκάστην ἐκείνων μὴ τοῦ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτῷ, καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκειν μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐᾶν, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι ἀλγεῖ ὁ δάκτυλος. | 22.42 The truth is that each of those parts does not perceive the pain in the finger, but the pain near itself, knowing this alone and letting the rest go, not knowing that the finger is in pain. |
| 22.43 εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν τὴν αἴσθησιν ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλου γνῶσιν εἶναι. Παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστίν, δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει.» | 22.43 If then perception is by transmission when mass exists, when one part suffers there is knowledge in another. For in every magnitude, if one part is different from another, that which perceives must be posited as such that it is everywhere the same with itself. And this belongs to some other of existing things to produce than a body. |
| 22.44 «Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἷόν τε εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἴη δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ σώματι προσχρωμένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τὸ διὰ σώματος καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. | 22.44 That it is not even possible to think (noeina) if the soul were any body whatsoever must be shown from the following. For if perceiving is the soul using a body to apprehend sense-objects, thinking cannot be apprehending through a body, or it will be the same as perceiving. |
| 22.45 Εἰ οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ἐστι τὸ ἄνευ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, πολὺ πρότερον δεῖ μὴ σῶμα αὖ τὸ νοῆσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἡ αἴσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἡ νόησις. Εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἔσονταί γε καὶ νοητῶν τινῶν νοήσεις καὶ ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις. | 22.45 If then thinking is apprehending without a body, much more must that which thinks not be a body, since perception is of sense-objects, but intellections (noēsis) are of intelligible objects. But if they do not wish this, nevertheless there will be intellections of certain intelligible objects and apprehendings of unextended things. |
| 22.46 πῶς οὖν μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν νοήσει; ἢ μέρει τινὶ ἀμερεῖ αὐτοῦ; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ νοῆσον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ ὅλου χρεία πρὸς τὸ θιγεῖν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἕν τι. | 22.46 How then will that which is a magnitude think what is not a magnitude, and with the divisible think the indivisible? Or with some indivisible part of itself? But if so, that which thinks will not be a body; for there is no need of the whole to touch it, since even one part is sufficient. |
| 22.47 εἰ μὲν οὖν συγχωρήσονται τὰς πρώτας νοήσεις, ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστι, εἶναι τῶν πάντῃ σώματος καθαρωτάτων, αὐτὸ ἑκάστου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ νοοῦν σώματος καθαρὸν ὄν, ἢ γιγνόμενον, γινώσκειν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε τῶν σωμάτων γίγνονται, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος. | 22.47 If then they will concede that primary intellections—which is true—are of things entirely purest from body, the essence of each, it is necessary that that which thinks, being or becoming pure of body, should know them. But if they say intellections are of forms in matter, yet they occur when bodies are separated, mind doing the separating. |
| 22.48 οὐ γὰρ δὴ μετὰ σαρκῶν, ἢ ὅλως ὕλης ὁ χωρισμὸς κύκλου καὶ τριγώνου καὶ γραμμῆς καὶ σημείου. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτὴν σῶμα εἶναι. ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις. ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀμερῆ κείσεται.» | 22.48 For surely the separation of a circle, triangle, line, and point is not with flesh or matter generally. The soul itself must therefore separate itself from body in such an operation. It must therefore not even be a body itself. And unextended, I think, are also the Beautiful and the Just, and so is the thinking of them. Thus, approaching the indivisible part of the soul, it will receive them, and in her they will lie indivisibly. |
| 22.49 «Πῶς δ’ ἂν καὶ σώματος ὄντος τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία τε καὶ ἄλλαι; πνεῦμά τι γάρ, ἢ αἷμά τι, τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴη ἢ δικαιότης, ἢ ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρεία τὸ δυσπαθὲς τοῦ πνεύματος εἴη, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἡ εὐκρασία, τὸ δὲ κάλλος εὐμορφία τις ἐν τύποις, καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν ἰδόντες ὡραίους καὶ καλοὺς τὰ σώματα. | 22.49 And how could virtues—temperance, justice, courage, and others—belong to the soul if it were a body? For would temperance or justice or courage be a certain breath (pneuma) or blood, unless courage were the hardiness of breath, and temperance its proper mixture, and beauty a symmetry in forms according to which we speak when seeing bodies handsome and beautiful? |
| 22.50 ἰσχυρῷ μὲν οὖν καὶ καλῷ ἐν τύποις πνεύματι εἶναι προσήκοι ἄν, σωφρονεῖν δὲ τί δεῖ πνεύματι; ἀλλ’ οὖν τοὐναντίον, ἐν περιπτύξεσι καὶ ἁφαῖς εὖ παθεῖν, ὅπου ἢ θερμανθήσεται, ἢ συμμέτρως ψύχους ἵμερος, ἢ μαλακοῖς τισι καὶ ἁπλοῖς καὶ λείοις πελάσει; τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀξίαν νεῖμαι τί ἂν αὐτῷ μέλοι; | 22.50 To be strong and handsome in form might belong to breath, but why should breath be temperate? Nay, on the contrary, it would suffer pleasure in embraces and touches, wherever it is heated or desires proportional cooling, or approaches soft, simple, and smooth things; but to distribute according to merit—what would it care for that? |
| 22.51 πότερον δὲ ἀιδίων ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν νοητῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφάπτεται, ἢ γίνεταί τῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖ καὶ πάλιν φθείρεται; ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ ποιῶν καὶ πόθεν; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο πάλιν μένοι. δεῖ ἄρα ἀιδίων εἶναι καὶ μενόντων, οἷα καὶ τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἀιδίων καὶ μενόντων, οὐ σωμάτων. καὶ δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔσται, τοιοῦτον εἶναι· ἄρα μὴ σῶμα εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ μένει, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖ ἡ σώματος φύσις πᾶσα.» | 22.51 Does the soul touch the theorems of virtue and other intelligibles as being eternal, or does virtue come to be for someone, benefit him, and perish again? But who is the maker and from where? For thus that former issue would remain again. They must therefore be eternal and remaining, like those in geometry. But if eternal and remaining, they are not bodies. And that in which they shall be must also be such—therefore not a body. For the nature of body does not remain, but is entirely in flux. |
| 22.52 «Εἰ δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ποιήσεις ὁρῶντες θερμαινούσας καὶ ψυχούσας καὶ ὠθούσας καὶ βαρυνούσας ἐνταῦθα τάττουσι τὴν ψυχήν, οἷον ἐν δραστηρίῳ τόπῳ ἱδρύοντες αὐτήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοοῦσιν ὡς καὶ ταῦτα τὰ σώματα δυνάμεσι ταῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ταῦτα ἐργάζεται· ἔπειτα ὅτι οὐ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀξιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐμφρόνως καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα, ἄλλην οὐσίαν ζητεῖ. | 22.52 If, seeing the actions of bodies heating, cooling, pushing, and weighing down, they assign the soul there, as if establishing her in an active place, first they are ignorant that even these bodies perform these things by incorporeal powers within them; next, that we do not consider these powers to be concerning the soul, but thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, caring wisely and nobly for all things—this seeks another substance. |
| 22.53 τὰς οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν ἀσωμάτων μεταβιβάσαντες εἰς τὰ σώματα οὐδεμίαν ἐκείνοις καταλείπουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσι δύναται ἃ δύναται ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὁμολογήσουσι γὰρ ἕτερον ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα εἶναι, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ποσὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ποιὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὴν ὕλην. ταῦτα δὲ ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν ποιότητα ὁμολογήσουσιν ἕτερον οὖσαν ποσοῦ, ἕτερον σώματος εἶναι. | 22.53 Transferring the powers of incorporeals to bodies, they leave none to those. That bodies are able to do what they can by incorporeal powers is clear from the following. For they will agree that quality and quantity are different, and that every body is quantitative, and yet not every body is qualitative, like matter. Agreeing to these things, they will agree that quality, being different from quantity, is different from body. |
| 22.54 πῶς γὰρ μὴ ποσὸς οὖσα σῶμα ἔσται, εἴπερ πᾶν σῶμα ποσόν; καὶ μήν, ὅπερ καὶ ἄνω που ἐλέγετο, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ πᾶν ἀφαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἦν, κερματιζομένου δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ μέρει ἡ αὐτὴ ὅλη ποιότης μένει, οἷον ἡ γλυκύτης ἡ τοῦ μέλιτος οὐδὲν ἔλαττον γλυκύτης ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα γλυκύτης. ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. | 22.54 For how, not being quantity, will it be body, if indeed every body is quantitative? And further, as was said somewhere above, if every body when divided loses what it was, but when body is fragmented the same whole quality remains in each part—such as the sweetness of honey is no less sweetness in each part—sweetness would not be a body; likewise with the other qualities. |
| 22.55 ἔπειτα εἰ σώματα ἦσαν αἱ δυνάμεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰς μὲν ἰσχυρὰς τῶν δυνάμεων μεγάλους ὄγκους, τὰς δὲ ὀλίγον δρᾶν δυναμένας ὄγκους μικροὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων μὲν τῶν ὄγκων μικραί, ὀλίγοι δὲ μικρότατοι τῶν ὄγκων μεγίστας ἔχουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ μεγέθει τὸ ποιεῖν ἀναθετέον· ἀμεγέθει ἄρα. | 22.55 Then, if powers were bodies, it would be necessary that strong powers be large masses, and those able to act little be small masses. But if small masses have the greatest powers, and large masses small ones, acting must be assigned to something other than magnitude—therefore to the unextended. |
| 22.56 τὸ δὲ ὕλην μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σῶμα, ὥς φασιν, οὖσαν, διάφορα δὲ ποιεῖν ποιότητας προσλαβοῦσαν, πῶς οὐ δῆλον ποιεῖ τὰ προσγενόμενα λόγους αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι; μηδ’ ὅτι πνεύματος ἢ αἵματος ἀποστάντων ἀποθνήσκει τὰ ζῷα λεγόντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἄνευ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη. καὶ μὴν οὔτε πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων οὔτε αἷμα, ψυχὴ δέ.» | 22.56 And that matter, being the same, is body (as they say), but produces different things when receiving qualities—how does this fail to make clear that the additions are forming principles (logoi) themselves and incorporeal? Nor let them say that when breath or blood departs, animals die. For it is impossible to exist without these, nor without many other things, which could not be the soul. And indeed, neither breath nor blood is throughout all parts, but soul is. |
| 22.57 «Ἔτι εἰ σῶμα οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ διῆλθε διὰ παντός, κἂν κραθεῖσα εἴη, ὃν τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἡ κρᾶσις. εἰ δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων κρᾶσις οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐᾷ εἶναι τῶν κραθέντων, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνείη τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, ἀπολέσασα τὸ εἶναι ψυχή, ὥσπερ εἰ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν κραθείη, τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔχομεν ψυχήν. | 22.57 Further, if the soul, being a body, passed through the whole, it would be blended in the manner of blending for other bodies. But if the blending of bodies leaves none of the blended things in actuality, the soul would no longer be in the bodies in actuality, but in potentiality only, having lost its being soul—just as if sweet and bitter were blended, the sweet is no longer. Therefore we do not have a soul! |
| 22.58 τὸ δὲ δὴ σῶμα ὂν σώματι κεκράσθαι ὅλον δι’ ὅλου, ὡς ὅπου ἂν ᾖ καὶ θάτερον, εἶναι ἴσον ὄγκον ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τὸ πᾶν κατεχόντων, καὶ μηδεμίαν αὔξην γεγονέναι ἐπεμβληθέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου, οὐδὲν ἀπολείψει ὃ μὴ τέμῃ. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη παραλλὰξ ἡ κρᾶσις· (οὕτω γάρ φασι παράθεσιν ἔσεσθαι·) διεληλυθὸς δὲ διὰ παντὸς τὸ ἐπεμβληθὲν ἐπὶ σμικρότερον· (ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἔλαττον ἴσον γενέσθαι τῷ μείζονι·) ἀλλ’ οὖν διεληλυθὸς πᾶν τέμνει κατὰ πᾶν. | 22.58 And that a body, being body, should be blended whole through whole so that wherever one is, the other is also, their mass being equal, occupying the whole, and no increase having occurred when the other was added—this will leave nothing uncut. For blending is not by large parts side by side (for thus they say there will be juxtaposition); but the added body having gone through all passes to a smaller space (which is impossible, for the smaller to become equal to the larger)—nevertheless, having gone through all, it cuts every part through every part. |
| 22.59 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἰ καθ’ ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον, καὶ μὴ μεταξύ, σῶμα ἔσται ὃ μὴ τέτμηται, εἰς σημεῖα τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰς δὲ ἄπειρον τῆς τομῆς οὔσης (ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς σῶμα διαίρετόν ἐστι) οὐ δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ ἄπειρα ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι’ ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατόν τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δι’ ὅλων· ἀσώματος ἄρα.» | 22.59 It is necessary, then, if at any point whatsoever there shall be a body between that is not cut, the division of the body has occurred into points, which is impossible. And division being to infinity (for whatever body you take is divisible), infinite parts will exist not in potentiality only, but in actuality. Body, therefore, cannot pass whole through whole, but soul passes through all—she is therefore incorporeal. |
| 22.60 «Τὸ δὲ καὶ φύσιν μὲν προτέραν τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ψυχρῷ γενομένην καὶ στομωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι, λεπτοτέραν ἐν ψυχρῷ γενομένην· ὃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον· πολλὰ γὰρ ζῷα ἐν θερμῷ γίγνεται, καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει οὐ ψυχθεῖσαν. ἀλλ’ οὖν φασί γε προτέραν φύσιν ψυχῆς εἶναι κατὰ συντυχίας τὰς ἔξω γιγνομένην. | 22.60 To say that the same breath is first nature, but becoming in cold and hardened becomes soul, becoming finer in cold—this itself is absurd; for many animals are born in heat and have a soul without being cooled. But at any rate they say that nature is prior to soul, coming to be by external chances. |
| 22.61 συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον, ἣν λέγουσιν ἔξιν. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὕστατος, ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος, ἢ εἰ πρὸ πάντων νοῦς, ἐφεξῆς ἔδει ψυχὴν ποιεῖν, εἶτα φύσιν· καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ ὕστερον χεῖρον, εἴπερ πέφυκεν. | 22.61 It happens to them, then, to make the worse first, and before this another lesser thing which they call habit (hexis). But mind is last, obviously generated from soul; or if mind is before all, it ought to make soul next, then nature—and always the later is worse, if such is its nature. |
| 22.62 εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὕστερος καὶ γεννητὸς καὶ ἐπακτὸν τὸ νοεῖν ἔχων, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μηδὲ ψυχὴν μηδὲ νοῦν, μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι· εἰ τὸ δυνάμει, μὴ ὄντος πρότερον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ νοῦς γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἥξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἄγον, μὴ ὄντος ἑτέρου παρ’ αὐτὸ προτέρου; εἰ δ’ ἑαυτὸ ἄξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ βλέπον γε πρός τι ἄξει, ὃ οὐ δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἔσται. | 22.62 If then God is also later to them according to mind, and generated, having imported thinking, it would be possible that neither soul, nor mind, nor God exists. If that which is potential, when that which is actual does not exist prior, should become mind, it will not even come into actuality. For what will be that which leads it, if another prior to it does not exist? But if it shall lead itself into actuality (which is absurd), yet it will lead looking toward something which is not in potentiality, but in actuality. |
