ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΡΙΣΚΑΙΔΕΚΑΤΟΝ
Thirteenth Book
Thirteenth Book
ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ
Preface
Preface
Eusebius introduces his next phase of argument: having shown that Plato derived his best ideas from Moses, he now turns to Plato’s critique of traditional Greek religion. He acknowledges a potential objection (why choose Moses over Plato if their doctrines are identical?) and defers it briefly to examine Plato's direct rejection of the poets and traditional genealogies of the gods. Eusebius cites Plato’s Timaeus (40d–e), pointing out Plato’s subtle irony when accepting myth without proofs "in obedience to the law." To prove Plato genuinely disbelieved these myths, Eusebius adds citations from the Epinomis and Republic, showing Plato explicit rejection of earlier divine genealogies as bad representations.
| Ἐπειδὴ πέφηνεν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου συγγράμμασιν ἡ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφία κατὰ πλεῖστα Μωσέως καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις ἱερῶν λόγων ἑρμηνείαν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν περιέχουσα, ἔρχομαι νῦν ὁμοῦ καὶ τὰ λείποντα προσαποδοῦναι τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν εἰς τοὺς τόπους εἰρημένα διελθεῖν, ὁμοῦ καὶ διαβολῆς εὐλόγου αἰτίαν ἀπολυσόμενος, εἰ δή τις ἡμῖν ἐπικαλῶν φαίη, τί δή ποτ' οὖν, Μώσεως καὶ Πλάτωνος τὰ συνῳδὰ πεφιλοσοφηκότων, οὐχὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος, ἀλλὰ τὰ Μώσεως μέτιμεν, τοὔμπαλιν δέον, ὅτι δὴ πρὸς τοῖς ἴσοις δόγμασι προσήκων ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν Ἕλλησιν οὖσιν ὁ Ἑλληνικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ βάρβαρος. ὀκνῶν δὲ ἀπαντῆσαι πρὸς τοῦτο αἰδοῖ τῇ πρὸς τὸν φιλόσοφον, τοῦτον μὲν εἰς ὕστερον ἀνατίθεμαι τὸν λόγον, τὰ δέ γε πρῶτά μοι λεχθέντα πρῶτα διασκέψομαι. λαβὼν οὖν ἀνάγνωθι ὁποίαν ἐπήγετο δόξαν ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν θεολόγων τε καὶ ποιητῶν, ὅπως τε πάσας τὰς πατρίους περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπολήψεις ἠθέτει καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀτοπίαν διήλεγχεν. | Since in the preceding writings it has been demonstrated that the philosophy of Plato contains for the most part an interpretation of Moses and the sacred utterances of the Hebrews translated, as it were, into the Greek tongue, I come now both to render what remains due to the argument and to go through what has been said on these topics by those before us. At the same time, I wish to clear away a reasonable cause for reproach, should anyone accuse us by saying: "Why on earth, when Moses and Plato have philosophized in harmony, do you not follow the teachings of Plato, but rather those of Moses?—when the opposite ought to be done, since, doctrines being equal, the Greek author would be more suitable to us, being Greeks, than the barbarian." Shrinking from answering this now out of respect for the philosopher, I defer this argument for later, and will first examine what was stated by me at the beginning. Take and read, then, what sort of opinion Plato introduced concerning the Greek theologians and poets, and how he set aside all traditional ancestral notions about the gods and exposed the absurdity within them. |
Chapter 1
| 1.1 «Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς, πιστευτέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ που τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν. ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκεῖα φασκόντων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. | 1.1 "To speak concerning the other divinities and to know their origin is beyond our capacity, but we must trust those who have spoken in former times, being, as they said, descendants of gods, and who surely somewhere knew their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, to disbelieve the children of the gods, even though they speak without plausible and necessary proofs; but as those who claim to report their own family affairs, we must trust them in obedience to the law. |
| 1.2 οὕτως οὖν κατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω. Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ἐγένεσθον, τούτων δὲ Φόρκυς Κρόνος τε καὶ Ῥέα, ἐκ δὲ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας Ζεὺς Ἥρα τε καὶ πάντες ὅσους ἴσμεν ἀδελφοὺς λεγομένους αὐτῶν, ἔτι τε τούτων ἄλλους ἐκγόνους.» | 1.2 Thus then let the generation concerning these gods be and be described according to them: Oceanus and Tethys were born as children of Earth and Heaven, and from these Phorcys, Cronus, and Rhea; and from Cronus and Rhea, Zeus, Hera, and all those whom we know called their siblings, and still others descended from them." |
| 1.3 Διὰ τούτων πιστεύειν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν μύθοις καὶ αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς τῶν μύθων ποιηταῖς ὡς δὴ θεῶν ἐκγόνοις οὖσι παρακελευσάμενος, πρῶτα μὲν διὰ τοῦ [«ὡς ἔφασαν»] φάναι ἐκγόνους εἶναι τῶν θεῶν τοὺς ποιητὰς χλευάζειν μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀνθρώπων γεγονότων καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ὁμοίων τὴν φύσιν. | 1.3 Having by these words urged us to trust the myths about the gods and the very poets of these myths as being descendants of gods, first of all, by saying ["as they said"], he seems to me to mock the idea that the poets are offspring of the gods, implying that the gods were merely human beings and similar in nature to their descendants. |
| 1.4 διαβάλλει δ' ἑξῆς ἄντικρυς τοὺς θεολόγους, οὓς ἐκγόνους ἔφησεν εἶναι θεῶν δι' ὧν ἐπάγει φάσκων· «καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν»· δι' ὧν τε προστίθησι τὸ «ὡς ἔφασαν». παίζειν δ' ἔοικε λέγων «σαφῶς γέ που τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσι»· καὶ τὸ «ἀδύνατον θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν». καὶ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην δὲ ταῦτα λέγειν τῶν νόμων ἕνεκα διαρρήδην παρίστησιν, ὁμολογήσας ὅτι δέοι ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. | 1.4 Next, he directly attacks the theologians whom he called descendants of gods through what he adds next, saying: "even though they speak without plausible and necessary proofs," and by adding the phrase "as they said." He appears to be playing mockingly when he says, "since they surely knew their own ancestors," and "it is impossible to disbelieve the children of gods." Furthermore, he explicitly demonstrates that he says these things against his real opinion merely for the sake of the laws, acknowledging that one ought to believe them only in obedience to the law. |
| 1.5 ὅτι δὲ ταῦτ' ἐνόει ἐπάκουσον ὅπως γυμνῇ καὶ ἀκατακαλύπτῳ φωνῇ τοὺς δὴ θεολόγους ἅπαντας διαβάλλει, κόπτων ἐν ἐπινομίδι [Νόμοις] τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν· | 1.5 That he intended this, listen to how in a bare and uncovered voice he attacks all the theologians, striking them in the Laws [cited as Epinomis] with these very words: |
Chapter 2
| 2.1 «Θεογονίαν τοίνυν καὶ ζῳογονίαν ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρῶτόν μοι κακῶς ἀπεικασάντων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν, βέλτιον ἀπεικάσαι κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον λόγον, ἀναλαβόντα ὃν πρὸς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐπικεχείρηκα λόγον.» | 2.1 "It is necessary, as it seems, because those before me modeled the generation of gods and the generation of living beings poorly, that I model them better in this later discourse, taking up again the argument I attempted against the impious." |
| 2.2 Ὅτι δ' εὐλόγως τὴν τῶν πρώτων θεολογίαν παραιτεῖται διδάσκει ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Πολιτείας, ἔνθα τὸν νοῦν ἐπιστῆσαι ἄξιον ὁπόσα καὶ οἷα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιητῶν τε καὶ θεολόγων τῶν γε ἐκ παλαιοῦ παραδεδομένων περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν θεῶν διέξεισιν, ὧδε ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς φάσκων· | 2.2 And that he reasonably rejects the theology of the earliest writers he teaches in the second book of the Republic, where it is worthwhile to direct one's mind to how many and what kind of things he sets forth concerning these same poets and theologians handed down from ancient times regarding the Greek gods, speaking in these exact words: |
Chapter 3
Eusebius cites an extensive passage from Plato’s Republic (Book II, 376e–383c), wherein Socrates establishes the key theological canons (typoi) for his ideal city: god is essentially good, causes only good (not evil), is simple, unchangeable, and completely free from falsehood or deception. Eusebius then contrasts this with Hebrew Scripture, arguing that biblical revelation perfectly aligns with Plato’s standards—and exceeds them—by rejecting disgraceful myths, attributing all good to God's creation, presenting divine punishment as benevolent discipline/healing rather than arbitrary malice, and revealing the divine Logos who entered the human sphere not as a mythical shapeshifter or deceiver, but as a true Savior restoring humanity to true piety.
| 3.1 «Ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτὸν δύνασθαι τούς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;» «Ἔγωγε, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις.» «Οὓς Ἡσίοδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους ψευδεῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι.» | 3.1 "In the greater myths," I said, "we shall also see the lesser ones. For the same pattern must apply, and both the greater and the lesser must have the same force. Or do you not think so?" "I do," he said; "but I do not even conceive what you mean by the greater ones." "Those," I said, "which Hesiod and Homer told us, along with the other poets. For these men composed false myths and told them—and continue to tell them—to mankind." |
| 3.2 «Ποίους δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις;» «Ὅπερ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, χρὴ πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται.» «Τί τοῦτο;» «Ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων, οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.» «Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;» | 3.2 "Which myths do you mean," he said, "and what fault do you find in them?" "That which," I replied, "ought first and most especially to be faulted, particularly if someone lies dishonorably." "What is that?" "Whenever someone portrays poorly in speech the nature of gods and heroes, what they are like—just like a painter painting something that bears no resemblance to the objects he wished to draw." "Indeed," he said, "it is right to fault such things. But how do we mean this, and what sort of examples?" |
| 3.3 «Πρῶτον μὲν δή, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ’ ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δ’ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον, ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὡς ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.» | 3.3 "First of all," I said, "he who told the greatest lie about the greatest matters lied dishonorably: how Uranus performed what Hesiod says he did, and how Cronus in turn took vengeance upon him. And as for the deeds and sufferings of Cronus at the hands of his son, even if they were true, I should not think they ought to be told so lightly to the foolish and young. Rather, they should preferably be buried in silence; but if there were some necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secret by as few as possible, after sacrificing not a mere pig, but some great and unprocurable victim, so that the smallest possible number would happen to hear them." |
| 3.4 «Καὶ γάρ, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὗτοί γέ οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί.» «Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ’, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει. οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ’ αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῴη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι.» «Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.» | 3.4 "Indeed," he said, "these stories are harsh." "And they must not be told, Adeimantus," I said, "in our city. Nor must it be said in the hearing of a young man that in doing the utmost wrong he would be doing nothing surprising, nor if he punished his wrongdoing father in every way, but that he would merely be doing what the first and greatest of the gods did." "No, by Zeus," he said, "it does not seem to me suitable to tell, either." |
| 3.5 «Οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀληθῆ· εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάσσειν αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι. πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ εἴ πως μέλλοιμεν πείσειν ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον λεκτέα πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσὶ καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις, καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν.» | 3.5 "Nor indeed," I said, "is it at all acceptable to say that gods make war on gods, plot against one another, and fight—for it is not even true!—if indeed those who are to guard our city must consider it most shameful to be easily at enmity with one another. Far from it! We must not tell them myths of battles of giants, nor weave them in embroidery, nor tell of many other various enmities of gods and heroes against their kin and relatives. Rather, if we are somehow to persuade them that no citizen was ever at odds with another and that this is unholy, such things must rather be told to children right away by old men and old women and as they grow older, and the poets must be forced to compose along these lines." |
| 3.6 «Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ ἀμύνειν τυπτομένῃ, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. | 3.6 "As for the bindings of Hera by her son, the hurlings of Hephaestus by his father when he was about to defend his mother while she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods that Homer has composed, we must not admit them into the city, whether they are composed with underlying allegorical meanings or without underlying meanings. |
| 3.7 ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὅ τι μή, ἀλλ’ ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον, ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν, ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.» | 3.7 For the young person is not able to judge what is an underlying allegorical meaning and what is not, but whatever opinions he receives at that age tend to become indelible and unalterable. For these reasons, perhaps, we must regard it as paramount that the first things they hear are myths composed in the finest manner toward virtue." |
| 3.8 «Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον· ἀλλ’ εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῴη ἡμᾶς ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν;» καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· «Ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ’ οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους.» | 3.8 "That stands to reason," he said; "but if someone were to ask us again what these are and which myths they are, which would we say?" And I said: "Adeimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city. It belongs to founders to know the patterns according to which the poets must compose their myths, beyond which if they write we must not permit them; however, founders ought not to write the myths themselves." |
| 3.9 «Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;» «Τοιοίδε πού τινες, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἷος τυγχάνει ὢν ὁ θεός, ἀεὶ δή που ἀποδοτέον, ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.» «Δεῖ γάρ.» «Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω;» | 3.9 "Correct," he said; "but this very thing: what would the patterns concerning theology be?" "Something like this," I said: "what god actually happens to be, he must always be represented as such, whether one portrays him in epic verse, in lyric song, or in tragedy." "For that is necessary." "Is not god good in reality, and must he not be spoken of as such?" |
| 3.10 «Τί μήν;» «Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἦ γάρ;» «Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.» «Ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ βλαβερὸν βλάπτει;» «Οὐδαμῶς.» «Ὃ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακόν τι ποιεῖ;» «Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.» «Ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ’ ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον;» «Πῶς γάρ;» «Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;» «Ναί.» «Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;» «Ναί.» | 3.10 "Of course." "Furthermore, nothing that is good is harmful, is it?" "I think not." "Does that which is not harmful do harm?" "By no means." "And does that which does no harm do any evil?" "Neither that." "And that which does no evil could not be the cause of any evil?" "How could it?" "What then? Is the good beneficial?" "Yes." "Therefore it is the cause of well-being?" "Yes." |
| 3.11 «Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.» «Παντελῶς γε, ἔφη.» «Οὐδ’ ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλα ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν θεόν.» | 3.11 "The good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but it is the cause of those things that are well, while of evil things it is blameless." "Completely so," he said. "Therefore," I said, "god, since he is good, would not be the cause of all things, as the many say, but the cause of few things for human beings, and blameless of many; for our goods are far fewer than our evils. And of our goods no other must be blamed, but for our evils we must seek other causes, and not god." |
| 3.12 «Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.» «Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὁμήρου οὔτε ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν· | 3.12 "You seem to me," he said, "to speak most truly." "Therefore," I said, "we must not accept from Homer or any other poet such an error concerning the gods foolishly committed, when he says that: 'Two jars sit upon the floor of Zeus, full of fates, the one of good things, the other of evil;' |
| 3.13 καὶ ᾧ μέν κ’ ἀμμίξας δῴῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ· ᾧ δέ κε μὴ μίξῃ, ἀλλ’ ἀκράτητα ἕτερα δῴῃ, τὸν δὲ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει· | 3.13 and to whomsoever Zeus who delights in thunder gives a mixture of both, 'he meets now with evil, and now with good'; but to whomsoever he gives unmixed evil, 'him evil famine drives across the divine earth'; |
| 3.14 οὐδ’ ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις φῇ δι’ Ἀθηνᾶς τε καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα· οὐδὲ θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιδός τε καὶ Διός· οὐδ’ αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους, ὅτι θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς, ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ. | 3.14 nor that Zeus has been appointed for us as 'dispenser of both good and evil.' Nor shall we praise anyone who says that the violation of oaths and treaties, which Pandarus broke, came about through Athena and Zeus, nor the strife and judgment of the gods through Themis and Zeus; nor again must we allow the young to hear, as Aeschylus says, that: 'God plants guilt among mortals whenever he wishes to destroy a house utterly.' |
| 3.15 ἀλλ’ ἐάν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι. ὡς δ’ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν. | 3.15 But if anyone composes poems in which these iambics occur—the sufferings of Niobe, or the troubles of the House of Pelops, or the Trojan tales, or any other such things—we must either not allow them to say these are the works of god, or if they are of god, they must discover for them nearly the very argument we are now seeking, and say that god worked what was just and good, and that they were benefited by being punished. But the poet must not be allowed to say that those paying the penalty were wretched and that it was god who did these things. |
| 3.16 ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον. | 3.16 Rather, if they say that the wicked were wretched because they needed punishment, and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by god, we must allow it. |
| 3.17 κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ, μήτε τινὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτ’ ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε ξύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.» | 3.17 But to say that god, being good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone—this we must fight in every way: that no one say these things in his own city, if it is to be well-governed, nor anyone hear them, whether younger or older, whether telling myths in verse or without verse, since such statements, if spoken, would be neither holy, nor advantageous to us, nor consistent with themselves." |
| 3.18 «Ξύμψηφός σοι εἰμί, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, κάμοὶ ἀρέσκει.» «Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, εἷς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοῦ νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν οἷς δεήσει τούς τε λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.» «Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἀπόχρη.» | 3.18 "I am of one mind with you," he said, "concerning this law, and it pleases me." "This then," I said, "would be one of the laws and patterns concerning god, in accordance with which speakers must speak and writers must write: that god is not the cause of all things, but of good things." "And indeed," he said, "it is sufficient." |
| 3.19 «Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε; ἆρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἴει εἶναι, καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι, καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν;» «Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν.» | 3.19 "What then about this second one? Do you think god is a sorcerer, and one who appears by design at different times in different forms—sometimes changing himself and altering his form into many shapes, and at other times deceiving us and making us think such things about him; or that he is simple, and least of all likely to step out of his own form?" "I cannot say," he said, "just now offhand." |
| 3.20 «Τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταιτο τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ μεθίστασθαι, ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου;» «Ἀνάγκη.» «Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται, οἷον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἱλήσεων τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατόν τε καὶ χαριέστατον ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται;» «Πῶς δ’ οὔ;» | 3.20 "What about this? Is it not necessary, if anything departs from its own form, that it be changed either by itself or by another?" "Necessary." "Are not things that are in the best condition least altered and moved by another—such as a body by food, drink, and labor, and every plant by solar heat, winds, and such afflictions: does not the healthiest and strongest suffer the least alteration?" "How could it be otherwise?" |
| 3.21 «Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ’ ἂν τι πάθος ἔξωθεν ταράξειεν;» «Ναί.» «Καὶ μήν που καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα, σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.» «Ἔστι ταῦτα.» | 3.21 "And as for the soul, would not the bravest and most prudent soul be least disturbed by any external condition?" "Yes." "And surely all composite things—utensils, buildings, and garments—by the same logic, those well made and in good condition are least altered by time and other conditions." "That is so." |
| 3.22 «Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται.» «Ἔοικεν.» «Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει.» «Πῶς δ’ οὔ;» «Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστ’ ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός.» «Ἥκιστα δῆτα.» «Ἀλλ’ ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ;» «Δηλονότι, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται.» | 3.22 "Everything, then, that is in a fine state either by nature or by art or by both admits the least change by another." "So it seems." "But surely god and what belongs to god are in every way in the best state." "How could they not be?" "In this way, then, god would least of all possess many forms." "Least of all indeed." "But would he change and alter himself?" "Clearly," he said, "if indeed he alters." |
| 3.23 «Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ αἴσχιον αὑτοῦ;» «Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι.» «Ὀρθότατα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δοκεῖ ἄν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἑκὼν αὑτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν ὁπῃοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων;» | 3.23 "Does he then change himself for the better and finer, or for the worse and uglier than himself?" "Necessarily," he said, "for the worse, if indeed he alters; for surely we shall not say that god is lacking in beauty or virtue." "You speak most correctly," I said. "And since this is so, does it seem to you, Adeimantus, that anyone—whether of gods or men—would willingly make himself worse in any way whatever?" |
| 3.24 «Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.» «Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεὸν ἐθέλειν αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ’, ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ.» «Πᾶσα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.» «Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν ὡς θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσιν, παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας· | 3.24 "Impossible," he said. "It is impossible, then," I said, "for a god to wish to alter himself; rather, as it seems, being as beautiful and best as possible, each of them always remains simply in his own form." "Every necessity," he said, "so it seems to me." "Let none of the poets, then, my excellent friend," I said, "tell us that: 'Gods, taking the likeness of strangers from foreign lands, assuming all kinds of forms, range through the cities.' |
| 3.25 μηδὲ Πρωτέως τε καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδείς, μηδ’ ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην, ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις. | 3.25 Nor let anyone lie about Proteus and Thetis, nor in tragedies or other poems let anyone bring in Hera altered as a priestess collecting alms for 'the life-giving children of the Argive river Inachus.' |
| 3.26 καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν. μηδ’ αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μῦθος κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοί τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους.» «Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.» | 3.26 And let them not tell us many other such lies. Nor again let mothers, persuaded by these stories, terrify their children, telling myths improperly—how certain gods go about by night taking the likeness of many strangers and all sorts of forms—lest they at once blaspheme against the gods and make their children more cowardly." "Let them not indeed," he said. |
| 3.27 «Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοί εἰσιν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμᾶς δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες;» «Ἴσως, ἔφη.» «Τί δέ; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι ὁ θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φαντάσματα προτείνων;» «Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ’ ὅς.» | 3.27 "Are then the gods themselves such as not to change, but do they make us think that they appear in all kinds of forms, deceiving and bewitching us?" "Perhaps," he said. "What then?" I said. "Would a god wish to lie, either in word or in deed, by displaying phantoms?" "I do not know," he said. |
| 3.28 «Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτ’ εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν;» «Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;» «Οἶσθά που, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι.» «Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δ’ ὅς, μανθάνω.» | 3.28 "Do you not know," I said, "that the true lie, if it is possible to say such a thing, all gods and men hate?" "How do you mean?" he said. "You know surely," I said, "that to lie in the most sovereign part of themselves and about the most sovereign matters is something no one willingly desires, but above all things everyone fears to possess it there." "Not even now do I quite understand," he said. |
| 3.29 «Οἴει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστ’ ἂν δέξαιντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.» | 3.29 "You think I am saying something profound," I said. "I am saying that to lie in the soul concerning reality, to be deceived and ignorant and to possess and hold falsehood there, is what all men would least accept, and they hate it most of all in such a place." |
| 3.30 «Πολύ γ’, ἔφη.» «Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ’ ἄν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου ἄγνοια· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστι παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω;» «Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.» | 3.30 "By far," he said. "Furthermore, it would be most correct to call this—what I was just speaking of—the true lie: the ignorance in the soul of the deceived person. For the lie in words is an imitation of the condition in the soul and an image born later, not an entirely unmixed lie. Or is it not so?" "Completely so." |
| 3.31 «Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται.» «Δοκεῖ μοι.» «Τί δὲ δή; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἆρ’ οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; | 3.31 "Real falsehood, then, is hated not only by gods, but also by men." "So it seems to me." "What then about the lie in words? When and for whom is it useful, so as not to be worthy of hatred? Is it not toward enemies, and toward those called friends when through madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad, that it becomes useful as a preventive remedy? |
| 3.32 καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;» «Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.» «Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο;» «Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ἔφη.» | 3.32 And in the myths we were just discussing, because of our not knowing where the truth lies concerning ancient events, by assimilating falsehood to the truth as much as possible, do we not thus make it useful?" "Indeed," he said, "that is so." "In respect of which of these, then, is falsehood useful to god? Would he lie by assimilating falsehood because he does not know ancient events?" "That would be ridiculous indeed," he said. |
| 3.33 «Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ἐν θεῷ ψευδὴς οὐκ ἔνι;» «Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.» «Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἂν ψεύδοιτο;» «Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.» «Ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν;» «Ἀλλ’ οὐδεὶς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής.» «Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο;» «Οὐκ ἔστιν.» «Πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.» «Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.» | 3.33 "A deceitful poet, then, is not in god?" "I think not." "Would he lie, then, out of fear of his enemies?" "Far from it." "Because of the folly or madness of his kin?" "But no foolish or mad person," he said, "is beloved of god." "There is no reason, then, why god should lie?" "There is none." "In every way, then, the divine and godlike is free from falsehood." "Entirely so," he said. |
| 3.34 «Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθέσταται, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ.» «Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.» «Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήθ' ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ;» «Συγχωρῶ.» | 3.34 "God, therefore, is altogether simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others, neither by phantoms, nor by sending signs, whether in waking or in dream." "So it appears to me myself," he said, "as you say." "You agree then," I said, "that this is a second pattern according to which one must speak and write about gods: that they are neither sorcerers who change themselves, nor do they mislead us with lies in word or deed?" "I agree." |
| 3.35 «Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδ' Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῇ ἡ Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ᾄδοντα ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἑὰς εὐπαιδίας, νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνος τύχας Παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ. κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών, αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν. | 3.35 "While praising many other things in Homer, then, we shall not praise this: the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor in Aeschylus when Thetis says that Apollo, singing at her wedding, 'recounted my blessed offspring, free from disease and enjoying long lives; having uttered the Paean, he gladdened my heart. And I hoped the divine mouth of Phoebus to be free from lie, brimming with prophetic skill. Yet he who sang, he who was present at the feast, he who said these things—he himself is the one who slew my child!' |
| 3.36 ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε.» «Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν αὐτοῖς χρῴμην.» | 3.36 Whenever anyone says such things about gods, we shall be angry and not grant a chorus, nor shall we allow teachers to use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are to be god-fearing and divine, as far as it is possible for a human being to be." "Completely," he said, "I agree with these patterns, and I would use them as laws." |
| 3.37 Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Πλάτων. εὕροις δ' ἂν τὴν Ἑβραίων γραφὴν οὐδαμῶς μὲν μύθους αἰσχροὺς περὶ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν θείων ἀγγέλων, οὐδέ γε περὶ τῶν θεοφιλῶν ἀνδρῶν ὁμοίως ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς θεολογίαις περιέχουσαν, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐκτεθέντα τύπον, ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ θεὸς τυγχάνει, καὶ τὰ πρὸς αὐτοῦ γεγονότα πάντα τοιαῦτα. | 3.37 These are the words of Plato. And you would find that the Scripture of the Hebrews contains no disgraceful myths about the God of all things, nor about the divine angels around Him, nor about men beloved of God, in the manner of Greek mythologies; but rather it contains the pattern set forth by Plato: that God happens to be good, and all things brought into being by Him are likewise. |
| 3.38 ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δ' οὖν τῶν δημιουργημάτων ὁ θαυμάσιος Μωϋσῆς ἐπιλέγει· «καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς ὅτι καλόν.» ἐπί τε πᾶσι τὸν περὶ πάντων συγκεφαλαιούμενος λόγον φησί· «καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησε, καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν.» δόγμα δ' Ἑβραίων ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν κακῶν αἴτιον, εἰ δὴ «ὁ θεὸς θάνατον οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τέρπεται ἐπ' ἀπωλείᾳ ζώντων· ἔκτισε γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, καὶ σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου»· «φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.» | 3.38 Upon each of the creations, therefore, the admirable Moses adds: "And God saw that it was good." And over all, summarizing the account concerning everything, he says: "And God saw all things that He had made, and behold, they were very good." It is also a doctrine of the Hebrews that God is not the cause of evil, since "God did not make death, nor does He delight in the destruction of the living; for He created all things that they might exist, and the generations of the world are wholesome" and "by the envy of the devil death entered into the world." |
| 3.39 διὸ καὶ παρὰ τῷ προφήτῃ εἰσῆκται λέγων ὁ θεὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως κακὸν γεγενημένον· «ἐγὼ δὲ ἐφύτευσά σε ἄμπελον καρποφόρον πᾶσαν ἀληθινήν· πῶς ἐστράφης εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ἡ ἄμπελος ἡ ἀλλοτρία;» εἰ δέ που λέγοιτο κακὰ τοῖς φαύλοις ἐκ θεοῦ συμβαίνειν, ὁμωνύμως ἀκουστέον, ὡς τῶν τιμωριῶν οὕτω κεκλημένων, ἃς ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν τιμωρουμένων, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ δὲ καὶ συμφέροντι λέγεται ἐπάγειν· ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ ἰατρὸς ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν καμνόντων κακὰ νομίζοιτο προσφέρειν τὰς ἀλγεινὰς καὶ πικρὰς θεραπείας. | 3.39 Wherefore also in the prophet, God is introduced speaking to him who became evil by his own choice: "I planted you a fruitful vine, entirely true; how were you turned backward into an alien vine?" And if it should be said anywhere that bad things happen to the base from God, it must be understood homonymously—that punishments are so called, which God, being good, brings upon them not for the harm of those punished, but is said to bring them for benefit and advantage; just as a physician, for the salvation of the sick, might be thought to administer painful and bitter treatments as 'evils.' |
| 3.40 διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἔνθα εἴρηται κακὰ ἀνθρώποις ἐπάγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, τὰ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, καὶ ὅτε τὰ σκυθρωπὰ καὶ ἀνθρώποις κακὰ νενομισμένα τοῖς τούτων ἀξίοις ἐπῆγεν, οἱ δὲ ὤναντο κολαζόμενοι, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἑβραίων γραφὴν λέγουσαν· «ὃν γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ κύριος παιδεύει· μαστιγοῖ δὲ πάντα υἱὸν ὃν παραδέχεται.» | 3.40 Wherefore also in Divine Scripture, where it is said that evils are brought upon men by God, we must apply the statements in Plato: that God worked what was just and good, and when He brought grim things, considered evil by men, upon those deserving them, they were benefited by being punished—not only according to the philosopher, but also according to Hebrew Scripture, which says: "For whom the Lord loves He disciplines, and scourges every son whom He receives." |
| 3.41 ὡς δ' ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δ' ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα ὁ θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι, ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ. | 3.41 But that those paying the penalty were wretched, and that the one doing these things was God, the poet must not be allowed to say; but if they say that the wicked were wretched because they needed punishment, and that in paying the penalty they were benefited by God, we must allow it. But to say that God, being good, becomes the cause of evil to anyone—this we must fight in every way. |
| 3.42 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὸν θεὸν ἡ παρ' Ἑβραίοις προφητεία ὧδέ πῃ ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκει λέγουσα· «διότι ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἠλλοίωμαι.» καὶ ἐν ταῖς θεολογίαις δὲ ὁ Δαβὶδ ἀναφωνεῖ λέγων· «πάντες ὡς ἱμάτιον παλαιωθήσονται, καὶ ὡσεὶ περιβόλαιον ἑλίξεις αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀλλαγήσονται· σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ, καὶ τὰ ἔτη σου οὐκ ἐκλείψουσιν.» | 3.42 Moreover, concerning God not altering, the prophecy among the Hebrews teaches thus somewhere from the person of God, saying: "Because I am the Lord your God, and I have not changed." And in his theological songs David proclaims, saying: "They all shall grow old like a garment, and like a cloak You shall roll them up and they shall be changed; but You are the same, and Your years shall not fail." |
| 3.43 εἰ δέ πῃ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον εἰσάγουσιν ἐν εἴδει καὶ σχήματι ἀνθρωπείῳ παραφαινόμενον, λεκτέον ὡς οὐ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων μύθους ὁμοίως Πρωτεῖ καὶ Θέτιδι καὶ Ἥρᾳ, οὐδ’ ὡς οἱ θεοὶ οἱ περιερχόμενοι νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ζῴοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, καὶ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον ἀνθρώποις πεφηνότα εἰσάγουσιν οἱ Ἑβραίων λόγοι, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων δεῖν ποτέ φησιν ἐπὶ φίλων εὐεργεσίᾳ, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους πάροδον. | 3.43 And if anywhere they introduce the Logos of God appearing in human form and shape, it must be said that the accounts of the Hebrews do not introduce the Logos of God revealed to men in the manner of the Greek myths—like Proteus, Thetis, and Hera, nor like gods going about by night taking the likeness of many animals and all kinds of forms—but as Plato himself says it is necessary at times for the benefit of friends, whenever through madness or some folly they attempt to do something bad, that the advent of God to men becomes a useful remedy for prevention. |
| 3.44 ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ζῴων οὐδὲν ἦν θεοφιλέστερον γένος ἀνθρώπου, συγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγῳ, παρ’ οὗ καὶ λογικὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀπείργαστο, εἰκότως, οἷα φίλου ζῴου κηδόμενον, τὸν ἐπουράνιον λόγον ἥκειν ἐπὶ θεραπείᾳ φασὶ παντὸς τοῦ γένους, νόσον καὶ μανίαν ἔκτοπον ὑπομείναντος, ὡς μήτε τὸν πατέρα γινώσκειν θεόν, μήτε τὴν οἰκείαν τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως οὐσίαν, μήτ’ αὖ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, σώτειραν τῶν ὅλων, εἰς ἀλόγου δὲ ζῴου σχεδὸν ὅσον παρατροπὴν ἥκοντος. | 3.44 Since then among the creatures upon earth no race was more beloved of God than mankind, being akin and closely tied to the Logos of God, by whom man was also made rational in the nature of his soul—naturally, out of care for a beloved creature, they say the heavenly Logos came for the healing of the whole race, which had suffered an extraordinary disease and madness, so as neither to know God as Father, nor the proper essence of its own intellectual nature, nor again the providence of God, the savior of all things, having arrived at almost total deviation like that of an irrational animal. |
| 3.45 διὸ δὴ τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ ἰατρὸν ἐπιστῆναι λέγουσιν, οὐ μὲν δὴ τῆς οἰκείας ἐκστάντα φύσεως, οὐδέ γε ψευσάμενον τοὺς ὁρῶντας, ἄμφω δὲ ἀληθῆ φυλάξαντα, τό τε ἀφανὲς καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. πῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἑωρᾶτο, πῇ δὲ θεοῦ λόγος ἦν ἀληθής, οὐ γοητεύων, οὐδὲ τοὺς θεωμένους ἐξαπατῶν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεῖον ἀψευδὲς καλῶς ἔχειν ἐδόκει καὶ Πλάτωνι. | 3.45 Wherefore they say the Savior and Physician stood by—not indeed having departed from His own nature, nor having lied to those who saw Him, but having preserved both true, the unseen and the seen. For in one respect He was seen as true man, and in another He was true Logos of God, not practicing sorcery nor deceiving those who beheld Him, since to Plato too it seemed right that the divine is free from falsehood. |
| 3.46 κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἁπλοῦς ὢν καὶ ἀληθὴς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθέστατο, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξηπάτα, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὐδ' ὄναρ. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οἷα λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἰατρός, σωτηρίας ἕνεκα τοῦ παντὸς ἀνθρώπων γένους ἀληθῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐ δοκήσει δι’ οὗ ἀνείληφεν ἀνθρώπου διεπραγματεύσατο, τὴν πρὸς τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα φιλίαν τε καὶ ὑποστροφὴν διὰ τῆς κατηγγελμένης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ θεογνωσίας τε καὶ ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας πᾶσιν ἡμῖν δωρούμενος. | 3.46 Completely, then, the God Logos, being simple and true in deed and word, neither changed Himself nor deceived others, neither by phantoms, nor by words, nor by sending signs, neither in waking nor in dream. For all such things, as physician of rational souls, He accomplished truly for the salvation of the whole human race—not in appearance—through the man whom He assumed, bestowing upon us all friendship with and return to His own Father through the knowledge of God and true piety proclaimed by Him. |
| 3.47 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοιαῦτα· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλως λέγουσι χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδέ γε τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίνεσθαι, ὡς καὶ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄριστα ἔχειν ἐδόκει. | 3.47 And such are our affairs; but with those who speak otherwise we shall be angry and not grant a chorus, nor shall we allow teachers to use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are to become god-fearing and divine, as also seemed best to the philosopher. |
Chapter 4
These two chapters (4-5) presents an excerpt from Plato's Euthyphro (5f–6c) followed by Eusebius's attribution and a commentary by Numenius of Apamea (On the Secrets in Plato). In the dialogue, Socrates questions the traditional, immoral myths about the gods (Zeus binding Cronus, Cronus castrating Uranus) and expresses doubt over divine warfare. Numenius explains Plato's pedagogical method: Plato used the character of Euthyphro to represent the superstitious and misguided religious view of the Athenians, allowing Socrates to challenge these myths safely using his customary dialectic without suffering the same fate as Socrates.