| 22.63 καίτοι τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει ἕξει, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἥξει, καὶ τοῦτο κρεῖττον ἔσται τοῦ δυναμένου, οἷον ὀρεκτὸν ὂν ἐκείνου. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἑτέραν φύσιν ἔχον σώματος καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ἀεί· πρότερον ἄρα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ φύσεως. οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα, οὐδ’ ὡς σῶμα. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν οὐ σῶμα λέγοιτ’ ἂν καὶ εἴρηται καὶ ἄλλοις ἕτερα, ἱκανὰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.» | 22.63 And yet to remain always the same, if it shall have potentiality, will come into actuality by itself, and this will be better than that which is potential, as being the object of desire for that. Prior, then, is the better, having another nature than body and being always in actuality; prior, then, are mind and soul to nature. Soul, therefore, is not as breath, nor as body. But that it is not body might be said—and other things have been said by others—and these are sufficient." |
| 22.64 «Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλης φύσεως, δεῖ ζητεῖν τίς αὕτη. ἆρ’ οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἁρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον, ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδὰς ἁρμονία. | 22.64 "Since it is of another nature, we must seek what this is. Is it then different from body, yet something belonging to body, such as a harmony? For speaking of harmony in another way than those around Pythagoras, they thought it to be something such as harmony concerning strings. |
| 22.65 ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένων τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεταί τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ’ αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἁρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος, ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένων, τὴν ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ζωήν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχήν, οὖσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν εἴρηται. | 22.65 For as there, when strings are stretched, a certain affection occurs upon them which is called harmony, in the same way with our body, when a blending of unlikes occurs, the particular quality of blending produces both life and soul, being the affection upon the blending. That this is impossible, many things have already been said against this opinion. |
| 22.66 καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἡ ψυχή, ἡ δ’ ἁρμονία ὕστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῇ, ἁρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὖσα ταῦτα ποιοῖ· καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία οὐκ οὐσία· καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὖσα, ὑγίεια ἂν εἴη· καὶ ὅτι καθ’ ἕκαστον μέρος ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχὴ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς εἶναι· καὶ τόδε μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιοῦσαν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ταύτην, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, τὸν μουσικόν, τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν, λόγον ἔχοντα παρ’ αὑτῷ, καθ’ ὃν ἁρμόσει. | 22.66 For both that the soul is prior, while harmony is later; and that the soul rules and presides over the body and fights it in many ways, while harmony, not being such, could not do these things; and that the soul is substance, while harmony is not substance; and that the blending of bodies of which we are composed, being in proportion, would be health; and that according to each part blended differently there would be a different soul, so that there are many; and this greatest point: that before this soul there must be another soul which produces this harmony—just as on instruments there is the musician who inserts the harmony into the strings, having in himself the forming principle according to which he will tune them. |
| 22.67 οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ’ αὑτῶν οὔτ’ ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἁρμονίαν ἄγειν δυνήσεται. ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἀψύχου ἔμψυχα ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα καὶ τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία.» | 22.67 For neither there can strings tune themselves, nor here can bodies bring themselves into harmony. In general, these thinkers also make living things out of inanimate things, and things ordered by chance out of disordered things, and that order takes its substance not from soul, but soul takes its substance from automatic order! But this is impossible to occur either in particular things or in others. The soul, therefore, is not a harmony." |
| 22.68 Ταῦτα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Πλωτίνου πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ ψυχῆς δόξαν, σωματικὴν φασκόντων αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ αὐταρκῶς τά τε πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ τὸν Περίπατον, τά τε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν, ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ παρατέθειμαι, ὥρα πάλιν ἐπανελθόντα τῶν γενναίων φιλοσόφων ὁμοῦ πάντων τὰς θαυμαστὰς ἐπισκέψασθαι φυσιολογίας, ὅτε μάλιστα κοινῶς πάντες Ἕλληνες θεοὺς ὁρατούς, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀστέρας, τά τε ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ἡγήσαντό τε καὶ ἐσέφθησαν, καὶ τάς γε μυθικὰς καὶ ληρώδεις αὐτῶν περὶ τῆς πολυθέου πλάνης διηγήσεις σεμνοτέραις δὴ καὶ φυσικαῖς ἀποδόσεσιν ἐπὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου μόρια μετενηνόχασιν. | 22.68 These things, then, are from Plotinus against the opinion of the Stoics concerning the soul, who declare it to be corporeal. But since I have adequately presented in summary both the arguments against Aristotle and the Peripatos, and those against the Stoic sect, it is time to return again and inspect the marvelous natural philosophies of all the noble philosophers together—especially when almost all Greeks commonly considered and revered visible gods (sun, moon, and remaining stars, and other parts of the cosmos), and have transferred their mythical and foolish narratives concerning polytheistic error by more solemn and natural explanations onto the elements and parts of the whole cosmos. |
|
22.69
διό μοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶνδε δόξας ὁμοῦ συναγαγεῖν, τάς τε διαστάσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τύφου τὸ μάταιον ἐπιθεωρῆσαι. θήσω δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς Πλουτάρχου γραφῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὰς περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νέων δόξας συναγαγὼν τοῦτον γράφει τὸν τρόπον·
«Περὶ ἡλίου.» |
22.69
Wherefore it seems necessary to me to collect their opinions concerning these matters together, and to inspect their disagreements and the vanity of their delusion. I shall set these down also from the writing of Plutarch, in which, having collected the opinions concerning all these matters together of both older and younger thinkers, he writes in this manner:
"On the Sun." |
Chapter 23
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes from (Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.20) and catalogues the various natural philosophical views on the physical nature and composition of the sun held by Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.
| 23.1 Ἀναξίμανδρος κύκλον εἶναι ὀκτωκαιεικοσαπλασίονα τῆς γῆς, ἁρματείῳ τροχῷ παραπλήσιον, τὴν ἁψῖδα ἔχοντα κοίλην, πλήρη πυρός, ἧς κατά τι μέρος ἐκφαινούσης διὰ στομίου τὸ πῦρ, ὥσπερ διὰ πρηστῆρος αὐλοῦ· καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. | 23.1 Anaximander [holds] that the sun is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the earth, resembling a chariot wheel, having a hollow rim full of fire, which at a certain part reveals the fire through an opening, as if through the pipe of a waterspout or blowpipe; and that this is the sun. |
| 23.2 Ξενοφάνης ἐκ πυριδίων τῶν φαινομένων συναθροιζομένων μὲν ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροιζόντων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκ νεφῶν πεπυρωμένων. | 23.2 Xenophanes [holds that it is formed] from little sparks gathered from the moist exhalation, which collect to form the sun out of ignited clouds. |
| 23.3 Οἱ Στωϊκοί, ἄναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάσσης. | 23.3 The Stoics [hold that it is] an intelligent kindle/ignition fueled by the sea. |
| 23.4 Πλάτων, ἐκ πλείστου πυρός. | 23.4 Plato [holds that it consists] mostly of fire. |
| 23.5 Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Μητρόδωρος, μύδρον ἢ πέτρον διάπυρον. | 23.5 Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus [hold that it is] a glowing red-hot mass of metal or a incandescent stone. |
| 23.6 Ἀριστοτέλης, σφαῖραν ἐκ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος. | 23.6 Aristotle [holds that it is] a sphere composed of the fifth element (ether). |
| 23.7 Φιλόλαος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος δίσκον ὑαλοειδῆ, δεχόμενον μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πυρὸς τὴν ἀνταύγειαν, διηθοῦντα δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ φῶς· ὥστε προσεοικέναι ἡλίου τὸ ἐν οὐρανῷ πυρῶδες τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνόπτρου κατ’ ἀνάκλασιν διασπειρομένῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐγῇ· καὶ γὰρ ταύτην προσονομάζομεν ἥλιον, οἱονεὶ εἴδωλον εἰδώλου. | 23.7 Philolaus the Pythagorean [holds that it is] a glass-like disc, receiving the reflection of the fire within the cosmos and filtering the light to us; so that the fiery nature of the sun in the heavens resembles the ray scattered toward us from a mirror by reflection—for we also call this ray "sun," as it were an image of an image. |
| 23.8 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο ἡλίους· τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον πῦρ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ τοῦ κόσμου, πεπληρωκὸς τὸ ἡμισφαίριον ἀεὶ κατ’ ἀντικρὺ τῆς ἀνταυγείας αὑτοῦ, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον ἀνταύγειαν εἶναι, ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ, τῷ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ θερμομιγοῦς πεπληρωμένῳ, ἀπὸ κυκλοτεροῦς τῆς γῆς κατ’ ἀνάκλασιν ἐγγιγνομένην εἰς τὸν ἥλιον τὸν κρυσταλλοειδῆ, συμπεριελκομένην δὲ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ πυρίνου. ὡς δὲ βραχέως εἰρῆσθαι συντεμόντα, ἀνταύγειαν εἶναι τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν πυρὸς τὸν ἥλιον. | 23.8 Empedocles [holds that there are] two suns: one being the archetypal fire in the other hemisphere of the cosmos, having filled that hemisphere directly opposite its own reflection; the other being the visible sun, which is a reflection in the other hemisphere (the one filled with air mixed with heat), arising by reflection from the circular earth onto the crystal-like sun, and drawn around by the motion of the fiery hemisphere. To put it briefly and concisely, the sun is a reflection of the fire surrounding the earth. |
| 23.9 Ἐπίκουρος, γήινον πύκνωμα, κισσηροειδὲς καὶ σπογγοειδὲς ταῖς κατατρήσεσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀνημμένον. | 23.9 Epicurus [holds that it is] an earthy condensation, like pumice stone or a sponge in its perforations, ignited by fire. |
Chapter 24
This chapter, (quoting Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.21) summarizes the physical size of the sun according to various ancient philosophers: Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Epicurus.
|
24.1
Περὶ μεγέθους ἡλίου. Ἀναξίμανδρος τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἴσον εἶναι τῇ γῇ, τὸν δὲ κύκλον ἀφ’ οὗ τὴν ἐκπνοὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὑφ’ οὗ φέρεται, ἑπτακαιεικοσαπλασίονα τῆς γῆς. |
24.1
On the size of the sun. Anaximander [holds] that the sun itself is equal in size to the earth, but the ring from which it has its vent and by which it is carried round is twenty-seven times the size of the earth. |
| 24.2 Ἀναξαγόρας πολλαπλασίονα Πελοποννήσου. | 24.2 Anaxagoras [holds that it is] many times larger than the Peloponnese. |
| 24.3 Ἡράκλειτος, εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπείου. | 24.3 Heraclitus [holds that it is] the width of a human foot. |
| 24.4 Ἐπίκουρος πάλιν φησὶν ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ προειρημένα πάντα· ἢ τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος φαίνεται, ἢ μικρῷ μείζω, ἢ ἐλάττω. | 24.4 Epicurus again says that all the aforementioned views are possible: [that it is] either as large as it appears, or slightly larger, or smaller. |
Chapter 25
This chapter, (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.22) surveys the various physical shapes assigned to the sun by Anaximenes, Heraclitus, the Stoics, and Epicurus, before concluding with Eusebius’s apologetic remark contrasting these speculations with the restraint of Moses and the Hebrew Scriptures.
| 25.1 Περὶ σχήματος ἡλίου. Ἀναξιμένης πλατὺν ὡς πέταλον. | 25.1 On the shape of the sun. Anaximenes [holds that it is] broad like a leaf. |
| 25.2 Ἡράκλειτος σκαφοειδῆ, ὑπόκυρτον. | 25.2 Heraclitus [holds that it is] bowl-shaped, slightly concave. |
| 25.3 Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ σφαιροειδῆ, ὡς τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα. | 25.3 The Stoics [hold that it is] spherical, like the cosmos and the stars. |
|
25.4
Ἐπίκουρος ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ προειρημένα πάντα.
Τοιοῦτος μὲν αὐτοῖς ὁ μέγας τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν φαινομένων θεὸς ἥλιος. Μωσῆς δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια οὐδὲν τούτων περιεργάζονται. |
25.4
Epicurus [holds that] all the aforementioned views are possible.
Such, then, is the great god of the heavenly phenomena, the sun, according to them. But Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews busy themselves with none of these idle speculations. |
Chapter 26
In this chapter, quoting Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.25) he details the physical nature, composition, and structure of the moon as theorized by various Greek philosophical traditions: Anaximander, Xenophanes, the Stoics, Plato, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Heraclitus, and Pythagoras.
| 26.1 Περὶ σελήνης. Ἀναξίμανδρος κύκλον εἶναι ἐννεακαιδεκαπλασίονα τῆς γῆς, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου, πλήρη πυρός, ἐκλείπειν δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστροφὰς τοῦ τροχοῦ· ὅμοιον δὲ εἶναι ἁρματείῳ τροχῷ, κοίλην ἔχοντα τὴν ἁψῖδα καὶ πυρὸς πλήρη, ἔχοντα μίαν ἐκπνοήν. |
26.1
On the moon. Anaximander [holds] that it is a circle nineteen times the size of the earth, like that of the sun, full of fire, and that it eclipses according to the turnings of the wheel; and that it resembles a chariot wheel, having a hollow rim and full of fire, possessing a single vent. |
| 26.2 Ξενοφάνης νέφος εἶναι πεπιλημένον. | 26.2 Xenophanes [holds that it is] a compressed cloud. |
| 26.3 Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ μικτὸν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. | 26.3 The Stoics [hold that it is] a mixture composed of fire and air. |
| 26.4 Πλάτων ἐκ πλείονος τοῦ γεώδους. | 26.4 Plato [holds that it consists] mostly of earthy substance. |
| 26.5 Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, στερέωμα διάπυρον, ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ πεδία καὶ ὄρη καὶ φάραγγας. | 26.5 Anaxagoras and Democritus [hold that it is] a glowing solid mass, having within itself plains and mountains and chasms. |
| 26.6 Ἡράκλειτος γῆν ὁμίχλῃ περιεχομένην. | 26.6 Heraclitus [holds that it is] earth enveloped in mist. |
| 26.7 Πυθαγόρας κατὰ τὸ πυροειδὲς σῶμα. | 26.7 Pythagoras [holds that it is] according to [the nature of] a fiery body. |
Chapter 27
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.26 and 2.27 to present short doxological opinions on the physical size of the moon (according to the Stoics and Parmenides).
|
27.1
Περὶ μεγέθους σελήνης. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ μείζονα τῆς γῆς ἀποφαίνονται, ὡς καὶ τὸν ἥλιον. |
27.1
On the size of the moon. The Stoics declare [it to be] larger than the earth, just like the sun. |
| 27.2 Παρμενίδης ἴσον τῷ ἡλίῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ φωτίζεται. | 27.2 Parmenides [holds that it is] equal to the sun; for indeed it is illuminated by it. |
Chapter 28
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.26 and 2.27 to present short doxological opinion the geometric shape of the moon (according to the Stoics, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and others).