| 4.1 «Αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, καὶ ἐκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ. | 4.1 "For men themselves happen to consider Zeus the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he bound his own father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that the father in turn castrated his own father for other similar reasons. Yet they are angry with me because I am prosecuting my father for acting unjustly, and so they contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me." |
| 4.2 Ἄρα γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι’ ἃ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἵ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγῇ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγονέναι;» «Καὶ ἔτι τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.» | 4.2 "Is it not, Euthyphro, for this very reason that I am defending myself against the indictment—because whenever someone says such things about the gods, I accept them with difficulty? For which reason, as it seems, someone will say that I am in error. Now, if these things seem right to you as well—who know so well about such matters—then it seems necessary for us to yield. For what else shall we say, we who ourselves admit that we know nothing about these things? But tell me, by the god of friendship, do you truly believe these things happened this way?" "Yes, Socrates, and even more wonderful things than these, which the crowd does not know." |
| 4.3 «Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγῇ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι φῶμεν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον;» | 4.3 "Do you then really believe that there is war among the gods against one another, and terrible enmities, battles, and many other such things, such as are told by the poets and portrayed upon our sacred places by good painters—and especially on the robe full of such embroideries that is carried up to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaia? Shall we say these things are true, Euthyphro?" |
|
4.4
«Μὴ μόνα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλὰ, ἐάν περ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θεῶν διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσῃ.»
Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Εὐθύφρονι. διασαφεῖ δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ Νουμήνιος ἐν τῷ Περί τῶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἀπορρήτων ὧδέ πῃ λέγων· |
4.4
"Not only these, Socrates, but as I just said, I will relate to you many other things about the gods, if you wish, which I know well you will be amazed to hear."
These things Plato writes in the Euthyphro. And Numenius clarifies the meaning in his work On the Secrets in Plato, speaking somewhat as follows: |
Chapter 5
| 5.1 «Εἰ μὲν γράφειν ὑποτεινάμενος ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς θεολογίας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἶτα ἐδυσχέραινεν αὐτῇ καὶ κατηγόρει ἐχούσῃ στάσεις μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τέκνων δὲ τῶν μὲν μίξεις, τῶν δὲ ἐδωδὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀντὶ τούτων πατράσι τιμωρίας ἀδελφῶν τε ἀδελφοῖς ὑμνούσῃ, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· εἴπερ ὁ Πλάτων ταὐτὰ λαβὼν εἰς τὸ φανερὸν κατηγόρει, παρασχεῖν ἂν, δοκεῖ μοι, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις αἰτίαν πάλιν κακοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀποκτείνασι καὶ αὐτὸν, ὥσπερ τὸν Σωκράτην. ἐπεὶ δὲ ζῆν μὲν οὐκ ἂν προείλετο μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθεύειν, ἑώρα δὲ ζῆν τε καὶ ἀληθεύειν ἀσφαλῶς δυνησόμενος, ἔθηκεν ἐν μὲν τῷ σχήματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸν Εὐθύφρονα, ὄντα ἄνδρα ἀλαζόνα καὶ κοάλεμον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος θεολογεῖ κακῶς, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ σχηματισμῷ ἐν ᾧπερ εἰωθότως ἤλεγχεν ἑκάστῳ προσομιλῶν.» | 5.1 "If Plato, having undertaken to write about the theology of the Athenians, had then expressed disgust at it and denounced it for depicting rivalries among the gods, sexual unions between children, devouring of offspring, and punishments inflicted on fathers by their children in return, as well as brotherly strife and other such matters—if Plato had brought these things into the open and denounced them, he would, it seems to me, have given the Athenians occasion to do evil once again by killing him as well, just as they did Socrates. But since he did not prefer living to telling the truth, and saw that he would be able both to live and to speak the truth safely, he set up Euthyphro in the persona of the Athenians—being a boastful and foolish man, if ever anyone misstated theology—while portraying Socrates himself as he was, in his customed character with which he habitually tested anyone he conversed with." |
Chapter 6
In this chapter, Socrates argues to Crito that one must prioritize reasoned principles over the opinions of the majority. Using an analogy from physical training—where an athlete listens only to a trainer rather than the public—he demonstrates that we must value only expert judgment when dealing with justice and the soul. In 6.12, Eusebius bridges this Platonic ideal with Gospel teaching (referencing John 5:44), arguing that Christian martyrs similarly disregard public opinion and threats of death to stay faithful to the Word of God.
| 6.1 «Ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μὴ, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. | 6.1 "Dear Crito, your zeal is worth much if it should be accompanied by some right reason; but if not, the greater it is, the more difficult it becomes. We must therefore consider whether these things ought to be done or not; for I am the kind of man who—not only now, but always—obeys nothing else among my concerns except the reason that seems best to me upon reflection. |
| 6.2 τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβάλλειν, ἐπειδή μοι ἥδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι συγχωρήσω, οὐδ’ ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμούς τε καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. | 6.2 The arguments I used to make in the past I cannot cast aside now simply because this fortune has befallen me; rather, they appear virtually identical to me, and I honor and revere the very same arguments as before. Unless we have better ones to offer at present, know well that I will not yield to you—not even if the power of the masses scares us like children with more terrors than it does now, subjecting us to bonds, deaths, and confiscations of property. |
| 6.3 πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, τὸν περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ· ἢ πρὶν μέν με δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς. | 6.3 How then might we examine these matters most properly? If we first take up this argument that you raise regarding opinions—whether it was correctly said on every occasion or not, that we should pay attention to some opinions, but not to others. Or was it correctly said before I had to die, but now it has become clear that it was merely said for the sake of argument, and was in truth only play and nonsense? |
| 6.4 ἐπιθυμῶ δ’ ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδ' ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἑκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. | 6.4 I desire to examine this together with you, Crito—whether it will appear any different to me now that I am in this state, or the same—and we shall either let it go or obey it. It used to be stated, I believe, by those who thought they were making sense—just as I was saying just now—that of the opinions men hold, we ought to value some highly, and others not. |
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6.5
τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τἀνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα συμφορά. σκόπει δή· οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὔ; τί φῄς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;»
«Καλῶς.» |
6.5
By the gods, Crito, does this not seem to you to be well said? For you, so far as human foresight goes, are outside the likelihood of dying tomorrow, and present misfortune would not lead you astray. Consider then: does it not seem to you to be stated adequately that we ought not to honor all the opinions of men, but some, and not others? Nor the opinions of all men, but of some, and not others? What do you say? Is this not well said?"
"It is well said." |
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6.6
«Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;»
«Ναί.» «Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;» «Πῶς δ’ οὔ;» «Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὤν;» «Ἑνὸς μόνου.» |
6.6
"Therefore, we should honor the good opinions, and not the bad?"
"Yes." "And are not the good opinions those of the wise, and the bad ones those of the foolish?" "How could they not be?" "Come then, how was this argued in turn? Does a man engaged in physical training and making it his business pay attention to the praise, blame, and opinion of every man, or to those of one alone—whoever happens to be his physician or trainer?" "To one alone." |
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6.7
«Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.»
«Δηλαδή.» «Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον, καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ᾗ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαΐοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.» «Ἔστι ταῦτα.» «Εἷεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων, ἆρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;» «Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;» «Τί δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;» «Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι.» |
6.7
"Must he not then fear the blamings and welcome the praises of that one alone, but not those of the crowd?"
"Clearly." "In this way, then, he must act and train, and eat and drink—in whatever way seems best to the one supervisor and expert, rather than to all the others combined." "That is so." "Very well. If he disobeys that one person and dishonors his opinion and praise, but honors the opinions of the crowd who know nothing, will he not suffer some harm?" "How could he not?" "What is this harm? Where does it extend, and to what part of the disobedient man?" "Clearly to his body; for it ruins it." |
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6.8
«Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διίωμεν; καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστι, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἕπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦτο;»
«Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.» |
6.8
"You speak well. So it is with other matters too, Crito, so that we need not go through them all. And especially regarding what is just and unjust, ugly and noble, good and bad—about which our counsel is now taken—ought we to follow the opinion of the crowd and fear it, or that of the one, if there is an expert, whom we ought to respect and fear more than all the others combined? If we do not follow him, we will corrupt and injure that which used to be made better by justice, but ruined by injustice. Or is there nothing to this?"
"I certainly think there is, Socrates." |
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6.9
«Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γινόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαιόντων δόξῃ, ἆρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα, ἢ οὐχί;»
«Ναί.» «Ἀρ’ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;» «Οὐδαμῶς.» |
6.9
"Come then, if we ruin that which is made better by health and destroyed by disease by heeding the opinion of non-experts, is life worth living for us when it is ruined? And this is surely the body, is it not?"
"Yes." "Is life then worth living for us with a wretched and ruined body?" "By no means." |
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6.10
«Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἥ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;»
«Οὐδαμῶς.» «Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;» «Πολύ γε.» |
6.10
"Is life then worth living for us when that part is ruined which injustice harms and justice benefits? Or do we consider that part of ourselves—whatever it may be, concerning which injustice and justice reside—to be inferior to the body?"
"By no means." "Is it more precious?" "Much more so." |
| 6.11 «Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τί ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγῇ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.» | 6.11 "Therefore, my good friend, we must not think so much about what the crowd will say about us, but rather what the expert on the just and unjust—the one man—will say, and truth itself. So in this respect you do not advise correctly when you suggest that we should care about the opinion of the crowd regarding what is just, noble, good, and their opposites." |
| 6.12 Καὶ ὁ σωτήριος δὲ λόγος φησί· «δόξαν τὴν παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ζητεῖτε, καὶ τὴν δόξαν τὴν παρὰ μόνου τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐ ζητεῖτε.» διὸ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ἀγῶσιν ὀρθῶς πράττομεν οὐ σκοποῦντες τί ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τί βούλεται εἷς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, ὃν ἅπαξ κρίσει ἑλομένους προσήκει ὁμοίως καὶ τότε ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ πρότερον τιμᾶν, καὶ μὴ μετατίθεσθαι, μηδ’ ἂν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ πάλαι παρ’ Ἑβραίοις ἐν μαρτυρίῳ διαλάμψαντες. | 6.12 And the Savior's Word says: "You seek glory from men, and do not seek the glory that comes from the only One." Therefore, we too in our struggles for piety act rightly when we do not consider what the masses will say about us, but what the one Word of God wills—whom, having once chosen by judgment, it is fitting to honor now just as before, and not to abandon, even if the power of the crowd should terrify us like children. Such also were those of old among the Hebrews who shone forth in martyrdom. |
Chapter 7
This chapter continues the quote from Plato's Crito (49a–49e), followed by Eusebius's own theological reflection (vs 5).
In the Platonic dialogue, Socrates argues that one must never commit injustice, even in response to being wronged or mistreated. Returning evil for evil or breaking just agreements is fundamentally unjust. In vs 5, Eusebius explicitly connects Socrates' moral principle of non-retaliation to Christian and Hebrew Scripture, juxtaposing Plato's words with Romans 12:17, Matthew 5:44–45, 1 Corinthians 4:12–13, and Psalms 7:5 and 120:6.
In the Platonic dialogue, Socrates argues that one must never commit injustice, even in response to being wronged or mistreated. Returning evil for evil or breaking just agreements is fundamentally unjust. In vs 5, Eusebius explicitly connects Socrates' moral principle of non-retaliation to Christian and Hebrew Scripture, juxtaposing Plato's words with Romans 12:17, Matthew 5:44–45, 1 Corinthians 4:12–13, and Psalms 7:5 and 120:6.
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7.1
«Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δ’ οὔ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ημέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσὶ, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἆρα τηλικοίδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μὴ, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὂν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;»
«Φαμέν.» |
7.1
"Do we say that in no way ought one willingly to do wrong, or that in some ways one may do wrong and in others not? Or is doing wrong never good nor noble, as has often been agreed between us in times past? Exactly as was said just now. Or have all those former agreements of ours been poured out in these few days, and have we, Crito, old men as we are, been conversing with one another in all seriousness without noticing that we are no different from children? Or is it above all else just as was said to us then—whether the majority agree or not, and whether we must suffer even harsher things than these or milder ones—that doing wrong is nevertheless both bad and shameful for the wrongdoer in every way? Do we say so or not?"
"We do." |
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7.2
«Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.»
«Οὐ δῆτα.» «Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν;» «Οὐ φαίνεται.» «Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ;» «Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.» «Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι, δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;» «Οὐδαμῶς.» «Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.» «Καλῶς λέγεις.» |
7.2
"Then one must in no way do wrong."
"Certainly not." "Nor then, when wronged, must one wrong in return, as the majority think, since one must in no way do wrong?" "It seems not." "What then? Ought one to do evil, Crito, or not?" "Surely not, Socrates." "What about this: is returning evil when suffering evil just, as the majority say, or not just?" "In no way." "For doing evil to human beings differs in no way from doing wrong." "You speak well." |
| 7.3 «Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ’ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ τις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ’ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῇς· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλὴ, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ.» | 7.3 "Therefore, one must neither wrong in return nor do evil to any human being, no matter what one may suffer at their hands. But watch out, Crito, in agreeing to this, that you do not agree contrary to your real opinion; for I know that to few people do these things seem right, or ever will seem right. Those who hold this view and those who do not have no common ground for counsel, but must inevitably despise one another when seeing each other's deliberations. Consider then very carefully yourself whether you share this view and agree with me, so that we may begin our deliberation from this premise: that neither doing wrong, nor returning wrong, nor defending oneself against evil by doing evil in return is ever right. Or do you withdraw and not share in this premise? For my part, it seemed so to me long ago, and it still seems so now." |
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7.4
«καὶ σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλῃ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε· εἰ δ’ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸν μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.»
«Ἀλλ’ ἐμμένω τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.» «Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ, πότερον ἃ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῳ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον, ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;» «Ποιητέον.» |
7.4
"And if it seems otherwise to you in any way, speak and teach me; but if you abide by what was said before, listen to what comes next."
"I do abide by it and agree with you; so speak on." "Then I say what comes next, or rather I ask: whatever a person agrees with someone to do, provided it is just, should he do it or deceive?" "He should do it." |
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7.5
Τούτοις παράθες τὸ «μηδενὶ κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ ἀποδιδόντες,» καὶ τὸ «εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς καταρωμένους ὑμᾶς· προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων καὶ διωκόντων ὑμᾶς, ἵνα γένησθε υἱοὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ὅστις τὸν ἥλιον αὑτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους,»
καὶ ἔτι τὸ «λοιδορούμενοι εὐλογοῦμεν, διωκόμενοι ἀνεχόμεθα, δυσφημούμενοι παρακαλοῦμεν,» ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἱεροῖς φερόμενα γράμμασιν. καὶ ὁ προφήτης δὲ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις φησὶν «εἰ ἀνταπέδωκα τοῖς ἀνταποδιδοῦσί μοι κακά,» καὶ πάλιν «μετὰ τῶν μισούντων τὴν εἰρήνην ἤμην εἰρηνικός.» |
7.5
Compare with these statements the passage: "Repaying no one evil for evil" [Romans 12:17], and "Bless those who curse you; pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven, who causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust" [Matthew 5:44–45],
and further: "When reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we encourage" [1 Corinthians 4:12–13], which are contained in our sacred writings. And the prophet among the Hebrews also says: "If I have repaid evil to those who repaid evil to me" [Psalm 7:5], and again: "With those who hated peace, I was peaceful" [Psalm 120:6]. |
Chapter 8
In this chapter, the Laws of Athens address Socrates, confronting him with his duty to respect his civic agreement. They point out that he previously chose death over exile, spent seventy years in Athens without leaving, and thereby implicitly bound himself to obey its laws. Consequently, fleeing trial or execution now would be the action of an untrustworthy slave breaking a voluntary contract.
| 8.1 «Σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ᾑροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνῃ οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπῃ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἡμᾶς διαφθεῖραι· πράττεις τε ὅπερ ἂν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τε καὶ ὁμολογίας καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν συνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. | 8.1 "At that time, you made a grand show of not being angry if you had to die, but chose—as you claimed—death over exile. Yet now you are neither ashamed of those words nor do you respect us, the Laws, when you attempt to destroy us. You are acting just as the vilest slave would act, trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements according to which you agreed to live as a citizen under us. |
|
8.2
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὡμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ;»
«Τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;» «Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.» «Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἢ συνθήκας πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας, οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς, οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἠρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς, μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι; |
8.2
First of all, answer us this very question: do we speak the truth when we claim that you agreed to live as a citizen under us by deed, and not merely by word, or is it not true?"
"What shall we say to these things, Crito? Anything other than that we agree?" "We must, Socrates." "What else then," they would say, "are you doing than violating the compacts and agreements made with us? You did not enter into them under compulsion, nor were you deceived, nor were you forced to decide in a short time, but over seventy years during which you were free to leave if we did not please you, or if the agreements did not seem just to you. |
| 8.3 σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προῃροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἑκάστοτε φῂς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι. οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δηλονότι· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὡμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.» | 8.3 You preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete—which you regularly say are well-governed—nor any other city among the Greeks or barbarians; rather, you left the city less than the lame, the blind, and other defectives. So remarkably more than other Athenians did the city and we, the Laws, please you—for to whom would a city be pleasing without laws? But now, will you not abide by what was agreed? You will if you listen to us, Socrates." |
Chapter 9
This chapter is an excerpt from Plato's Crito (53b–54c). Speaking through the persona of the Laws of Athens, Socrates argues that escaping prison would ruin his moral standing, turn him into a lawbreaker, and humiliate him in well-governed cities or in disorder-prone Thessaly. Furthermore, escaping will not benefit his children—as it would either exile them or abandon them to friends—whereas dying unjustly at the hands of men (rather than breaking the law) leaves his soul blameless before both living society and the Laws of the Underworld (Hades).
| 9.1 «Ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων τε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξῃ τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἆρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος λόγους τινάς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἵους ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. | 9.1 "For whoever is a corrupter of the laws would surely be thought to be a corrupter of young and foolish men. Will you then avoid well-governed cities and the most orderly of men? And if you do this, will life be worth living for you? Or will you approach them and have the effrontery to engage in the kind of discourses, Socrates, that you used here—that virtue, justice, customs, and laws are of highest value to human beings? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates will appear shameful? You surely must think so. |
| 9.2 ἀλλ’ ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες, σκευήν τέ τινα περιθέμενος ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. | 9.2 Instead, you will depart from these places and go to Thessaly, to Crito’s hosts; for there is the greatest disorder and licentiousness, and perhaps they would listen with pleasure to how ridiculously you escaped from prison—putting on some disguise or wearing a leather hide or other such gear as runaways are accustomed to wrap around themselves, and altering your appearance. |
| 9.3 ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ μικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβὰς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπήσῃς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσῃ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; | 9.3 And that an old man, with so little time remaining in his life, as is likely, dared to desire to live so greedily by violating the highest laws—will there be no one to say this? Perhaps, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will hear many things unworthy of yourself. So you will live by fawning on all men and acting as their slave—doing what, or feasting in Thessaly, as if you had traveled to Thessaly for a dinner party? Where will those arguments of ours about justice and the rest of virtue be then? But surely you wish to live for the sake of your children, so that you may rear and educate them? |
| 9.5 Will they take care of them if you move to Thessaly, but fail to take care of them if you depart for Hades—if indeed there is any benefit in those who claim to be your companions? One must certainly think so. 9.4 τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. | 9.4 What then? Will you take them to Thessaly and rear and educate them there, making foreigners of them so that they may enjoy this benefit from you as well? Or will this not happen, but rather, by being reared here while you are alive, will they be better reared and educated even if you are not with them? For your companions will take care of them. |
| 9.5 πότερον δὲ ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται, εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστι τῶν σοὶ φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι; οἴεσθαί γε χρή. | 9.5 Will they take care of them if you move to Thessaly, but fail to take care of them if you depart for Hades—if indeed there is any benefit in those who claim to be your companions? One must certainly think so. |
| 9.6 ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἅιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενὶ, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. | 9.6 So, Socrates, obey us, your nurturers, and value neither children nor life nor anything else more than what is right, so that when you arrive in Hades you may have all these arguments to present in your defense before the rulers there. For it appears that doing this is neither better for you here, nor more just, nor more holy, nor for any of your friends, nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. |
| 9.7 ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἠδικημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίῃς, οὐχ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς, ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς, κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ, οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου νόμοι, οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος.» | 9.7 As it is, if you depart, you will depart having been wronged not by us, the Laws, but by men. But if you escape so shamefully—returning wrong for wrong and evil for evil, violating your own compacts and agreements with us, and doing harm to those whom you least ought to harm: yourself, your friends, your country, and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the Laws in Hades, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you attempted to destroy us so far as lay in your power." |
Chapter 10
This chapter comprises famous quotes from Plato’s Apology (28b–29d; 40c–41c), followed by Eusebius's Christian commentary and biblical parallels (vs 13). Socrates defends his philosophical vocation as a divine duty that must be pursued regardless of danger or death. He frames death as either a dreamless, peaceful sleep or a migration to an afterlife where he can converse with unjust martyrs and ancient wise men. In vs 13, Eusebius draws direct parallels between Socrates' stance and Christian doctrine, quoting Acts 5:29, Matthew 10:28, 2 Corinthians 5:1, 5:8, and Jesus' promise of resting in the bosom of Abraham with the Hebrew prophets.
| 10.1 «Ἴσως δ’ ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· “Εἶτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;” ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ δίκαιον ἂν λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι “Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. | 10.1 "Perhaps someone might say: 'Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having pursued such a pursuit as a result of which you now run the risk of dying?' But I would reply to him with a just argument: 'You do not speak well, sir, if you think a man who is of even slight worth ought to calculate the risk of living or dying, rather than consider this alone whenever he acts: whether he is doing just or unjust things, and the deeds of a good man or a bad one. |
| 10.2 φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ‘Ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι,’ φησί, ‘μεθ’ Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος’· ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησεν, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, ‘Αὐτίκα,’ φησί, ‘τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης.’ | 10.2 For according to your argument, all those demigods who died at Troy would be bad, especially the son of Thetis [Achilles], who despised danger so much compared to enduring something shameful that, when his mother—being a goddess—said to him when he was eager to kill Hector, something like this (as I recall): "My child, if you avenge the murder of your companion Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for straightway," she says, "after Hector, fate is prepared for you." But he, upon hearing this, made light of death and danger, fearing far more to live as a coward and not avenge his friends. "Straightway," he says, "may I die, after inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer, lest I remain here a laughingstock beside the curved ships, a burden upon the earth." |
| 10.3 μὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;” οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις αὑτὸν τάξῃ, ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι, ἢ ὑπὸ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. | 10.3 Do you think he gave any thought to death and danger?' For this is how it stands in truth, men of Athens: wherever a man posts himself, believing it to be best, or wherever he is posted by a commander, there he must—as it seems to me—remain and face danger, calculating neither death nor anything else before disgrace. |
| 10.4 ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, καὶ ἄλλοθί που, οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. | 10.4 I would then have done a terrible thing, men of Athens, if—when the commanders whom you chose to command me posted me at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, and anywhere else—I remained where they posted me like anyone else and risked death, yet when God posted me (as I thought and supposed) to live philosophizing and examining myself and others, I were then through fear of death or anything else whatever to abandon my post. |
| 10.5 δεινὸν μέντ’ ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ’ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ’ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δὲ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; | 10.5 It would indeed be a terrible thing, and then in truth someone might justly bring me into court for not believing that gods exist, disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself wise when I am not. For to fear death, men, is nothing other than to seem wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows death, not even whether it happens to be the greatest of all goods for a man; yet men fear it as if they knew well that it is the greatest of evils. And how is this not that reproachful ignorance—that of thinking one knows what one does not know? |
| 10.6 ἐγὼ δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἀνθρώπων· καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι, οὐδὲ φεύξομαι. | 10.6 And I, men, differ from most human beings in this respect and here; and if I should claim to be wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this: that as I do not know sufficiently about things in Hades, so I do not think I know. But doing wrong and disobeying one's superior, whether god or man, I know to be evil and shameful. Therefore, before the evils that I know to be evil, I will never fear nor flee from things that I do not know whether they may even happen to be good. |
| 10.7 ὥστε οὐδ’ εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε, Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ‘Ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ’ ᾧ τε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφοῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ’— | 10.7 So even if you acquit me now, disbelieving Anytus—who said either that I ought not to have entered this courtroom at all, or that once I entered, it was impossible not to execute me, telling you that if I escaped, all your sons would at once practice what Socrates teaches and be completely corrupted—if you should say to me regarding this: 'Socrates, for now we will not obey Anytus, but acquit you, on this condition however: that you no longer spend time in this inquiry nor philosophize; and if you are caught still doing this, you shall die'— |
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10.8
εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ‘Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τ’ ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷαπερ εἴωθα.’”
Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· |
10.8
If you should acquit me on these terms, as I said, I would say to you: 'I respect and love you, men of Athens, but I will obey God rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease philosophizing and encouraging and instructing whichever of you I meet, saying the kind of things I am accustomed to say.'"
And shortly after he adds: |
| 10.9 «Ἐννοήσωμεν δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδέν τι εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδὲ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. | 10.9 "Let us consider it in this way too, how great a hope there is that it is a good thing. For dying is one of two things: for either it is like being nothing and the dead person has no perception of anything, or according to what is said, it happens to be a change and migration of the soul from this place to another place. And if indeed there is no perception, but it is like sleep when someone sleeping sees not even a dream, death would be a wondrous gain. |
| 10.10 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲν ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ, εἰ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν οὐχὶ ἰδιώτην τινὰ, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας τε καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτως εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. | 10.10 For I think that if someone had to select that night in which he slept so deeply as not even to see a dream, and compare the other nights and days of his own life against that night, and had to say upon reflection how many days and nights he lived better and more pleasantly than that night in his life, I think not merely a private citizen, but even the Great King would find them easy to count compared to the other days and nights. If then death is such a thing, I say it is a gain; for all time appears in this way to be no more than a single night. |
| 10.11 εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; | 10.11 If, on the other hand, death is like a journey from here to another place, and what is said is true—that all who have died are indeed there—what greater good could there be than this, men of the jury? For if someone arriving in Hades, freed from these self-proclaimed judges, will find those who are truly judges, who are said to judge there—Minos, Rhadamanthys, Aeacus, Triptolemus, and as many other demigods as were just in their own lives—would that journey be a poor one? |
| 10.12 ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ’ ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἴπερ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἴεται μὲν, ἔστι δ’ οὔ.» | 10.12 Or again, to associate with Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer—how much would any of you give for that? For my part, I am willing to die many times if these things are true, since for me too spending time there would be wonderful, whenever I met Palamedes, Ajax son of Telamon, or anyone else of the ancients who died through an unjust judgment; comparing my own experiences against theirs, as I think, would not be unpleasant. And above all, to spend time examining and searching out those there—just like those here—to see who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not." |
| 10.13 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν «πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις» εἴρηται. καὶ «μὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεινόντων τὸ σῶμα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι. εἰδέναι τε, ὅτι ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ, οἰκοδομὴν ἐκ θεοῦ ἔχομεν, οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· ὅτι τε ἐκδημοῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδημοῦμεν τῷ κυρίῳ,» ὃς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸν ἠλπικόσιν ἐπήγγελται εἰς κόλπους Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακὼβ ἀναπαύσεσθαι, μετά τε τῶν ἄλλων παρ’ Ἑβραίοις θεοφιλῶν προφητῶν τε καὶ δικαίων ἐν μακαρίᾳ ζωῇ τὸν μακρὸν αἰῶνα διάξειν. | 10.13 And among us it is said: "We must obey God rather than men" [Acts 5:29]. And "Do not fear those who kill the body, but are unable to kill the soul" [Matthew 10:28]. And to know that "If our earthly house of this tent is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" [2 Corinthians 5:1]; and that "While away from the body, we are present with the Lord" [2 Corinthians 5:8]—who has promised to all who hope in Him that they shall rest in the bosoms of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and spend the long age in blessed life alongside the other God-loving prophets and righteous ones among the Hebrews. |
Chapter 11
This chapteer consists of a quotation from Plato’s Republic (Book 5, 468e–469b). In vs 1, Plato argues that fallen heroic soldiers (and those who live exceptionally good lives) belong to the Hesiodic "golden race" and should be honored after death as benevolent local spirits (daimones), with their tombs venerated and cared for. In vs 2–3, Eusebius draws a direct parallel to the Christian practice of honoring martyrs ("soldiers of true piety") at their tombs/relics, noting how Plato's philosophy aligns with Christian custom, before introducing quotes from the Jewish-Hellenistic philosopher Aristobulus.
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11.1
«Τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἆρ’ οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;
— Πάνυ γε μάλιστα. — Ἀλλ’ οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδάν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα “οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν, ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων;” — Πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν. — Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν, ᾗ ἂν ἐξηγῆται; — Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλομεν; — Καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαίμονας γεγονότας οὕτω θεραπεύσομέν τε καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας; τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομιοῦμεν, ὅταν τις γήρᾳ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσι;» |
11.1
"'And as for those who die on campaign, whoever dies after distinguishing himself—shall we not say, first of all, that he belongs to the golden race?'
'Most certainly.' 'And shall we not believe Hesiod, that whenever any of this race die, "they become holy earthly guardian spirits, noble, averters of evil, guardians of mortal men"?' 'We shall indeed believe him.' 'Therefore, having inquired of the god how we ought to inter men who are spirit-like and divine, and with what distinguished honors, shall we bury them in the very manner that he directs?' 'Why would we not?' 'And for the rest of time, shall we care for and worship their tombs as belonging to spirits who have come into being? And shall we hold these same customs whenever anyone dies of old age or in any other way among those who have been judged preeminently good in life?'" |
| 11.2 Καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἁρμόζει ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν θεοφιλῶν τελευτῇ, οὓς στρατιώτας τῆς ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις εἰπὼν παραλαμβάνεσθαι. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήκας αὐτῶν ἔθος ἡμῖν παριέναι, καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς παρὰ ταύταις ποιεῖσθαι, τιμᾶν τε τὰς μακαρίας αὐτῶν ψυχάς, ὡς εὐλόγως καὶ τούτων ὑφ’ ἡμῶν γιγνομένων. | 11.2 And these words apply fittingly to the death of those beloved by God, whom you would not err in calling soldiers of true piety taken to their rest. Hence it is also our custom to assemble at their tombs, to offer our prayers beside them, and to honor their blessed souls, since these things are reasonably done by us. |
| 11.3 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀνελεξάμεθα· φιλόκαλος δέ τις ἄλλος καὶ τούτων ἔτι πλείω ἂν εὕροι παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ σύμφωνα τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασι, τάχα δὲ καὶ παρ’ ἑτέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμῖν ὑποθέσεως προλαβόντες ἐφήψαντο καὶ ἄλλοι, εὖ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖν καὶ τὰ τοτούτοις πεπονημένα. παραθήσω δὲ πρώτου Ἀριστοβούλου τοῦ ἐξ Ἑβραίων φιλοσόφου τὰς οὕτως ἐχούσας φωνάς. | 11.3 Now we have gathered these points from the writings of Plato; but a lover of beauty could find even more things in his works that harmonize with our doctrines, and perhaps in other writers as well. But since others before us have taken up the same subject, it seems right to me to examine their labor as well. And first I will set forth the statements of Aristobulus, the philosopher from among the Hebrews, which run as follows. |
Chapter 12
This chapter consists of an extensive quotation taken from the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Aristobulus. Aristobulus argues that Greek philosophers (Plato, Pythagoras, Socrates) and poets (Orpheus, Aratus, Hesiod, Homer, Linus) derived their highest theological insights—such as the creation of the world by God's word, divine omnipresence, and the sanctity of the Seventh Day (Sabbath)—directly from early translations of the Hebrew Scriptures and the Law of Moses.
| 12.1 «Φανερὸν ὅτι κατηκολούθησεν ὁ Πλάτων τῇ καθ’ ἡμᾶς νομοθεσίᾳ, καὶ φανερός ἐστι περιειργασμένος ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ. διηρμήνευται γὰρ πρὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως δι’ ἑτέρων, πρὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Περσῶν ἐπικρατήσεως, τά τε κατὰ τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν τὴν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου τῶν Ἑβραίων, ἡμετέρων δὲ πολιτῶν, καὶ ἡ τῶν γεγονότων ἁπάντων αὐτοῖς ἐπιφάνεια, καὶ κράτησις τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῆς ὅλης νομοθεσίας ἐπεξήγησις, ὡς εὔδηλον εἶναι τὸν προειρημένον φιλόσοφον εἰληφέναι πολλά· γέγονε γὰρ πολυμαθής, καθὼς καὶ Πυθαγόρας πολλὰ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν μετενέγκας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δογματοποιίαν κατεχώρισεν. | 12.1 "It is evident that Plato followed our legislation, and it is clear that he carefully studied each of its contents. For before Demetrius Phalereus, prior to the conquest of Alexander and the Persians, translations had been made by others concerning the departure of the Hebrews—our fellow citizens—from Egypt, and the divine manifestation that occurred in all things for them, their conquest of the land, and the detailed explanation of the whole legislation. Thus it is manifest that the aforesaid philosopher took many things from it, for he was very learned; just as Pythagoras also transferred many of our teachings into his own system of doctrine and recorded them. |
| 12.2 ἡ δ’ ὅλη ἑρμηνεία τῶν διὰ τοῦ νόμου πάντων ἐπὶ τοῦ προσαγορευθέντος Φιλαδέλφου βασιλέως, σοῦ δὲ προγόνου, προσενεγκαμένου μείζονα φιλοτιμίαν, Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως πραγματευσαμένου τὰ περὶ τούτων.» | 12.2 The complete translation of all things in the Law, however, took place in the reign of the king named Philadelphus, your ancestor, who displayed greater magnanimity, Demetrius Phalereus having managed the business concerning these things." |
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12.3
Εἶτα μεταξύ τινα εἰπὼν ἐπιφέρει λέγων·
«Δεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνειν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν οὐ ῥητὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ἔργων κατασκευάς, καθὼς
καὶ διὰ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἡμῖν ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου θεοῦ λόγους εἴρηκεν ὁ Μωσῆς. συνεχῶς γάρ φησιν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου· “καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός, καὶ ἐγένετο.” |
12.3
Then after saying a few intervening things, he adds:
"For one must understand the divine voice not as spoken speech, but as the creation of works, just as Moses in our legislation has declared the entire genesis of the world to be the words of God; for he repeatedly says at each step: 'And God said, and it came to pass.' |
| 12.4 Δοκοῦσι δέ μοι περιειργασμένοι πάντα κατηκολουθηκέναι τούτῳ Πυθαγόρας τε καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων, λέγοντες ἀκούειν φωνῆς θεοῦ, τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν ὅλων συνθεωροῦντες ἀκριβῶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονυῖαν καὶ συνεχομένην ἀδιαλείπτως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ Ὀρφεὺς ἐν ποιήμασι τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον αὐτῷ λεγομένων οὕτως ἐκτίθεται περὶ τοῦ διακρατεῖσθαι θείᾳ δυνάμει τὰ πάντα καὶ γενητὰ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι τὸν θεόν. λέγει δ’ οὕτως· | 12.4 Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato seem to me to have followed him through careful study of all things, saying that they hear the voice of God when closely contemplating the structure of the universe as brought into being by God and continuously held together without ceasing. Furthermore, Orpheus also, in those poems of his called The Sacred Discourse, sets forth in this way how all things are held together by divine power, are created, and that God is over all. For he speaks thus: |
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12.5
“Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί, θύρας δ’ ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι,
φεύγοντες δικαίων θεσμούς, θείοιο τεθέντος πᾶσι νόμου· σὺ δ’ ἄκουε, φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε Μήνης, Μουσαῖ’· ἐξερέω γὰρ ἀληθέα, μηδέ σε τὰ πρὶν ἐν στήθεσσι φανέντα φίλης αἰῶνος ἀμέρσῃ. εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας τούτῳ προσέδρευε, ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος· εὖ δ’ ἐπίβαινε ἀτραπιτοῦ, μοῦνον δ’ ἐσόρα κόσμοιο τυπωτὴν ἀθάνατον. παλαιὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τοῦδε φααίνει· εἷς ἔστ’ αὐτοτελής, αὐτοῦ δ’ ὕπο πάντα τελεῖται, ἐν δ’ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται, οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν εισοράᾳ ψυχῶν θνητῶν, νῷ δ’ εἰσοράαται. αὐτὸς δ’ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν θνητοῖς κακὸν οὐκ ἐπιτέλλει ἀνθρώποις· αὐτῷ δὲ χάρις καὶ μῖσος ὀπηδεῖ, καὶ πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἰδ’ ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα· οὐδέ τις ἔσθ’ ἕτερος. σὺ δέ κεν ῥέα πάντ’ ἐσορήσαις, αἴ κεν ἴδῃς αὐτόν· πρὶν δή ποτε δεῦρ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν, τέκνον ἐμόν, δείξω σοι, ὁπηνίκα δέρκομαι αὐτοῦ ἴχνια καὶ χεῖρα στιβαρὴν κρατεροῖο θεοῖο. αὐτὸν δ’ οὐχ ὁρόω· περὶ γὰρ νέφος ἐστήρικται· λοιπὸν ἐμοί· στᾶσιν δὲ δέκα πτυχαὶ ἀνθρώποισιν· οὐ γάρ κέν τις ἴδοι θνητῶν μερόπων κραίνοντα, εἰ μὴ μονογενής τις ἀπορρὼξ φύλου ἄνωθεν Χαλδαίων· ἴδρις γὰρ ἴην ἄστροιο πορείης, καὶ σφαίρης κίνημά τ’ ἀμφὶ χθόνα ὡς περιτέλλει, κυκλοτερὲς δ’ ἐν ἴσῳ, κατὰ δὲ σφέτερον κνώδακα· πνεύματα δ’ ἡνιοχεῖ περί τ’ ἠέρα καὶ περὶ χεῦμα νάματος· ἐκφαίνει δὲ πυρὸς σέλας ἰφιγενήτου. αὐτὸς δ’ αὖ μέγαν αὖθις ἐπ’ οὐρανὸν ἐστήρικται χρυσέῳ εἰνὶ θρόνῳ· γαίῃ δ’ ὑπὸ ποσσὶ βέβηκε· χεῖρα δὲ δεξιτερὴν ἐπὶ τέρμασιν ὠκεανοῖο ἐκτέτακεν· ὀρέων δὲ τρέμει βάσις ἔνδοθι θυμῷ, οὐδὲ φέρειν δύναται κρατερὸν μένος. ἔστι δὲ πάντως αὐτὸς ἐπουράνιος, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ πάντα τελευτᾷ, ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσσην ἠδὲ τελευτήν, ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὑλογενὴς διέταξεν, ἐκ θεόθεν γνώμαισι λαβὼν κατὰ δίπλακα θεσμόν. ἄλλως οὐ θεμιτὸν δὲ λέγειν· τρομέω δέ γε γυῖα ἐν νόῳ. ἐξ ὑπάτου κραίνει περὶ πάντ’ ἐνὶ τάξει. ὦ τέκνον, σὺ δὲ τοῖσι νόοισι πελάζεο, γλώσσης εὖ μάλ’ ἐπικρατέων, στέρνοισι δὲ ἔνθεο φήμην.” | 12.5 'I shall speak to those for whom it is lawful; close the doors, ye uninitiated, fleeing the ordinances of the righteous, now that a divine law has been set for all. But listen, Musaeus, offspring of light-bearing Selene; for I shall declare true things, lest what appeared before in your breast rob you of your dear life. Look unto the divine Word and adhere to it, guiding straight the intellectual vessel of your heart. Walk well upon the path, and look only upon the immortal fashioner of the cosmos. An ancient discourse shines forth concerning Him: He is One, self-perfect, and under Him all things are accomplished; and among them He Himself moves around, nor does any of mortal souls behold Him, but by the mind is He beheld. He Himself out of good things does not bring evil upon mortal men; but grace and hatred attend Him, as do war, pestilence, and tearful griefs; nor is there any other. You could easily behold all things if you should see Him; formerly here upon earth, my child, I shall show you whenever I perceive His footprints and the mighty hand of the strong God. But Him I see not; for a cloud is fixed around Him, remaining to me; and ten layers stand for men. For no mortal man would see the Ruler, unless a certain uniquely-born offspring from above of the Chaldean race [Abraham]; for he was skilled in the path of the star, and how the movement of the sphere turns about the earth, in a circle evenly on its pivot; and he steers the winds around both air and the flow of the stream, and reveals the gleam of the strong-born fire. But He Himself again is fixed upon the great heaven on a golden throne, and earth stands beneath His feet, and He has stretched out His right hand to the bounds of the ocean; and the base of the mountains trembles within its heart, nor can it bear His mighty power. He is altogether heavenly, and upon the earth brings all things to fulfillment, having Himself the beginning, middle, and end, as the discourse of the ancients says, as the water-born [Moses] ordained, having received it from God in his judgments according to the double tablet. Otherwise it is not lawful to speak; and I tremble in my limbs in my mind. From the highest He fulfills all things in order. O child, draw near to these thoughts, mastering your tongue well, and place this story in your breast.' |
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12.6
Καὶ Ἄρατος δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν φησιν οὕτως·
“Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶσιν ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ θεοῦ πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα, καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ θεοῦ κεχρήμεθα πάντες. τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν· ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει, μιμνήσκων βιότοιο· λέγει δ’ ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη βουσί τε καὶ μακέλῃσι, λέγει δ’ ὅτε δεξιαὶ ὧραι καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι, καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι.” | 12.6 And Aratus also speaks concerning the same things in this way: 'Let us begin from Zeus, whom we men never leave unsaid; full of God are all the streets, and all the gathering places of men, full is the sea and the harbors; and in every way we all have need of God. For we are also His offspring; and He kindly gives favorable signs to men, and rouses the peoples to work, reminding them of life; and He tells when the soil is best for oxen and mattocks, and tells when the seasons are favorable to circle plants and throw all seeds.' |
| 12.7 Σαφῶς οἶμαι δεδεῖχθαι ὅτι διὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ. καθὼς δὲ δεῖ σεσημάγκαμεν, περιαιροῦντες τὸν διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων Δία καὶ Ζῆνα· τὸ γὰρ τῆς διανοίας αὐτῶν ἐπὶ θεὸν ἀναπέμπεται· διόπερ οὕτως ἡμῖν εἴρηται. οὐκ ἀπεοικότως οὖν τοῖς ἐπιζητουμένοις προενηνέγμεθα ταῦτα. | 12.7 I think it has been clearly shown that the power of God is through all things. And as is necessary, we have indicated this by removing Zeus and Zen from the poems, for the intent of their thought is directed up to God; wherefore it has been spoken by us in this way. Not unreasonably, therefore, have we brought forward these things for the matters under inquiry. |
| 12.8 Πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁμολογεῖται ὅτι δεῖ περὶ θεοῦ διαλήψεις ὁσίας ἔχειν, ὃ μάλιστα παρακελεύεται καλῶς ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς αἵρεσις. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νόμου κατασκευὴ πᾶσα τοῦ καθ’ ἡμᾶς περὶ εὐσεβείας τέτακται καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν κατ’ ἀλήθειαν. | 12.8 For it is agreed among all philosophers that one ought to hold pious conceptions regarding God, which our school especially commands well. And the entire structure of our law is ordained concerning piety, justice, self-control, and the rest of the virtues that exist in truth." |
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12.9
Τούτοις ἑξῆς μεθ’ ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει·
«Ἐχομένως δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ θεὸς τὸν ὅλον κόσμον κατεσκεύακε, καὶ δέδωκεν ἀνάπαυσιν ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ κακόπαθον εἶναι πᾶσι τὴν βιοτὴν τὴν ἑβδόμην ἡμέραν, ἣ δὴ καὶ πρώτη φυσικῶς ἂν λέγοιτο φωτὸς γένεσις, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα συνθεωρεῖται. | 12.9 Subsequent to these things, after other remarks, he adds: "Following upon this, it is as God created the entire world and gave rest to us because life is full of hardship for all on the seventh day—which indeed might naturally be called the first birth of light, in which all things are contemplated together. |
| 12.10 μεταφέροιτο δ’ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σοφίας· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν φῶς ἐστιν ἐξ αὐτῆς. καί τινες εἰρήκασι τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἱρέσεως ὄντες τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου λαμπτῆρος αὐτὴν ἔχειν τάξιν· ἀκολουθοῦντες γὰρ αὐτῇ συνεχῶς ἀτάραχοι καταστήσονται δι’ ὅλου τοῦ βίου. | 12.10 And the same principle might also be transferred to wisdom, for all light comes from it. And some of those belonging to the Peripatetic school have said that it occupies the place of a lamp; for by following it continuously, men will be established untroubled throughout their whole life. |
| 12.11 σαφέστερον δὲ καὶ κάλλιον τῶν ἡμετέρων προγόνων τις εἶπε Σολομῶν αὐτὴν πρὸ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ σύμφωνόν ἐστι τῷ προειρημένῳ. τὸ δὲ διασαφούμενον διὰ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἀποπεπαυκέναι τὸν θεὸν ἐν αὐτῇ, τοῦτο οὐχ, ὥς τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μηκέτι ποιεῖν τι τὸν θεὸν καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ καταπεπαυκέναι τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν οὕτως εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον τεταχέναι. | 12.11 And more clearly and beautifully, one of our ancestors, Solomon, said that wisdom exists before heaven and earth; and this harmonizes with what was said before. As for what is clarified through the law—that God rested on it—this does not mean, as some suppose, that God no longer performs anything, but rather that after completing their arrangement, He has so ordered it for all time. |
| 12.12 σημαίνει γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἓξ ἡμέραις ἐποίησε τόν τε οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἵνα τοὺς χρόνους δηλώσῃ καὶ τὴν τάξιν προείπῃ τί τίνος προτερεῖ. τάξας γάρ, οὕτως αὐτὰ συνέχει καὶ οὐ μεταποιεῖ. διασεσάφηκε δ’ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν ἔννομον ἕνεκεν σημείου τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἑβδόμου λόγου καθεστῶτος, ἐν ᾧ γνῶσιν ἔχομεν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ θείων πραγμάτων. | 12.12 For it signifies that in six days He made heaven and earth and all things in them, in order to reveal the times and foretell the order of what takes precedence over what. For having ordered them, He thus holds them together and does not alter them. And He clarified it to us as a law for a sign of the seventh logos established regarding us, in which we have knowledge of human and divine matters. |
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12.13
δι’ ἑβδομάδων δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος κυκλεῖται τῶν ζῳογονουμένων καὶ τῶν φυομένων ἁπάντων· τῷ δὲ σάββατον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύεσθαι διερμηνεύεται ἀνάπαυσις οὖσα. διασαφεῖ δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος καὶ Ἡσίοδος, μετειληφότες ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων βιβλίων, ἱερὰν εἶναι. Ἡσίοδος μὲν οὕτως·
“πρῶτον ἕνη τετράς τε καὶ ἑβδόμη, ἱερὸν ἦμαρ”· καὶ πάλιν λέγει· “ἑβδομάτη δ’ αὖτις λαμπρὸν φάος ἠελίοιο.” |
12.13
And by sevens the whole cosmos revolves, both of all living creatures and growing plants; and its being called the Sabbath is interpreted as being rest. And both Homer and Hesiod clarify that it is sacred, having derived it from our books. Hesiod speaks thus:
'First the new moon, the fourth, and the seventh, a sacred day'; and again he says: 'and the seventh day again, the bright light of the sun.' |
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12.14
Ὅμηρος δὲ οὕτω λέγει·
“ἑβδομάτη δ’ ἔπειτα κατήλυθεν, ἱερὸν ἦμαρ”· καὶ πάλιν· “ἕβδομον ἦμαρ ἔην, καὶ τῷ τετέλεστο ἅπαντα·” καὶ· “ἑβδομάτῃ δ’ ἠοῖ λίπομεν ῥόον ἐξ Ἀχέροντος.” | 12.14 And Homer speaks thus: 'Then came the seventh day, a sacred day'; and again: 'it was the seventh day, and by it all things were completed'; and: 'on the seventh daybreak we left the stream from Acheron.' |
| 12.15 τοῦτο δὴ σημαίνων, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν λήθης καὶ κακίας ἐν τῷ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἑβδόμῳ λόγῳ καταλιμπάνεται τὰ προειρημένα καὶ γνῶσιν ἀληθείας λαμβάνομεν, καθὼς προείρηται. | 12.15 Signifying this very thing—that leaving behind forgetfulness and evil in the soul, in the true seventh logos we abandon the aforesaid things and receive knowledge of truth, as was said before. |
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12.16
Λίνος δέ φησιν οὕτως·
“ἑβδομάτῃ δ’ ἠοῖ τετελεσμένα πάντα τέτυκται”· καὶ πάλιν· “ἑβδόμη εἰν ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἑβδόμη ἐστὶ γενέθλη·” καί· “ἑβδόμη ἐν πρώτοισι, καὶ ἑβδόμη ἐστὶ τελείη.” καί· “ἑπτὰ δὲ πάντα τέτυκται ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι, ἐν κύκλοισι φανέντ’ ἐπιτελλομένοις ἐνιαυτοῖς.”» |
And Linus speaks thus:
'And on the seventh daybreak all things were completed'; and again: 'the seventh is among the good, and the seventh is the birthday'; and: 'the seventh is among the first, and the seventh is complete.' And: 'and all seven things are fashioned in the starry heaven, appearing in their turning circles as the years revolve.'" |
Chapter 13
In this chapter, Eusebiius quotes at length from Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata (Book 5)—the author argues that Greek philosophy, poetry, and drama plagiarized, borrowed, or derived their highest truths from "barbarian philosophy" (the Hebrew Scriptures / Old Testament).
Clement cites a wide variety of Greek thinkers and poets—including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Pythagoras, Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Callimachus, Democritus, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, and Menander—to demonstrate that where Greek thought reflects sound theology (such as monotheism, creation, divine providence, incorporeality, moral judgment, the soul’s immortality, or the sacredness of the seventh day), it is directly indebted to the prophetic writings of Moses and the Hebrew prophets.