|
28.1
Περὶ σχήματος σελήνης. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ σφαιροειδῆ εἶναι, ὡς τὸν ἥλιον. Ἡράκλειτος σκαφοειδῆ. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δισκοειδῆ. Ἄλλοι κυλινδροειδῆ. |
28.1
On the shape of the moon. The Stoics [hold that it is] spherical, like the sun. Heraclitus [holds that it is] bowl-shaped. Empedocles [holds that it is] disc-shaped. Others [hold that it is] cylinder-shaped. |
Chapter 29
In this chapter, citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.28) Eusebius addresses the views of the illumination of the moon, debating whether it possesses its own inherent light or reflects light from the sun according to Anaximander, Antiphon, Thales, and Heraclitus.
| 29.1 Περὶ φωτισμοῦ σελήνης. Ἀναξίμανδρος ἴδιον αὐτὴν ἔχειν φῶς, ἀραιότερον δέ πως. | 29.1 On the illumination of the moon. Anaximander [holds that] it has its own light, but somewhat rarer/dimmer. |
| 29.2 Ἀντιφῶν ἰδίῳ φέγγει λάμπειν τὴν σελήνην· τὸ δ’ ὑποκρυπτόμενον περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῆς προσβολῆς τοῦ ἡλίου ἀμαυροῦσθαι, πεφυκότος τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου πυρὸς τὸ ἀσθενέστερον ἀμαυροῦν, ὃ δὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα. | 29.2 Antiphon [holds that] the moon shines with its own light, but that the part hidden about it is obscured by the impact of the sun’s light—since stronger fire naturally dims the weaker, which is precisely what occurs with the other stars as well. |
| 29.3 Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεσθαι τὴν σελήνην. | 29.3 Thales and his followers [hold that] the moon is illuminated by the sun. |
| 29.4 Ἡράκλειτος τὸ αὐτὸ πεπονθέναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην· σκαφοειδεῖς γὰρ ὄντας τοῖς σχήμασι τοὺς ἀστέρας, δεχομένους τε τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐγάς, φωτίζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν· λαμπρότερον μὲν τὸν ἥλιον, ἐν καθαρωτέρῳ γὰρ ἀέρι φέρεσθαι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐν θολερῷ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀμαυροτέραν φαίνεσθαι. | 29.4 Heraclitus [holds that] the sun and the moon experience the same thing; for the heavenly bodies, being bowl-shaped in their forms and receiving the vapors from the moist exhalation, are illuminated to our sight—the sun more brightly, because it is carried in cleaner air, and the moon more dimly, because it moves in turbid air, and for this reason appears darker. |
Chapter 30
In this chapter, quoting Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.13), he surveys the physical nature and composition of both fixed stars and planets according to various thinkers—including Thales, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Plato, Xenophanes, Heraclides, the Pythagoreans, and Epicurus—concluding with an Orphic reference and Epicurus’s characteristic acceptance of multiple possibilities.
|
30.1
Τίς ἡ οὐσία τῶν πλανήτων ἄστρων καὶ ἀπλανῶν. Θαλῆς γεώδη μέν, ἔμπυρα δὲ τὰ ἄστρα. | 30.1 What is the substance of the wandering stars [planets] and fixed stars. Thales [holds that] the stars are earthy, but incandescent. |
| 30.2 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πύρινα, ἐκ τοῦ πυρώδους, ὅπερ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιέχων ἐξανέθλιψε κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διάκρισιν. | 30.2 Empedocles [holds that they are] fiery, formed from the fiery element which the air contained within itself and squeezed out during the primary separation. |
| 30.3 Ἀναξαγόρας τὸν περικείμενον ἀέρα πύρινον μὲν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τῇ δ’ εὐτονίᾳ τῆς περιδινήσεως ἀναρπάσαντα πέτρους ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ καταφλέξαντα, τούτους ἠστερικέναι. | 30.3 Anaxagoras [holds that] the surrounding air is fiery in its nature, and that by the intense force of its rotation it snatched up stones from the earth, set them on fire, and thus converted them into stars. |
| 30.4 Διογένης κισσηρώδη τὰ ἄστρα, διαπνοὰς αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου· πάλιν δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀφανεῖς μὲν λίθους, πίπτοντας δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν σβέννυσθαι, καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς πυροειδῶς κατενεχθέντα ἀστέρα πέτρινον. | 30.4 Diogenes considers the stars to be pumice-like, regarding them as breathing-holes of the cosmos. The same thinker further holds that there are unseen stones which frequently fall to the earth and are extinguished, just like the stony star that fell in a fiery state at Aegospotami. |
| 30.5 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τοὺς μὲν ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας συνδεδέσθαι τῷ κρυστάλλῳ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἀνεῖσθαι. | 30.5 Empedocles [holds that] the fixed stars are attached to the crystalline firmament, but the planets are unattached. |
| 30.6 Πλάτων ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείστου μέρους πυρίνους, μετέχοντας δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, κόλλης δίκην. | 30.6 Plato [holds that they consist] for the most part of fire, but partake also of the other elements after the manner of a binding glue. |
| 30.7 Ξενοφάνης ἐκ νεφῶν μὲν πεπυρωμένων, σβεννυμένους δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναζωπυρεῖν νύκτωρ, καθάπερ τοὺς ἄνθρακας· τὰς γὰρ ἀνατολὰς καὶ τὰς δύσεις ἐξάψεις εἶναι καὶ σβέσεις. | 30.7 Xenophanes [holds that they are formed] from ignited clouds, which are extinguished every day and rekindled at night like embers; for their risings and settings are lightings and extinguishings. |
| 30.8 Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν, γῆν περιέχοντα ἀέρα τε καὶ αἰθέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ. ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἐμφέρεται· κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων. | 30.8 Heraclides and the Pythagoreans [hold that] each of the stars is a cosmos, containing earth and air and ether in the infinite universe. These doctrines are also found in the Orphic writings; for they make a cosmos out of each of the stars. |
| 30.9 Ἐπίκουρος οὐδὲν ἀπογινώσκει τούτων, ἐχόμενος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου. | 30.9 Epicurus rejects none of these views, adhering to the principle of possibility. |
Chapter 31
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.14) outlines various theories on the physical shape and attachment of the stars (according to the Stoics, Cleanthes, Anaximenes, and others), followed by Eusebius’s concluding critique mockingly evaluating these philosophical theories about the "visible gods" before transitioning to his broader citation of Plutarch regarding the universe.
|
31.1
Περὶ σχήματος ἀστέρων. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ σφαιρικοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, καθάπερ τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην. |
31.1
On the shape of the stars. The Stoics [hold that] the stars are spherical, just like the cosmos and the sun and the moon. |
| 31.2 Κλεάνθης κωνοειδεῖς. | 31.2 Cleanthes [holds that they are] cone-shaped. |
|
31.3
Ἀναξιμένης ἥλων δίκην καταπεπηγέναι τῷ κρυσταλλοειδεῖ· ἔνιοι δὲ πέταλα εἶναι πύρινα, ὥσπερ ζωγραφήματα.
Τοιαῦτα τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ περὶ ὧν φασι φαινομένων θεῶν ἐξευρήματα. Οἷα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς διειλήφασιν, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς μάνθανε τοῦ Πλουτάρχου φωνῆς. |
31.3
Anaximenes [holds that they are] fixed like nails in the crystalline vault; but some say they are fiery leaves, like painted figures.
Such are the inventions of these admirable philosophers concerning those they call visible gods. Learn now from the same voice of Plutarch what sort of views they have also formed concerning the universe as a whole. |
Chapter 32
In this chapter, Eusebius (quoting Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.4 for sections 32.1–32.7) details the mechanistic formation of the cosmos (cosmogony) through the random collision, sorting, and aggregation of atoms of various shapes and sizes. Sections 32.8–32.10 serve as Eusebius’s editorial transition, summarizing the endless philosophical disputes (logomachia) over the universe, stars, souls, and meteorology, and arguing that their sharp contradictions justify the Christian practice of setting aside Greek physics in favor of divine revelation.
|
32.1
Πῶς συνέστη ὁ κόσμος. Ὁ τοίνυν κόσμος περικεκλασμένῳ σχήματι ἐσχημάτισται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. Τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῶς τε καὶ τάχιστα κινουμένων, εἰς ταὐτὸ πολλὰ σώματα συνηθροίσθη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποικιλίαν ἔχοντα σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν. |
32.1
How the cosmos was formed. The cosmos was formed into an vaulted/arched shape in the following manner. As atomic bodies possessed an unguided and accidental motion, moving continuously and at extreme speed, many bodies gathered together into the same place, possessing on this account a variety of shapes and sizes. |
| 32.2 Ἀθροιζομένων δὲ ἐν ταὐτῷ τούτων, τὰ μὲν ὅσα μείζονα ἦν καὶ βαρύτατα πάντων ὑπεκάθιζεν, ὅσα δὲ μικρὰ καὶ περιφερῆ καὶ λεῖα καὶ εὐολίσθητα, ταῦτα ἐξεθλίβετο κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον τῶν σωμάτων, εἴς τε τὸ μετέωρον ἀνεφέρετο. | 32.2 As these gathered in the same place, those that were larger and heaviest of all settled underneath, while those that were small, spherical, smooth, and slippery were squeezed out at the collision of the bodies and carried upward into the height. |
| 32.3 Ὡς οὖν ἐξέλιπε μὲν ἡ πληκτικὴ δύναμις μετεωρίζουσα, οὐκέτι δὲ ἦγεν ἡ πληγὴ πρὸς τὸ μετέωρον, ἐκωλύετο δὲ ταῦτα φέρεσθαι κάτω, ἐπιέζετο πρὸς τοὺς τόπους τοὺς δυναμένους δέξασθαι· οὗτοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ πέριξ. | 32.3 When the impelling force carrying them upward gave out, and the impact no longer drove them into the height, and yet they were prevented from moving downward, they were compressed against the regions capable of receiving them; and these were the surrounding spaces. |
| 32.4 Καὶ πρὸς τούτους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων περιεκλᾶτο· περιπλεκόμενα δὲ ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν περίκλασιν τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐγέννησε. Τῆς δ’ αὐτῆς ἐχόμεναι φύσεως αἱ ἄτομοι, ποικίλαι οὖσαι, καθὼς εἴρηται, πρὸς τὸ μετέωρον ἐξωθούμεναι, τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν ἀπετέλουν. | 32.4 Against these the multitude of bodies was bent around; and entangling with one another in this arching curve, they produced the heaven. And the atoms belonging to the same nature, being varied (as has been said) and thrust upward into the height, produced the nature of the stars. |
| 32.5 Τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν ἀναθυμιωμένων σωμάτων ἐπέπληττε τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τοῦτον ἐξέθλιβε· πνευματούμενος δὲ οὗτος κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ περιλαμβάνων τὰ ἄστρα συμπεριῆγεν αὐτά, καὶ τὴν νῦν περιφορὰν αὐτῶν μετέωρον ἐφύλαττε. Κἄπειτα ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὑποκαθιζόντων ἐγένετο ἡ γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μετεωριζομένων ὁ οὐρανός, πῦρ, ἀήρ. | 32.5 The mass of vaporized bodies struck the air and squeezed it out; and this air, becoming wind-driven by its motion and encircling the stars, carried them round with it and preserved their present revolving motion in mid-air. Then from the settling particles arose the earth, and from those raised on high arose the heaven, fire, and air. |
| 32.6 Πολλῆς δὲ ὕλης ἔτι περιειλημμένης ἐν τῇ γῇ, πυκνουμένης δὲ ταύτης κατὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων πληγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων αὔρας, προσεθλίβετο πᾶς ὁ μικρομερὴς σχηματισμὸς ταύτης καὶ τὴν ὑγρὰν φύσιν ἐγέννα. | 32.6 But as much matter was still enclosed within the earth, and as this was compacted by the blows of the winds and the breezes from the stars, all its fine-particled structure was squeezed out and produced the fluid nature. |
| 32.7 Ῥευστικῶς δ’ αὕτη διακειμένη κατεφέρετο πρὸς τοὺς κοίλους τόπους καὶ δυναμένους χωρῆσαί τε καὶ στέξαι· ᾗ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ὑποστὰν ἐκοίλαινε τοὺς ὑποκειμένους τόπους. | 32.7 Being in a fluid state, this was carried down toward hollow places capable of containing and holding it; or rather, the water settling by itself hollowed out the underlying places. |
| 32.8 Τοιαύτη καὶ ἡ θαυμάσιος αὐτῶν κοσμογονία. Συνῆπται δὲ τούτοις ἄλλη τις πλείστη λογομαχία, παντοίων πέρι προτάσεων ἀπορησάντων εἰ χρὴ τὸ πᾶν ἓν ἢ πολλὰ ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ ἕνα τὸν κόσμον ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἴτε ἔμψυχος οὗτος καὶ προνοίᾳ τυγχάνει θεοῦ διοικούμενος, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία, καὶ εἰ ἄφθαρτος ἢ φθαρτός, καὶ πόθεν τρέφεται, καὶ ἀπὸ ποίου ἤρξατο ὁ θεὸς κοσμοποιεῖν· περί τε τῆς τάξεως τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ αὐτὸν ἐγκλιθῆναι· περί τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς τῆς τοῦ κόσμου περιφερείας· καὶ τίνα τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη· περί τε οὐρανοῦ· καὶ πρὸς ἅπασι τούτοις περί τε δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων· περί τε ὕλης καὶ περὶ ἰδεῶν· περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς τάξεως· ἔτι μὴν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὁπόθεν φωτίζονται οἱ ἀστέρες· καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων Διοσκούρων· περί τε ἐκλείψεως ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης· καὶ περὶ ἐμφάσεως αὐτῆς· καὶ διὰ τί γεώδης φαίνεται· καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποστημάτων αὐτῆς· καὶ ἔτι περὶ ἐνιαυτῶν. | 32.8 Such is their admirable cosmogony. Joined to these matters is another vast war of words (logomachia), as they were in doubt concerning all kinds of propositions: whether one ought to consider the all as one or many; whether the cosmos is one or several; whether it is animated and governed by God's providence, or the exact opposite; whether it is imperishable or perishable; from where it is nourished; from what point God began to create the cosmos; concerning the order of the cosmos; what is the cause of its inclination; concerning what lies outside the circumference of the cosmos; what are the right and left parts of the cosmos; concerning heaven; and in addition to all these, concerning daemons and heroes; concerning matter and ideas; concerning the order of the universe; further, concerning the carriage and motion of the stars; and in addition to these, from where the stars are illuminated; concerning the so-called Dioscuri; concerning eclipses of the sun and moon; concerning the appearance of the moon and why it appears earth-like; concerning its distances; and further, concerning years. |
| 32.9 Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα διὰ μυρίων τοῖς περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος κατεσκευασμένα, ἐπειδὴ τεμὼν ὁ Πλούταρχος ἐν ὀλίγοις συνεῖλεν, ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ συναγαγὼν ἀποφάσεις καὶ τὰς διαφωνίας αὐτῶν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἄχρηστα γενήσεσθαι αὐτὰ παρατεθέντα εἰς τὴν εὔλογον αὐτῶν παραίτησιν. Ὅτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐναντίοι κατὰ διάμετρον ἔστησαν, μάχας τε καὶ πολέμους, πλέον δ’ οὐδὲν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἐξῆψαν, τὰ τῶν πέλας ἕκαστοι φιλοτιμίᾳ λόγων ἀπελέγξαντες, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἡμῖν ἀσφαλῆ τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐποχὴν γεγονέναι πᾶς ὁστισοῦν ὁμολογήσειε; | 32.9 All these matters having been elaborated through ten thousand arguments by the philosophers in question, since Plutarch cut them short and summarized them in few words, bringing together into one place their declarations and disagreements, I consider that it will not be useless for us also to set them forth as a reasonable ground for rejecting them. For when they themselves stood diametrically opposed to one another, kindling battles and wars against themselves without achieving anything further than each refuting the arguments of their neighbors through intellectual ambition, how could anyone fail to agree that our suspension of judgment (epoche) concerning these matters is entirely safe? |
| 32.10 Προσθήσω δὲ ἑξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὅσα καὶ περὶ τῶν προσγειοτέρων ἐπηπόρησαν· περὶ γῆς σχήματος, καὶ περὶ θέσεως καὶ ἐγκλίσεως αὐτῆς· καὶ ἔτι περὶ θαλάσσης· ὡς ἂν εἰδείης ὅτι μὴ περὶ μόνων τῶν μετεώρων καὶ μεταρσίων οἱ γενναῖοι διέστησαν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περιγείοις διαπεφωνήκασιν. Ἵνα δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν σοφίαν ἀποθαυμάσῃς, προσθήσω καὶ ὅσα περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ ἡγεμονικοῦ διεμαχήσαντο, οὐδὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιγνῶναι οἵας εἶεν φύσεως δεδυνημένοι. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀνίωμεν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν εἰρημένων. | 32.10 In due order following what has been said, I will add all that they raised doubts about concerning terrestrial matters: concerning the shape of the earth, its position and inclination, and further concerning the sea—so that you may know that these noble men differed not only about lofty and celestial matters, but also disagreed about terrestrial things. And so that you may marvel all the more at the wisdom of these wise men, I will also add all that they fought over concerning the soul and the ruling faculty (hegemonikon) within it, not even being able to recognize what nature they themselves were of. But let us return to the first of the points mentioned. |
Chapter 33
In this chapter, Eusebius (quoting Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.5) addresses the question of whether the universe (to pan) is one or infinite. It outlines the views of the Stoics, Empedocles, Plato (including a counter-argument to Platonic cosmology), and Metrodorus of Chios, who argues for an infinite number of worlds based on the infinity of causes (atoms or elements).