Clement cites a wide variety of Greek thinkers and poets—including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Pythagoras, Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Callimachus, Democritus, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, and Menander—to demonstrate that where Greek thought reflects sound theology (such as monotheism, creation, divine providence, incorporeality, moral judgment, the soul’s immortality, or the sacredness of the seventh day), it is directly indebted to the prophetic writings of Moses and the Hebrew prophets.
| 13.1 Τὰ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοβούλου τοιαῦτα. ὁποῖα δὲ καὶ Κλήμεντι περὶ τῆς αὐτῆς εἴρηται ὑποθέσεως, γνοίης ἂν διὰ τούτων· «Τὰ δ’ ἑξῆς προσαποδοτέον καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας Ἑλληνικὴν κλοπὴν σαφέστερον ἤδη παραστατέον. φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πνεῦμα κατ’ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. πάντα ταῦτα ἄντικρυς εὑρήσεις ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς. μὴ γάρ μοι τὰς ἀλληγορίας αὐτῶν ἐννοήσῃς τανῦν, ὡς ἡ γνωστικὴ παραδίδωσιν ἀλήθεια, εἰ ἄλλο τι δεικνύουσαι, καθάπερ οἱ σοφοὶ παλαισταί, ἄλλο μηνύουσιν. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν διήκειν διὰ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας τὸν θεόν φασιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ποιητὴν μόνον αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν καὶ λόγῳ ποιητήν. | 13.1 Such, then, are the statements of Aristobulus. But what sort of things are also said by Clement concerning the same subject you may learn from these words: "We must next render what follows, and now demonstrate more clearly the theft made by Greek philosophy from the barbarian philosophy. For the Stoics say that God is a body, and spirit according to essence, just as indeed is the soul. All these things you will find directly in the Scriptures. Do not, I pray you, consider their allegories for the moment as the Gnostic truth hands them down—as if showing one thing, like skilled wrestlers, they mean another. But while they say that God pervades all essence, we call Him Creator alone, and Creator by His Word. |
| 13.2 παρήγαγε δ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ἐν τῇ Σοφίᾳ εἰρημένον· “διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα”, ἐπεὶ μὴ συνῆκαν λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῆς σοφίας τῆς πρωτοκτίστου τῷ θεῷ. ναί, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὕλην ὑποτίθενται οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, οἵ τε Στωϊκοὶ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Περιπατητικός, οὐχὶ δὲ μίαν ἀρχήν. ἴστωσαν οὖν τὴν καλουμένην ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον λεγομένην πρὸς αὐτῶν, τολμηρὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ὂν πρὸς τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ μή τι μυστικώτατα μίαν τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν ἀρχὴν εἰδὼς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ αὐταῖς φησι ταῖς λέξεσιν· | 13.2 Now what was said in Wisdom misled them: 'She reaches and moves through all things by reason of her purity,' since they did not understand that these things were said of wisdom, the first-created of God. 'Yes,' they say, 'but the philosophers lay down matter among the first principles—the Stoics, Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle the Peripatetic—and not a single principle.' Let them know, then, that what is called matter is said by them to be without quality and formless; but it was a bold statement on Plato’s part to call it 'non-being.' Did he not, knowing in the most mystical manner that there is one principle that truly exists, say in the Timaeus in these very words: |
| 13.3 “Νῦν δὴ οὖν τό γε παρ’ ἡμῶν ὧδε ἐχέτω· τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων, εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχάς, εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ τούτων πέρι, τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δι’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα.” | 13.3 'Now then, let our view of the matter be this: as to the principle or principles of all things, or however it seems best to hold regarding them, we must not speak now, for no other reason than the difficulty of declaring our opinions according to the present method of exposition.' |
| 13.4 Ἄλλως τε ἡ λέξις ἡ προφητικὴ ἐκείνη “ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος” ἀφορμὰς αὐτοῖς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας παρέσχηται. ναὶ μὴν Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν ἡ τοῦ αὐτομάτου παρείσδυσις οὐ παρακολουθήσαντι τῷ ῥητῷ γέγονεν ἐντεῦθεν· “ματαιότης ματαιοτήτων, τὰ πάντα ματαιότης”. Ἀριστοτέλει δὲ μέχρι σελήνης ἐπῆλθε καταγαγεῖν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ ψαλμοῦ· “κύριε, ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τὸ ἔλεός σου καὶ ἡ ἀλήθειά σου ἕως τῶν νεφελῶν”. οὐδέπω γὰρ ἀπεκαλύπτετο ἡ τῶν προφητικῶν δήλωσις μυστηρίων πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας. | 13.4 "Moreover, that prophetic saying, 'and the earth was invisible and unformed,' furnished them with the starting-points for a material substance. Indeed, to Epicurus the stealthy introduction of the 'automatic' (chance) came from his failing to follow the scripture: 'Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.' And it occurred to Aristotle to limit providence down to the moon from this Psalm: 'Thy mercy, O Lord, is in the heavens, and Thy truth reacheth unto the clouds.' For the revelation of the prophetic mysteries was not yet unveiled before the coming of the Lord. |
| 13.5 τάς τε αὖ μετὰ θάνατον κολάσεις καὶ τὴν διὰ πυρὸς τιμωρίαν ἀπὸ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας ἥ τε ποιητικὴ πᾶσα μοῦσα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία ὑφείλετο. Πλάτων γοῦν ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς Πολιτείας αὐταῖς φησι ταῖς λέξεσιν· “Ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν ἰδίᾳ παραλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ Ἀριδαῖον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἷλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ’ ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες.” Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες οἱ διάπυροι ἀγγέλους αὐτῷ βούλονται δηλοῦν, οἳ παραλαβόντες τοὺς ἀδίκους κολάζουσιν. “Ὁ ποιῶν”, φησί, “τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς λειτουργοὺς αὐτοῦ πῦρ φλέγον.” | 13.5 "Furthermore, both the entire poetic Muse and Greek philosophy stole from the barbarian philosophy the punishments after death and retribution by fire. Plato, at any rate, in the last book of the Republic, says in these exact words: 'Thereupon savage men, fiery to look upon, standing by and paying attention to the voice, took some aside and led them off; but Aridnaeus and the others they bound hand and foot and head, threw them down, flayed them, and dragged them along the road outside, carding them upon thorn-bushes.' For by the 'fiery men' he means to indicate angels who take charge of the unjust and punish them. 'He who makes His angels spirits,' it says, 'and His ministers a flaming fire.' |
| 13.6 Ἕπεται δὲ τούτοις τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον. τὸ γὰρ κολαζόμενον ἢ παιδευόμενον ἐν αἰσθήσει ὂν ζῇ, κἂν πάσχειν λέγηται. τί δέ; οὐχὶ οἶδεν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ πυρὸς ποταμοὺς καὶ τῆς γῆς τὸ βάθος, τὴν πρὸς τῶν βαρβάρων γέενναν καλουμένην, Τάρταρον ποιητικῶς ὀνομάζων, Κωκυτόν τε καὶ Ἀχέροντα καὶ Πυριφλεγέθοντα καὶ τοιαῦτά τινα εἰς τὴν παίδευσιν σωφρονίζοντα παρεισάγων κολαστήρια; τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν καὶ ἐλαχίστων τοὺς ἀγγέλους τοὺς ὁρῶντας τὸν θεόν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς δι’ ἀγγέλων τῶν ἐφεστώτων ἥκουσαν ἐπισκοπὴν ἐμφαίνων νῦν οὐκ ὀκνεῖ γράφειν· “Ἐπειδὴ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ᾑρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν, ἐκείνην δὲ ἑκάστῳ, ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα τοῦ βίου συμπέμπειν καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων.” Τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ Σωκράτει τὸ δαιμόνιον τοιοῦτόν τι ᾐνίσσετο. | 13.6 "It follows from these things that the soul is immortal. For that which is punished or disciplined, being in sensation, lives, even if it is said to suffer. What then? Does not Plato know both rivers of fire and the depth of the earth, which is called Gehenna by the barbarians, poetically naming it Tartarus, and introducing Cocytus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and suchlike places of torment as chastisements to bring men to sobriety? Showing that the angels who see God belong to the small and least according to Scripture, and furthermore indicating the oversight that comes to us through the stationed angels, he does not hesitate to write: 'When all the souls had chosen their lives according to their lot, they approached Lachesis in order; and she sent along with each the guardian spirit (daemon) he had chosen, to guard his life and fulfill the things chosen.' And perhaps something of this kind was hinted at to Socrates by his daimonion. |
| 13.7 Ναὶ μὴν γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἐδογμάτισαν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ ὅ γε Πλάτων ἄντικρυς εἴρηκε· “Πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχων γενέσεως οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος; ὁρατός τε γὰρ ἁπτός τε καὶ σῶμα ἔχει.” Αὖθίς τε ὁπόταν εἴπῃ· “Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον”, οὐ μόνον γεννητὸν ἔδειξε τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι σημαίνει, ὡς ἂν ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ὑποστάντος. | 13.7 "Indeed, the philosophers laid it down as a doctrine that the cosmos was created. Plato himself explicitly says: 'Whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or has come into being, having started from some beginning; for it is visible and tangible and has a body.' And again, when he says, 'To find the Maker and Father of this universe is a hard task,' he not only showed that the world was generated, but also indicates that it came into being from Him, as having been brought into existence out of nothing by Him alone. |
| 13.8 γενητὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τίθενται τὸν κόσμον. τόν τε ὑπὸ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας θρυλούμενον διάβολον, τὸν τῶν δαιμόνων ἄρχοντα, κακοεργὸν εἶναι ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων ὁ Πλάτων λέγει ταῖσδε ταῖς λέξεσιν· “Ψυχὴν διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι; — Τί μήν; — Μίαν, ἢ πλείους; — Πλείους, ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρινοῦμαι· δυοῖν μέν που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι.” | 13.8 "The Stoics also hold that the world was created. And as for the devil who is so much talked of in barbarian philosophy—the ruler of the daemons—Plato in the tenth book of the Laws says that he is an evil-doing soul, in these very words: 'Must we not necessarily say that a soul governs and inhabits all things that move everywhere, and also governs heaven? — What else? — One soul, or more? — More, I will answer for you; let us set down no fewer than two: the beneficent one, and that which is capable of effecting the opposite.' |
| 13.9 Ὁμοίως δὲ κἀν τῷ Φαίδρῳ τάδε γράφει· “Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλά τις δαίμων ἔμιξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡδονήν.” Ἀλλὰ κἀν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων ἄντικρυς τὸ ἀποστολικὸν δείκνυσιν ἐκεῖνο “οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς” ὧδέ πως γράφων· | 13.9 "Similarly, in the Phaedrus he writes as follows: 'There are indeed other evils, but some daemon has mixed pleasure with most of them for the moment.' And in the tenth book of the Laws he explicitly indicates that apostolic saying, 'Our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against spiritual powers in the heavens,' writing somewhat as follows: |
| 13.10 “Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συνεχωρήσαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐσθ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη.” | 13.10 'For since we agreed among ourselves that heaven is full of many good things, and also of the opposite, and more of those that are not good, such a battle, we say, is immortal, and requires marvelous watchfulness.' |
| 13.11 Κόσμον τε αὖθις τὸν μὲν νοητὸν οἶδεν ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, τὸν δὲ αἰσθητόν· καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοῦ παραδείγματος. καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀνατίθησι μονάδι, ὡς ἂν νοητόν, τὸν δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἑξάδι· γάμος γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς ἂν γόνιμος ἀριθμός, ἡ ἑξὰς καλεῖται. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ μονάδι συνίστησιν οὐρανὸν ἀόρατον καὶ γῆν ἁγίαν καὶ φῶς νοητόν· “ἐν ἀρχῇ γάρ”, φησίν, “ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος”. | 13.11 "Again, the barbarian philosophy knows one world as intelligible and another as sensible; the one as the archetype, the other as the image of the fair paradigm. The intelligible world it assigns to the Monad, as being intellectual, and the sensible world to the Hexad (six); for among the Pythagoreans the hexad is called marriage, as being a fertile number. And in the Monad it establishes an invisible heaven, a holy earth, and an intelligible light: 'In the beginning,' it says, 'God made the heaven and the earth; and the earth was invisible.' |
| 13.12 εἶτ’ ἐπιφέρει· “καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός, γενέσθω φῶς, καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.” ἐν δὲ τῇ κοσμογονίᾳ τῇ αἰσθητῇ οὐρανὸν ἐδημιούργει, τὸ δὲ στερεὸν αἰσθητόν, γῆν τε ὁρατὴν καὶ φῶς βλεπόμενον. ἆρ’ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐντεῦθεν ὁ Πλάτων ζῴων ἰδέας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπολείπειν κόσμῳ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ αἰσθητὰ κατὰ τὰ γένη δημιουργεῖν τὰ νοητά; | 13.12 "Then it adds: 'And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.' But in the creation of the sensible world He fashioned a sensible heaven—the firmament—a visible earth, and a light that is seen. Does it not seem to you that Plato derived from this source his leaving ideas of living beings in the intelligible world, and making sensible forms according to their intelligible kinds? |
| 13.13 εἰκότως ἄρα ἐκ γῆς μὲν τὸ σῶμα διαπλάττεσθαι λέγει Μωϋσῆς, ὃ γήινον φησιν ὁ Πλάτων σκῆνος, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἄνωθεν ἐμπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ θεοῦ εἰς πρόσωπον. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἱδρῦσθαι λέγουσι, τὴν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐπεισόδιον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου εἴσοδον ἑρμηνεύοντες, διὸ καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι. | 13.13 "Naturally, therefore, Moses says that the body was molded from earth—which Plato calls an earthly tabernacle—but that the rational soul was breathed from above by God into man's face. For they say that the governing faculty is seated there, interpreting the entering of the soul into the first-formed man through the senses; wherefore also man was made after the image and likeness. |
| 13.14 εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ θεοῦ λόγος ὁ θεῖος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν δ’ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς. ἑτέρῳ δ’ εἰ βούλει παραλαβεῖν ὀνόματι τὴν ἐξομοίωσιν, εὕροις ἂν παρὰ τῷ Μωϋσεῖ ἀκολουθίαν ὀνομαζομένην θείαν. φησὶ γάρ· “ὀπίσω κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν πορεύεσθε, καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ φυλάξατε.” ἀκόλουθοι δ’ οἶμαι καὶ θεραπευταὶ θεοῦ πάντες οἱ ἐνάρετοι. | 13.14 "For the image of God is the divine and royal Word (Logos), the impassible man; but the image of the image is the human mind. If you wish to express this resemblance by another name, you would find what Moses calls a divine following; for he says: 'Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and keep His commandments.' And all virtuous men, I think, are followers and servants of God. |
| 13.15 Ἐντεῦθεν δ’ οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν εἰρήκασιν, ὁ Πλάτων δὲ ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ, ὡς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ παρεστήσαμεν Στρωματεῖ, Ζήνων τε ὁ Στωϊκὸς παρὰ Πλάτωνος λαβών, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πάντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι φίλους λέγει. φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Φαιδρῷ Σωκράτης ὡς “οὐχ εἵμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῷ μὴ φίλον.” | 13.15 "Hence the Stoics said that the end of philosophy is to live conformably to nature, and Plato said it is likeness to God, as we showed in the second book of the Stromata. Zeno the Stoic, taking this from Plato, and he from barbarian philosophy, says that all good men are friends to one another. For Socrates says in the Phaedrus: 'It is not fated that evil should be friend to evil, nor that good should not be friend to good.' |
| 13.16 ὅπερ κἀν τῷ Λύσιδι ἀπέδειξεν ἱκανῶς, ὡς ἐν ἀδικίᾳ καὶ πονηρίᾳ οὐκ ἄν ποτε σωθείη φιλία. καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος ὁμοίως φησί· “Πρᾶξιν εἶναι φίλην καὶ ἀκόλουθον θεῷ καὶ λόγον ἔχουσαν ἀρχαῖον, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ μετρίῳ ὄντι φίλον ᾖ, τὰ δὲ ἄμετρα οὔτε τοῖς ἀμέτροις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη.” | 13.16 "This he also adequately demonstrated in the Lysis, showing that friendship could never be preserved in unrighteousness and wickedness. And the Athenian Stranger likewise says: 'That action is friendly and follower to God, and has an ancient doctrine, when that which is like is friend to what is like, being temperate; but intemperate things are friends neither to the intemperate nor to the temperate. And God would be for us the measure of all things.' |
| 13.17 Εἶτα ὑποβὰς ἐπάγει Πλάτων· “Πᾶς γὰρ δὴ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθῷ ὅμοιος, κατὰ δὲ καὶ θεῷ ἐοικώς, ἀγαθῷ τε παντὶ φίλος ὑπάρχει καὶ θεῷ.” Ἐνταῦθα γενόμενος κἀκείνου ἀνεμνήσθην· ἐπὶ τέλει γὰρ τοῦ Τιμαίου λέγει· “Τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι δεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.” | 13.17 "Then, going a little further, Plato adds: 'For every good man is like a good man, and according to this is also like God, and is a friend to every good man and to God.' Having reached this point, I was reminded of that passage also; for at the end of the Timaeus he says: 'It is necessary to assimilate the contemplating mind to that which is contemplated, according to its ancient nature; and having made it like, to attain the end of the best life proposed to men by the gods, both for the present and for the future time.' |
| 13.18 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· Ἀδελφοὺς δ’ εἶναι ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς θεοῦ ὄντας καὶ ἑνὸς διδασκάλου, φαίνεταί που καὶ Πλάτων καλῶς ὧδέ πως· “Ἔστε μὲν γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες· ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δὲ ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς.” | 13.18 "And a little further on he adds: That we are brothers, as being of the one God and one Teacher, Plato also seems to say somewhere beautifully, thus: 'For ye are all brothers in the city, as we shall say to them in telling our myth; but God, in molding you, mixed gold in the generation of as many of you as are fit to rule, wherefore they are most precious; but silver in those who are helpers, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen.' |
| 13.19 Ὅθεν ἀνάγκη φησὶ γεγονέναι, ἀσπάζεσθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα ἐφ’ οἷς γνῶσις, ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ’ οἷς δόξα. ἴσως γὰρ τὴν ἐκλεκτὴν ταύτην φύσιν γνώσεως ἐφιεμένην μαντεύεται, εἰ μή τι τρεῖς τινας ὑποτιθέμενος φύσεις, τρεῖς πολιτείας, ὡς ὑπέλαβόν τινες, διαγράφει, καὶ Ἰουδαίων μὲν ἀργυρᾶν, Ἑλλήνων δὲ τὴν τρίτην, Χριστιανῶν δὲ, οἷς ὁ χρυσὸς ὁ βασιλικὸς ἐγκαταμέμικται, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. | 13.19 "Whence, he says, it is necessary that these should cherish and love those in whom there is knowledge, and those in whom there is opinion. For perhaps he divines this elect nature that longs for knowledge; unless indeed, in assuming three natures, he is sketching three polities, as some supposed—a silver one for the Jews, a third for the Greeks, and a golden one for the Christians, with whom the royal gold is intermingled, the Holy Spirit. |
| 13.20 τόν τε Χριστιανῶν βίον ἐμφαίνων κατὰ λέξιν γράφει ἐν τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ· “Λέγωμεν δὴ περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὗτοι δέ που οὔτε εἰς ἀγορὰν ἴσασι τὴν ὁδὸν οὔτε ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἤ τί τῳ κακόν ἐστι γεγονὸς ἐκ προγόνων, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάσσης λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα οὔθ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ πέταται, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ‘τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθεν’ οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομῶν καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνώμενος.” | 13.20 "And indicating the life of Christians, he writes word for word in the Theaetetus: 'Let us speak then of the leaders; for why should one speak of those who spend their time poorly in philosophy? These, I suppose, know not the way to the market-place, nor where the court of justice is, or the council-house, or any other public assembly of the city; and laws and decrees, spoken or written, they neither see nor hear. The zealous efforts of political factions, meetings, banquets, and revels with flute-girls do not occur to them even in a dream. Whether anything has gone well or ill in the city, or what evil has come to anyone from his ancestors, escapes them more than the proverbial cups of the sea. Nor does he even know that he does not know these things; but in reality his body alone lies and dwells in the city, while his mind flies everywhere, as Pindar says, "both beneath the earth" and measuring the stars above the sky, searching out every nature on every side.' |
| 13.21 Πάλιν αὖ τῷ τοῦ κυρίου ῥητῷ τῷ “ἔστω τὸ ναὶ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὒ οὔ” ἐκεῖνα ἀπεικαστέον· “ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις.” τῷ τε περὶ τοῦ ὀμόσαι ἀπαγορεύσει συνᾴδει ἥδε ἡ ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων λέξις· “ἔπαινος δὲ ὅρκος τε περὶ παντὸς ἀπέστω.” καὶ τὸ σύνολον Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων λέγοντες ἀκούειν φωνῆς θεοῦ, τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν ὅλων θεωροῦντες ἀκριβῶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονυῖαν καὶ συνεχομένην ἀδιαλείπτως, ἀκηκόασι τοῦ Μωϋσέως λέγοντος “εἶπε καὶ ἐγένετο”, τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι διαγράφοντος. | 13.21 "Again, to the word of the Lord, 'Let your Yea be Yea, and your Nay, Nay,' those words are to be likened: 'To yield to falsehood and obscure truth is by no means lawful for me.' And with the prohibition concerning swearing agrees this statement in the tenth book of the Laws: 'Let praise and oath concerning everything be absent.' On the whole, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, when they say they hear the voice of God while beholding the structure of all things made accurately by God and sustained without ceasing, have heard Moses saying, 'He spake and they were made,' describing the word of God as action. |
| 13.22 ἐπί τε τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκ χοὸς διαπλάσεως ἱστάμενοι, γήινον μὲν οἱ φιλόσοφοι παρ’ ἕκαστα τὸ σῶμα ἀναγορεύουσιν, Ὅμηρος δὲ οὐκ ὀκνεῖ ἐν κατάρας μέρει τίθεσθαι τὸ “ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε”, καθάπερ Ἠσαΐας “καὶ καταπατήσατε αὐτοὺς” λέγων “ὡς πηλόν.” | 13.22 "And dwelling upon the molding of man from the dust, the philosophers repeatedly call the body 'earthly,' while Homer does not hesitate to place in the category of a curse: 'But may ye all become water and earth,' just as Isaiah says: 'And ye shall trample them like mud.' |
| 13.23 Καλλίμαχος δὲ διαρρήδην γράφει· “ἦν κεῖνος οὑνιαυτός, ᾧ ποτὲ πτηνὸν καὶ τοὐν θαλάσσῃ καὶ τὸ τετράπουν οὕτως ἐφθέγγεθ’, ὡς ὁ πηλὸς ὁ Προμηθέως.” πάλιν τε ὁ αὐτός· “εἴ σε”, ἔφη, “Προμηθεὺς ἔπλασε, καὶ πηλοῦ μὴ ἐξ ἑτέρου γέγονας.” Ἡσίοδόσ τε ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδώρας λέγει· “Ἥφαιστον δὲ κέλευσε περικλυτὸν ὅττι τάχιστα γαῖαν ὕδει φύρειν, ἐν δ’ ἀνθρώπου θέμεν αὐδὴν καὶ νόον.” | 13.23 "And Callimachus explicitly writes: 'That was the year in which bird, sea-creature, and quadrupeds uttered sound in the same way as Prometheus's clay.' And again the same author says: 'If Prometheus molded thee, and thou art not come from other clay.' And Hesiod says regarding Pandora: 'He commanded glorious Hephaestus quickly to mix earth with water, and to place in it human voice and mind.' |
| 13.24 πῦρ μὲν οὖν τεχνικόν, ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, τὴν φύσιν ὁρίζονται οἱ Στωϊκοί· πῦρ δὲ καὶ φῶς ἀλληγορεῖται ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῆς γραφῆς. τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ Ὅμηρος παραφράζων χωρισμὸν τοῦ ὕδατος ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τὴν ἐμφανῆ τῆς ξηρᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς Τηθύος καὶ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ λέγει· “ἤδη γὰρ δηρὸν χρόνον ἀλλήλων ἀπέχονται εὐνῆς καὶ φιλότητος”; | 13.24 "Now the Stoics define nature as a creative fire proceeding in a methodical way toward generation; but fire and light are used allegorically in Scripture for God and His Logos. What then? Does not Homer also, paraphrasing the separation of the water from the land and the visible manifestation of the dry land, say of Tethys and Oceanus: 'For now for a long time they abstain from one another's bed and love'? |
| 13.25 πάλιν τὸ δυνατὸν ἐν πᾶσι προσάπτουσι καὶ οἱ παρ’ Ἕλλησι λογιώτατοι τῷ θεῷ· ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, Πυθαγόρειος δὲ ἦν, λέγων· “οὐδὲν ἐκφεύγει τὸ θεῖον· τοῦτο γινώσκειν σε δεῖ· αὐτός ἐστ’ ἀμῶν ἐπόπτης, ἀδυνατεῖ δ’ οὐδὲν θεῷ.” ὁ μελοποιὸς δέ· “θεῷ δυνατὸν ἐκ μελαίνας νυκτὸς ἀμίαντον ὄρσαι φάος, κελαινεφεῖ δὲ σκότει καλύψαι καθαρὸν ἁμέρας σέλας.” ὁ μόνος ἡμέρας ἐνεστώσης νύκτα ποιῆσαι δυνάμενος, φησί, θεὸς οὗτός ἐστιν. | 13.25 "Again, the most learned among the Greeks attribute power in all things to God. Epicharmus, who was a Pythagorean, says: 'Nothing escapes the divine; this thou oughtest to know: He Himself is our overseer, and nothing is impossible for God.' And the lyric poet says: 'To God it is possible to raise pure light out of black night, and to hide the clean beam of day in dark cloud.' He who alone is able to make night when day is present, he says, is this God. |
| 13.26 ἔν τε τοῖς Φαινομένοις ἐπιγραφομένοις ὁ Ἄρατος “Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα” εἰπών, “τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες. τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν”, οἷον δημιουργίᾳ, ἐπιφέρει· “ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν δεξιὰ σημαίνει, αὐτὸς γάρ γε σήματ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν, ἄστρα διακρίνας, ἐσκέψατο δ’ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν ἀστέρας, οἵ κε μάλιστα τετυγμένα σημαίνοιεν ἀνδράσιν ὡράων, ὄφρ’ ἔμπεδα πάντα φύηται· καί μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται. χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ.” καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ Ὅμηρος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστοτεύκτου ἀσπίδος κοσμοποιῶν κατὰ Μωϋσέα· “ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ’, ἐν δ’ οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν”, φησίν, “ἐν δὲ τὰ τείρεα πάντα, τά τ’ οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται.” ὁ γὰρ διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων ᾀδόμενος Ζεὺς τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀναφέρει. | 13.26 "And Aratus in the work entitled Phenomena, having said, 'From Zeus let us begin, whom we men never leave unnamed; full of Zeus are all the streets, all the gathering places of men, full is the sea and the harbors; and everywhere we all have need of Zeus,' adds: 'For we are also his offspring'—meaning by creation. 'He in kindness gives favorable signs to men, for he himself fixed the signs in heaven, dividing the stars, and considered stars for the year which should chiefly mark for men the signs of the seasons, that all things may grow steadfastly; and him they ever propitiate first and last. Hail, Father, great wonder, great benefit to men!' And before him Homer, in describing the creation of the world on the shield made by Hephaestus according to Moses, says: 'In it he wrought earth, in it sky, in it sea, and all the constellations with which heaven is crowned.' For the Zeus celebrated through poems and prose writings turns the mind back to God. |
| 13.27 Ἤδη δέ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὑπ’ αὐγὰς ὁ Δημόκριτος εἶναί τινας ὀλίγους γράφει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, “οἳ δὴ ἀνατείναντες τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, οὗ νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες, πάντα Ζεὺς μυθεῖται, καὶ πάντα οὗτος οἶδε καὶ διδοῖ καὶ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ βασιλεὺς οὗτος τῶν πάντων.” μυστικώτερον δὲ ὁ μὲν Βοιώτιος Πίνδαρος, ἅτε Πυθαγόρειος ὤν, “ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ ματρὸς πνέομεν ἄμφω”, τῆς ὕλης παραδίδωσι, καὶ ἕνα τὸν τούτων δημιουργόν, τὸν ἀριστοτέχναν πατέρα λέγει, τὸν καὶ τὰς προκοπὰς κατ’ ἀξίαν εἰς θειότητα παρεσχημένον. | 13.27 "And now, so to speak, at dawn Democritus writes that there are some few men 'who, stretching out their hands here to what we Greeks now call air, speak of everything as Zeus; and he knows all things, and gives and takes away, and he is king of all.' More mystically, Pindar of Boeotia, as being a Pythagorean, hands down: 'One is the race of men, one the race of gods, and from one mother we both draw our breath'—meaning matter; and he speaks of one Creator of these, the master-craftsman Father, who also granted advancements to divinity according to merit. |
| 13.28 σιωπῶ γὰρ Πλάτωνα, ὃς ἄντικρυς οὗτος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἐραστὸν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ φαίνεται πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἐκ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν γραφῶν ἐμφαίνων, παρακελευόμενος κατὰ λέξιν, “ἐπομνύντας σπουδῇ τε ἅμα μὴ ἀμούσῳ καὶ τῇ τῆς σπουδῆς ἀδελφῇ παιδείᾳ τὸν πάντων θεὸν αἴτιον, καὶ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπομνύντας, ὃν ἐὰν ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφῆτε, εἴσεσθε.” ἥ τε ἐν Τιμαίῳ δημηγορία πατέρα λέγει τὸν δημιουργόν, λέγουσα ὧδέ πως· “θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ πατὴρ δημιουργός τε ἔργων.” | 13.28 "For I pass over Plato, who quite openly in his letter to Erastus and Coriscus appears to indicate Father and Son from the Hebrew Scriptures, commanding in these very words: 'Swearing with serious purpose not unsuited to culture, and with education the sister of seriousness, by the God who is cause of all things, and swearing by the Lord and Father of the leader and cause, whom, if ye philosophy rightly, ye shall know.' And the public address in the Timaeus calls the Creator Father, speaking thus: 'Gods of gods, whereof I am Father and Creator of works.' |
| 13.29 ὥστε καὶ ἐπὰν εἴπῃ “περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστί, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα τὰ πάντα, κἀκεῖνο αἴτιον τῶν καλῶν, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα”, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύεσθαι· τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι’ οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός. | 13.29 "So that when he says, 'All things are about the King of all, and for His sake are all things, and He is the cause of all good things, and second things about the second, and third things about the third,' I can understand it in no other way than that the Holy Trinity is indicated; for the third is the Holy Spirit, and the Son is second, through whom all things were made according to the will of the Father. |
| 13.30 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου, μέμνηται, ὅς ἐστι Ζωρόαστρις. αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ Ζωρόαστρις γράφει· “τάδε συνέγραψε Ζωρόαστρις ὁ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Πάμφυλος, ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ὅσα ἐν Ἅιδῃ γενόμενος ἐδάην παρὰ θεῶν.” τὸν δὴ Ζωρόαστριν τοῦτον ὁ Πλάτων δωδεκαταῖον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενον ἀναβιῶναι λέγει. τάχα μὲν οὐ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνα αἰνίσσεται, ὡς διὰ τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων ἡ ὁδὸς ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίνεται εἰς τὴν ἀνάληψιν, αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν γένεσίν φησι τὴν αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι κάθοδον. ταῦτα ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἆθλα λέγεσθαι ιβ΄, μεθ’ ἃ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου τοῦδε τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχή. οὐ παραπέμπομαι καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα· ὁ φυσικὸς οὗτος τῆς τῶν πάντων ἀναλήψεως μέμνηται ὡς ἐσομένης ποτὲ εἰς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίαν μεταβολῆς. | 13.30 "And the same author in the tenth book of the Republic mentions Er the son of Armenius, by birth a Pamphylian, who is Zoroaster. Zoroaster himself at any rate writes: 'These things wrote Zoroaster the son of Armenius, by birth a Pamphylian, having died in war, whatsoever things I learned in Hades from the gods.' This Zoroaster Plato says revived on the twelfth day while lying on the funeral pyre. Perhaps he hints not at the resurrection, but at the fact that through the twelve signs of the zodiac lies the way for souls to ascend, and he says the same descent takes place into generation. We must suppose that the twelve labors of Heracles are also spoken of in this sense, after which the soul obtains release from this entire world. Nor do I pass over Empedocles; this natural philosopher mentions the restoration of all things, as there will one day be a change into the essence of fire. |
| 13.31 Σαφέστατα δ’ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δόξης, τὸν μέν τινα κόσμον ἀίδιον εἶναι δοκιμάσας, τὸν δέ τινα φθειρόμενον, τὸν κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, εἰδὼς οὐχ ἕτερον ὄντα ἐκείνου πως ἔχοντος. ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν ἀίδιον τὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἀιδίως ποιὸν κόσμον ᾔδει, φανερὸν ποιεῖ λέγων οὕτως· “κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν πάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.” ὅτι δὲ καὶ γεννητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐδογμάτιζε μηνύει τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα· “πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πρηστήρ.” δυνάμει γὰρ λέγει ὅτι τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικοῦντος λόγου καὶ θεοῦ τὰ σύμπαντα δι’ ἀέρος τρέπεται εἰς ὑγρόν, τὸ ὡς σπέρμα τῆς διακοσμήσεως, ὃ καλεῖ θάλασσαν· ἐκ δὲ τούτου αὖθις γίνεται οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐμπεριεχόμενα. ὅπως δὲ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ ἐκπυροῦται σαφῶς διὰ τούτων δηλοῖ· “θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι.” ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων τὰ αὐτά. | 13.31 "Heraclitus of Ephesus is most clearly of this opinion, having judged that one cosmos is eternal, but another perishable—that according to the arrangement—knowing that it is no other than the former existing in a certain state. But that he knew that the world composed of all essence is eternally of a certain quality, he makes clear by speaking thus: 'This world, the same for all, neither any of the gods nor of men hath made, but it was always, and is, and shall be, an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.' And that he also held it to be created and perishable, what follows indicates: 'The turnings of fire: first sea, and of sea half is earth and half fiery storm.' For he means in effect that fire, by the Logos and God who governs all things, is turned through air into moisture, which is as the seed of the world-formation, which he calls sea; and from this again are made heaven and earth and the things contained therein. And how it is taken back again and burned up he clearly shows by these words: 'Sea is poured out and measured into the same ratio as existed before it came to be.' Likewise concerning the other elements the same things. |
| 13.32 Παραπλήσια τούτῳ καὶ οἱ ἐλλογιμώτατοι τῶν Στωϊκῶν δογματίζουσι περί τε ἐκπυρώσεως ὡς διαλαμβάνοντες καὶ κόσμου διοικήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἰδίως ποιοῦ κόσμου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς. πάλιν τε αὖ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν μὲν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τῆς Πολιτείας τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἡμέραν “νυκτερινὴν ἡμέραν” κέκληκεν διὰ τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας, οἶμαι, τοῦ σκότους τούτου· ὕπνον δὲ καὶ θάνατον τὴν εἰς σῶμα ὁδὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ ταὐτὰ τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ. καὶ μή τι τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος προεθέσπιζε τὸ πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ Δαβὶδ λέγον· “ἐγὼ ἐκοιμήθην καὶ ὕπνωσα· ἐξηγέρθην, ὅτι κύριος ἀντιλήψεταί μου”· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἀνάστασιν μόνον τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐξ ὕπνου ἔγερσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰς σάρκα κάθοδον τοῦ κυρίου ὕπνον ἀλληγορεῖ. | 13.32 "Similar to this, the most distinguished of the Stoics dogmatize both concerning the conflagration and the governance of the world, and concerning the individually qualified world and man, and the survival of our souls. And again Plato, in the seventh book of the Republic, has called the day here a 'nightly day,' on account of the rulers of the world of this darkness, I think; and sleep and death he calls the path of the soul into the body, after the same manner as Heraclitus. And did not the Spirit prophesy this concerning the Savior through David, saying: 'I slept and took my rest; I awoke, for the Lord will sustain me'? For he allegorizes not only the resurrection of Christ as an awakening from sleep, but also the descent of the Lord into the flesh as sleep. |
| 13.33 αὐτίκα ὁ αὐτὸς σωτὴρ παρεγγυᾷ· “γρηγορεῖτε”· οἷον, μελετᾶτε ζῆν καὶ χωρίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος πειρᾶσθε. τήν τε κυριακὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὁ Πλάτων διὰ τούτων καταμαντεύεται· “Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖ τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύεσθαι καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους.” Λειμῶνα μὲν οὖν ἀκουστέον τὴν ἀπλανῆ σφαῖραν, ὡς ἥμερον χωρίον καὶ προσηνὲς καὶ τῶν ὁσίων χῶρον· ἑπτὰ δὲ ἡμέρας ἑκάστην κίνησιν τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐργαστικὴν τέχνην εἰς τέλος ἀναπαύσεως σπεύδουσαν· ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοὺς πλανωμένους πορεία ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄγει, τουτέστι τὴν ὀγδόην κίνησίν τε καὶ ἡμέραν· τεταρταίους δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπιέναι λέγει, δηλῶν τὴν διὰ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων πορείαν. | 13.33 "Immediately the Savior Himself exhorts: 'Watch!'; that is, practice living and try to separate the soul from the body. And the Lord's Day Plato divines in the tenth book of the Republic through these words: 'And when seven days had passed for each of those in the meadow, they had to rise up on the eighth day and depart, and arrive on the fourth day.' By the 'meadow' must be understood the sphere of the fixed stars, as a gentle and pleasant place and the region of the holy; by 'seven days' the movement of each of the seven planets and all practical art hastening to the goal of rest; and the journey after the wandering stars leads to heaven, that is, to the eighth movement and day; and he says the souls depart on the fourth day, indicating the journey through the four elements. |
| 13.34 Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑβδόμην ἱερὰν οὐ μόνον οἱ Ἑβραῖοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἴσασι, καθ’ ἣν ὁ πᾶς κόσμος κυκλεῖται τῶν ζωογονουμένων καὶ φυομένων ἀπάντων. Ἡσίοδος μὲν οὖν οὕτω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγει· “πρῶτον ἔνη τετράς τε καὶ ἑβδόμη ἱερὸν ἦμαρ.” καὶ πάλιν· “ἑβδομάτῃ δ’ αὖθις λαμπρὸν φάος ἠελίοιο.” Ὅμηρος δέ· “ἑβδομάτη δ’ ἤπειτα κατήλυθεν ἱερὸν ἦμαρ.” καὶ· “ἑβδόμη ἦν ἱερή.” καὶ πάλιν· “ἕβδομον ἦμαρ ἔην, καὶ τῷ τετέλεστο ἅπαντα.” καὶ αὖθις· “ἑβδομάτῃ δ’ ἠοῖ λίπομεν ῥόον ἐξ Ἀχέροντος.” ναὶ μὴν καὶ Καλλίμαχος ὁ ποιητὴς γράφει· “ἑβδομάτῃ δ’ ἠοῖ, καί οἱ ἐτέτυκτο ἅπαντα.” καὶ πάλιν· “ἑβδόμη εἰν ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἑβδόμη ἐστὶ γενέθλη.” καὶ· “ἑβδόμη ἐν πρώτοισι, καὶ ἑβδόμη ἐστὶ τελεία.” καὶ· “ἑπτὰ δὲ πάντα τέτυκτο ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι, ἐν κύκλοισι φανέντ’ ἐπιτελλομένοις ἐνιαυτοῖς.” | 13.34 "Moreover, not only the Hebrews but also the Greeks know that the seventh day is holy, according to which the whole world of all living and growing things revolves. Hesiod speaks of it thus: 'First the first day, and the fourth, and the seventh, a holy day.' And again: 'And on the seventh again the bright light of the sun.' And Homer: 'And then arrived the seventh, a holy day.' And: 'The seventh was holy.' And again: 'It was the seventh day, and on it all things were completed.' And further: 'On the seventh morning we left the stream of Acheron.' Callimachus the poet also writes: 'On the seventh morning all things were completed.' And again: 'The seventh is among good things, and the seventh is the birthday.' And: 'The seventh is among the first, and the seventh is complete.' And: 'Seven things were made in the starry sky, appearing in circles as the years roll on.' |
| 13.35 Ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ Σόλωνος ἐλεγεῖαι σφόδρα τὴν ἑβδομάδα ἐκθειάζουσι. Τὰ δὲ οὐχὶ παραπλήσια τῇ λεγούσῃ γραφῇ “ἄρωμεν ἀφ’ ἡμῶν τὸν δίκαιον, ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἐστιν”, ὁ Πλάτων μονονουχὶ προφητεύων τὴν σωτήριον οἰκονομίαν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Πολιτείας οὕτω φησίν· “Οὕτω δὲ διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, ἐκκοπήσεται τὼ ὀφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασκινδυλευθήσεται.” Ὅ τε Σωκρατικὸς Ἀντισθένης παραφράζων τὴν προφητικὴν ἐκείνην γραφήν “τίνι με ὡμοιώσατε; λέγει κύριος”, οὐδενὶ ἐοικέναι φησί, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται. τὰ δὲ ὅμοια καὶ Ξενοφῶν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος κατὰ λέξιν λέγει· “ὁ γοῦν πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις καὶ δυνατός, φανερός, ὁποῖος δ’ ἐστὶ μορφήν, ἀφανής. οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ παμφαὴς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐδ’ οὗτος ἔοικεν ὁρᾶν αὑτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλ’ ἤν τις ἀναιδῶς αὐτὸν θεάσηται, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται.” τίς γὰρ σὰρξ δύναται τὸν ἐπουράνιον καὶ ἀληθῆ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖν θεὸν ἄμβροτον, ὃς πόλον οἰκεῖ; ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἀκτίνων κατ’ ἐναντίον ἠελίοιο ἄνθρωποι στῆναι δυνατοί, θνητοὶ γεγαῶτες, προεῖπεν ἡ Σίβυλλα. | 13.35 "Moreover, the elegies of Solon greatly deify the seventh day. And are not those words almost a prophecy of the saving dispensation in the second book of the Republic, where Plato says: 'Thus disposed, the righteous man will be scourged, tortured, have his eyes gouged out, and at last, after suffering every evil, will be impaled'? And Antisthenes the Socratic, paraphrasing that prophetic scripture, 'To whom have ye likened me? saith the Lord,' says that He is like no one, wherefore no one can learn Him from an image. And Xenophon the Athenian says word for word similar things: 'He who shakes all things and holds them still is manifested as great and powerful, but what He is like in form is unmanifest. Nor indeed does the sun, which seems to shine on all, seem to permit itself to be seen, but if anyone gazes at it shamelessly, it takes away his sight.' For what flesh can see with eyes the heavenly and true immortal God, who inhabits the pole? Nay, men cannot even stand against the rays of the sun, being mortals, as the Sibyl foretold. |
| 13.36 εὖ γοῦν καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος διδάσκων ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματος ὁ θεὸς ἐπιφέρει· “εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα.” καὶ πάλιν· “ἀλλ’ οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς, τὴν σφετέρην δ’ ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.” καὶ πάλιν· “ἀλλ’ εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες, ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, ἵπποι μέν θ’ ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοῖαι καί κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ’ ἐποίουν τοιαῦθ’ οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.” | 13.36 "Well, then, Xenophanes of Colophon also, teaching that God is one and incorporeal, adds: 'One God, greatest among gods and men, not at all like mortals in body or in thought.' And again: 'But mortals think that gods are born, and have their own dress and voice and body.' And again: 'But if oxen or lions had hands, or could draw with their hands and produce works such as men do, horses would draw the forms of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and would make such bodies as they themselves had.' |
| 13.37 ἀκούσωμεν οὖν πάλιν Βακχυλίδου μὲν τοῦ μελοποιοῦ περὶ τοῦ θείου λέγοντος· “οἱ μὲν ἀδμῆτες ἀεικελίων νούσων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀναίτιοι, οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις εἴκελοι.” Κλεάνθους τε τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ ἔν τινι ποιήματι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ταῦτα γεγραφότος, ἄκουε· “τἀγαθὸν ἐρωτᾷς μ’ οἷόν ἐστ’; ἄκουε δή· τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβές, κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλόν, δέον, αὐστηρόν, αὐθέκαστον, ἀεὶ σύμφορον, ἄφοβον, ἄλυπον, λυσιτελές, ἀνώδυνον, ὠφέλιμον, εὐάρεστον, ἀσφαλές, φίλον, ἔντιμον, ὁμολογούμενον, εὐκλεές, ἄτυφον, ἐπιμελές, πρᾶον, σφοδρόν, χρονιζόμενον, ἄμεμπτον, ἀεὶ διαμένον.” | 13.37 "Let us hear Bacchylides the lyric poet again saying concerning the divine: 'They are untamed by grievous diseases and guiltless, in no way like men.' And listen to what Cleanthes the Stoic wrote in a poem about God: 'Thou askest me what the Good is like? Hear then: ordered, just, holy, pious, self-controlled, useful, beautiful, necessary, severe, unfeigned, ever profitable, fearless, painless, advantageous, painless, helpful, well-pleasing, secure, friendly, honored, agreed upon, glorious, unboastful, careful, gentle, vehement, long-lasting, blameless, ever remaining.' |
| 13.38 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διαβάλλων εἰδωλολατρίαν ἐπιφέρει· “ἀνελεύθερος πᾶς ὅστις εἰς δόξαν βλέπει, ὡς δὴ παρ’ ἐκείνης τευξόμενός τινος καλοῦ.” οὔκουν ἔτι κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν περὶ τοῦ θείου ὑποληπτέον· “οὐδὲ γὰρ λάθρᾳ δοκῶ, φωτὸς κακούργου σχήματ’ ἐκμιμούμενον, σοὶ τήνδ’ ἐς εὐνήν, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπον, μολεῖν”, Ἀμφίων λέγει τῇ Ἀντιόπῃ. ὁ Σοφοκλῆς δὲ εὐθυρρημόνως γράφει· “τὴν τοῦδε γάρ τοι Ζεὺς ἔγημε μητέρα, οὐ χρυσόμορφος οὐδ’ ἐπημφιεσμένος πτίλον κύκνειον, ὡς κόρην Πλευρωνίαν ὑπημβρύωσεν, ἀλλ’ ὁλοσχερὴς ἀνήρ.” εἶτα ὑπελθὼν καὶ δὴ ἐπήγαγε· “ταχὺς δὲ βαθμοῖς νυμφικοῖς ἐπεστάθη ὁ μοιχός.” ἐφ’ οἷς ἔτι φανερώτερον τὴν ἀκρασίαν τοῦ μυθοποιουμένου Διὸς ὧδέ πως ἐκδιηγεῖται· “ὁ δ’ οὔτε δαιτὸς οὔτε χέρνιβος θιγὼν πρὸς λέκτρον ᾔει καρδίαν ὠδαγμένος, ὅλην δ’ ἐκείνην εὐφρόνην ἐθόρνυτο.” | 13.38 "And the same writer, silently attacking the idolatry of the many, adds: 'Unfree is everyone who looks to opinion, as though he were to obtain some good from it.' Therefore we must no longer hold opinions about the divine according to the notion of the vulgar: 'For I do not think that stealthily, imitating the forms of a evil light, I came to thy bed like a man,' says Amphion to Antiope. And Sophocles writes frankly: 'For Zeus married the mother of this man, not taking golden form, nor clad in swan's plumage, as he begot a child on the Pleuronian maiden, but as a full-grown man.' Then proceeding, he adds: 'And quickly the adulterer stood upon the bridal steps.' Whereupon he describes still more clearly the intemperance of the mythologized Zeus: 'He, touching neither feast nor water for hands, went to the bed stung at heart, and revelled through that whole night.' |
| 13.39 ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν παρείσθω ταῖς τῶν θεάτρων ἀνοίαις. ἄντικρυς δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἡράκλειτος· “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.” ὁ μελοποιὸς δὲ Μελανιππίδης ᾄδων φησί· “κλῦθί μοι, ὦ πάτερ, θαῦμα βροτῶν, τᾶς ἀειζώου ψυχᾶς μεδέων.” Παρμενίδης τε ὁ μέγας, ὥς φησιν ἐν Σοφιστῇ Πλάτων, ὧδέ πως περὶ τοῦ θείου γράφει· “πολλὰ μάλ’ ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, οὖλον, μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ’ ἀγένητον.” ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἡσίοδος· “αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων”, φησί, “βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανός ἐστιν ἀθανάτων, σέο δ’ οὔ τις ἐρήρισται κράτος ἄλλος.” | 13.39 "Let these things be left to the follies of the theaters. But Heraclitus explicitly says: 'Men ever prove without understanding of this Logos, both before they hear it and when they have first heard it.' And Melanippides the lyric poet sings: 'Hear me, O Father, wonder of mortals, who rule the ever-living soul.' And Parmenides the Great, as Plato says in the Sophist, writes thus concerning the divine: 'Very many are the signs that being is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, steadfast, and uncreated.' Moreover Hesiod says: 'For He Himself is King of all and Lord of the immortals, and no other contendeth with Thy power.' |
| 13.40 Ναὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων ἀποσπῶσα εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέπειν διδάσκει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Σοφοκλῆς, ὥς φησιν Ἑκαταῖος ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας συνταξάμενος ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ἄντικρυς ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐκβοᾷ· “εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστιν θεός, ὃς οὐρανόν τ’ ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὴν πόντου τε χαροπὸν οἶδμα κἀνέμων βίας. θνητοὶ δὲ πολλόν, καρδίᾳπλανώμενοι, ἱδρυσάμεσθα πημάτων παραψυχὴν θεῶν ἀγάλματ’ ἐκ λίθων ἢ χαλκέων ἢ χρυσοτεύκτων ἢ ἐλεφαντίνων τύπους· θυσίας τε τούτοις καὶ καλὰς πανηγύρεις στέφοντες οὕτως εὐσεβεῖν νομίζομεν.” | 13.40 "Indeed, tragedy also, drawing us away from idols, teaches us to look up to heaven. For Sophocles, as Hecataeus who compiled the histories says in his work on Abraham and the Egyptians, cries out directly on the stage: 'One in truth, one is God, who made heaven and the wide earth, and the blue surge of the sea and the force of winds. But many of us mortals, erring in heart, have set up as a consolation for troubles images of gods out of stone, or brass, or gold-wrought, or ivory figures; and offering sacrifices and fair festivals to these, we think we are being pious.' |
| 13.41 Εὐριπίδης δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς σκηνῆς τραγῳδῶν· “ὁρᾷς”, φησί, “τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ’ ἄπειρον αἰθέρα καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ’ ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις; τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ’ ἡγοῦ θεόν.” ἔν τε τῷ Πειρίθῳ δράματι ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ τάδε τραγῳδεῖ· “σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ ῥόμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ’, ᾧ πέρι μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ’ ὀρφναία νὺξ αἰολόχρως, ἄκριτός τ’ ἄστρων ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.” ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν μὲν αὐτοφυῆ τὸν δημιουργὸν νοῦν εἴρηκε, τὰ δ’ ἑξῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου τάσσεται, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αἱ ἐναντιότητες φωτός τε καὶ σκότους. ὅ τε Εὐφορίωνος Αἰσχύλος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ σεμνῶς σφόδρα φησί· “Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθήρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ’ οὐρανός, Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα χὤτι τῶνδ’ ὑπέρτερον.” | 13.41 "And Euripides, writing tragedy on the same stage, says: 'Seest thou this boundless ether on high, holding earth around in its moist arms? Deem this to be Zeus, consider this to be God.' And in the play Pirithous the same poet sings: 'Thee, self-begotten, who hast entwined the nature of all things in ethereal whirl, around whom light and murky, variegated night, and the unnumbered throng of stars unceasingly dance.' For here he called the Creator-Mind self-begotten, and what follows is ordered concerning the world, in which are the opposites of light and darkness. And Aeschylus the son of Euphorion says very reverently concerning God: 'Zeus is ether, Zeus is earth, Zeus is heaven; Zeus is all things, and whatever is above these.' |
| 13.42 οἶδα ἐγὼ καὶ Πλάτωνα προσμαρτυροῦντα Ἡρακλείτῳ γράφοντι· “ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς οὔνομα.” καὶ πάλιν· “νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἑνός.” κἂν τὸ ῥητὸν ἐκεῖνο ἀναγαγεῖν ἐθέλῃς “ὁ ἔχων ὦτα ἀκούειν ἀκουέτω”, εὕροις ἂν ὧδε ἐμφαινόμενον πρὸς τοῦ Ἐφεσίου· “ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι· φάτις αὐτοῖσι μαρτυρεῖ παρεόντας ἀπεῖναι.” ἀλλ’ ἄντικρυς μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ’ Ἑλλήνων ἀκοῦσαι ποθεῖς; Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὧδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει· “μία ἀρχὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγέννατος· εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχά, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνα ἐξ ᾶς ἁ ἀρχὰ ἐγένετο.” ἐρρύη γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ἡ δόξα ἡ ἀληθινή· “ἄκουε”, φησίν, “Ἰσραήλ, κύριος ὁ θεός σου εἷς ἐστι, καὶ αὐτῷ μόνῳ λατρεύσεις.” οὗτος ἰδοὺ πάντεσσι σαφὴς ἀπλάνητος ὑπάρχει, ὥς φησιν ἡ Σίβυλλα. | 13.42 "I know also that Plato agrees with Heraclitus when he writes: 'The one wise thing alone is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.' And again: 'It is law to obey the counsel of one.' And if you wish to trace back that saying, 'He that hath ears to hear, let him hear,' you may find it thus indicated by the Ephesian: 'Having heard without understanding, they are like the deaf; the proverb testifies to them that being present they are absent.' But do you desire to hear directly of one principle even among the Greeks? Timaeus the Locrian in his physical treatise will testify to me word for word thus: 'One principle of all things is unbegotten; for if it had come into being, it would no longer be a principle, but that from which the principle came into being.' For from that source flowed the true doctrine: 'Hear,' it says, 'O Israel, the Lord thy God is one, and Him only shalt thou serve.' Behold, this God is clear and unerring to all, as the Sibyl says. |
| 13.43 Ξενοκράτης τε ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τὸν μὲν ὕπατον Δία, τὸν δὲ νέατον καλῶν, ἔμφασιν πατρὸς ἀπολείπει καὶ υἱοῦ. καὶ τὸ παραδοξότατον, γινώσκειν φαίνεται τὸ θεῖον ὁ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς εἰσάγων τοὺς θεούς· ὃν οὐδ’ οὕτως αἰδεῖται Ἐπίκουρος. φησὶ γοῦν· “τίπτε με, Πηλέος υἱέ, ποσὶν ταχέεσσι διώκεις, αὐτὸς θνητὸς ἐών, θεὸν ἄμβροτον; οὐδέ νυ πώ με ἔγνως ὡς θεός εἰμι.” οὐχ ἁλωτὸν γὰρ εἶναι θνητῷ οὐδὲ καταληπτὸν τὸ θεῖον οὔτε ποσὶν οὔτε χερσὶν οὔτε ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐδ’ ὅλως τῷ σώματι δεδήλωκε. “τίνι ὡμοιώσατε κύριον; ἢ τίνι ὁμοιώματι ὡμοιώσατε αὐτόν;” φησὶν ἡ γραφή. “μὴ εἰκόνα ἐποίησε τέκτων, ἢ χρυσοχόος χωνεύσας χρυσίον περιεχρύσωσεν αὐτόν;” καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις. | 13.43 "And Xenocrates of Carthage, calling one Zeus supreme (hypatos) and the other lowest (neatos), leaves an indication of Father and Son. And most paradoxically, he who introduces gods with human passions appears to know the divine; whom Epicurus does not even reverence. He says at any rate: 'Why, son of Peleus, dost thou pursue me with swift feet, being thyself a mortal, an immortal god? Nor didst thou know me yet, that I am a god.' For that the divine is not to be caught by a mortal nor comprehended either by feet or hands or eyes or body at all, he has made clear. 'To whom have ye likened the Lord? Or to what likeness have ye likened Him?' says the Scripture. 'Hath a craftsman made an image, or a goldsmith melted gold and overlaid Him with gold?' and what follows. |
| 13.44 ὅ τε κωμικὸς Ἐπίχαρμος σαφῶς περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγει ὧδέ πως· “ὁ βίος ἀνθρώποις λογισμοῦ κἀριθμοῦ δεῖται πάνυ· ζῶμεν δ’ ἀριθμῷ καὶ λογισμῷ· ταῦτα γὰρ σῴζει βροτούς.” εἶτα διαρρήδην ἐπιφέρει· “ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπους κυβερνᾷ κατὰ τρόπον, σῴζει.” εἶτα· “εἰ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων λογισμός, ἔστι καὶ θεῖος λόγος. ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπῳ πέφυκε περὶ βίου καταστροφάς. ὁ δέ γε τὰς τέχνας ἅπασι συνέπεται θεῖος λόγος, ἐκδιδάσκων αὐτὸς αὐτοὺς ὅ τι ποιεῖν δεῖ συμφέρον. οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τέχναν εὗρε, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ταύταν φέρει· ὁ δέ γε τἀνθρώπου λόγος πέφυκεν ἀπό γε τοῦ θείου λόγου.” | 13.44 "And Epicharmus the comic poet speaks clearly concerning the Logos in his Politeia somewhat as follows: 'Human life stands greatly in need of calculation and number; we live by number and calculation, for these save mortals.' Then he explicitly adds: 'The Logos governs men in a proper manner, and saves them.' Then: 'If there is human calculation, there is also a divine Logos. Human reason is by nature concerned with the turns of life; but the divine Logos attends all arts, teaching them what they ought to do for their benefit. For man did not discover art, but God brings it; and human reason is by nature derived from the divine Logos.' |