|
33.1
Εἰ ἓν τὸ πᾶν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἕνα κόσμον ἀπεφήναντο, ὃν δὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔφασαν εἶναι καὶ τὰ σωματικά. |
33.1
Whether the All is one. The Stoics declared that the cosmos is one, which they affirmed to be both the All and corporeal existence. |
| 33.2 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ κόσμον ἕνα, οὐ μέντοι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντὸς μέρος, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἀργὴν ὕλην. | 33.2 Empedocles [holds that] the cosmos is one, yet that the cosmos is not the All, but a small part of the All, while the remainder is inert matter. |
| 33.3 Πλάτων δὲ τεκμαίρεται τὸ δοκοῦν, ὅτι εἷς ὁ κόσμος καὶ ἓν τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τριῶν· ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔσεσθαι τέλειον, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ἐμπεριέχῃ· ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔσεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ παραδείγματι, ἐὰν μὴ μονογενὴς ᾖ· ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἔσεσθαι ἄφθαρτον, ἐάν τι ἐξωτέρω αὐτοῦ ᾖ. | 33.3 Plato proves his view that the cosmos is one and the All is one from three arguments: first, from its not being complete/perfect unless it encompasses all things; second, from its not being like its archetype unless it is unique in its kind; third, from its not being imperishable if anything should exist outside it. |
| 33.4 Πρὸς δὲ τὸν Πλάτωνα λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τέλειος ὁ κόσμος, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ πάντα περιέχει· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τέλειος, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντα περιέχει· καὶ πολλὰ παραδείγματά ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπ’ ἀνδριάντων καὶ οἰκιῶν καὶ ζωγραφιῶν· πῶς δὲ τέλειος, εἴπερ τι αὐτοῦ περιδινεῖσθαι δύναται; ἄφθαρτος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δύναται εἶναι, γεννητὸς ὤν. | 33.4 But against Plato it must be said that the cosmos is not complete/perfect, for it does not contain all things; indeed, a man is complete, yet he does not contain all things; and there are many archetypes/models, as in the case of statues, houses, and paintings. How, moreover, can it be complete if something outside it is able to revolve around it? Nor is it imperishable, nor can it be, since it is generated. |
| 33.5 Μητρόδωρος δέ φησιν ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐν μεγάλῳ πεδίῳ ἕνα στάχυν γεννηθῆναι καὶ ἕνα κόσμον ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ. Ὅτι δὲ ἄπειρος κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κόσμος πεπερασμένος, τὰ δὲ αἴτια πάντα ἄπειρα, ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη ἀπείρους εἶναι. Ὅπου γὰρ τὰ πάντα γέγονεν αἴτια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀποτελέσματα. Αἴτια δὲ ἤτοι αἱ ἄτομοι, ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα. | 33.5 Metrodorus says that it is absurd for a single ear of corn to grow in a large field, or for a single cosmos to exist in the infinite. That [the cosmos] is infinite in number is clear from the fact that its causes are infinite. For if the cosmos is finite, but all the causes from which the cosmos was generated are infinite, it is necessary that [the worlds] are infinite [in number]. For wherever all the causes exist, there also are the effects. And the causes are either the atoms or the elements. |
Chapter 34
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.7 & 2.3) examines whether the cosmos is animated (endowed with a soul) and governed by divine providence. It contrasts the views of Democritus and Epicurus (who attribute it to irrational nature) with those of Aristotle (who posits a divided cosmos where only the celestial spheres possess life and soul, while the terrestrial realm participates in order merely by accident).
| 34.1 Εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενος. Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον. | 34.1 Whether the cosmos is animated and governed by providence. All the others [hold that] the cosmos is animated and governed by providence. |
| 34.2 Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅσοι τε τὰς ἀτόμους εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενόν, οὔτ’ ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ. | 34.2 But Democritus and Epicurus, and as many as introduce the atoms and the void, [hold that] the cosmos is neither animated nor governed by providence, but by a certain irrational nature. |
| 34.3 Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτ’ ἔμψυχον ὅλον δι’ ὅλων, οὔτε μὴν αἰσθητικόν, οὔτε λογικόν, οὔτε νοερόν, οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐράνια τούτων πάντων κοινωνεῖν—σφαίρας γὰρ περιέχειν ἐμψύχους καὶ ζωτικάς—τὰ δὲ περίγεια μηδενὸς αὐτῶν, τῆς δ’ εὐταξίας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὐ προηγουμένως μετέχειν. | 34.3 Aristotle [holds that it is] neither animated entirely through all its parts, nor indeed capable of sensation, nor rational, nor intellectual, nor governed by providence throughout; for while the heavenly regions share in all these attributes—enclosing, as they do, animated and living spheres—the terrestrial regions share in none of them, and partake of good order only by accident, not by primary intent. |
Chapter 35
In this chapter, (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.11 / 2.4) addresses whether the cosmos is imperishable (aphthartos). It contrasts the views of Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics (generated by God, inherently perishable but preserved eternally by divine providence), Epicurus (perishable because generated), Xenophanes (unbegotten and imperishable), and Aristotle (who distinguishes the eternal upper realm from the sublunary realm, which is subject to affection and decay).
| 35.1 Εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος. Πυθαγόρας τε καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ γεννητὸν ὑπὸ θεοῦ τὸν κόσμον· καὶ φθαρτὸν μὲν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει—αἰσθητὸν γὰρ εἶναι, διότι σωματικόν—οὐ μὴν φθαρησόμενόν γε, προνοίᾳ καὶ συνοχῇ θεοῦ. | 35.1 Whether the cosmos is imperishable. Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics [declare] that the cosmos was generated by God; and that, while it is perishable so far as its own nature is concerned—for it is perceptible because it is corporeal—it will nevertheless not perish, owing to the providence and sustaining bond of God. |
| 35.2 Ἐπίκουρος φθαρτόν, ὅτι γεννητόν, ὡς ζῷον, ὡς φυτόν. | 35.2 Epicurus [holds that it is] perishable, because it was generated, just like an animal or a plant. |
| 35.3 Ξενοφάνης ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ ἄφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον. | 35.3 Xenophanes [holds that] the cosmos is unbegotten, eternal, and imperishable. |
| 35.4 Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν σελήνην τοῦ κόσμου μέρος παθητόν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ περίγεια κηραίνεται. | 35.4 Aristotle [holds that] the sublunary part of the cosmos is subject to change and affection, within which terrestrial things also suffer decay. |
Chapter 36
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.5) examines cosmological views on how the universe is nourished (pothen trephetai ho kosmos). It contrasts Aristotle (who holds that the cosmos needs no nourishment and is therefore eternal), Plato (who argues that the cosmos feeds on its own decaying matter through transformation), and Philolaus the Pythagorean (who posits a dual destruction and renewal cycle via cosmic fire and lunar water, which yield exhalations that nourish the universe).
| 36.1 Πόθεν τρέφεται ὁ κόσμος. Ἀριστοτέλης, εἰ τρέφεται ὁ κόσμος, καὶ φθαρήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιδέεται τροφῆς, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀίδιος. | 36.1 From where the cosmos is nourished. Aristotle [holds that] if the cosmos is nourished, it will also perish; but in fact it stands in need of no nourishment, and for this reason it is also eternal. |
| 36.2 Πλάτων, αὐτὸν αὑτῷ τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ φθίνοντος κατὰ μεταβολὴν τὸ τρέφον παρέχεσθαι. | 36.2 Plato [holds that] the cosmos supplies its own nourishment to itself out of its own decaying matter through change and transformation. |
| 36.3 Φιλόλαος, διττὴν εἶναι τὴν φθοράν, τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πυρὸς ῥυέντος, τοτὲ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σεληνιακοῦ περιστροφῇ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀποχυθέντος· καὶ τούτων εἶναι τὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις τροφὰς τοῦ κόσμου. | 36.3 Philolaus [holds that] destruction is twofold, occurring at one time when fire flows down from heaven, and at another time when lunar water is poured forth by the revolution of the air; and that the exhalations from these serve as nourishment for the cosmos. |
Chapter 37
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.6) explores differing philosophical views on the order of creation—specifically, which element or principle God or nature began with when forming the cosmos. It contrasts the views of the early natural philosophers (physikoi), Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, concluding with the geometric mapping of the five regular Platonic solids to the primary elements and the universe.
| 37.1 Ἀπὸ ποίου πρώτου ἤρξατο ὁ θεὸς κοσμοποιεῖν. Οἱ φυσικοὶ ἀπὸ γῆς ἄρξασθαί φασι τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κέντρου· ἀρχὴ δὲ σφαίρας τὸ κέντρον. | 37.1 From which primary element God began to fashion the cosmos. The natural philosophers say that the origin of the cosmos began from the earth, just as from a center; and the center is the starting point of a sphere. |
| 37.2 Πυθαγόρας ἀπὸ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ πέμπτου στοιχείου. | 37.2 Pythagoras [holds that creation began] from fire and the fifth element. |
| 37.3 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν μὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ’ ᾧ τὴν γῆν, ἐξ ἧς ἄγαν περισφιγγομένης τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς σφαίρας ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ οὗ θυμιαθῆναι τὸν ἀέρα· καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ τοῦ πυρός, πιληθῆναι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ περίγεια. | 37.3 Empedocles [holds that] aether was separated out first, second fire, and after that earth, from which—as it was tightly compressed by the force of the sphere's rotation—water gushed forth, and from water air evaporated; and that heaven was generated from the aether, the sun from the fire, while terrestrial things were condensed from the remaining elements. |
| 37.4 Πλάτων ὁρατὸν τὸν κόσμον γεγονέναι πρὸς παράδειγμα τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου· τοῦ δὲ ὁρατοῦ προτέραν μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὸ σωματοειδές, τὸ ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν καὶ γῆς πρῶτον, ὕδατος δὲ καὶ ἀέρος δεύτερον. | 37.4 Plato [holds that] the visible cosmos came into being according to the pattern of the intelligible cosmos; and that of the visible cosmos, the soul was formed first, and after it the corporeal frame—the latter formed primarily from fire and earth, and secondarily from water and air. |
| 37.5 Πυθαγόρας πέντε σχημάτων ὄντων στερεῶν, ἅπερ καλεῖται καὶ μαθηματικά, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγονέναι τὴν γῆν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς πυραμίδος τὸ πῦρ· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀκταέδρου τὸν ἀέρα· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ εἰκοσαέδρου τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δωδεκαέδρου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖραν. | 37.5 Pythagoras says that, there being five solid figures—which are also called mathematical figures—the earth was generated from the cube; fire from the pyramid; air from the octahedron; water from the icosahedron; and the sphere of the universe from the dodecahedron. |
| 37.6 Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις πυθαγορίζει. | 37.6 And Plato follows Pythagoras in these matters as well. |
Chapter 38
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.7) details ancient philosophical theories regarding the structural ordering (taxis) and arrangement of the elements within the cosmos. It outlines Parmenides’ concentric bands (stephanai), Leucippus and Democritus’ outer membrane (chiton), Epicurus’ variable boundaries, Plato’s elemental hierarchy, Aristotle’s addition of the impassive fifth element (aether) with natural motions, and Empedocles’ view that elemental regions are not fixed but undergo continuous mutual interchange.
| 38.1 Περὶ τάξεως κόσμου. Παρμενίδης στεφάνας εἶναι περιπεπλεγμένας ἐπ’ ἀλλήλαις, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀραιοῦ, τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυκνοῦ· μικτὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ φωτὸς καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τούτων· καὶ τὸ περιέχον δὲ πάσας τοίχου δίκην στερεὸν ὑπάρχον. | 38.1 On the order of the cosmos. Parmenides [holds that] there are bands woven one upon another, the one of the rare/subtle element, the other of the dense; and others between these mixed of light and darkness; and that which encompasses them all exists as a solid barrier like a wall. |
| 38.2 Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος χιτῶνα κύκλῳ καὶ ὑμένα περιτείνουσι τῷ κόσμῳ. | 38.2 Leucippus and Democritus stretch a circular robe and membrane around the cosmos. |
| 38.3 Ἐπίκουρος ἐνίων μὲν κόσμων ἀραιὸν τὸ πέρας, ἔνια δὲ πυκνά· καὶ τούτων τὰ μέν τινα κινούμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀκίνητα. | 38.3 Epicurus [holds that] the boundary of some worlds is rare/subtle, while that of others is dense; and of these boundaries, some are moving while others are stationary. |
| 38.4 Πλάτων πῦρ πρῶτον, εἶτα αἰθέρα, μεθ’ ὃν ἀέρα, ἐφ’ ᾧ ὕδωρ, τελευταίαν δὲ γῆν· ἐνίοτε δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα συνάπτει τῷ πυρί. | 38.4 Plato [arranges] fire first, then aether, after which air, upon which water, and lastly earth; though sometimes he joins aether with fire. |
| 38.5 Ἀριστοτέλης πρῶτον μὲν αἰθέρα ἀπαθῆ, πέμπτον δὲ σῶμα· μεθ’ ὃν παθητά, πῦρ, ἀέρα, ὕδωρ, τελευταίαν δὲ γῆν. Τούτων δὲ τοῖς μὲν οὐρανίοις ἀποδεδόσθαι τὴν κυκλικὴν κίνησιν· τῶν δ’ ὑποτεταγμένων τοῖς μὲν κούφοις τὴν ἄνω, τοῖς δὲ βαρέσι τὴν κάτω. | 38.5 Aristotle [posits] first an impassive aether, a fifth body; after which are the passible elements: fire, air, water, and lastly earth. To the celestial bodies among these he assigns circular motion, while among the sublunary elements, to the light ones he assigns upward motion, and to the heavy ones downward motion. |
| 38.6 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὴ διὰ παντὸς ἑστῶτας εἶναι, μηδὲ ὡρισμένους τοὺς τόπους τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ πάντα πως ἀλλήλων μεταλαμβάνειν. | 38.6 Empedocles [holds that] the places of the elements are not perpetually fixed nor defined, but that all things in a way partake of one another. |
Chapter 39
In this brief chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.8) presents early Greek philosophical explanations for why the cosmos (and specifically the celestial sphere / Earth's axis) is tilted relative to the equator. Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaxagoras attribute this inclination to a spontaneous—yet possibly providential—shift toward the south after living creatures emerged, creating habitable and uninhabitable zones through temperature distribution. Empedocles attributes the tilt to atmospheric resistance against the sun's driving force.