| 13.45 ναὶ μὴν διὰ τοῦ Ἠσαΐου πνεύματος κεκραγότος· “τί μοι πλῆθος τῶν θυσιῶν ὑμῶν; λέγει κύριος· πλήρης εἰμὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων, καὶ στέαρ ἀρνῶν καὶ αἷμα ταύρων οὐ βούλομαι”· καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα ἐπαγαγόντος· “λούσασθε, καθαροὶ γένεσθε, ἀφέλετε τὰς πονηρίας ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν”· καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις, Μένανδρος ὁ κωμικὸς αὐταῖς γράφει ταῖς λέξεσιν· “εἴ τις δὲ θυσίαν προσφέρων, ὦ Πάμφιλε, ταύρων τι πλῆθος ἢ ἐρίφων ἢ νὴ Δία ἑτέρων τοιούτων, ἢ κατασκευάσματα χρυσᾶς ποιήσας χλαμύδας ἤτοι πορφυρᾶς ἢ δι’ ἐλέφαντος ἢ σμαράγδου ζῴδια, εὔνουν νομίζει τὸν θεὸν καθεστάναι, πεπλάνητ’ ἐκεῖνος καὶ φρένας κούφας ἔχει. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα χρήσιμον πεφυκέναι, μὴ παρθένους φθείροντα καὶ μοιχώμενον, κλέπτοντα καὶ σφάττοντα χρημάτων χάριν. μηδὲ βελόνης ἔναμμ’ ἐπιθυμῇς, Πάμφιλε· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς βλέπει σε πλησίον παρών.” | 13.45 "Indeed, through the spirit of Isaiah crying out, 'To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord; I am full of burnt-offerings, and the fat of lambs and the blood of bulls I desire not'; and adding a little later, 'Wash you, make you clean, put away the evil from your souls,' and what follows, Menander the comic poet writes in these very words: 'If anyone offering sacrifice, O Pamphilus, a multitude of bulls or goats, or by Zeus other such things, or making woven garments of gold or purple, or figures of ivory or emerald, thinks he makes God well-disposed, he is deceived and has a shallow mind. For a man ought to be useful, not corrupting maidens, nor committing adultery, nor stealing, nor slaying for money's sake. Do not covet even the thread of a needle, Pamphilus; for God sees thee, being present near at hand.' |
| 13.46 “Θεὸς ἐγγίζων ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ οὐχὶ θεὸς πόρρωθεν. ποιήσει τι ἄνθρωπος ἐν κρυφαίοις, καὶ οὐκ ὄψομαι αὐτόν;” διὰ Ἱερεμίου φησί. καὶ πάλιν ὁ Μένανδρος παραφράζων τὴν γραφὴν ἐκείνην “θύσατε θυσίαν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ κύριον” ὧδέ πως γράφει· “μηδὲ βελόνης, ὦ φίλτατ’, ἐπιθυμήσῃς ἀλλοτρίας ποτέ. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς δικαίοις ἔργοις ἥδεται καὶ οὐκ ἀδίκοις, πονοῦντα δ’ ἐᾷ τὸν ἴδιον ὑψῶσαι βίον, τὴν γῆν ἀροῦντα νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν. θεῷ δὲ θῦε διὰ τέλους δίκαιος ὤν, λαμπρὸς ὢν ταῖς χλαμύσιν ὡς τῇ καρδίᾳ. βροντῆς ἐὰν ἀκούσῃς, μὴ φύγῃς, μηδὲν συνειδὼς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, δέσποτα· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς βλέπει σε πλησίον παρών.” | 13.46 "'I am a God at hand, and not a God far off. Shall a man do anything in secret places, and I shall not see him?' He says through Jeremiah. And again Menander, paraphrasing that scripture, 'Sacrifice the sacrifice of righteousness, and hope in the Lord,' writes somewhat as follows: 'Do not covet, my dear friend, even another's needle at any time; for God delights in righteous deeds and not in unrighteous ones, but permits him who labors to exalt his own life, plowing the earth night and day. Sacrifice to God continually by being righteous, being bright in your garments as in your heart. If thou hear thunder, fly not, conscious of nothing evil in thyself, master; for God sees thee, being present near at hand.' |
| 13.47 “Ἔτι σοῦ λαλοῦντος”, φησὶν ἡ γραφή, “ἐρῶ· ἰδοὺ πάρειμι.” Δίφιλος πάλιν ὁ κωμικὸς τοιαῦτά τινα περὶ τῆς κρίσεως διαλέγεται· “οἴει σὺ τοὺς θανόντας, ὦ Νικήρατε, τρυφῆς ἁπάσης μεταλαβόντας ἐν βίῳ πεφευγέναι τὸ θεῖον ὡς λεληθότας; ἔστιν Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὃς τὰ πάνθ’ ὁρᾷ. καὶ γὰρ καθ’ Ἅιδην δύο τρίβους νομίζομεν, μίαν δικαίων, ἑτέραν δ’ ἀσεβῶν εἶν’ ὁδόν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς δύο καλύψει γῆ τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ, ἀπελθὼν κλέπτ’, ἀποστέρει, κύκα, μηδὲν πλανηθῇς. ἔστι κἀν Ἅιδου κρίσις, ἥνπερ ποιήσει θεὸς ὁ πάντων δεσπότης, οὗ τοὔνομα φοβερόν, οὐδ’ ἂν ὀνομάσαιμ’ ἐγώ, ὃς τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι πρὸς μῆκος βίον δίδωσιν. εἴ τις δὲ θνητῶν οἴεται τοὐφήμερον κακόν τι πράσσων τοὺς θεοὺς λεληθέναι, δοκεῖ πονηρά, καὶ δοκῶν ἁλίσκεται, ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγουσα τυγχάνῃ Δίκη. ὁρᾶθ’ ὅσοι δοκεῖτε οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· ἔστιν γάρ, ἔστιν· εἰ δέ τις πράττει κακῶς κακὸς πεφυκώς, τὸν χρόνον κερδαινέτω· χρόνῳ γὰρ οὗτος ὕστερον δώσει δίκην.” | 13.47 "'While thou art yet speaking,' says the Scripture, 'I will say, Behold, I am here.' Diphilus again, the comic poet, discourses somewhat as follows concerning the judgment: 'Thinkest thou, O Niceratus, that the dead, having shared in every luxury in life, have escaped the divine as having been hidden? There is an eye of Justice that sees all things. For even in Hades we hold that there are two paths, one of the righteous, and another that is the way of the ungodly. For if the earth cover both for all time, go away, steal, rob, confound, be not deceived! There is even in Hades a judgment which God the Master of all will execute, whose name is fearful, which I would not even utter, who gives long life to sinners. But if any mortal thinks that in doing some evil day by day he escapes the notice of the gods, he thinks evil thoughts, and thinking so is caught, whenever Justice happens to have leisure. See, as many as think there is no God: there is, there is! And if anyone does ill being evil, let him gain time; for in time he shall later pay the penalty.' |
| 13.48 Συνᾴδει δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία διὰ τῶνδε· “ἔσται γάρ, ἔσται κεῖνος αἰῶνος χρόνος, ὅταν πυρὸς γέμοντα θησαυρὸν σχάσῃ χρυσωπὸς αἰθήρ, ἡ δὲ βοσκηθεῖσα φλὸξ ἅπαντα τἀπίγεια καὶ μετάρσια φλέξει μανεῖσα.” καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα αὖθις ἐπιφέρει· “ἐπὰν δ’ ἐκλίπῃ τὸ πᾶν, φροῦδος μὲν ἔσται κυμάτων ἅπας βυθός, γῆ δ’ ἐράνων ἔρημος, οὐδ’ ἄρ’ ἔτι πτερωτὰ φῦλα βλαστήσει πυρουμένη, κἄπειτα σώσει πάνθ’ ἃ πρόσθ’ ἀπώλεσε.” | 13.48 "And tragedy also agrees with these things through the following: 'For there shall be, there shall be that time of age when the golden-visaged ether shall cleave its treasure full of fire, and the devouring flame shall burn in fury all things on earth and on high.' And after a little he again adds: 'And when everything fails, the whole depth of waves shall be gone, and the earth deserted of inhabitants; nor shall winged tribes spring up any more when it is burned, and then He shall save all that He previously destroyed.' |
| 13.49 Τὰ ὅμοια τούτοις κἀν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς εὑρήσομεν ὧδέ πως γεγραμμένα· “πάντας γὰρ κρύψας αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς ἐξ ἱερᾶς κραδίης ἀνενέγκατο, μέρμερα ῥέζων.” ἢν δὲ ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαγήν, οὐ χρόνῳ τινὶ εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλ’ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύσεσθαι δυνάμενοι, “ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, αὐτοτράπεζοι ἐόντες, ἀνδρείων ἀχέων ἀπόκληροι, ἀτειρεῖς”, ἡ φιλόσοφος Ἐμπεδοκλέους λέγει ποιητική. οὐχ οὕτω τις μέγας ἔσται καὶ καθ’ Ἕλληνας ὡς ὑπερέχειν τὴν δίκην, οὐδὲ σμικρὸς ὡς λαθεῖν. | 13.49 "We shall find things similar to these written in the Orphic writings somewhat as follows: 'For having hidden all things, He brought them back again to the joyful light from His sacred heart, working wonders.' If we live holy and righteously, we shall be blessed here, and more blessed after our departure hence, not having happiness for a time, but able to rest in eternity, 'dwelling at the same hearth with other immortals, sharing the same table, free from manly griefs, unwearied,' as the philosophical poetry of Empedocles says. No one among the Greeks shall be so great as to rise above justice, nor so small as to escape it. |
| 13.50 Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς Ὀρφεὺς καὶ ταῦτα λέγει· “εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας τούτῳ προσέδρευε, ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος· εὖ δ’ ἐπίβαινε ἀτραπιτοῦ, μοῦνον δ’ ἐσόρα κόσμοιο ἄνακτα, ἀθάνατον.” αὖθίς τε περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀόρατον αὐτὸν λέγων, μόνῳ γνωσθῆναι ἑνί τινί φησι τὸ γένος Χαλδαίῳ, εἴτε τὸν Ἁβραὰμ λέγων τοῦτον εἴτε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τούτων· “εἰ μὴ μουνογενής τις ἀπορρὼξ φύλου ἄνωθεν Χαλδαίων· ἴδρις γὰρ ἔην ἄστροιο πορείης καὶ σφαίρης κίνημ’ ἀμφὶ χθόνα ὡς περιτέλλει, κυκλοτερές γ’ ἐν ἴσῳ, κατὰ δὲ σφέτερον κνώδακα· πνεύματι δ’ ἡνιοχεῖ περί τ’ ἠέρα καὶ περὶ χεῦμα.” | 13.50 "And the same Orpheus also says these things: 'Looking unto the divine Logos, attend to it, guiding the intellectual vessel of the heart; walk well upon the path, and look only to the King of the cosmos, the Immortal.' And again concerning God, calling Him invisible, he says He was known to one single person, Chaldean by race—whether he means Abraham or his son—through these words: 'Unless it be a certain only-begotten offshoot of the race from above of the Chaldeans; for he was skilled in the course of the star, and how the movement of the sphere turns around the earth, in a circle equally, upon its own axis, and drives by the spirit around the air and around the wave.' |
| 13.51 Εἶτα, οἷον παραφράζων τὸ “ὁ οὐρανός μοι θρόνος, ἡ δὲ γῆ ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν μου”, ἐπιφέρει· “αὐτὸς δ’ αὖ μέγαν αὖθις ἐπ’ οὐρανὸν ἐστήρικται, χρυσέῳ ἐνὶ θρόνῳ, γαίῃ δ’ ὑπὸ ποσσὶ βέβηκε· χεῖρα δὲ δεξιτερὴν ἐπὶ τέρμασιν Ὠκεανοῖο ἐκτέτακεν· ὀρέων δὲ τρέμει βάσις ἔνδοθι θυμῷ, οὐδὲ φέρειν δύναται κρατερὸν μένος· ἔστι δὲ πάντῃ αὐτὸς ἐπουράνιος, καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ πάντα τελευτᾷ, ἀρχὴν αὐτὸς ἔχων καὶ μέσον ἠδὲ τελευτήν.” “ἄλλως οὐ θεμιτόν σε λέγειν· τρομέω δέ γε γυῖα ἐν νόῳ· ἐξ ὑπάτου κραίνει”, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις. διὰ γὰρ τούτων δεδήλωκε πάντα ἐκεῖνα τὰ προφητικά· “ὃς ἐὰν ἀνοίξῃ τὸν οὐρανόν, τρόμος λήψεται, καὶ ἀπὸ σοῦ ὄρη τακήσεται, ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου πυρὸς τήκεται κηρός”· καὶ τὰ διὰ Ἠσαΐου· “τίς ἐμέτρησε τὸν οὐρανὸν σπιθαμῇ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν δρακί;” | 13.51 "Then, as if paraphrasing 'Heaven is my throne, and earth the footstool of my feet,' he adds: 'He Himself again is fixed upon the great heaven, upon a golden throne, and earth is under His feet; and He hath stretched out His right hand to the ends of the Ocean; and the foundation of the mountains trembles within its soul, nor can it bear His mighty wrath. And He Himself is altogether heavenly, and fulfills all things upon earth, having Himself beginning, middle, and end.' 'Otherwise it is not lawful to speak of Thee; I tremble in my limbs and mind; He decrees from on high,' and what follows. For through these words he has indicated all those prophetic sayings: 'If Thou shouldest open the heaven, trembling shall take hold; and from Thy presence the mountains shall melt, as wax melts from the face of fire'; and those through Isaiah: 'Who hath measured the heaven with a span, and all the earth with the hollow of his hand?' |
| 13.52 Πάλιν ὅταν· “αἰθέρος ἠδ’ Ἀΐδου, πόντου, γαίης τε τύραννε, ὃς βρονταῖς σείεις βριαρὸν δόμον Οὐλύμποιο, δαίμονες ὃν φρίσσουσι, θεῶν δὲ δέδοικεν ὅμιλος, ᾧ Μοῖραι πείθονται, ἀμείλικτοί περ ἐοῦσαι· ἄφθιτε, μητροπάτωρ, οὗ θυμῷ πάντα δονεῖται, ὃς κινεῖς ἀνέμους, νεφέλῃσί τε πάντα καλύπτεις, πρηστῆρσι σχίζων πλατὺν αἰθέρα. σὴ μὲν ἐν ἄστροις τάξις ἀναλλάκτοισιν ἐφημοσύναισι τρέχουσα· σῷ δὲ θρόνῳ πυρόεντι παρεστᾶσιν πολύμοχθοι ἄγγελοι, οἷσι μέμηλε βροτοῖς ὡς πάντα τελεῖται. σὸν μὲν ἔαρ λάμπει νέον ἄνθεσι πορφυρέοισι, σὸς χειμών, ψυχραῖσιν ἐπερχόμενος νεφέλαισιν, σάς ποτε βακχευτὰς Βρόμιος διένειμεν ὀπώρας.” | 13.52 "Again when he says: 'O Lord of ether and Hades, of sea and earth, who with thunders shakest the strong house of Olympus, whom daemons dread and the host of gods fears, whom the Fates obey, unpitying though they be; imperishable, mother-father, by whose wrath all things are shaken, who movest the winds and coverest all things with clouds, cleaving the broad ether with fiery storms; Thy order among the stars runs in unchangeable commands; and by Thy fiery throne stand the much-enduring angels, whose care it is for mortals how all things are fulfilled. Thy young spring shines with purple flowers, Thy winter comes with cold clouds, and Thy autumn fruits Bacchus once distributed.' |
| 13.53 Εἶτα ἐπιφέρει, ῥητῶς παντοκράτορα ὀνομάζων τὸν θεόν· “ἄφθιτον, ἀθάνατον, ῥητὸν μόνον ἀθανάτοισιν· ἐλθέ, μέγιστε θεῶν πάντων, κρατερῇ σὺν ἀνάγκῃ, φρικτός, ἀήττητος, μέγας, ἄφθιτος, ὃν στέφει αἰθήρ.” διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ “μητροπάτωρ” οὐ μόνον τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν ἐμήνυσεν, ἐνδέδωκε δὲ ἀφορμὰς τοῖς τὰς προβολὰς εἰσάγουσι τάχα καὶ σύζυγον νοῆσαι τοῦ θεοῦ· παραφράζει δὲ ἐκείνας τὰς προφητικὰς γραφάς, τήν τε διὰ Ὠσηέ· “ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ στερεῶν βροντήν, κτίζων πνεῦμα, οὗ αἱ χεῖρες τὴν στρατιὰν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐθεμελίωσαν”· καὶ τὴν διὰ Μωϋσέως· “ἴδετε ἴδετε ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς ἕτερος πλὴν ἐμοῦ· ἐγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν ποιήσω, πατάξω κἀγὼ ἰάσομαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃς ἐξελεῖται ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν μου.” “αὐτὸς δ’ ἐξ ἀγαθοῖο κακὸν θνητοῖσι φυτεύει καὶ πόλεμον κρυόεντα”, κατὰ τὸν Ὀρφέα. | 13.53 "Then he adds, explicitly naming God the Almighty (Pantokrator): 'Imperishable, immortal, speakable only to immortals; come, greatest of all gods, with strong necessity, fearful, invincible, great, imperishable, whom ether crowns.' Now by 'mother-father' he not only indicated generation out of non-being, but gave occasions to those who introduce emanations (probolai) perhaps also to conceive a consort of God. And he paraphrases those prophetic writings, both that through Hosea [Amos]: 'Lo, I am He that establishes thunder, and creates spirit, whose hands founded the host of heaven'; and that through Moses: 'See, see that I am He, and there is no other God beside me; I will kill and make alive, I will smite and I will heal, and there is none that shall deliver out of my hands.' 'And He Himself out of good plants evil for mortals, and chilling war,' according to Orpheus. |
| 13.54 Τοιαῦτα καὶ ὁ Πάριος Ἀρχίλοχος λέγει· “ὦ Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος, σὺ δ’ ἔργ’ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους ὁρᾷς λεωργὰ καὶ ἀθέμιστα.” πάλιν ἡμῖν ᾀσάτω ὁ Ὀρφεύς· “χεῖρα δὲ δεξιτερὴν ἐπὶ τέρματος Ὠκεανοῖο πάντοθεν ἐκτέτακεν, γαίη δ’ ὑπὸ ποσσὶ βέβηκεν.” ταῦτα ἐμφανῶς ἐκεῖθεν εἴληπται· “κύριος σώσει κατοικουμένας, καὶ τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅλην καταλήψεται τῇ χειρὶ ὡς νοσσιάν, κύριος ὁ ποιήσας τὴν γῆν ἐν τῇ ἰσχύϊ αὐτοῦ”, ὥς φησιν Ἱερεμίας, “καὶ ἀνορθώσας τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ αὐτοῦ.” ἔτι πρὸς τοῖσδε Φωκυλίδης μὲν τοὺς ἀγγέλους δαίμονας καλῶν, τοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς αὐτῶν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους διὰ τούτων παρίστησιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀποστάτας τινὰς παρειλήφαμεν· “ἀλλ’ ἄρα δαίμονές εἰσιν ἐπ’ ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοτε ἄλλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπερχομένου κακοῦ ἀνέρι ἐκλύσασθαι.” | 13.54 "Such things Archilochus of Paros also says: 'O Zeus, Thine is the power of heaven, and Thou seest the deeds of men, both wickedness and lawlessness.' Again let Orpheus sing to us: 'And He hath stretched out His right hand to the end of the Ocean on every side, and the earth is set under His feet.' These things are manifestly taken from there: 'The Lord shall save inhabited places, and shall take the whole world in His hand as a nest; the Lord who made the earth by His strength,' as Jeremiah says, 'and set upright the world by His wisdom.' Further in addition to these, Phocylides, calling the angels daemons, shows through these lines that some of them are good and some bad, since we also have received doctrine concerning certain apostates: 'Nay, there are daemons over men, different at different times, some to deliver a man from coming evil.' |
| 13.55 Καλῶς οὖν καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ κωμικὸς τὴν εἰδωλολατρίαν ἐκκόπτει διὰ τούτων· “οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν οὐδεμία τύχη θεός, οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόματον, ὃ γίγνεται ὡς ἔτυχ’ ἑκάστῳ, προσαγορεύεται τύχη.” Σοφοκλῆς δὲ ὁ τραγῳδοποιὸς “οὐδὲ θεοῖς”, λέγει, “αὐθαίρετα πάντα πέλονται, νόσφι Διός· κεῖνος γὰρ ἔχει τέλος ἠδὲ καὶ ἀρχήν.” ὅ τε Ὀρφεύς· “εἷς κράτος, εἷς δαίμων γένετο, μέγας οὐρανὸς αἴθων, ἐν δὲ τὰ πάντα τέτυκται, ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα”, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις. | 13.55 Rightly then does Philemon the comic poet cut away idol-worship through these lines: "There is no Chance (Tyche) that is a god for us—there is none; but that which happens spontaneously as it falls out to each man is called Chance." And Sophocles the tragic poet says that not even to the gods do all things happen by choice, "save for Zeus alone; for he holds the end and the beginning." And Orpheus, letting go of [false] power, says: "One deity came to be, great glowing heaven, in which all things are fashioned, and in which all these things revolve: fire and water and earth, and all that depends on them." |
| 13.56 Πίνδαρος δὲ ὁ μελοποιὸς οἷον ἐκβακχεύεται ἄντικρυς εἰπών· “τί θεός; ὅ τι τὸ πᾶν”, καὶ πάλιν· “θεὸς ὁ πάντα τεύχων βροτοῖς.” ἐπὰν δὲ εἴπῃ· “τί ἔλπεαι σοφίαν ὀλίγον τοι ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἔχειν; τὰ θεῶν βουλεύματα ἐρευνᾶσαι βροτέᾳ φρενὶ δύσκολον· θνατᾶς δ’ ἀπὸ ματρὸς ἔφυ”, ἐκεῖθεν ἔσπακε τὴν διάνοιαν· “τίς ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου; ἢ τίς σύμβουλος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο;” | 13.56 Pindar the lyric poet is, as it were, filled with prophetic frenzy, outright asking: "What is God? What is the All?" and again: "God is the one who fashions all things for mortals." And whenever he says: "Why do you hope to possess wisdom? A man has but little advantage over another man. It is difficult for a mortal mind to search out the plans of the gods, for he was born of a mortal mother,"—from there he drew the thought: "Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor?" |
| 13.57 Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἡσίοδος δι’ ὧν γράφει συνᾴδει τοῖς προειρημένοις· “μάντις δ’ οὐδείς ἐστιν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, ὅστις ἂν εἰδείη Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο.” εἰκότως ἄρα Σόλων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγείαις, καὶ αὐτὸς κατακολουθήσας Ἡσιόδῳ, πάμπαν δ’ ἀθανάτων ἀφανὴς νόος ἀνθρώποισι, γράφει. | 13.57 But Hesiod also, through what he writes, accords with those mentioned before: "No prophet among earthly men is there who might know the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus." Naturally then Solon the Athenian in his elegies, having himself followed Hesiod, writes: "The mind of the immortals is entirely hidden from human beings." |
| 13.58 Πάλιν τοῦ Μώσεως εἰς μόχθους καὶ πόνους διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τέξεσθαι τὴν γυναῖκα προφητεύσαντος ποιητής τις οὐκ ἄσημος γράφει Οὐδέ ποτ ἦμαρ Παύσονται καμάου καὶ ὀϊζύος, οὐδέ τι νύκτωρ Στεινόμενοι· χαλεπὰς δὲ θεοὶ δώσουσι μερίμνας. | 13.58 Again, when Moses prophesied that the woman would bring forth in labors and pains because of the transgression, a poet of no small renown writes: "Never by day shall they cease from toil and woe, nor at night from being oppressed; and the gods shall give grievous cares." |
| 13.59 ἓτι Ὃμηρος μὲν εἰπὼν αὐτὸς δὲ χρύσεια πατήρ ἐπίταινε τάλαντα· δίκαιον τὸν θεὸν μηνύει. Μένανδρος δὲ ὁ κωμικὸς ἀγαθὸν ἑρμηνεύων τὸν θεόν φησιν, ἃπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρί συμπαρίσταται εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου ἀγαθός· κακὸν γὰρ δαίμον οὐ νομιστέον εἶναι, βίον βλάπτοντα χρηστόν. εἶται ἐπιφέρει ἃπαντα δ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν θεόν· ἢτοι πάντα θεὸν ἀγαθὸν λέγων, ἢ, ὃπερ καὶ μᾶλλον, ἐν πᾶσι τὸν θεὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. | 13.59 Furthermore, Homer himself, having said: "And the Father stretched out the golden scales," reveals God as just. And Menander the comic poet, interpreting God as good, says: "A good guardian spirit (daimon) stands beside every man straightway at his birth, a good guide of life; for a bad spirit ruining a good life must not be thought to exist." Then he adds that God is good in everything—either calling every god good, or, which is rather more likely, that God is good in all things. |
| 13.60 Πάλιν αὖ Λἰσχύλος μὲν ὁ τραγῳδοποιὸς τὴν Δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ παρατιθέμενος οὐκ ὀκνεῖ καὶ ὓψιστον Αὐτὸν προσαγορεύειν διὰ τούτων χώριζε θνητῶν τὸν θεὸν, καὶ μὴ δόκει ὃμοιον αὐῷ σάρκινον καθεστάναι. οὐκ οἶσθά γ αὐτόν. ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται, ἂπλατος ὁρμῇ, ποτὲ δ ὓδωρ, ποτὲ γνόφος, καὶ θηρςὶν αὐτὸς γίνεται παρεμφερὴς, ἀνέμῳ, νεφέλῃ τε, κἀστραπῇ, βροντῇ, βροχῇ. ὑπηρετεῖ δ αὐτῷ θάλασσα, καὶ πετραι, καὶ πᾶσα πηγὴ, χὒδατος συστήματα· τρέμει δ’ ὂρη καὶ γαῖα, καὶ πελώριος βυθὸς θαλάσσης, καὶ ὀρέων ὓψος, [ἐπὶ] μέγα ἐπὰν ἐπιβλέψῃ γοργὸν ὂμμα δεσπότου· πάντα δυνατὴ γὰρ δόξα ὑψίστου θεοῦ. ἆρ ού δοκεῖ σοι ἐκεῖνο παραφράζειν τὸ "ἀπὸ παροςώπου κυρίου τρέμει ἡ γῆ;" | 13.60 Again, Aeschylus the tragic poet, setting forth the power of God, does not hesitate even to address Him as "Highest" through these lines: "Separate God from mortals, and do not think that he, being fleshly, is like unto you. You do not know him. At times he appears as fire, irresistible in force, at times as water, at times as darkness; and he becomes like wild beasts, like wind, and cloud, and lightning, thunder, and rain. The sea serves him, and rocks, and every spring, and the gatherings of water; the mountains and earth tremble, and the gigantic depth of the sea, and the great height of the mountains, whenever the fierce eye of the Master gazes upon them. For all-powerful is the glory of the Highest God." Does he not seem to you to be paraphrasing that passage: "At the presence of the Lord the earth trembles"? |
| 13.61 Ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ μαντικώτατος Ἀπόλλων, μαρτυρῶν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγειν ἀναγκάζεται περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, ἡνίκα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευον οἱ Μῆδοι, ὡς ἐδεῖτό τε καὶ ἱκέτευε τὸν Δία περὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε ὁ χρησμὸς οὐ δύναται Πάλλας Δί’ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι, λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις, καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ. πολλοὺς δ’ ἀθανάτων νηοὺς μαλερῷ πυρὶ δώσει, οἴ που νῦν ἱδρῶτι ῥεεύμενοι ἑστήκασι, δείματι παλλόμενοι, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις. | 13.61 In addition to these, Apollo, most prophetic, testifying to the glory of God, is compelled to say concerning Athena—when the Medes were marching against Greece—how she begged and supplicated Zeus concerning Attica. The oracle runs thus: "Pallas cannot appease Olympian Zeus, though entreating with many words and cunning counsel. But many temples of the immortals shall he give to fierce fire, which now stand streaming with sweat, quivering with dread," and so forth. |
| 13.62 Θεαρίδας δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ φύσεως γράφει "‘Α ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ μία. κείνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τέ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ μόνον." οὐδέ τις ἔσθ’ ἕτερος χωρὶς μεγάλου βασιλῆος, Ὀρφεὺς λέγει· ᾧ πειθόμενος ὁ κωμικὸς Δίφιλος μικωτατα Τὸν ὄντα πάντων φησὶ) πατέρα, ... — — τοῦτον διὰ τέλους τίμα, μόνον ἀγαθῶν τοσούτων εὑρετὴν καὶ κτίστορα. | 13.62 Thearidas in his treatise On Nature writes: "The principle of existing things is truly one true principle; for that in the beginning is one and alone." "Nor is there any other apart from the Great King," Orpheus says; obeying whom Diphilus the comic poet says most wisely: "Honor through to the end the Father of all things... the sole discoverer and creator of so many good things." |
| 13.63 εἰκότως τοίνυν ὁ Πλάτων’ ἐθίζει τὰς βελτίστας φύσεις ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα, ὁ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν. τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφὴ, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ, ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ταύτης μετασχόντας τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους κρίνει, ἔστε μὲν δὴ πάντες ἀδελφοὶ, λέγων· οἱ δὲ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους ἀκριβέστατα, καὶ πάντη εἰς. | 13.63 Fittingly, therefore, Plato accustomed the finest natures to arrive at that study which we previously said was the greatest: both to see the Good and to make that ascent. This, as it seems, would not be the flipping of a shell, but the turning around of a soul from a night-like day to a true return to Real Being, which we shall call true philosophy; and he judges those who participate in this to be of the golden race, saying: "Though you are all brothers, those of the golden race are most exact, and in every way one." |
| 13.64 τοῦ πατρὸς ἄρα καὶ ποιητοῦ ξυμπάντων ἐμφύτως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται πάνταπρὸς πάντων, τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα συμπαθοῦντα, τῶν δὲ ζῴων τῶν ἐμψύχων τὰ μὲν ἤδη ἀθάνατα, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐργαζόμενα· τῶν δέ τοι θνητῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν φόβῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτῶν ἔτι κατὰ γαστρὸς ὀχούμενα, τὰ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ λογισμῷ. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι, γένος δ’ οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῶν γεωργούντων οὔτε νομάδων, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν δύναται ζῆν, μὴ προκατειλημμένον τῇ τοῦ κρείττονος πίστει. διὸ πᾶν μὲν ἔθνος ἑῷον, πὰν δὲ ἐσπερίων ἁπτόμενον ᾐόνων, βόρειόν τε καὶ τὰ πρὸς τῷ νότῳ πάντα, μίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πρόληψιν περὶ τοῦ καταστησαμένου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, εἴ γε καὶ τὰ καθολικώτατα τῶν ἐνεργημάτων αὐτοῦ διαπεφοίτηκεν ἐπ’ ἴσης πάντα. | 13.64 Therefore, the perception of the Father and Maker of all things is possessed naturally and un-taught by all toward all: inanimate things sympathizing, and of animate creatures, some already immortal, and others working day by day; and of mortals, some riding in fear and through their mother while still in the womb, and others by free self-governing reason. Indeed, among human beings, all Greeks and barbarians—no class anywhere, whether of farmers, nomads, or city-dwellers—can live without being pre-occupied by faith in the Superior Being. Wherefore every nation, whether touching the eastern or western shores, northern or all those toward the south, holds one and the same intuition regarding Him who established the dominion, since His most universal operations have pervaded all things equally. |
| 13.65 Πολὺ δὲ πλέον οἱ παρ’ Ἕλλησι πολυπράγμονες φιλόσοφοι, ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου ὁρμώμενοι φιλοσοφίας, τῷ ἀοράτῳ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ δυνατωτάτῳ καὶ τεχνικωτάτῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλλίστων αἰτιωτάτῳ τὴν προνομίαν ἔδωκαν, τὰ ἀκόλουθα τούτοις, εἰ μὴ κατηχηθεῖεν πρὸς ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ αὐτὸν ὅπως νοεῖσθαι πέφυκε τὸν θεὸν, μόνον δὲ, ὼς ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, κατὰ περίφρασιν ἀληθῆ." | 13.65 But much more did the inquisitive philosophers among the Greeks, setting out from the barbarian philosophy, give priority to the invisible, sole, most powerful, most skillful, and ultimate cause of all other noble things—not understanding the details that follow these things unless instructed by us, nor even how God is by nature to be conceived, but only, as we have already often said, through true circumlocution. |
| 13.66 Τοσαῦτα καὶ ὁ Κλήμης. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ διὰ μακροτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ κατὰ Πλάτωνα παρέστη φιλοσοφία συνῳδὸς οὖσα κατὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς Ἐβραίων δόγμασιν, (ἐφ οἷς καὶ ἀγάμεθα τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εὐγνωμοσύνης, ) ὥρα ἐπιθεωρῆσαι τίνα ταῦτ’ εἶναί φαμεν ἐφ’ ὧν οὐκέθ’ ὁμοίως περὶ αὐτὸν διακείμεθα, τὴν δὲ νενομισμένην βάρβαρον τῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν προτιμῶμεν φιλοσοφίας. | 13.66 So far Clement. But since through longer arguments the philosophy according to Plato has been shown by us to be in agreement on most points with the doctrines of the Hebrews (for which we admire the man for his fairness toward this and other truth), it is time to inspect what those things are on which we no longer stand similarly disposed toward him, but prefer the so-called barbarian philosophy to his. |
Chapter 14
In this chapter, Eusebius contrasts Hebrew scripture with Greek philosophy, arguing that the divine Oracles contain untainted, self-authenticating truth backed by prophecy and fulfillment. By contrast, even the greatest Greek philosopher, Plato, mixed truth with falsehood due to human weakness. Although Plato reached the heights of reason by identifying the Creator, he succumbed to social pressure and fear of death—recommending traditional polytheism, pagan sacrifices, and deference to mythologizing poets whom he elsewhere condemned in The Republic. Eusebius concludes that Plato must be rejected for his hypocrisy and cowardice, while Moses and the Hebrew Oracles should be honored for upholding pure, unwavering truth.