| 39.1 Τίς ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐγκλιθῆναι. Διογένης, Ἀναξαγόρας, μετὰ τὸ συστῆναι τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐγκλιθῆναί πως τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου εἰς τὸ μεσημβρινὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, ἴσως ὑπὸ προνοίας, ἵνα τὰ μὲν ἀοίκητα γένηται, τὰ δὲ οἰκητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου, κατὰ ψῦξιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ εὐκρασίαν. | 39.1 What is the cause of the tilt of the cosmos. Diogenes and Anaxagoras [hold that] after the cosmos was constructed and had brought forth living creatures out of the earth, the cosmos was somehow tilted spontaneously toward its southern region—perhaps by providence—in order that some parts of the cosmos might become uninhabitable and others habitable, according to frigidity, scorching heat, and temperate climate. |
| 39.2 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τοῦ ἀέρος εἴξαντος τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου ὁρμῇ, ἐπικλιθῆναι τὰς ἄρκτους καὶ τὰ βόρεια ὑψωθῆναι, τὰ δὲ νότια ταπεινωθῆναι, καθὸ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον. | 39.2 Empedocles [holds that], when the air gave way before the impetuous force of the sun, the regions of the Bears (the north) were tilted and the northern parts were raised on high, while the southern parts were depressed, according to which the whole cosmos [was likewise tilted]. |
Chapter 40
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.9) examines whether a void (kenon) exists outside the cosmos. It contrasts the views of the Pythagoreans (who held that an extra-cosmic void exists for cosmic respiration), the Stoics (who posited an infinite void into which the cosmos dissolves during conflagration), Posidonius (who argued for a finite void just sufficient for cosmic dissolution), and Plato and Aristotle (who denied the existence of any void either outside or inside the cosmos).
| 40.1 Περὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου, εἰ ἔστι κενόν. Οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου, ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου κενόν, εἰς ὃ ἀναπνεῖ ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ἐξ οὗ. | 40.1 Concerning what is outside the cosmos, whether there is a void. The followers of Pythagoras [hold that] there is a void outside the cosmos, into which the cosmos breathes, and out of which [it inhales]. |
| 40.2 Οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοί, εἰς ὃ καὶ τῇ ἐκπυρώσει ἀναλύεται, ἄπειρον. | 40.2 The Stoics [hold that there is a void] into which [the cosmos] is also dissolved at the conflagration, and that this void is infinite. |
| 40.3 Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ ἄπειρον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον αὔταρκες εἰς τὴν διάλυσιν, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ κενοῦ. | 40.3 Posidonius [holds that it is] not infinite, but as much as is sufficient for the dissolution, in the first book of On the Void. |
| 40.4 Πλάτων, Ἀριστοτέλης, μήτ’ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν εἶναι μήτ’ ἐντός. | 40.4 Plato and Aristotle [hold that] there is no void either outside the cosmos or inside it. |
Chapter 41
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.10) explores ancient philosophical opinions on defining directional orientation—specifically the "right" (dexia) and "left" (aristera) sides—of the cosmos. Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle define the right side as the east (where cosmic motion originates) and the left as the west. Empedocles, by contrast, identifies the right side with the summer solstice (north) and the left side with the winter solstice (south).
|
41.1
Τίνα δεξιὰ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τίνα ἀριστερά.
Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, Ἀριστοτέλης δεξιὰ τοῦ κόσμου τὰ ἀνατολικὰ μέρη, ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ἀριστερὰ δὲ τὰ δυτικά. |
41.1
Which are the right parts of the cosmos and which are the left.
Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle [hold that] the eastern parts of the cosmos are on the right, from which comes the origin of motion, while the western parts are on the left. |
| 41.2 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, δεξιὰ μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὸν θερινὸν τροπικόν, ἀριστερὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸν χειμερινόν. | 41.2 Empedocles [holds that] the parts toward the summer solstice are on the right, while the parts toward the winter solstice are on the left. |
Chapter 42
| 42.1 Περὶ οὐρανοῦ, τίς ἡ οὐσία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Ἀναξιμένης [περιστεφάνωσιν] τὴν περιφορὰν τῆς ἔξωθεν ζώνης εἶναι. | 42.1 On the heaven, what is its substance. Anaximenes [holds that] the circumference of the outer band surrounds [the earth]. |
| 42.2 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς στερέμνιον εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν, ἐξ ἀέρος συμπαγέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς κρυσταλλοειδῶς, τὸ πυρῶδες καὶ ἀερῶδες ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ἡμισφαιρίων περιέχοντα. | 42.2 Empedocles [holds that] the heaven is solid, consisting of air solidified like crystal by the action of fire, encompassing both the fiery and the airy elements in each of its hemispheres. |
| 42.3 Ἀριστοτέλης ἐκ πέμπτου σώματος, ἢ ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ μίγματος. | 42.3 Aristotle [holds that it is composed] of a fifth body, or of a mixture of heat and cold. |
Chapter 43
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.11) examines ancient theories regarding the nature and substance of the sky/heaven (ouranos). Anaximenes conceives it as an outer boundary girdle; Empedocles describes it as a solid, crystal-like dome forged from air solidified by fire, containing both fiery and airy hemispheres; and Aristotle views it as composed of a fifth element (aether) or a blend of heat and cold.
|
43.1
Περὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων. Παρακειμένως δὲ τῷ περὶ θεῶν λόγῳ τὸν περὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων ἱστορητέον. |
43.1
On daemons and heroes. Adjacent to the discourse concerning gods, one must examine the account concerning daemons and heroes. |
| 43.2 Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, οἱ Στωϊκοί, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἥρωας τὰς κεχωρισμένας ψυχὰς τῶν σωμάτων· καὶ ἀγαθοὺς μὲν τὰς ἀγαθάς, κακοὺς δὲ τὰς φαύλας. | 43.2 Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics [hold that] daemons exist as psychical (soul-like) essences, and that heroes are the souls separated from their bodies—the good souls being good [heroes/daemons], and the base souls being evil ones. |
| 43.3 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐγκρίνει. | 43.3 Epicurus, however, accepts none of these views. |
Chapter 44
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.9) outlines ancient philosophical definitions and theories regarding matter (hyle), the underlying substrate of generation and corruption. It contrasts the Stoics/Thales/Pythagoras (who view matter as entirely changeable and fluid), Democritus (who posits impassive atoms and the void), Aristotle and Plato (who define prime matter as formless, qualityless, and acting as a receptive "nurse" or matrix for forms), and those who identify matter with concrete elements or indivisible particles.
|
44.1
Περὶ ὕλης. Ὕλη ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς. |
44.1
On matter. Matter is that which underlies generation, corruption, and all other changes. |
| 44.2 Οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω καὶ Πυθαγόρα καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι’ ὅλων τὴν ὕλην. | 44.2 The followers of Thales and Pythagoras, as well as the Stoics, [hold that] matter is entirely changeable, alterable, and fluid throughout its whole extent. |
| 44.3 Οἱ ἀπὸ Δημοκρίτου, ἀπαθῆ τὰ πρῶτα, τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον. | 44.3 The followers of Democritus [hold that] the primary principles are impassive, namely the atoms, the void, and the incorporeal. |
| 44.4 Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην σωματοειδῆ, ἄμορφον, ἀνείδεον, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἄποιον μὲν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει, δεξαμενὴν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷον τιθήνην καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ μητέρα γενέσθαι. Οἱ δὲ ὕδωρ λέγοντες, πῦρ, ἢ ἀέρα, ἢ γῆν τὴν ὕλην, οὐκέτι ἄμορφον αὐτὴν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ σῶμα· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἀμερῆ, καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους, ἄμορφον. | 44.4 Aristotle and Plato [hold that] matter is body-like, formless, unshaped, figureless, and devoid of quality as far as its own proper nature is concerned, but becomes a receptacle of forms, serving as a nurse, a modeling matrix, and a mother. But those who say that matter is water, fire, air, or earth no longer say that it is formless, but a body; whereas those who say it consists of partless particles and atoms call it formless. |
Chapter 45
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 1.10) presents ancient definitions and opinions on the "Idea" or Form (Idea). It defines an Idea as an incorporeal essence, outlines Socrates and Plato’s view that Ideas exist separately from matter in the mind of God, notes Aristotle’s rejection of separate Forms outside of material objects, and concludes with the Stoic view that Ideas are merely concepts/mental constructs (ennoemata).
| 45.1 Περὶ ἰδέας. Ἰδέα δέ ἐστιν οὐσία ἀσώματος, αὐτὴ μὲν ὑφεστῶσα καθ’ ἑαυτήν, εἰκονίζουσα δὲ τὰς ἀμόρφους ὕλας καὶ αἰτία γιγνομένη τῆς τούτων δείξεως. | 45.1 On the Idea. An Idea is an incorporeal essence, existing in itself and by itself, giving form to formless matter and becoming the cause of its manifestation. |
| 45.2 Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων χωριστὰς τῆς ὕλης οὐσίας τὰς ἰδέας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ, τουτέστι τοῦ νοῦ, ὑφεστώσας. | 45.2 Socrates and Plato suppose that Ideas are essences separated from matter, existing in the thoughts and mental representations of God—that is, of the divine Mind. |
| 45.3 Ἀριστοτέλης εἴδη μὲν ἀπέλιπε καὶ ἰδέας, οὐ μὴν κεχωρισμένας τῆς ὕλης, ὡς οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ [κεχωρισμένας]. | 45.3 Aristotle retained forms and ideas, yet not as separated from matter, holding that they do not exist apart through God. |
| 45.4 Οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν εἶναι. | 45.4 The Stoics of Zeno’s school said that Ideas are merely our own mental concepts. |
Chapter 46
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.15) summarizes ancient astronomical views regarding the ordering, relative arrangement, and depth/distance of the stars and planets (peri taxeos). It covers Xenocrates's single-surface model, the Stoic layered model, Democritus's progression, Plato's 7-sphere planetary order (Saturn down to the Moon), the variations among mathematicians, and the inverted arrangements proposed by Anaximander, Metrodorus, and Crates.
|
46.1
Περὶ τάξεως.
Ξενοκράτης κατὰ μίαν ἐπιφάνειαν οἴεται κινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας. | 46.1 On the order [of the stars]. Xenocrates thinks that the stars move along a single surface. |
| 46.2 Οἱ ἄλλοι Στωϊκοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἑτέρων τοὺς ἑτέρους, ἐν ὕψει καὶ βάθει. | 46.2 The rest of the Stoics [hold that] some stars are arranged in front of others, varying in height and depth. |
| 46.3 Δημόκριτος τὰ μὲν ἀπλανῆ πρῶτον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς πλάνητας, ἐφ’ οἷς ἥλιον, Φωσφόρον, σελήνην. | 46.3 Democritus [places] the fixed stars first, and after these the planets, followed by the sun, the Morning Star (Phosphoros), and the moon. |
| 46.4 Πλάτων μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν θέσιν πρῶτον Φαίνοντα λεγόμενον, τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου· δεύτερον Φαέθοντα, τὸν τοῦ Διός· τρίτον Πυρόεντα, τὸν τοῦ Ἄρεως· τέταρτον Ἑωσφόρον, τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης· πέμπτον Στίλβοντα, τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ· ἕκτον ἥλιον· ἕβδομον σελήνην. | 46.4 Plato [places], after the position of the fixed stars, first the one called Phainon (the Shining One), that of Saturn; second Phaethon (the Radiant One), that of Jupiter; third Pyroeis (the Fiery One), that of Mars; fourth Heosphoros (the Dawn-Bearer), that of Venus; fifth Stilbon (the Gleaming One), that of Mercury; sixth the sun; seventh the moon. |
| 46.5 Τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς μὲν ὡς Πλάτων, τινὲς δὲ μέσον πάντων τὸν ἥλιον. | 46.5 Among the mathematicians, some follow Plato, while others place the sun in the middle of them all. |
| 46.6 Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος καὶ Κράτης ἀνωτάτω μὲν πάντων τὸν ἥλιον τετάχθαι· μετ’ αὐτὸν τὴν σελήνην· ὑπὸ δὲ αὐτοὺς τὰ ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τοὺς πλάνητας. | 46.6 Anaximander, Metrodorus of Chios, and Crates [hold that] the sun is placed highest of all; after it the moon; and beneath them the fixed stars and the planets. |
Chapter 47
In this chapter, Eusebius (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.16) surveys ancient views on stellar and planetary motion. It covers the East-to-West revolution of all stars (Anaxagoras, Democritus, Cleanthes), the counter-directional West-to-East movement of planets (Alcmaeon, mathematicians), circular orbital carrying mechanisms (Anaximander, Anaximenes's non-underground rotation), and the identical speeds of the Sun, Venus, and Mercury (Plato, mathematicians).
| 47.1 Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως. Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Κλεάνθης, ἀπ’ ἀνατολῶν ἐπὶ δυσμὰς φέρεσθαι πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας. |
47.1
On the revolution and motion of the stars.
Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Cleanthes [hold that] all the stars are carried from east to west. |
| 47.2 Ἀλκμαίων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τοὺς πλάνητας τοῖς ἀπλανέσιν ἐναντίως· ἀπὸ γὰρ δυσμῶν ἐπ’ ἀνατολὰς φέρεσθαι. | 47.2 Alcmaeon and the mathematicians [hold that] the planets move in opposition to the fixed stars; for they move from west to east. |
|
47.3
Ἀναξίμανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων καὶ τῶν σφαιρῶν, ἐφ’ ὧν ἕκαστος βέβηκε, φέρεσθαι.
Ἀναξιμένης οὐχ ὑπὸ γῆν, περὶ αὐτὴν δὲ στρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας. |
47.3
Anaximander [holds that the stars] are carried by the circles and the spheres upon which each one is mounted.
Anaximenes [holds that] the stars do not move under the earth, but revolve around it. |
| 47.4 Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ ἰσοδρόμους εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν Φωσφόρον, τὸν Στίλβοντα. | 47.4 Plato and the mathematicians [hold that] the sun, Phosphoros (Venus), and Stilbon (Mercury) move at equal speeds. |
Chapter 48
In this chapter, (citing Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 2.17) Eusebius examines ancient views on how stars receive light and nourishment (pothen photizontai hoi asteres). Metrodorus holds that all fixed stars are illuminated by the sun; Heraclitus and the Stoics claim stars are nourished by earthly exhalations; Aristotle argues heavenly bodies are eternal/indestructible and require no nourishment; while Plato maintains the entire cosmos feeds upon itself.
|
48.1
Πόθεν φωτίζονται οἱ ἀστέρες.
Μητρόδωρος ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καταλάμπεσθαι. |
48.1
From where the stars receive their light.
Metrodorus [holds that] all the fixed stars are illuminated by the sun. |
| 48.2 Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἐπιγείου ἀναθυμιάσεως. | 48.2 Heraclitus and the Stoics [hold that] the stars are nourished by exhalations rising from the earth. |
| 48.3 Ἀριστοτέλης μὴ δεῖσθαι τὰ οὐράνια τροφῆς· οὐ γὰρ φθαρτά, ἀλλ’ ἀίδια. | 48.3 Aristotle [holds that] heavenly bodies have no need of nourishment; for they are not perishable, but eternal. |
| 48.4 Πλάτων κοινῶς τὸν κόσμον ὅλον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ἐξ αὑτοῦ τρέφεσθαι. | 48.4 Plato [holds that], as a whole, the entire cosmos and the stars within it are nourished from itself. |
Chapter 49
In this chapter, Eusebius examines Saint Elmo's Fire (the "Dioscuri"), explained as glowing, motion-induced cloudlets (Xenophanes) or flashes generated by the frightened eyes of viewers (Metrodorus).
|
49.1
Περὶ τῶν καλουμένων Διοσκούρων.
Ξενοφάνης τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πλοίων φαινομένους οἷον ἀστέρας νεφέλια εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ποιὰν κίνησιν παραλάμποντα. |
49.1
On the so-called Dioscuri (Saint Elmo's Fire).
Xenophanes [holds that] the star-like appearances seen upon ships are little clouds that shine due to a particular motion. |
| 49.2 Μητρόδωρος τῶν ὁρώντων ὀφθαλμῶν μετὰ δέους καὶ καταπλήξεως εἶναι στιλβηδόνας. | 49.2 Metrodorus [holds that they] are glimmers from the eyes of the onlookers, arising out of fear and astonishment. |
Chapter 50
In this chapter, Eusebius presents ancient theories on solar eclipses: Thales’ correct observation of the moon blocking the sun; Anaximander’s blocked fire-vent model; Heraclitus’s rotating bowl theory; Xenophanes’ extinction/multi-sun concepts; cloud-density explanations; and Aristarchus of Samos’ heliocentrist model, where eclipse shadows occur as the moon orbits the ecliptic.
|
50.1
Περὶ ἐκλείψεως ἡλίου.
Θαλῆς πρῶτος ἔφη ἐκλείπειν τὸν ἥλιον τῆς σελήνης αὐτὸν ὑπερχομένης κατὰ κάθετον, οὔσης φύσει γεώδους· βλέπεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο κατοπτρικῶς ὑποτιθεμένης τῷ δίσκῳ. |
50.1
On the eclipse of the sun.
Thales was the first to state that the sun is eclipsed when the moon, being earthy in nature, passes directly beneath it in a vertical alignment; and that this is seen mirror-like when she is positioned under the sun's disk. |
| 50.2 Ἀναξίμανδρος τοῦ στομίου τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς διεκπνοῆς ἀποκλειομένου. | 50.2 Anaximander [holds that an eclipse happens] when the mouth of the fire's vent is blocked. |
| 50.3 Ἡράκλειτος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σκαφοειδοῦς στροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἄνω γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ κυρτὸν κάτω πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν ὄψιν. | 50.3 Heraclitus [holds that it happens] through the turning of the bowl-like vessel, so that its hollow side faces upward and its convex side faces downward toward our view. |
| 50.4 Ξενοφάνης κατὰ σβέσιν· ἕτερον δὲ πάλιν πρὸς ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς γίγνεσθαι. Παριστόρηκε δὲ καὶ ἔκλειψιν ἡλίου ἐφ’ ὅλον τὸν μῆνα, καὶ πάλιν ἔκλειψιν ἐντελῆ, ὥστε τὴν ἡμέραν νύκτα φανῆναι. | 50.4 Xenophanes [holds that it occurs] through extinction, and that a new sun is produced again at the east. He also records a solar eclipse lasting an entire month, and again a complete eclipse so that day appeared as night. |
| 50.5 Ἔνιοι πύκνωμα τῶν ἀοράτων ἐπερχομένων τῷ δίσκῳ νεφῶν. | 50.5 Some [hold that it is caused by] a condensation of unseen clouds passing over the disk. |
| 50.6 Ἀρίσταρχος τὸν ἥλιον ἵστησι μετὰ τῶν ἀπλανῶν, τὴν δὲ σελήνην κινεῖ περὶ τὸν ἡλιακὸν κύκλον, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ἐγκλίσεις σκιάζεσθαι τὸν δίσκον. | 50.6 Aristarchus places the sun stationary among the fixed stars, and moves the moon around the solar circle, holding that the solar disk is shadowed according to these inclinations. |
| 50.7 Ξενοφάνης πολλοὺς ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, κατὰ τὰ κλίματα τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἀποτομάς, καὶ ζώνας· κατά τινα δὲ καιρὸν ἐμπίπτειν τὸν δίσκον εἴς τι μέρος τῆς γῆς οὐκ οἰκουμένης ὑφ’ ἡμῶν, καὶ οὕτως ὥσπερ κενεμβατοῦντα ἔκλειψιν ὑποφαίνειν. Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς τὸν ἥλιον μὲν εἰς ἄπειρον προϊέναι, δοκεῖν κυκλεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν. | 50.7 Xenophanes holds that there are many suns and moons, according to the regions, sections, and zones of the earth; and that at a certain time the sun's disk steps into an uninhabited region of the earth, and thus, stepping as if into empty space, produces the appearance of an eclipse. The same thinker holds that the sun proceeds infinitely forward, but only appears to revolve in a circle because of its distance. |
Chapter 51
In this chapter, Eusebius details ancient explanations for lunar eclipses and phases: Anaximander’s wheel-vent obstruction; Berossus’s rotation of the un-ignited side of the moon; Heraclitus’s rotating bowl; Pythogorean theories (shadowing by the Earth or Counter-Earth, or gradual spreading flame); and the unified astronomical view of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and mathematicians (conjunction with the sun for monthly phases, and entry into the Earth's shadow for eclipses).
|
51.1
Περὶ ἐκλείψεως σελήνης.
Ἀναξίμανδρος τοῦ στομίου τοῦ περὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἐπιφραττομένου. |
51.1
On the eclipse of the moon.
Anaximander [holds that it occurs] when the mouth of the vent around the wheel is shut off. |
| 51.2 Βηρωσσὸς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ ἀπυρώτου μέρους. | 51.2 Berossus [holds that it occurs] by the turning toward us of its un-ignited side. |
| 51.3 Ἡράκλειτος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σκαφοειδοῦς στροφήν. | 51.3 Heraclitus [holds that it occurs] by the rotation of the bowl-like vessel. |
| 51.4 Τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινὲς ἀνταύγειαν καὶ ἐπίφραξιν γῆς, ἢ τῆς ἀντίχθονος· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, κατ’ ἐπινέμησιν φλογὸς κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαπτομένης τεταγμένως ἕως ἂν τὴν τελείαν πανσέληνον ἀποδῷ, καὶ πάλιν ἀναλόγως μειουμένης μέχρι τῆς συνόδου, καθ’ ἣν τελέως σβέννυται. | 51.4 Some of the Pythagoreans [hold that it occurs by] reflection and obstruction by the earth, or by the Counter-Earth; while the younger ones hold that it is caused by the spreading of a flame kindling gradually in an orderly manner until it produces the full moon, and diminishing proportionally again until the conjunction, at which it is completely extinguished. |
| 51.5 Πλάτων, Ἀριστοτέλης, οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ μαθηματικοὶ συμφωνοῦσι τὰς μὲν μηνιαίους ἀποκρύψεις συνοδεύουσαν αὐτὴν ἡλίῳ καὶ συμπεριλαμπομένην ποιεῖσθαι· τὰς δὲ ἐκλείψεις, εἰς τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς ἐμπίπτουσαν μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀστέρων γινομένης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἀντιφραττούσης. | 51.5 Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the mathematicians agree that she undergoes monthly vanishings when traveling in conjunction with the sun and illuminated around by it; but that eclipses occur when she falls into the shadow of the earth coming between both heavenly bodies, or rather when the light is obstructed from the moon. |
Chapter 52
In this chapter, Eusebius addresses the visual appearance of the moon and why it seems earth-like: the Pythagoreans attribute it to larger animals and finer plants living on it (with 15-day-long days); Anaxagoras to a structural irregularity blending cold, earthy, and dark elements with fire (making it a "false-shining" star); and the Stoics to an airy mixture in its substance.
|
52.1
Περὶ ἐμφάσεως αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τί γεώδης φαίνεται.
Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι γεώδη φαίνεσθαι τὴν σελήνην διὰ τὸ περιοικεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καθάπερ τὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν γῆν μείζοσι ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς καλλίοσιν· εἶναι γὰρ πεντεκαιδεκαπλασίονα τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς ζῷα, μηδὲν σωματικὸν ἀποκρίνοντα· καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν τοσαύτην τῷ μήκει. |
52.1
On her appearance, and why she seems earth-like.
The Pythagoreans hold that the moon appears earth-like because she is inhabited just like the earth among us by larger animals and fairer plants; for the animals upon her are fifteen times larger, excreting no bodily waste, and her day is equal in length. |
| 52.2 Ἀναξαγόρας ἀνωμαλότητα διὰ τοῦ συγκρίματος, διὰ τὸ ψυχροειδὲς ἅμα καὶ γεῶδες· παραμεμίχθαι γὰρ τῷ πυροειδεῖ τὸ ζοφῶδες· ὅθεν καὶ ψευδοφαῆ λέγεσθαι τὸν ἀστέρα. | 52.2 Anaxagoras [attributes it to] irregularity in her composition, owing to its being cold as well as earthy; for the dark element is mixed with the fiery, which is why this star is also called "false-shining." |
| 52.3 Οἱ Στωϊκοί, διὰ τὸ ἀερομιγὲς τῆς οὐσίας, μὴ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἀκήρατον τὸ σύγκριμα. | 52.3 The Stoics [attribute it to] the air-mixed nature of her substance, holding that her composite body is not unmixed. |
Chapter 53
In this chapter, Eusebius presents calculations regarding the distances (apostemata) of the sun and moon from Earth (Empedocles, mathematicians, and Eratosthenes).
|
53.1
Περὶ τῶν ἀποστημάτων αὐτῆς.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς διπλάσιον ἀπέχειν τὴν σελήνην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἤπερ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς. | 53.1 On her distances [i.e., of the sun and moon]. Empedocles [holds that] the moon is twice as far distant from the sun as she is from the earth. |
| 53.2 Οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὀκτωκαιδεκαπλάσιον. | 53.2 Those among the mathematicians say eighteen times as far. |
| 53.3 Ἐρατοσθένης, τὸν ἥλιον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς σταδίων μυριάδας τετρακοσίας καὶ ὀκτακισμυρίας, τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἀπέχειν τῆς γῆς μυριάδας ἑκατὸν τεσσαράκοντα σταδίων. | 53.3 Eratosthenes [holds that] the sun is distant from the earth four million eight hundred thousand stadia [4,800,000 = 888,000 km or 551,800 miles], and the moon is distant from the earth one million four hundred thousand stadia [1,400,000 = 259,000 km or 160,900 miles]. |
Actually the sun is 150,000,000 km or 93,000,000 miles from earth
and the moon is about 363,300 km or 225,300 miles from earth.
and the moon is about 363,300 km or 225,300 miles from earth.
Chapter 54
In this chapter, Eusebius defines planetary orbital periods (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun/Mercury/Venus, and Moon) and theories on the "Great Year" (megas eniautos)—including cycles of 8 years, 19 years, Heraclitus's 18,000 solar years, and Diogenes's expanded cycle.
Verse 3 serves as Eusebius's concluding transition, noting how widely these pagan thinkers disagreed on celestial matters before turning to their theories on the Earth.
Verse 3 serves as Eusebius's concluding transition, noting how widely these pagan thinkers disagreed on celestial matters before turning to their theories on the Earth.
|
54.1
Περὶ ἐνιαυτῶν.
Ἐνιαυτός ἐστι Κρόνου μὲν ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδος λ’· Διὸς δὲ δώδεκα, Ἄρεως δὲ δυεῖν, ἡλίου δὲ ιβ’ μῆνες· οἱ δ’ αὐτοὶ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἀφροδίτης· ἰσόδρομοι γάρ· σελήνης δὲ ἡμέραι λ’· οὗτος γὰρ ὁ τέλειος μὴν ἀπὸ φάσεως εἰς σύνοδον. |
54.1
On years.
The year [i.e., orbital period] of Saturn is a cycle of 30 years; that of Jupiter is 12 years; that of Mars is 2 years; that of the sun is 12 months; and the same for Mercury and Venus, for they run at equal speeds; and that of the moon is 30 days, for this is the complete month from her appearance to conjunction. |
| 54.2 Τὸν δὲ μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ ὀκταετηρίδι τίθενται· οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐννεακαιδεκαετηρίδι· οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἑξήκοντα ἑνὸς δέουσιν. Ἡράκλειτος, ἐκ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἡλιακῶν. Διογένης, ἐκ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίων ἐνιαυτῶν τοσούτων, ὅσων κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον ὁ ἐνιαυτός· ἄλλοι δὲ διὰ ψοζ’. | 54.2 As for the "Great Year," some place it in the 8-year cycle (octaeteris); others in the 19-year cycle; others in 59 years [sixty lacking one]. Heraclitus [reckons it] at 18,000 solar years. Diogenes reckons it as 365 years, each year being as long as Heraclitus’s Great Year; and others reckon it through 777 [years]. |
| 54.3 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ μεταρσίων τοσαῦτα τοῖς δεδηλωμένοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους διεστασίασται. Θέα δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ γῆς. | 54.3 Such are the vast contradictions among the aforementioned thinkers regarding heavenly and celestial matters. Look now also at their theories concerning the Earth. |
Chapter 55
This chapter (Number of Earths): addresses whether there is one Earth or more (Thales, the Stoics, Xenophanes, Metrodorus; Hicetas posits a second Earth, the Counter-Earth).
|
55.1
Περὶ γῆς.
Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν γῆν. |
55.1
On the Earth.