| 14.1 Τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια θεοπρόπια καὶ χρησμοὺς θείας ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον δυνάμεως περιέχοντα, θεόν τε αὐθέντην ἐπιγραφόμενα, καὶ πιστούμενά γε τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν διὰ τῆς τῶν μελλόντων προρρήσεως, διά τε τῶν συμφώνων τοῖς θεσπίσμασιν ἀποτελεσμάτων, πάσης λέγεται διεψευσμένης διανοίας ἐκτὸς τυγχάνειν. Τὰ γοῦν θεῖα λόγια ἁγνά, «καὶ ἀργύριον πεπυρωμένον, δοκίμιον τῇ γῇ, κεκαθαρισμένον ἑπταπλασίως,» ἀνείρηται. | 14.1 The oracles of the Hebrews, containing divine prophecies and revelations beyond human power, claiming God as their author, and validating their promise through the prediction of future events and results in harmony with the divine decrees, are said to be free from all deceptive thought. The divine oracles are indeed called pure, "and silver refined by fire, tested in the earth, purified sevenfold." |
| 14.2 Ἀλλ’ οὐ καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος τοιαῦτα, οὐδὲ μὴν ἑτέρου του τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις σοφῶν, οἳ θνητῆς διανοίας ὄμμασιν ἐπικήροις τε στοχασμοῖς καὶ εἰκασίαις, ὄναρ ὥσπερ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὕπαρ, τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπὶ φαντασίαν ἐλθόντες πολὺ τὸ κρᾶμα τοῦ ψεύδους τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀληθεῖ συνεπηνέγκαντο, ὡς μὴ ἀνευρεῖν ἀπάτης καθαρὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς μάθημα. | 14.2 But such are not the writings of Plato, nor indeed of any other wise man among human beings. For these men, coming only to an illusion of the nature of true reality as if in a dream and not awake—through the eyes of mortal intellect, fragile conjectures, and guesswork—introduced a heavy mixture of falsehood into the truth of nature, so that one cannot find among them any doctrine pure of deceit. |
| 14.3 Αὐτίκα γοῦν βραχύ τι τῆς φιλαυτίας εἰ ἐθελήσαις ὑφεῖναι, καὶ φῶς αὐτὸ δυνάμει λογικῆς οὐσίας ἐπιθεωρῆσαι, γνοίης ἂν τὸν θαυμάσιον φιλόσοφον αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, τὸν δὴ μόνον πάντων Ἑλλήνων ἀληθείας προθύρων ψαύσαντα, ὕλῃ φθαρτῇ καὶ ξοάνοις βαναύσων χερσὶν εἰς ἀνδρείκελον σχῆμα κατεσκευασμένοις τὴν τῶν θεῶν προσηγορίαν καταισχύνοντα, καὶ μετὰ τὸ μέγα τῆς μεγαλοφωνίας ὕψος, δι’ ἧς τὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν εἰδέναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς διετείνατο, ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐξ ὑπερκοσμίων ἁψίδων εἰς τὸν κατωτάτω βυθὸν τῆς θεομισοῦς εἰδωλολατρίας τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων συνωθούμενον· ὡς μὴ διατρέπεσθαι τὸν Σωκράτην καταβῆναι φάντα εἰς Πειραιᾶ προσευξόμενον τῇ θεῷ, καὶ τὴν βάρβαρον ἑορτὴν τοὺς πολίτας τότε πρῶτον ἐπιτελοῦντας θεασόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ θῦσαι ὁμολογοῦντα προστάξαι, τόν τε πάτριον Ἑλλήνων ἐξηγητήν, τὸν ἐγκαθήμενον ἐν Δελφοῖς δαίμονα, θειάζοντα. | 14.3 For instance, if you were willing to set aside self-love for a moment and contemplate the light itself by the power of a rational nature, you would recognize that very marvelous philosopher—the only one among all the Greeks who touched the threshold of truth—shamelessly applying the title of the gods to perishable matter and to wooden images crafted into human form by vulgar hands. You would see him, after the high grandeur of his lofty language in which he asserted that he knew the Father and Creator of this universe, pushed down from somewhere above, from the super-cosmic arches, into the deepest abyss of God-hating idolatry along with the common people of Athens. So unashamed was Socrates to say that he went down to the Piraeus to pray to the goddess and to observe the citizens celebrating the foreign festival for the very first time, and admitting that he ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Asclepius, and attributing divine inspiration to the ancestral interpreter of the Greeks, the demon seated at Delphi. |
| 14.4 Διὸ καὶ εἰκότως τῆς ἀφιλοσόφου πληθύος τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς δεισιδαίμονος πλάνης ἐπιγράψαιτο ἄν. Ἀνάλαβε γοῦν σμικρὸν ἄνωθεν τὸν λόγον, καὶ θέα οἷά σοι ὁ πάνσοφος μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους ἰδέας, καὶ μετὰ θεὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ μετὰ νοερὰς καὶ ἀθανάτους οὐσίας, περὶ τῆς πανδήμου δόξης ἐνομοθέτει, λέγων· | 14.4 Therefore, one might reasonably lay the blame for the superstitious error upon the unphilosophical multitude. Resume the argument, then, a little from above, and observe what things this all-wise man laid down as law concerning popular opinion—after speaking of the incorporeal and imperishable Ideas, after the first God and the second Cause, and after the intellectual and immortal essences—when he said: |
| 14.5 «Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ’ ἡμᾶς· πιστευτέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ που τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν· ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἰκεῖα φασκόντων ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. Οὕτως οὖν κατ’ ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω· Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθὺς ἐγενέσθην, τούτων δὲ Φόρκυς Κρόνος τε καὶ Ῥέα, καὶ ὅσοι μετὰ τούτων, ἐκ δὲ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας Ζεὺς Ἥρα τε καὶ πάντες ὅσους ἴσμεν πάντας ἀδελφοὺς λεγομένους αὐτῶν, ἔτι τε τοὺς τούτων ἄλλους ἐκγόνους.» |
14.5
(Quoting Plato, Timaeus 40d–e)
"To speak concerning the other spirits and to know their origin is beyond our capability. But we must trust those who have spoken before, being offspring of the gods, as they claimed, and who surely knew their own ancestors. It is impossible, therefore, to disbelieve the children of the gods, even though they speak without probable and necessary proofs; rather, since they claim to report their own family affairs, we must trust them in obedience to the law. In this way, then, according to them, let the generation of these gods be understood and described by us: Oceanus and Tethys were born as children of Earth and Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys, Cronus, and Rhea, and all those with them; and from Cronus and Rhea sprang Zeus, Hera, and all those whom we know called their brothers, as well as their other descendants." |
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14.6
Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀπολειπτέος ἡμῖν ὁ φιλόσοφος, οὐ κατὰ φιλόσοφον, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ συμφώνως, τὰς μυθικὰς τῶν ποιητῶν γενεαλογίας καθυποκρινάμενος. Αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀκοῦσαι φάντος ἐν Πολιτείᾳ τάδε·
«Ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. Δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτὸν δύνασθαι τούς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους· ἢ οὐκ οἴει; —Ἔγωγε, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ πάνυ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. —Οὓς Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρος, εἶπον, ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι,» καὶ τὰ μικρῷ πρόσθεν τεθειμένα. |
14.6
On account of these things, then, the philosopher must be abandoned by us—acting unphilosophically and inconsistently with himself by playing the hypocrite toward the mythical genealogies of the poets. For it was possible to hear him saying these things in the Republic:
"In the larger myths," said I, "we shall also see the smaller ones. For the same pattern must be present and have the same power in both the larger and smaller ones; or do you not think so?" "I do," he said; "but I do not quite understand which ones you call the larger." "Those," I said, "which Hesiod and Homer told us, as well as the other poets. For they surely composed false myths for humanity and told them, as they still do..." and what was set down shortly before that. |
| 14.7 Πάλιν τε αὐτοῦ ἦν καὶ τὰ δι’ ὧν ἔφησεν· «Ἐξαλείψομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους ἀρξάμενοι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, “βουλοίμην κ’ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,”» καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς· δι’ ὧν τε ἐπιλέγει· |
14.7
And again, his own words were those through which he said:
"We shall erase, then," said I, "beginning from this verse, all such things: 'I would rather be a serf on the land bound to another man...'" and what follows, through which he adds: |
| 14.8 «Πάλιν δὴ Ὀμήρου δεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν Ἀχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα, ἄλλοτ’ ἐπὶ πλευρὰς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε ὕπτιον,» καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα· οἷς ἐπάγει· |
14.8
"Again, we shall beg Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a goddess, as lying now on his side, and now again on his back,"
and the passages following these; to which he adds: |
| 14.9 «Ἢ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορὼς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο, τούτων πάντων ῥᾳδίως ἐπιλαθόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἰδόντα τὴν Ἥραν, ὥστε μηδ’ εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἐλθεῖν ἐθέλειν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ βουλόμενον χαμαὶ συγγίνεσθαι κορύδου δίκην· καὶ λέγοντα ὡς οὕτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται, ὡς οὐδὲ ὅτε πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας, οὐδὲ Ἄρεος τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμὸν δι’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.» | 14.9 "Nor Zeus, while the other gods and men were sleeping, as the only one awake, easily forgetting all the things he had planned because of his desire for sexual passion, and being so struck upon seeing Hera that he was unwilling even to go into the bedchamber, but wanted to couple with her right there on the ground like a lark; and saying that he was so seized by desire as not even when they first frequented each other, escaping the notice of their dear parents, nor the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus because of other such things." |
| 14.10 Ὧν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἰρημένων, τί δῆτα βούλεται αὐτῷ ἡ μετὰ ταῦτα φωνὴ τοὺς μὲν ποιητὰς θεῶν παῖδας ὀνομάζουσα, καὶ τό τε ἀπιστεῖν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον εἶναι φήσασα, καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων αὐτοὺς ἀποδείξεων τοὺς περὶ θεῶν μύθους πλάσαι μαρτυραμένη; | 14.10 When these things have been said in this manner, what on earth does his subsequent statement mean when he calls the poets children of the gods, declaring it impossible to disbelieve them—even while testifying that they fashioned myths about the gods without probable or necessary proofs? |
| 14.11 Τί δὲ ἡ ἄλογος ἐθέλει πίστις, δέει τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας προβεβλημένη; Πῶς δὲ θεῶν Οὐρανὸς καὶ Γῆ πρῶτοι, ἔπειτα τούτων ἔκγονοι, Ὠκεανὸς καὶ Τηθύς, Κρόνος τε καὶ πάντες οἱ πρὸς Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόδου μυθευόμενοι παῖδες καὶ ἀδελφοὶ καὶ ἔκγονοι τούτων, ὁπότε ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἀνῄρει λέγων· | 14.11 And what does this irrational faith mean, put forward out of fear of punishment from the laws? And how could Heaven and Earth be the primary gods, and then their offspring Oceanus and Tethys, and Cronus, and all the children, brothers, and descendants mythicalized by Homer and Hesiod, when he himself did away with these very things, saying: |
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14.12
«Ὅπερ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, χρὴ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται. —Τί τοῦτο; —Ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων, οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.»
Καὶ πάλιν· «Πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἠσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν,» καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς. |
14.12
(Quoting Plato, Republic 377e)
"Which," said I, "one must first and foremost blame, especially if someone lies improperly." "What is this?" "Whenever someone portrays poorly in speech the nature of gods and heroes—what they are like—just as a painter painting a picture that bears no resemblance to the things he wished to portray as similar." And again: "First of all," said I, "the speaker told the greatest lie about the greatest things dishonorably—how Heaven performed what Hesiod says he did, and how Cronus in turn took vengeance on him," and what follows these. |
| 14.13 Πῶς δὲ οἱ νῦν ψευδεῖς καὶ οὐκ ἀληθεῖς ποιηταὶ πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ θεῶν ἔκγονοι λέγοιντ’ ἄν; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων δὴ χάριν ἀπολειπτέος μὲν ἡμῖν οὗτος, δέει θανάτου τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον καθυποκρινάμενος· τιμητέος δὲ Μωϋσῆς, τά τε Ἑβραίων λόγια καθαρᾶς ἐχεχόμενα διόλου τῆς μόνης ἀληθοῦς καὶ ἀπλανοῦς εὐσεβείας. Θέα δὴ καὶ ἄλλο. | 14.13 And how could these same poets—now deemed false and untrue—be called offspring of the gods again? But indeed, for these very reasons, this man must be abandoned by us, for out of fear of death he played the hypocrite to the Athenian populace. But Moses is to be honored, and the oracles of the Hebrews, which hold fast throughout to the only true and unerring piety. Consider now another point. |
Chapter 15
In this chapter, Eusebius critiques Plato’s metaphysics concerning created, rational beings, contrasting them with Hebrew doctrine. He explains that Hebrews view rational entities (angels, archangels) as created ex nihilo (out of nothing), capable of choosing evil, which accounts for the fall of demons. Plato, however, asserts that rational souls are uncreated emanations from the First Cause, inherently divine and incorruptible, yet he inconsistently claims a separate class of bad demons exists. Eusebius argues that Plato’s model creates a logical contradiction: if demons are emanations of a good source, they cannot be evil; if they are evil, they cannot be uncreated divine emanations. Eusebius concludes that the Hebrew doctrine—where God creates rational beings out of nothing with free will—is the only coherent explanation.
| 15.1 Ἐβραῖοι τὴν μέσην τῶν λογικῶν φύσιν γεννητήν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγέννητον εἶναί φασι. Ταύτην δὲ εἰς νοερὰς οὐσίας διαιροῦντες τῷ λόγῳ πνεύματα καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ θεοῦ λειτουργοὺς ἀγγέλους τε καὶ ἀρχαγγέλους ἐπονομάζουσιν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ἀποπτώσεως καὶ παρατροπῆς τὸ δαιμόνων γένος καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας καὶ μοχθηρᾶς ἐνεργείας εἶδος εἰσάγουσιν. | 15.1 The Hebrews declare that the intermediate nature of rational beings is created, and not uncreated. Dividing this nature in discourse into intellectual essences, they title them spirits, powers, and ministers of God, both angels and archangels; and from their falling away and turning aside, they introduce the race of demons and every form of opposing and evil operation. |
| 15.2 Διόπερ οὐδὲ θεοὺς ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς μὴ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀχώριστον τῆς φύσεως ἐπαγομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτῶν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου ἐπενηνεγμένους, τό τε εὖ εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, αὐτό τε τὸ ἀθάνατον, οὔτε τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ ὁμοίως οὔτε τῷ δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα συνέστη ἐπιφερομένους. | 15.2 Wherefore, they do not permit those beings to be considered gods who do not possess goodness and virtue as inseparable from their nature, but who derive their existence not from themselves, but from the Cause of all things, and who receive well-being, virtue, and immortality itself without bearing them in the same manner as the God over all or Him through whom all things were established. |
| 15.3 Ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων ἀσωμάτους μὲν καὶ νοητὰς οὐσίας τὰς λογικὰς φύσεις Ἑβραίοις ὑφίστησι, διαπίπτει δὲ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγεννήτους εἶναι φάσκων αὐτάς, ὥσπερ καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχήν, ἔπειτα ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου συστῆναι λέγων. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος αὐτὰς γεγονέναι διδόναι βούλεται. | 15.3 Now Plato, like the Hebrews, posits rational natures as incorporeal and intelligible essences, but he falls away from logical consistency: first by declaring them to be uncreated, just like every soul, and then by saying that they subsisted as an emanation from the First Cause. For he is unwilling to grant that they came into being out of non-existence. |
| 15.4 Διὸ καὶ πλειόνων θεῶν ὑποτίθεται εἶναι γένος, ἀπορροίας τινὰς καὶ προβολὰς τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἰτίου τῷ λόγῳ ὑφιστάμενος· εἶναί τε ἀγαθὰς τὴν φύσιν, οὐδαμῶς οἵας τε τῆς οἰκείας ἐκστῆναι ἀρετῆς, ἔνθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι δοξάζει. | 15.4 For this reason he posits that there is a race of multiple gods, defining them logically as certain emanations and projections of the First and Second Causes; and holding that they are good by nature and completely incapable of falling away from their own proper virtue, he consequently considers them to be gods. |
| 15.5 Τούτων δὲ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δαιμόνων φῦλον ἡγεῖται, φαυλότητος ὂν καὶ μοχθηρίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τροπῆς δεκτικόν· ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους εἶναί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεσθαι. Ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὰ Ἑβραίοις δοκοῦντα τοῦτον ὑποθέμενος τὸν τρόπον, οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν ὁπόθεν ὑποστῆναι φάναι εἰκὸς τοὺς δαίμονας. | 15.5 Distinct from these, however, he considers the tribe of demons to exist, being capable of wickedness, malice, and turning toward the worse—some of whom are, and are called, good, and others evil. But having posited these things in this manner contrary to the doctrines of the Hebrews, he fails to explain from where it is reasonable to say that demons originated. |
| 15.6 Ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης οὐδεὶς ἂν νοῦν ἔχων εἴποι· ἄλογος γὰρ αὕτη· λογικὰ δ’ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐξ ἀλόγου τεχθείη, λογικοὶ δὲ οἱ δαίμονες. Εἰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπορροίας οὗτοι, καὶ πῶς οὐ θεοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς γεγεννηκόσιν ἐξ ἴσου; | 15.6 For no person of sound mind would say they come from the matter of bodies, for matter is irrational, and rational beings could never be born from the irrational—and demons are rational. But if these beings come from the emanation of higher entities, how are they not themselves gods equally with those who begat them? |
| 15.7 Πῶς δ’ ἀγαθῆς οὔσης πηγῆς οὐχ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ παρ’ αὐτῆς; Κακίας δ’ ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις ἡ βλάστη πόθεν ἐξέφυ τῆς ῥίζης ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δι’ ἀγαθῶν ἰούσης; Πῶς δ’ ἂν γένοιτο πικρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γλυκέος; Εἰ δὲ δὴ σκότους παντὸς καὶ πικρίας πάσης χαλεπώτερον τὸ τῶν μοχθηρῶν δαιμόνων γένος, πῶς ἐξ ἀπορροίας λέγοιτ’ ἂν τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων φύσεως; Εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῆσδε ἦν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐτράπη τῆς οἰκείας λήξεως· εἰ δ’ ἠλλοίωται, οὐδ’ ἦν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπαθὲς τὴν φύσιν· εἰ δ’ οὐ τοιάδε ἦν, καὶ πῶς θεοὶ εἶεν, οἳ δὴ φαύλης οἷοί τε εἰσὶ μετέχειν μοίρας; | 15.7 And how, if the source is good, are the things proceeding from it not similar? From where did the sprout of vice burst forth among secondary beings if the root came from above out of good things and through good things? How could bitter come from sweet? And if the race of evil demons is harsher than all darkness and all bitterness, how could it be said to come from an emanation of the nature of higher beings? For if it were from that nature, it would not have turned away from its own proper lot; and if it altered, it was not impassible in nature from the beginning; and if it was not of such a nature, how could they be gods who are capable of sharing in an evil portion? |
| 15.8 Ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπορροίας μήτ’ αὖ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης εἶεν, ὥρα ἢ ἀγεννήτους λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ ὕλῃ τῶν σωμάτων τρίτον στῖφος λογικῶν ἀγεννήτων ἀντιπαρατάττειν τῷ θεῷ, οὐκέτι τε τὸν θεὸν πάντων εἶναι ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἀποδιδόναι, ἢ τοῦθ’ ὁμολογοῦντας, καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ποιεῖν αὐτὸν τοῖς Ἑβραίων συμφώνως ὁμολογεῖν λόγοις. | 15.8 On the other hand, if they are neither an emanation of higher beings nor again from the matter of bodies, it is time either to declare them uncreated and—alongside the uncreated matter of bodies—to array a third band of uncreated rational entities against God, no longer attributing to God that He is the Maker of all things and Creator of the universe; or, admitting this, to agree with the doctrines of the Hebrews that He creates out of things that do not exist. |
| 15.9 Τίνα δὲ οἵδε περὶ τούτων ἐκδιδάσκουσιν; Τὴν μέσην τῶν λογικῶν φύσιν οὔτ’ ἐκ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὕλης οὔτ’ ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχούσης οὐσίας ὑποστῆναί φασι· μὴ οὖσαν δὲ πρότερον δυνάμει δραστηρίῳ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου γεγονέναι. | 15.9 And what do the Hebrews teach concerning these things? They say that the intermediate nature of rational beings subsisted neither from the matter of bodies nor as an emanation from the uncreated essence that is always the same and in the same state; but that, not existing previously, it came into being by the active power of the Cause of all things. |
| 15.10 Ταύτῃ τε μὴ θεοὺς εἶναι, μηδὲ κυρίως τῆσδε τῆς προσηγορίαν ἠξιῶσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ τὴν φύσιν ἰσοῦται τῷ πεποιηκότι, μηδ’ ἀχώριστον ὁμοίως τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφέλκεται, τό τε τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ δέξοιτ’ ἂν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τῆς περὶ τὸ κρεῖττον σχολῆς, ἣν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὐτῷ κατείργασται, τῆς οἰκείας ὁρμῆς τε καὶ γνώμης πεφυκὼς κύριος. Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τάδε. Μετίωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ ἕτερα. | 15.10 And for this reason they are not gods, nor are they strictly deemed worthy of this title, because they are neither equal in nature to their Maker, nor do they possess goodness inseparably in the same manner as God. Rather, a rational being may sometimes receive what is opposed to the good through neglect of devotion to the higher, which each one works out for himself, being by nature master of his own impulse and will. So much for these matters. Let us now move on to other topics. |
Chapter 16
In this chapter, Eusebius critiques Plato’s doctrine of the soul. While Eusebius acknowledges that Plato correctly held the soul to be immortal and like God, he argues that Plato severely contradicted himself. Eusebius quotes long selections from Plato’s dialogues—including the Timaeus (on the soul's composite creation), the Phaedo and Phaedrus (on the soul's transmigration into animal forms), the Republic (the Myth of Er and the choice of lives), and the Gorgias (post-mortem judgment and eternal punishment in Tartarus). Eusebius argues that Plato’s theory of metempsychosis (souls choosing animal lives based on desire/habit) irreconcilably clashes with his theory of divine judgment and eternal punishment in Hades.
| 16.1 Ἑβραίοις ὁμοίως τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ὑποθέμενος, καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὁμοίαν αὐτὴν εἰπών, οὐκέτ’ ἀκολούθως αὐτοῖς ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν σύνθετον εἶναί φησιν, ὡς ἂν μέρος μέν τι ἐπαγομένης τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης αἰτίας, καὶ μέρος περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς φύσεως. | 16.1 Though Plato, like the Hebrews, posited that the soul is immortal and said that it is like God, he no longer follows them consistently when he claims that its essence is sometimes composite—as though it brought along one part from the indivisible and ever-changeless cause, and another part from the nature that is divided among bodies. |
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16.2
λέγει δ’ οὖν αὐτοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ·
«Ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομένου, συνεστήσατο ἐκ τῶνδε καὶ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ.» |
16.2
At any rate, he speaks in these very words in the Timaeus:
"And God constructed the soul prior to and older than the body in both origin and excellence, as a mistress and ruler over that which is to be ruled, out of the following elements and in the following way: From the indivisible and ever-changeless essence, and again from that which becomes divided among bodies, he mixed in the middle a third form of essence out of both—belonging to the nature of the Same and to that of the Other—and thus constructed it in the middle between the indivisible element of them and the element divided among bodies. And taking these three existing things, he mixed them all into one form, harmonizing by force the nature of the Other, which was hard to mix, into the Same." |
| 16.3 Ἔνθεν εἰκότως αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῇ συνῆπται. ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ὧδε περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας διείληφε, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλο τι χεῖρον περιτίθησιν αὐτῇ ἀτόπημα, τὴν θείαν ἐκείνην καὶ οὐράνιον, τὴν ἀσώματον καὶ λογικήν, τὴν θεῷ ὁμοίαν καὶ δι’ ἀρετῆς μέγεθος τὰς οὐρανίους ὑπερπαίουσαν ἀψῖδας, ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἐκ τῶν ὑπερκοσμίων ἐπὶ ὄνους καὶ λύκους καὶ μύρμηκας καὶ μελίττας κατιέναι φάσκων, καὶ τούτ’ ᾦ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς παρακαλῶν τῷ λόγῳ ἄνευ τινὸς ἀποδείξεως. | 16.3 Hence, reasonably enough according to his account, the passive element was joined to the soul's essence. But while he at times treated the soul's essence in this manner, at other times he attached another and worse absurdity to it: claiming that this divine, heavenly, incorporeal, and rational entity—which is like God and through the greatness of virtue surpasses the heavenly vaults—comes down from somewhere above out of the supracosmic realms into donkeys, wolves, ants, and bees, calling on us to trust this assertion without any proof. |
| 16.4 λέγει δ’ οὖν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς τάδε· «Καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα. ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἤθη, ὁποῖ’ ἄττ’ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν βίῳ.» |
16.4
At any rate, in the dialogue On the Soul [Phaedo], he says the following:
"And indeed they wander until, by the desire for the corporeal element that continuously accompanies them, they are bound once again into a body. And, as is natural, they are bound into such characters as they happen to have practiced during life." |
| 16.5 «Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;» «Οἷον τοὺς μὲν τὰς γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβουμένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;» «Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.» | 16.5 "What kind of habits do you mean, Socrates?" "For example, those who have practiced gluttony, insolence, and heavy drinking, and have taken no precautions, are likely to enter into the species of donkeys and such beasts; or do you not think so?" "What you say is indeed very likely." |
| 16.6 «Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσε φαῖμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;» «Ἀμέλει,» ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, «εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.» «Οὐκοῦν,» ἦ δ’ ός, «δῆλα δὴ καὶ τἄλλα, ᾗ ἑκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;» | 16.6 "And those who have preferred injustice, tyrannies, and plunder enter into the species of wolves, hawks, and kites. Or where else should we say such souls go?" "Unquestionably," said Cebes, "into such as these." "Is it not clear, then," he said, "where the rest go as well, each going according to the likenesses of their own practice?" |
| 16.7 «Δῆλον δή,» ἔφη· «πῶς δ’ οὔ;» «Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι,» ἔφη, «καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;» «Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;» «Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἤπου μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς αὐτό γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.» | 16.7 "It is clear, of course," he said; "how could it not be?" "Are not those among them the happiest," he said, "and going to the best place, who have practiced popular and civic virtue—which they call temperance and justice—arising from habit and practice, without philosophy and reason?" "Are these then the happiest?" "Because it is natural for these to return again into such a civic and gentle species, perhaps of bees, wasps, or ants, or even back into the human species itself." |
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16.8
Καὶ ἐν τῷ Φαιδρῷ δὲ ἐπάκουσον ὁποῖα διέξεισιν·
«Εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας. αὗται δὲ τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεῖ, ἐὰν ἕλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῷ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον· κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην τίνουσιν, αἱ δ’ εἰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τινὰ τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὗ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου, αἱροῦνται ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἑκάστη. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ ἀφικνεῖται καὶ ἐκ θηρίου, ὅς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον.» |
16.8
And listen to what he expounds in the Phaedrus:
"For the soul does not return to the same place from which it came for ten thousand years; for it does not grow wings before such a time, except for the soul of one who has practiced philosophy without guile, or loved boys with philosophy. These, in the third thousand-year period, if they choose this life three times in succession, become winged in this way and depart in the three-thousandth year. But the others, when they finish their first life, undergo judgment; and once judged, some go to the places of punishment beneath the earth and pay the penalty, while others, raised up by justice to a certain place in heaven, pass their time in a manner worthy of the life they lived in human form. But in the thousandth year, both groups arrive for the drawing of lots and the choice of their second life, and each chooses whichever it wishes. There indeed a human soul may arrive into the life of a beast, and from a beast—one that was once a human—it returns again into a human." |
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16.9
Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν Φαιδρῷ· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τοιάδε γράφοντος ἄκουε·
«Ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔφη ψυχὴν τήν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἱρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ’ ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι. ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνος ἑλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. |
16.9
These things are in the Phaedrus. But hear what he writes in the Republic:
"For he said he saw the soul that was once Orpheus choosing the life of a swan, out of hatred for womankind because of his death at their hands, refusing to be born conceived in a woman. And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing that of a nightingale; and he saw a swan changing to the choice of a human life, and other musical animals likewise, as was natural. |
| 16.10 τὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἑλέσθαι λέοντος βίον, εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὅπλων κρίσεως. τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ἐχθρὰν καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχήν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δὲ ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην. | 16.10 And the soul that drew its lot chose the life of a lion—this was the soul of Ajax son of Telamon, fleeing from becoming a man because it remembered the judgment of the armor. The soul after him was Agamemnon's, which, also out of hatred for the human race on account of its sufferings, changed to the life of an eagle. Drawing a lot in the middle, the soul of Atalanta, beholding the great honors of an athletic man, was unable to pass it by, but took it. After her, he saw the soul of Epeius son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a craftswoman; and far off among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Thersites putting on an ape." |
| 16.11 κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην, αἱρησομένην ἰέναι· μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου καὶ ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὑρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἂν ἔπραξε καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἑλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἥμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μίξεις μίγνυσθαι.» | 16.11 "And by chance, the soul of Odysseus drew the very last lot of all and came forward to choose; through memory of its former labors, having cooled its ambition, it went around searching for a long time for the life of an ordinary, quiet man, and with difficulty found one lying somewhere neglected by the others. Upon seeing it, the soul said it would have done the same even if it had drawn the first lot, and gladly chose it. And in the same way, souls pass from the other beasts into humans and into one another—the unjust changing into wild beasts and the just into gentle ones, undergoing every kind of mixture." |
| 16.12 Τοσαῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Πλάτων εἰπὼν δῆλός ἐστιν αἰγυπτιάζων τῷ δόγματι· οὐ γὰρ Ἑβραίων ὁ λόγος, ὅτι μηδὲ ἀληθείᾳ φίλος. τοῦτο δ’ οὐ καιρὸς ἀπελέγχειν, ὅτι μηδ’ αὐτὸς δι’ ἀποδείξεων ἐνεχείρησε τῷ προβλήματι. τοσοῦτον δ’ εὐλόγως τις ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο, ὡς οὐκ ἦν σύμφωνα τὸν αὐτὸν λέγειν ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαττομένας δίκας εἰς Ἅιδου ὧν ἔδρασαν διδόναι κἀκεῖσε τιμωρεῖσθαι εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ πάλιν φάσκειν αὐτὰς τοὺς ἐνταῦθα βίους κατὰ γνώμην οἰκείαν αἱρεῖσθαι. | 16.12 Having said so much concerning the soul, Plato is clearly adopting Egyptian doctrine; for this teaching does not belong to the Hebrews, nor is it a friend to truth. Now is not the time to refute this, since he himself did not attempt the problem by means of proofs. But one might reasonably point out this much: that it was inconsistent for the same author to say both that at death the souls of the ungodly departing from here pay penalties in Hades for what they did and are punished there forever, and then again to claim that they choose their lives here according to their own inclination. |
| 16.13 ἐνδεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτάς φησιν εἰς σῶμα ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς· καὶ τὰς μὲν ὕβρει καὶ γαστριμαργίᾳ ἐντραφείσας ὄνους γίνεσθαι, θηρίων τε ἄλλων ὑποδύνειν σώματα, κατὰ γνώμην, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ δίκην ταῦτα αἱρουμένας· τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους καὶ ἅρπαγας λύκους καὶ ἰκτῖνας γίγνεσθαι, ἐθελοντὰς ἐπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐλθόντας. εἶτα Ὀρφέως μὲν ψυχὴν κύκνον εἶναι θελῆσαι· Θαμύρου δὲ ἀηδόνος, Θερσίτην δὲ πιθήκου βίον ἑλέσθαι. | 16.13 For he says that they are bound into a body through desire for the corporeal: those brought up in insolence and gluttony become donkeys, and enter the bodies of other beasts, choosing these by inclination and not by judgment; while the unjust and rapacious become wolves and kites, coming to this voluntarily. Then again, the soul of Orpheus wanted to be a swan, Thamyras a nightingale, and Thersites chose the life of an ape. |
| 16.14 ποῦ δ’ ἂν εἴη τὰ τῆς μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαγὴν κρίσεως, ἣν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπογράφων φησὶν, ὡς «Ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἷ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει... καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκε, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος. οἳ δ’ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.» |
16.14
Where then would be the judgment that follows departure from here, which he outlines in the dialogue On the Soul [Phaedo], saying:
"When the deceased arrive at the place to which their guardian spirit brings each one... those who seem to have lived an average life, traveling to Acheron and embarking on such transports as they have, arrive on these at the lake, and there they dwell; and being purified and paying the penalty for their wrongdoings, they are acquitted if anyone has done any wrong, and each receives honors for his good deeds according to his merit. But those who seem to be incurable because of the magnitude of their sins—having committed many great acts of sacrilege or many unjust and unlawful murders, or whatever else of that kind there may be—these are cast by fitting fate into Tartarus, whence they never emerge." |
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16.15
Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὧδέ πῃ διῆλθε. περὶ δὲ τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐπάκουσον ὥς φησι·
«Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε καμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.» |
16.15
And in some such way he set forth the fate of the ungodly. But concerning the pious, listen to what he says:
"And of these themselves, those who have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live entirely without hardship for all future time, and arrive at even fairer dwellings than these, which it is neither easy to describe nor is time sufficient in the present." |
| 16.16 Καὶ ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ δὲ πρόσχες τί καί φησι· «Τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεως τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι... οἱ δ’ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα.» |
16.16
Pay attention also to what he says in the Gorgias:
"The man who has lived life justly and holily, when he dies, departs to the Islands of the Blessed to dwell in total happiness apart from evils; but he who has lived unjustly and godlessly goes to the prison-house of retribution and justice, which they call Tartarus... And those who have committed the ultimate wrongs and because of such crimes have become incurable—from these examples are made. These themselves no longer profit, being incurable, but others profit who behold them suffering the greatest, most painful, and most fearful passions for all time because of their sins, hanging there explicitly as examples in the prison in Hades, as sights and warnings for the unjust who continuously arrive." |
| 16.17 Ταῦτα πῶς ἂν δύναιτο συνᾴδειν τοῖς περὶ ἀμοιβῆς σωμάτων, ἃ τὴν ψυχὴν μετιοῦσαν αἱρεῖσθαι φάσκουσι, λόγοις; πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρίας καὶ δεσμωτήρια καὶ τοσαύτην δίκην εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε τελευτὴν ὑφέξει, καὶ πάλιν οἵα τις ἀνειμένη καὶ δεσμῶν ἐλευθέρα βίους ἕλοιτ’ ἂν οὓς ἂν ἐθέλῃ; εἰ δὲ τὰ καθ’ ἡδονὴν μέλλοι πάλιν αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῦ τὸ τῆς τίσεως τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον; μυρία δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἐπιλάβοιτ’ ἂν τοῦ λόγου, ὧν οὐ καιρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν μηκύνειν. | 16.17 How could these statements accord with his arguments concerning the exchange of bodies, which claim that the soul chooses as it goes along? For how could the same soul undergo punishments, prisons, and such severe retribution for all time after death here, and then again—as if released and free from bonds—choose whatever lives it wishes? And if it is going to choose again according to pleasure, where then is the prison-house of retribution and justice? One could pick at a thousand other things in his argument at leisure, but this is not the time to lengthen our discussion. |
| 16.18 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίσθημα τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ τῶνδε δόξης ταύτῃ πῃ πέφανται· τὸ δ’ ἕτερον τῆς τοῦ δόγματος διασκευῆς, δι’ οὗ τὸ μέν τι θεῖον καὶ λογικὸν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δέ τι μέρος αὐτῆς ἄλογον καὶ παθητικὸν τυγχάνειν ὡρίσατο, καὶ πρὸς τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων κατέγνωσται, ὡς μαθεῖν ἔνεστιν ἀπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων· | 16.18 And so the first slip of Plato's doctrine concerning these matters has been exposed in this way; while the second aspect of his doctrine's elaboration—through which he defined one part of the soul as divine and rational, and another part of it as irrational and passive—has been condemned even by his own acquaintances, as can be learned from the following arguments: |
Chapter 17
Eusebius presents an extract from Severus the Platonist's treatise On the Soul (Περὶ ψυχῆς). Severus critiques Plato’s doctrine (expressed in the Timaeus) that God created the soul out of a mixture of impassible (indivisible) and passible (divisible/corporeal) substances. Severus argues:
If the soul is composed of opposing natures (like a intermediate color blended from black and white), then over time those opposite elements must naturally separate, causing the soul to dissolve and perish (making it mortal rather than immortal).