Thales and his followers hold that the Earth is one. |
| 55.2 Ἱκέτης ὁ Πυθαγόρειος δύο, ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἀντίχθονα. | 55.2 Hicetas the Pythagorean holds that there are two, this Earth and the Counter-Earth. |
| 55.3 Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὴν γῆν μίαν καὶ πεπερασμένην. | 55.3 The Stoics hold that the Earth is one and finite. |
| 55.4 Ξενοφάνης ἐκ τοῦ κατωτέρου μέρους εἰς ἄπειρον ἐρριζῶσθαι, ἐξ ἀέρος δὲ καὶ πυρὸς συμπαγῆναι. | 55.4 Xenophanes holds that it extends downward into infinity by its roots, and that it was solidified out of air and fire. |
| 55.5 Μητρόδωρος τὴν μὲν γῆν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι καὶ τρύγα τοῦ ὕδατος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον τοῦ ἀέρος. | 55.5 Metrodorus holds that the Earth is the sediment and dregs of water, just as the sun is of air. |
Chapter 56
This chapter (Shape of the Earth): Surveys cosmological shapes, including spherical (Thales, Stoics), cylindrical like a stone column (Anaximander), trapezoidal/flat (Anaximenes), drum-like (Leucippus), and disk-shaped with a hollowed center (Democritus).
|
56.1
Περὶ σχήματος γῆς.
Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὴν γῆν. |
56.1
On the shape of the Earth.
Thales and the Stoics hold that the Earth is spherical in shape. |
| 56.2 Ἀναξίμανδρος λίθῳ κίονι προσφερῆ, τῶν ἐπιπέδων ᾧ ἐπιβεβήκαμεν. | 56.2 Anaximander holds that it resembles a stone column, [standing on] one of its flat surfaces upon which we walk. |
| 56.3 Ἀναξιμένης τραπεζοειδῆ. | 56.3 Anaximenes holds that it is trapezoidal. |
| 56.4 Λεύκιππος τυμπανοειδῆ. | 56.4 Leucippus holds that it is drum-shaped. |
| 56.5 Δημόκριτος δισκοειδῆ τῷ πλάτει, κοίλην δὲ τῷ μέσῳ. | 56.5 Democritus holds that it is disk-like in its breadth, but hollowed out in the middle. |
Chapter 57
This chapter (Position of the Earth): Reviews location theories (central location vs. Xenophanes's infinite roots) and Philolaus's Pythagorean scheme placing a Central Fire at the middle with the Counter-Earth and Earth orbiting it, as well as Parmenides's division of habitable zones.
|
57.1
Περὶ θέσεως τῆς γῆς.
Οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω τὴν γῆν μέσην. |
57.1
On the position of the Earth.
The followers of Thales place the Earth in the center. |
| 57.2 Ξενοφάνης πρώτην, εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἐρριζῶσθαι. | 57.2 Xenophanes places it foremost [or primary], for it is rooted into infinity. |
| 57.3 Φιλόλαος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος τὸ μὲν πῦρ μέσον· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς ἑστίαν· δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀντίχθονα· τρίτην δὲ ἣν οἰκοῦμεν γῆν, ἐξ ἐναντίας κειμένην τε καὶ περιφερομένην τῇ ἀντίχθονι· παρ’ ὃ καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇδε τοὺς ἐν ἐκείνῃ. | 57.3 Philolaus the Pythagorean places the Fire in the center—for this is the "hearth" of the universe—and second the Counter-Earth, and third the Earth which we inhabit, situated opposite to and revolving around with the Counter-Earth; wherefore also those on this Earth are not seen by those on that one. |
| 57.4 Παρμενίδης πρῶτος ἀφώρισε τῆς γῆς τοὺς οἰκουμένους τόπους ὑπὸ ταῖς δυσὶ ζώναις ταῖς τροπικαῖς. | 57.4 Parmenides was the first to define the inhabited regions of the Earth as lying beneath the two tropical zones. |
Chapter 58
This chapter (Motion of the Earth): Details whether the Earth stays still or moves, contrasting the mainstream view of a stationary Earth with Philolaus’s orbital motion around the Central Fire, Heraclides Ponticus and Ecphantus’s axial rotation from west to east, and Democritus’s primordial floating Earth that settled as it gained density.
Transition: Eusebius concludes his summary of their disagreements on the Earth and transitions to their conflicting views on the sea.
Transition: Eusebius concludes his summary of their disagreements on the Earth and transitions to their conflicting views on the sea.
|
58.1
Περὶ κινήσεως γῆς.
Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι μένειν τὴν γῆν. |
58.1
On the motion of the Earth.
The others hold that the Earth remains still. |
| 58.2 Φιλόλαος δὲ ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι περὶ τὸ πῦρ κατὰ κύκλου λοξοῦ, ὁμοιοτρόπως ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ. | 58.2 Philolaus the Pythagorean holds that it revolves in a circle around the Fire along an inclined circle, in the same manner as the sun and the moon. |
| 58.3 Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἔκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μὴν μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐν ἄξονι στρεφομένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ’ ἀνατολάς, περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον. | 58.3 Heraclides of Pontus and Ecphantus the Pythagorean give motion to the Earth, not indeed by translation [locomotion], but by axial rotation—spinning like a wheel upon an axle from west to east around its own center. |
|
58.4
Δημόκριτος κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν πλάζεσθαι τὴν γῆν διά τε μικρότητα καὶ κουφότητα, πυκνωθεῖσαν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ βαρυνθεῖσαν καταστῆναι.
Τούτων καὶ περὶ γῆς διαπεφωνημένων τοῖς γενναίοις, ἄκουε καὶ τῶν περὶ θαλάσσης. |
58.4
Democritus holds that in the beginning the Earth wandered about on account of its smallness and lightness, but having become condensed and heavier over time, it came to a stand.
Having heard such disagreements concerning the Earth among these "noble" thinkers, listen now to their opinions regarding the sea. |
Chapter 59
In this chapter (On the Sea): Surveys ancient theories regarding the origin and bitterness/salty nature of the sea, including the evaporation of primeval moisture (Anaximander), solar heating of standing liquid (Anaxagoras), the Earth's sweat under solar heat (Empedocles and Antiphon), filtration/straining through the Earth (Metrodorus), and Platonic vaporous exhalations.
Verse 7 (Eusebius's Epilogue): Serves as Eusebius's scathing conclusion to this doxographical survey, observing that thinkers who claimed to explain the entire cosmos and celestial mechanisms failed to understand even the immediate terrestrial elements around themselves.
Verse 7 (Eusebius's Epilogue): Serves as Eusebius's scathing conclusion to this doxographical survey, observing that thinkers who claimed to explain the entire cosmos and celestial mechanisms failed to understand even the immediate terrestrial elements around themselves.
|
59.1
Περὶ θαλάσσης, πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστι πικρά.
Ἀναξίμανδρος τὴν θάλασσάν φησιν εἶναι τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον· ἧς τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος ἀνεξήρανε τὸ πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὑπολειφθὲν διὰ τὴν ἔκκαυσιν μετέβαλεν. |
59.1
On the sea, how it was formed and why it is bitter.
Anaximander says that the sea is a remnant of the original moisture, the greater part of which was dried up by the fire, while the remainder was transformed through being scorched. |
| 59.2 Ἀναξαγόρας τοῦ κατ’ ἀρχὰς λιμνάζοντος ὑγροῦ περικαέντος ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς περιφορᾶς, καὶ τοῦ λιπαροῦ λοιπὸν ὑποστῆναι, εἰς ἁλυκίδα καὶ πικρίαν. | 59.2 Anaxagoras [holds that] when the original standing liquid was scorched around by the solar revolution, the oily residue settled, [turning] into brackishness and bitterness. |
| 59.3 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἱδρῶτα τῆς γῆς ἐκκαιομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον πίλησιν. | 59.3 Empedocles [calls it] the sweat of the earth as it is scorched by the sun through increasing compression. |
| 59.4 Ἀντιφῶν ἱδρῶτα τοῦ θερμοῦ, ἐξ οὗ τὸ περιληφθὲν ὑγρὸν ἀπεκρίθη, τῷ καθεψηθῆναι παραλυκίσαντος, ὅπερ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἱδρῶτος συμβαίνει. | 59.4 Antiphon [calls it] the sweat of heat, from which the remaining liquid was separated, turning salty as it boiled down—just as happens with all sweat. |
| 59.5 Μητρόδωρος διὰ τὸ διηθεῖσθαι διὰ τῆς γῆς μετειληφέναι τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν πάχους, καθάπερ τὰ διὰ τῆς τέφρας ὑλιζόμενα. | 59.5 Metrodorus [holds that] because it is filtered through the earth, it partakes of the earth's density, just as liquids strained through ashes do. |
| 59.6 Οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὕδατος τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀέρος κατὰ περίψυξιν συνιστάμενον γλυκὺ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ γῆς κατὰ περίκαυσιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν ἀναθυμιώμενον ἁλμυρόν. | 59.6 The followers of Plato [hold that] of elemental water, that which is formed out of air by cooling becomes sweet, whereas that which rises from the earth as an exhalation through scorching and burning becomes salty. |
| 59.7 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ θαλάσσης. Ὅπως δὲ οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου οὐρανίων τε πέρι καὶ αἰθερίων καὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων καταλήψεως φυσιολογεῖν ἐπαγγειλάμενοι οὐδὲ τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ᾔδεισαν, μάθοις ἂν ἐξ ὧν καὶ περὶ τούτων ὧδέ πως διαπεφωνήκασιν. | 59.7 Such then are their opinions concerning the sea as well. But as to how those who promised to discourse on natural philosophy—concerning the entire cosmos, heavenly bodies, ethereal realms, and the comprehension of all things—did not even understand the things directly around themselves, you may learn from how they have contradicted one another on these matters in this manner. |
Chapter 60
In this chapter, Eusebius, drawing from Aëtius/Pseudo-Plutarch Placita 4.4), covers ancient philosophies regarding the parts and division of the soul (psyche).
Pythagoras and Plato: Divide the soul broadly into two parts (rational and irrational), or strictly into three parts by subdividing the irrational part into the spirited (thymikon) and appetitive (epithymetikon).
The Stoics: Posit eight parts: the five senses, speech, reproduction, and the ruling center (hegemonikon), which branches out like octopus tentacles.
Democritus and Epicurus: Posit two parts: the rational located in the chest and the irrational dispersed throughout the entire body.
Democritus (further view): Asserts that all things—even corpse matter—possess a degree of soul/sensation due to lingering heat, though most of it dissipates.
|
60.1
Περὶ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς.
Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον, διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον· κατὰ δὲ τὸ προσεχὲς καὶ ἀκριβὲς τριμερῆ· τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον διαιροῦσιν εἴς τε τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. |
60.1
On the parts of the soul.
Pythagoras and Plato, according to the most general account, hold that the soul has two parts; for it has a rational part and an irrational part. But according to a more immediate and precise account, it has three parts; for they divide the irrational part into the spirited and the appetitive. |
| 60.2 Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξ ὀκτὼ μερῶν συνεστάναι, πέντε τῶν αἰσθητικῶν, ὁρατικοῦ, ὀσφραντικοῦ, ἀκουστικοῦ, γευστικοῦ, ἁπτικοῦ· ἕκτου δὲ φωνητικοῦ, ἑβδόμου δὲ σπερματικοῦ, ὀγδόου δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, ἀφ’ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα τέτακται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων, προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναις. | 60.2 The Stoics hold that it consists of eight parts: five sensory parts—sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch; a sixth, the vocal part; a seventh, the generative part; and an eighth, the ruling power (hegemonikon) itself, from which all these are extended through their proper organs, resembling the tentacles of an octopus. |
| 60.3 Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος, διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καθ’ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένον. | 60.3 Democritus and Epicurus hold that the soul has two parts, having the rational part established in the chest, and the irrational part dispersed throughout the whole structure of the body. |
| 60.4 Ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φύσει ποιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων· διότι ἀφανῶς τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου. | 60.4 But Democritus holds that all things by nature partake of a certain kind of soul, even dead bodies; because they imperceptibly partake of a certain heat and sensation, though the greater part of it evaporates. |
Chapter 61
In verses 1-10 of this chapter (The Seat of the Governing Faculty): Eusebius details the conflicting ancient views on where the governing center of the soul (hegemonikon) is located: the whole head (Plato, Democritus), eyebrows (Straton), brain membrane (Erasistratus), brain ventricle (Herophilus), chest (Parmenides), heart (Epicurus, Stoics), arterial ventricle of the heart (Diogenes), composition of the blood (Empedocles), pericardium or diaphragm (others), or split between the heart (vital part) and head (rational part) by Pythagoras.
In verses 11-12 (Eusebius's Conclusion): Eusebius argues that Christians are completely justified in abandoning this fruitless, contradictory "vain labor" (mataioponia) of pagan cosmology. He asserts that these theories offer no moral benefit or practical good for human life, and invokes Socrates (via Xenophon's Memorabilia) as a pagan witness who likewise condemned such celestial speculators (meteoroleschai) as foolish, mad, and distracted by useless pursuits.
In verses 11-12 (Eusebius's Conclusion): Eusebius argues that Christians are completely justified in abandoning this fruitless, contradictory "vain labor" (mataioponia) of pagan cosmology. He asserts that these theories offer no moral benefit or practical good for human life, and invokes Socrates (via Xenophon's Memorabilia) as a pagan witness who likewise condemned such celestial speculators (meteoroleschai) as foolish, mad, and distracted by useless pursuits.
|
61.1
Περὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ.
Πλάτων, Δημόκριτος, ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ κεφαλῇ. |
61.1
On the governing power of the soul.
Plato and Democritus place it in the entire head. |
| 61.2 Στράτων ἐν μεσοφρύῳ. | 61.2 Straton places it between the eyebrows. |
| 61.3 Ἐρασίστρατος περὶ τὴν μήνιγγα τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, ἣν ἐπικρανίδα λέγει. | 61.3 Erasistratus places it around the membrane of the brain, which he calls the epikranis. |
| 61.4 Ἡρόφιλος ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλίᾳ, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ βάσις. | 61.4 Herophilus places it in the ventricle of the brain, which is also its base. |
| 61.5 Παρμενίδης ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι. | 61.5 Parmenides places it in the whole chest. |
| 61.6 Ἐπίκουρος, οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντες, ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ. | 61.6 Epicurus and all the Stoics place it in the whole heart. |
| 61.7 Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πνευματική. | 61.7 Diogenes places it in the arterial ventricle of the heart, which is filled with breath (pneuma). |
| 61.8 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἵματος συστάσει. | 61.8 Empedocles places it in the composition of the blood. |
| 61.9 Οἱ δ’ ἐν τῷ περικαρδίῳ ὑμένι· οἱ δ’ ἐν τῷ διαφράγματι· τῶν νεωτέρων τινὲς διήκειν ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς μέχρι τοῦ διαφράγματος. | 61.9 Others place it in the pericardial membrane; others in the diaphragm; and some of the more recent thinkers hold that it extends from the head all the way to the diaphragm. |
| 61.10 Πυθαγόρας τὸ μὲν ζωτικὸν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν καὶ νοερὸν περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. | 61.10 Pythagoras places the vital part around the heart, but the rational and intellectual part around the head. |
| 61.11 Τοσαῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶνδε. Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ σοι δοκοῦμεν κρίσει καὶ λογισμῷ τῆς τούτων ἀπάντων ἀνωφελοῦς καὶ πολυπλανοῦς ματαιοπονίας ἀνακεχωρηκέναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν εἰρημένων μηδὲν πολυπραγμονεῖν, μηδὲ γὰρ ὁρᾶν ἐξ αὐτῶν τὸ λυσιτελὲς καὶ αὐτόθεν συντεῖνον πρὸς ὠφέλειαν καὶ ἀγαθοῦ κτῆσιν ἀνθρώποις, μόνης δὲ τῆς ἀμφὶ τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεὸν εὐσεβείας ἔχεσθαι, καὶ διὰ σώφρονος βίου τῆς τε ἄλλης κατ’ ἀρετὴν θεοφιλοῦς πολιτείας ἀρεσκόντως ζῆν σπουδάζειν τῷ πάντων θεῷ; | 61.11 Such, then, are their opinions on these matters. Do we not, therefore, seem to you to have withdrawn with good reason and sound logic from the useless and wandering vain labor of all these thinkers—refusing to meddle in any of the aforementioned theories, since we see in them nothing profitable or directly contributing to human benefit and the acquisition of good, but choosing rather to hold fast to piety toward God, the Creator of all things, and striving through a temperate life and a godly conduct in virtue to live in a manner pleasing to the God of all? |
| 61.12 Ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ σὺ βασκανίᾳ καὶ φθόνῳ τὴν ἀληθῆ μαρτυρίαν ἡμῖν προσέσθαι δι’ ὄκνου φέρεις, φθάσει γέ σε πάλιν ὁ πάντων Ἑλλήνων σοφώτατος Σωκράτης τὰς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ψήφους φιλαληθῶς ἐξενηνεγμένος· τοὺς γοῦν μετεωρολέσχας ἐκείνους μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν καὶ μηδὲν μαινομένων διαφέρειν ἔλεγεν, ἀπελέγχων αὐτοὺς διαρρήδην οὐ μόνον ὡς ἀνεφίκτων ὀρεγομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄχρηστα καὶ ἀνωφελῆ τῷ βίῳ κατατριβομένους. Ταῦτα δέ σοι καὶ ὁ πρόσθεν μαρτυρήσει Ξενοφῶν, Σωκράτους ἑταίρων γνωριμώτατος, ὧδέ πη γράφων ἐν Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν· | 61.12 But even if, out of malice and envy, you shrink from accepting our truthful testimony, Socrates—the wisest of all the Greeks—will anticipate you, having truthfully rendered his verdict on our behalf. For he proved that those chatterers about the heavens (meteoroleschai) were acting foolishly and said that they differed in no way from madmen, explicitly refuting them not only as striving after unreachable things, but also as wasting their lives on useless and unprofitable pursuits. Xenophon, the most well-known of Socrates' companions, will also bear witness to these things for you, writing somewhere as follows in the Memorabilia: |
Chapter 62
In verses 1-6, Eusebius quotes directly from Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.1.11–16) to show that Socrates rejected physical cosmology (physiologia), considering it foolish, useless, and impossible for humans to fathom. Socrates noted that physical philosophers act like madmen—disagreeing fundamentally on whether being is one or infinite, constantly moving or static—and argued that philosophers should instead focus exclusively on moral and practical human affairs (ethical philosophy).
In verses 7-15, Eusebius highlights that later pagan thinkers—such as Aristippus of Cyrene, Ariston of Chios, and the satirist Timon of Phlius—followed Socrates in condemning natural philosophy as unachievable, impious, and morally useless. Timon’s Silli are cited to mock the endless, hollow squabbling (eris) of these philosophical schools.
In verses 16-18 (Apologetic Epilogue),Eusebius closes the 15-book work. Having demonstrated through the philosophers' own admission that pagan wisdom is a maze of self-contradiction, he justifies why Christians abandoned Greek speculation in favor of Hebrew Scripture. He then transitions to his companion work, the Demonstratio Evangelica (Evangelical Proof), where he will answer Jewish critiques regarding why Gentile Christians embrace Hebrew prophecy while not observing the Mosaic Law.
In verses 7-15, Eusebius highlights that later pagan thinkers—such as Aristippus of Cyrene, Ariston of Chios, and the satirist Timon of Phlius—followed Socrates in condemning natural philosophy as unachievable, impious, and morally useless. Timon’s Silli are cited to mock the endless, hollow squabbling (eris) of these philosophical schools.
In verses 16-18 (Apologetic Epilogue),Eusebius closes the 15-book work. Having demonstrated through the philosophers' own admission that pagan wisdom is a maze of self-contradiction, he justifies why Christians abandoned Greek speculation in favor of Hebrew Scripture. He then transitions to his companion work, the Demonstratio Evangelica (Evangelical Proof), where he will answer Jewish critiques regarding why Gentile Christians embrace Hebrew prophecy while not observing the Mosaic Law.
| 62.1 «Οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀνόσιον οὔτε ἀσεβὲς οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀπάντων φύσεως, ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. | 62.1 "No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or unholy. For he did not discourse about the nature of all things or about other such topics as most thinkers do, investigating how the so-called 'cosmos' of the sophists is constituted and by what necessary laws each of the heavenly bodies operates; on the contrary, he proved that those who worried about such matters were acting foolishly. |
| 62.2 Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τὰ ἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. | 62.2 And first of all, he examined whether they engaged in such reflections because they believed they already possessed adequate knowledge of human affairs, or whether they thought they were doing what was fitting by ignoring human affairs and investigating divine matters. |
| 62.3 Ἐθαύμαζε δέ, εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστα φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. | 62.3 He marveled that it was not obvious to them that it is impossible for human beings to discover these things, since even those who pride themselves most on speaking about them do not hold the same opinions as one another, but are affected toward each other like madmen. |
| 62.4 Τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ’ ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδ’ ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὔθ’ ἱερὸν οὔτε βωμὸν οὔτ’ ἄλλο τῶν θείων οὐδὲν τιμᾶν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ξύλα καὶ λίθους τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ θηρία σέβεσθαι. Τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνώντων τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖν ἓν μόνον τὸ ὂν εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε κινηθῆναι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῖς δὲ οὔτ’ ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι. | 62.4 For among madmen, some do not fear even terrifying things, while others fear things that are not fearful at all; some think it is not disgraceful to say or do anything whatsoever even in a crowd, while others think they ought not to go out among people at all; and some honor neither temple, altar, nor anything divine, while others worship any random pieces of wood and stone and wild beasts. Likewise, among those who obsess over the nature of all things, some think that Being is one only, others that it is infinite in number; some that all things are always in motion, others that nothing could ever be moved; and some that all things are generated and perish, others that nothing could ever be generated or perish. |
| 62.5 Ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάδε· ἆρ’ ὥσπερ οἱ τἀνθρώπινα μανθάνοντες ἡγοῦνται τοῦθ’ ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτῳ ἂν βούλωνται ποιήσειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες νομίζουσιν, ἐπειδὰν γνῶσιν αἷς ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται, ποιήσειν ὅταν βούλωνται καὶ ἀνέμους καὶ ὕδατα καὶ ὥρας καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου δέωνται τῶν τοιούτων; Ἢ τοιοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἀρκεῖ δ’ αὐτοῖς γνῶναι μόνον ᾗ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεται; | 62.5 He also considered this regarding them: whether, just as those who learn human arts suppose they will be able to apply what they learn for themselves and for anyone else they wish, so also those who search into divine matters suppose that, once they learn by what necessary laws each thing occurs, they will produce winds, waters, seasons, and whatever else of such things they need whenever they wish; or whether they expect no such thing, but are satisfied merely to know how each of these things occurs. |
| 62.6 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν· αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία.» | 62.6 Such were the things he said about those who busied themselves with these matters; but he himself always conversed about human affairs, examining what is pious, what is impious; what is noble, what is base; what is just, what is unjust; what is sound-mindedness, what is madness." |
| 62.7 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης. Μετὰ δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ περὶ Ἀρίστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον, ἔπειθ’ ὕστερον οἱ περὶ Ἀρίστωνα τὸν Χῖον ἐπεχείρησαν λέγειν ὡς δέοι μόνα τὰ ἠθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν· εἶναι γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν δυνατὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα· τοὺς μέντοι περὶ τῆς φύσεως λόγους πᾶν τοὐναντίον, μήτε καταληπτοὺς εἶναι μήτ’, εἰ καὶ ὀφθεῖεν, ὄφελος ἔχειν τι. | 62.7 Such, then, were the words of Socrates. And after him, Aristippus of Cyrene and his school, and later Ariston of Chios and his followers, attempted to argue that one should study ethical philosophy alone, asserting that these matters are achievable and beneficial; whereas theories about nature are entirely the opposite, being neither comprehensible nor, even if perceived, of any benefit. |
| 62.8 Μηδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔσεσθαι πλέον, «ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰ μετεωρότεροι τοῦ Πέρσεως ἀρθέντες ὑπέρ τε πόντου χεῦμ’ ὑπέρ τε Πλειάδα», αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄμμασι κατίδοιμεν τὸν πάντα κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἥτις δή ποτέ ἐστιν. | 62.8 For there would be no advantage to us—"not even if, raised higher than Perseus, we should gaze with our own eyes upon the entire cosmos and the nature of existing things, whatever it may be, above the swell of the sea and above the Pleiades." |
| 62.9 Οὐ γὰρ δὴ διά γε τοῦτο φρονιμωτέρους ἢ δικαιοτέρους ἢ ἀνδρειοτέρους ἢ σωφρονεστέρους ἡμᾶς ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἰσχυροὺς ἢ καλοὺς ἢ πλουσίους, ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν. | 62.9 For surely we would not thereby become wiser, more just, more courageous, or more temperate; nor indeed would we become strong, handsome, or wealthy—without which qualities it is impossible to be happy. |
| 62.10 Ὅθεν ὀρθῶς εἶπε Σωκράτης ὅτι τῶν ὄντων «τὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἴη, τὰ δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς»· εἶναι γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνα δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα. | 62.10 Wherefore Socrates rightly said that among existing things, "some are above us, while others are nothing to us"; for physical matters are above us, and things after death are nothing to us, whereas human affairs alone concern us. |
| 62.11 Ταύτῃ δὲ καὶ χαίρειν αὐτὸν εἰπόντα τῇ Ἀναξαγόρου καὶ Ἀρχελάου φυσιολογίᾳ ζητεῖν «ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ’ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται». | 62.11 On this account, he bid farewell to the natural philosophy of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, seeking instead "whatever good or evil has been wrought in the halls." |
| 62.12 Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ εἶναι τοὺς φυσικοὺς λόγους οὐ χαλεποὺς οὐδὲ ἀδυνάτους μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ὑπεναντίους. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῦν μηδ’ εἶναι θεοὺς τὸ παράπαν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον, ἢ τὸ ὄν, ἢ τὸ ἕν· καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς νομιζομένους. | 62.12 Moreover, theories of nature are not merely difficult or impossible, but even impious and contrary to custom and law. For some thinkers claim that gods do not exist at all, while others exalt the Infinite, or Being, or the One—anything rather than the accepted gods. |
| 62.13 Τήν τ’ αὖ διαφωνίαν παμπόλλην οὖσαν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ πᾶν, τοὺς δὲ πεπερασμένον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀξιοῦν ἅπαντα κινεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ καθάπαξ μηδέν. | 62.13 Furthermore, there is vast disagreement among them: for some declare the universe to be infinite, others finite; and some demand that all things are in motion, others that nothing moves at all. |
|
62.14
Καὶ μὴν εἴ τι καὶ ἄλλο πάντων ἄριστά μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις καὶ ὁ Φλιάσιος Τίμων εἰρηκέναι τάδε·
«Τίς γὰρ τούσδ’ ὀλοῇ ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; Ἠχοῦς σύνδρομος ὄχλος· ὁ γὰρ σιγῶσι χολωθεὶς νοῦσον ἐπ’ ἀνέρας ὦρσε λάλην, ὀλέκοντο δὲ πολλοί.» | 62.14 Indeed, if anything else has been stated best of all on these matters, it seems to me that Timon of Phlius expressed it in his Silli as follows: "Who then brought these together to fight in destructive strife? The noisy crowd of Echo; for he, enraged at their silence, roused a babbling disease among men, and many perished." |
|
62.15
Ὁρᾷς ὡς ἤδη καὶ ἀλλήλους σκώπτουσιν οἱ γενναῖοι; Τὴν γοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονεικίαν αὐτῶν τάς τε μάχας καὶ τὰς διαστάσεις ἔτι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ δηλωθεὶς ἀνὴρ τοῦτον ὑπογράφει τὸν τρόπον·
«Φοιτᾷ δὲ βροτολοιγὸς ἔρις, κενεὸν λελακυῖα, νείκης ἀνδροφόνοιο κασιγνήτη καὶ ἔριθος, ἥ τ’ ἀλαὴ περὶ πάντα κυλίνδεται, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα ἐς βροτοὺς στήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐς ἐλπίδα βάλλει.» | 62.15 Do you see how these "noble thinkers" now mock one another? At any rate, the aforementioned author describes their mutual contention, their battles, and their divisions in this manner in addition to what has been said: "And deadly strife goes roaming about, shouting emptiness, sister and companion of man-slaying conflict, which rolls blindly around all things; but thereafter it fixes its head upon mortals and casts them into false hope." |
| 62.16 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῆς τῶνδε πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀποδεδειγμένης στάσεως τε καὶ μάχης, τῆς τε μηδὲν ἡμῖν προσηκούσης, περιττῆς δὲ ἄλλως καὶ οὐ γνωστῆς παιδείας τε καὶ μαθήσεως τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων, ἐν οἷς εἰσέτι νῦν ἀποσεμνύνονται φιλοσόφων παῖδες, ἀπεληλεγμένων οὐχ ἡμετέραις, ταῖς δ’ οἰκείαις αὐτῶν ἀποδείξεσιν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς αἰτίας εἰς φανερὸν τεθείσης, δι’ ἣν τὰ τῶνδε ἀποστραφέντες τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια προτετιμήκαμεν, τὰ μὲν τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Προπαρασκευῆς ἐν τούτοις ἡμῖν περιγεγράφθω· | 62.16 But since the internal conflict and battle among these thinkers has been clearly demonstrated, as well as the fact that all their remaining instruction and learning—in which the children of the philosophers still pride themselves—is completely irrelevant to us, superfluous, and unknowable, having been refuted not by our arguments, but by their own proofs; and since the reason has been made clear why we turned away from their views and preferred the Hebrew Oracles, let the contents of the Evangelical Preparation be concluded at this point. |
| 62.17 Τὰ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεστέρας πραγματείας, τῆς κατὰ τὴν Εὐαγγελικὴν Ἀπόδειξιν, ἤδη λοιπὸν ἐπισκεπτέον ἀφ’ ἑτέρας λόγων ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὴ λειπούσης τῷ προβλήματι, τὴν διδασκαλίαν ποιησομένοις. | 62.17 As for the matters of the more complete work, that of the Evangelical Proof, we must now examine them starting from another premise of arguments, supplying the teaching that is still lacking for our subject. |
| 62.18 Λείπει δ’ ἄρα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς ἐπιμεμψαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι, τί δή ποτε ἀλλόφυλοι ὄντες καὶ ἀλλογενεῖς ταῖς αὐτῶν βίβλοις ἀποχρώμεθα, μηδὲν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν, προσηκούσαις· ἢ τί δὴ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀσπαζόμενοι λόγια οὐχὶ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀκόλουθον τῷ παρ’ αὐτοῖς παρέχομεν νόμῳ. | 62.18 It remains, therefore, to answer those of the Circumcision who reproach us, asking why on earth we, who are aliens and foreigners by birth, make use of their books which—as they themselves would say—do not belong to us at all; or why, while welcoming the oracles among them, we do not also render our lives conformable to their Law. |