Therefore, the soul cannot be a composite of two opposing elements; it must be a simple, incorporeal, and naturally impassible substance.
Platonists/philosophers must avoid both the Materialist error (holding the soul to be corporeal/mortal due to its passions) and Plato’s error (forcing a passible thread into an impassible nature to explain passions).
| 17.1 Περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα ψυχῆς, ἥν φησιν ἐξ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ παθητῆς οὐσίας συστῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τῶν μέσων τι χρωμάτων, ἐκεῖνα ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη χρόνῳ διαστάσεως αὐτῶν γιγνομένης ἀφανισθῆναι αὐτήν, ὡς τὴν τοῦ μέσου χρώματος σύστασιν, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἑκάστου, ἐξ ὧν συνέστη, ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει χωριζομένου. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, φθαρτὴν ἀποφανοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχήν. | 17.1 Concerning the soul according to Plato—which he claims was constructed by God out of an impassible and a passible substance, like an intermediate color formed from white and black—we have this to say: when separation of these elements occurs in time, the soul must necessarily disappear, just like the composition of an intermediate color, as each of the elements out of which it was constituted naturally separates over time to its own proper sphere. And if this is so, we shall demonstrate that the soul is corruptible, and not immortal. |
| 17.2 εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται, μηδὲν τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὄντων ἄνευ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἶναι, τά τε ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων φύσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκοσμῆσθαι, φιλίαν αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ πρὸς τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ πρὸς τὸ ψυχρόν, τῷ τε βαρεῖ πρὸς τὸ κοῦφον, λευκῷ τε πρὸς τὸ μέλαν, γλυκεῖ τε πρὸς τὸ πικρόν, σκληρῷ τε πρὸς τὸ μαλακόν, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις μίαν ἄλλην πάντων κοινωνίαν, τῆς τε ἀπαθοῦς οὐσίας πρὸς τὴν παθητήν—τὰ δὲ κραθέντα καὶ μιχθέντα χωρισμὸν τὸν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει ἐπιδέχεται—ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἀπαθοῦς καὶ παθητῆς οὐσίας γεγονέναι ὑποκείσεται, ἀνάγκη ὡς τὸ μέσον χρῶμα οὕτω καὶ ταύτην ἐν χρόνῳ φύσει ἀφανισθῆναι, τῶν ἐν τῇ συστάσει αὐτῆς ἐναντίων ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἐπειγομένων. | 17.2 For if this is agreed—that nothing among existing things in nature exists without its opposite, and that the things in the universe were arranged by God out of the nature of opposites, He having produced friendship and communion among them (such as dry with moist, hot with cold, heavy with light, white with black, sweet with bitter, hard with soft, and for all such things another single communion of all things, namely of impassible substance with passible substance); and if things that have been blended and mixed naturally undergo separation from one another in time; and if it be posited that the soul is made of impassible and passible substance—then, just like the intermediate color, it necessarily follows that the soul too disappears naturally in time, as the opposites within its composition hasten toward their own proper nature. |
| 17.3 ἦ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὸ φύσει βαρύ, κἂν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἤ τινος ἔξωθεν φυσικῆς προσγενομένης αὐτῷ κουφότητος ἄνω φέρηται, ὡς αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν κάτω βιάζεται; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ φύσει κοῦφον κατὰ τὰς ὁμοίας ἔξωθεν αἰτίας κάτω φερόμενον, ὡς αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω βιάζεται; τὰ γὰρ ἐκ δύο τινῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐναντίων εἰς ταὐτὸν συναχθέντα ἀδύνατον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι, μὴ τρίτου τινὸς τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐνόντος αὐτοῖς. | 17.3 For do we not see that even that which is heavy by nature, even if it be borne upward by us or by some external natural lightness added to it, nevertheless forces its way downward toward its own proper nature? And likewise that which is light by nature, when borne downward through similar external causes, forces its way upward? For it is impossible that things brought together into one from two mutually opposite elements should remain forever in the same state, unless some third thing belonging to the essence of real beings were continually present within them. |
| 17.4 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι ψυχὴ τρίτον τι πρᾶγμα ἐκ δύο ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις σύνθετον, ἁπλοῦν δὲ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ φύσει ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀσώματον· ὅθεν Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι. | 17.4 But indeed, the soul is not some third compound object made of two elements mutually opposed to each other, but is simple, and by its very nature impassible and incorporeal; whence Plato and those after him declared it to be immortal. |
| 17.5 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος κοινός ἐστι πάντων λόγος γεγονέναι, τὰ δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄνευ σώματος ἑκουσίως καὶ ἀκουσίως γιγνόμενα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι λέγεται, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τούτῳ τεκμαιρόμενοι παθητὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, θνητὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ σωματοειδῆ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀσώματον. | 17.5 But since it is a common principle among all that man is composed of soul and body, and since the passions occurring within us—both voluntarily and involuntarily without direct body involvement—are said to belong to the soul, the majority of people, inferring from this that its essence is passible, declare it to be mortal and corporeal, but not incorporeal. |
| 17.6 ὁ δὲ Πλάτων τῷ φύσει αὐτῆς ἀπαθεῖ προσηναγκάσθη τὴν παθητὴν οὐσίαν προσυφᾶναι. ὅτι δὲ μηδετέρως ἔχει, ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι εἰρήκασιν, Πλάτων τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, πειρασόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνεργούσας δυνάμεις παραθέντες, προσβιβάσαι. | 17.6 Plato, on the other hand, was forced to weave a passible substance onto its naturally impassible nature. But that neither account holds true—neither from what Plato nor from what the others have said—we shall attempt in our argument to demonstrate, setting forth the faculties that operate within us. |
| 17.7 Ταῦτά μοι ἀπὸ τῶν Σεβήρου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ Περὶ ψυχῆς προκείσθω. σκέψαι δὲ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδε περὶ τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φωστήρων ἀρχῆς. | 17.7 Let these extracts from On the Soul by Severus the Platonist be set forth by me. In addition to what has been said, consider also the following concerning the origin of the heaven and the luminaries within it. |
Chapter 18
In this chapter, Eusebius examines Plato's views on the cosmos, heavenly bodies, and spiritual entities, comparing them to Hebrew (biblical) theology. He notes that while Plato correctly acknowledges the universe as created by a single primary cause, Plato errs by assigning divine status and worship to created elements (the stars, sky, and air-dwelling daemons). Eusebius contrasts this with the Mosaic law—supported by Philo of Alexandria—which forbids worshipping the created order and directs all adoration to the transcendent Creator. Eusebius concludes by expressing deep admiration for Plato despite these shortcomings, noting that his purpose is comparative rather than malicious.
| 18.1 Συμφώνως Ἑβραίοις καὶ τὸν περὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φαινομένων ἀποδοὺς λόγον, καθ’ ὃν γεννητὰ εἶναι πρὸς τοῦ τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου πεποιημένα μετέχειν τε τῆς σωματικῆς καὶ φθαρτῆς οὐσίας συνέστη, οὐκέθ’ ὁμοίως Ἑβραίοις σέβειν αὐτὰ νομοθετεῖ καὶ θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, ὧδε φάσκων ἐν Ἐπινομίδι· | 18.1 Although Plato accounts for the heaven and the phenomena within it in agreement with the Hebrews—holding that they are generated, made by the Cause of all things, and partake of a corporeal and perishable nature—he no longer legislates, as do the Hebrews, against worshipping them and considering them gods, speaking thus in the Epinomis: |
| 18.2 «Τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὦ Μέγιλλε καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιότατον, ὡς ξύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν.» | 18.2 "What god, Megillus and Cleinias, should I extol in speaking? Very likely the Heaven, which it is most just—as all other spirits and gods do—to honor and pray to in an extraordinary manner. And that it has become the cause of all other good things for us, we would all agree." |
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18.3
Εἶθ’ ὑποβὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ προστίθησι ταῦτα·
«Θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατούς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιωτάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὁρῶντας πάντῃ, τοὺς πρώτους τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν λεκτέον, καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἑξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἕδραν τρίτην καὶ μέσην, τῆς ἑρμηνείας αἴτιον, εὐχαῖς τιμᾶν μάλα χρεὼν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.» |
18.3
Then, proceeding further in the same work, he adds these words:
"As for the visible gods, greatest, most honorable, and everywhere most keen-sighted, we must state that the primary ones are the nature of the stars, and whatever else we perceive coming into being along with them. And after these, and beneath them in order, are the daemons—an aerial race occupying the third and middle place, responsible for interpretation—whom it is very necessary to honor with prayers for the sake of a favorable passage." |
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18.4
Διὰ τούτων θεοὺς εἰπὼν εἶναι τοὺς δηλωθέντας, περὶ τῆς πρώτης αὐτῶν συστάσεως φυσιολογῶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ τάδε διεξέρχεται·
«Ὅτι πῦρ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦτο ἀὴρ πρὸς ὕδωρ, καὶ ὅτι ἀὴρ πρὸς ὕδωρ, τοῦτο ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν γῆν, ξυνέδησε καὶ ξυνεστήσατο οὐρανὸν ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτόν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων τοιούτων καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τεσσάρων τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα ἐγεννήθη δι’ ἀναλογίας ὁμολογῆσαν, φιλίαν τε ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, ὥστ’ εἰς ταὐτὸν αὑτῷ ξυνελθὸν ἄλυτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνδήσαντος γενέσθαι.» |
18.4
Having declared through these passages that the aforementioned are gods, in discussing their initial constitution naturalistically in the Timaeus, he expounds as follows:
"As fire is to air, so is air to water; and as air is to water, so is water to earth—thus did he bind together and construct a visible and tangible heaven. And for these reasons, out of such elements—four in number—the body of the world was generated, brought into agreement by proportion; and from these it gained friendship, so that having come together into unity with itself, it is indestructible by any other except by the one who bound it together." |
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18.5
Εἶτ’ ἐπιλέγει·
«Ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινε καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψε, καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησε.» |
18.5
Then he adds:
"And having placed the soul in its center, he extended it through the whole, and further wrapped the body on the outside with it; and setting the heaven turning in a circle, he established it as one single solitary entity." |
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18.6
Καὶ πάλιν ὑποβὰς ἐπιφέρει λέγων·
«Ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, ἵνα γενηθῇ χρόνος, ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρα, ἐπίκλην ἔχοντα πλάνητες, εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονεν· σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφοράς, ἃς ἡ θατέρου περίοδος ᾔει.» |
18.6
And again, proceeding further, he adds saying:
"Out of such design and intention of God, then, regarding the generation of time—in order that time might be brought into being—the sun, moon, and five other stars (bearing the name 'planets') came into existence for the defining and guarding of the numbers of time. And having made the bodies of each of them, God placed them in the orbits through which the circuit of the other moved." |
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18.7
Καὶ ἐπιλέγει·
«Δεσμοῖς τε ἐμψύχοις σώματα δεθέντα ζῷα τό τε προσταχθὲν ἔμαθεν.» |
18.7
And he adds:
"And bodies bound with living bonds became living beings and learned that which was commanded." |
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18.8
Καὶ ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς ἀποφαίνεται λέγων ὧδε·
«Μεταβάλλει μέντοιγε πάνθ’ ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν· μεταβαλόντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον· μικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβαλόντα ἐλάττω κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα μεταπεσόντα εἰς βάθος.» |
18.8
And in the tenth book of the Laws, he declares universally regarding every soul, speaking thus:
"All things that partake of soul change, possessing within themselves the cause of their change; and having changed, they move according to the order and law of destiny. Those that change less in character move across a smaller distance upon the surface of the realm, while those that fall further into injustice sink into the depths." |
| 18.9 Εἰ δὴ οὖν μεταβάλλει πάνθ’ ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν, οὐρανὸς δὲ καὶ ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν Πλάτωνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρα μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. πῶς οὖν πάλιν ἀιδίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεούς φησι, καίπερ ἐν σώματι φθαρτῷ ὄντας καὶ λυθῆναι οἴους τε; | 18.9 If, then, all things that partake of soul change, possessing within themselves the cause of change, and the heaven, sun, and moon partake of soul according to Plato himself, then these too would change, possessing in themselves the cause of change according to his own argument. How then, on the other hand, can he say that they are eternal and therefore gods, even though they exist in a perishable body and are capable of being dissolved? |
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18.10
Λέγει δ’ οὖν πάλιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ·
«Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ ἔσχον γένεσιν, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας τάδε· θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἄλυτα ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν· τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ λύειν ἐθέλειν κακοῦ. δι’ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστέ, οὐδ’ ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν· οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες ἐκείνων οἷς ὅτε ἐγίγνεσθε ξυνεθεῖσθε.» |
18.10
At any rate, he says again in the Timaeus:
"When all the gods—both those who revolve visibly and those who appear as far as they wish—had come into being, the Creator of this universe spoke to them as follows: 'O gods of gods, whose creator and father I am, the works created by me are indissoluble without my consent. Now, everything that is bound can be dissolved; yet to wish to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and well-conditioned is the mark of an evil nature. Wherefore, since you have come into being, you are not entirely immortal nor indissoluble; yet you shall by no means be dissolved, nor shall you meet with the fate of death, having obtained in my will a bond even greater and more sovereign than those by which you were bound when you came into being.'" |
| 18.11 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. εἰκότως δῆτα Μωσῆς καὶ τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια σέβειν μὲν ἀπαγορεύει ταῦτα καὶ θεοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄνω δὲ πρὸς τὸν παμβασιλέα θεὸν ἀνάγοντα, αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων ὅλου τε οὐρανοῦ καὶ κόσμου δημιουργόν, τὸν δὴ τὰ πάντα θείῳ λόγῳ συνδήσαντά τε καὶ συναρμοσάμενον, μόνον ἡγεῖσθαι θεόν, καὶ μόνῳ τὴν σεβάσμιον ἀπονέμειν νομοθετεῖ τιμήν, λέγων· «μήποτε ἰδὼν τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας, καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πλανηθεὶς προσκυνήσῃς αὐτοῖς.» | 18.11 Thus speaks Plato. Fittingly, then, Moses and the oracles of the Hebrews forbid worshipping these and considering them gods. Leading us upward to the King of all, God—the very Creator of the sun, moon, stars, and the entire heaven and world, who bound together and harmonized all things by His divine Word—Moses legislates to consider Him alone as God, and to render the reverent honor to Him alone, saying: "Lest, when you look up to the sun, moon, stars, and all the host of heaven, you be led astray and worship them." |
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18.12
Ἑρμηνεύει δὲ ταῦτα διασαφῶν εἰς πλάτος ὁ τὰ Ἑβραίων πεπαιδευμένος Φίλων ὧδέ πῃ λέγων πρὸς λέξιν·
«Τινὲς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας ὑπέλαβον εἶναι θεοὺς αὐτοκράτορας, οἷς τὰς τῶν γιγνομένων ἁπάντων αἰτίας ἀνέθεσαν. Μωσεῖ δ’ ὁ κόσμος ἔδοξεν εἶναι καὶ γεννητός, καὶ πόλις ἡ μεγίστη ἄρχοντας ἔχουσα καὶ ὑπηκόους· ἄρχοντας μὲν τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ πάντας, οἷον πλάνητας καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· ὑπηκόους δὲ τὰς μετὰ σελήνην ἐν ἀέρι καὶ περιγείους φύσεις. |
18.12
Philo, well-educated in Hebrew lore, interprets these matters in detail, speaking to this effect word-for-word:
"Some have supposed the sun, moon, and other stars to be sovereign gods, to whom they attribute the causes of everything that comes to be. But to Moses, the world appeared to be created and generated, like a vast city possessing rulers and subjects: the rulers being all those in heaven, such as the planets and fixed stars, and the subjects being the post-lunar natures in the air and around the earth. |
| 18.13 Τοὺς δὲ λεχθέντας ἄρχοντας οὐκ αὐτεξουσίους, ἀλλ’ ἑνὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς ὑπάρχους, οὐ μιμουμένους τὴν ἐπιστασίαν κατορθοῦν, πρυτανεύοντος κατὰ δίκην καὶ νόμον ἕκαστον τῶν γεγονότων· τοὺς δὲ μὴ βλέποντας τὸν ἐπιβεβηκότα ἡνίοχον τοῖς ὑπεζευγμένοις, ὡς αὐτουργοῖς τῶν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων, ἀνάψαι τὰς αἰτίας. ὧν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ὁ ἱερώτατος νομοθέτης εἰς ἐπιστήμην μεθαρμόζεται λέγων ὧδε· “μήποτε ἰδὼν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πλανηθεὶς προσκυνήσῃς.” | 18.13 The aforementioned rulers, however, are not independent, but are lieutenants of the one Father of all; they do not rule by imitating arbitrary power, but carry out their stewardship while He governs each created thing according to justice and law. But those who fail to see the charioteer standing over the harnessed team attribute the causes of world events to the instruments themselves as if they were independent agents. The most holy lawgiver converts their ignorance into knowledge, speaking thus: 'Lest, when you see the sun, moon, stars, and all the host of heaven, you be led astray and worship them.' |
| 18.14 Εὐθυβόλως πάνυ καὶ καλῶς πλάνον εἶπε τὴν τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς θεῶν ἀποδοχήν. οἱ γὰρ ἰδόντες ἡλίου μὲν προσόδοις καὶ ἀναχωρήσεσι τὰς ἐτησίους ὥρας συνισταμένας, ἐν αἷς αἱ ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις ὡρισμέναις χρόνων περιόδοις τελεσφοροῦνται, σελήνην δ’ ὑπηρέτιν καὶ διάδοχον ἡλίου νύκτωρ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ προστασίαν ἀνειληφυῖαν ὧν μεθ’ ἡμέραν ἥλιος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τἀπίγεια συμπάθειαν μυρία τῶν ἐπὶ διαμονῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἐνεργοῦντάς τε καὶ δρῶντας, πλάνον ἐπλανήθησαν ἀνήνυτον, μόνους εἶναι τούτους θεοὺς ὑποτοπήσαντες. | 18.14 Very accurately and well did he call the acceptance of these created things as gods a 'wandering.' For those who saw the annual seasons constituted by the approaches and retreats of the sun—wherein the generations of animals, plants, and fruits reach fruition in fixed periods of time—and saw the moon as a servant and successor to the sun by night, taking charge of what the sun managed by day, and saw the other stars acting in sympathy with earthly things for the preservation of the universe, wandered into an endless maze by suspecting these alone to be gods. |
| 18.15 Εἰ δ’ ἐσπούδασαν διὰ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς βαδίζειν ὁδοῦ, κἂν εὐθὺς ἔγνωσαν ὅτι καθάπερ αἴσθησις ὑποδιάκονος νοῦ γέγονε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ οἱ αἰσθητοὶ πάντες ὑπηρέται τοῦ νοητοῦ συνέστησαν.» | 18.15 Yet if they had striven to walk along the un-wandering path, they would immediately have recognized that just as sensory perception is an assistant to the mind, in the exact same way all sensible things were established as servants of the intelligible." |
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18.16
Καὶ ἐπάγει λέγων·
«Ὥστ’ ὑπερβάντες τῷ λογισμῷ πᾶσαν τὴν ὁρατὴν οὐσίαν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀειδοῦς καὶ ἀοράτου καὶ μόνῃ διανοίᾳ καταληπτοῦ τιμὴν ἴωμεν, ὃς οὐ μόνον θεός ἐστι νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπάντων δημιουργός. ἐὰν δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀιδίου καὶ ποιητοῦ θεραπείαν ἄλλῳ προσνέμῃ νεωτέρῳ καὶ γεννητῷ, φρενοβλαβὴς ἀναγεγράφθω καὶ ἔνοχος ἀσεβείᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ.» |
18.16
And he continues, saying:
"Therefore, transcending all visible essence with our reasoning, let us advance to the honor of the unseen, invisible, and mind-apprehended One, who is not only the God of intelligible and sensible things, but the Creator of all. And if anyone renders the service due to the Eternal and Maker to a younger and created object, let him be recorded as out of his mind and guilty of the greatest impiety." |
| 18.17 Ταῦτα τῆς Ἑβραίων εὐσεβείας τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀκήρατά τε καὶ θεῖα μαθήματα πρὸ τῆς τετυφωμένης φιλοσοφίας τετιμήκαμεν. τί με δεῖ μηκύνειν καὶ τἄλλα τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰς φῶς ἄγειν, ἐκ τῶνδε παρὸν καὶ τὰ ἐμοὶ νῦν σεσιγημένα τεκμαίρεσθαι; οὐ μὴν διαβολῆς ἕνεκα ταῦτα φάναι προήχθην, ἐπεὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἔγωγε ἄγαμαι τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ πάντων μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνων φίλον ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τιμῶ, τὰ ἐμοὶ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὰ ἴσα διόλου, πεφρονηκότα, Μωσέως δ’ ἐν παραθέσει καὶ τῶν παρ’ Ἑβραίοις προφητῶν τὸ ἐλλιπὲς ἐπιδεικνὺς αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας. | 18.17 These truly pure and divine doctrines of Hebrew piety we have honored above a boastful philosophy. What need is there for me to drag out the rest of Plato's writings and bring them to light, when from these examples one may infer what I have left unmentioned? However, I have not been led to say these things out of malice, since I myself deeply admire the man, and consider him a friend and honor him more than any of the Greeks, as one who held opinions kindred and dear to me—even if not identical in all respects—yet showing the deficiency of his thought when placed side-by-side with Moses and the Hebrew prophets. |
| 18.18 Καίτοι παρῆν τῷ καταμέμφεσθαι παρεσκευασμένῳ μυρί’ ἄττα καταιτιᾶσθαι, οἷα τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ σοφὰ αὐτῷ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ διατεταγμένα, ἢ οἷα τὰ περὶ ἔρωτος ἐκθέσμου σεσεμνολογημένα ἐν Φαίδρῳ. σὺ δ’, εἰ καὶ τούτων ἐπακοῦσαι ποθεῖς, ἀνάγνωθι τάσδε αὐτοῦ λαβὼν τὰς φωνάς· | 18.18 And yet, to one prepared to find fault, it would be possible to bring countless accusations—such as the solemn and wise directives concerning women in the Republic, or the elevated discourses on unlawful love in the Phaedrus. But if you desire to hear these as well, take up his own words and read them. |
Chapter 19
In this chapter, Eusebius presents several controversial proposals from Plato regarding women, warfare, family life, and reproduction, drawn primarily from the Republic and the Laws. These include:
Eusebius contrasts these radical Platonic social policies with the Hebrew worldview, which places all victory in God rather than military power, and maintains strict marital and moral boundaries. He closes by acknowledging that while some interpreters try to read Plato’s "communal women" as an administrative, metaphor-driven policy rather than licentiousness, the actual legislation remains deeply problematic from a biblical perspective.
Co-educational athletic training in the nude for men and women.
Equal participation of women in military service, combat, and sports.
Communal living, abolition of individual marriage, and collective child-rearing among the guardian class.
Selective breeding and population control (including exposure/infanticide of unapproved offspring).
Eusebius contrasts these radical Platonic social policies with the Hebrew worldview, which places all victory in God rather than military power, and maintains strict marital and moral boundaries. He closes by acknowledging that while some interpreters try to read Plato’s "communal women" as an administrative, metaphor-driven policy rather than licentiousness, the actual legislation remains deeply problematic from a biblical perspective.
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19.1
«Ἴσως δὴ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται.
— Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. — Τί δ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὁρᾷς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις γυμναζομένας μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν;» |
19.1
"Perhaps, then," I said, "contrary to custom, many of the things now being said would appear laughable if carried out in the way they are stated."
"Quite so," he said. "What, then," said I, "is the most laughable thing you see in them? Is it not clearly the sight of women exercising naked in the palaestras along with the men—not only the young women, but even the older ones by now, just like the old men in the gymnasiums when, though wrinkled and unpleasant to look upon, they nevertheless love athletic exercise?" |
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19.2
Καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἑξῆς·
«Ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυμναῖς ταῖς γυναιξὶ τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἅτε δὴ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν, οὐδὲ οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ’ ᾧ γελᾷ.» |
19.2
And he adds next:
"But the man who laughs at naked women exercising for the sake of what is best, plucking the fruit of wisdom from the laughable, does not even know, as it seems, what he is laughing at." |
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19.3
Φησὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἑβδόμῳ τῶν Νόμων·
«Ὡς ἄρα δεήσει τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς παῖδας ὀρχεῖσθαί τε καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι μανθάνειν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν παισὶν ὀρχησταί, ταῖς δὲ ὀρχηστρίδες ἂν εἶεν πρὸς τὸ διαπονεῖν οὐκ ἀνεπιτηδειότερον.» Τίθησι δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τάδε· «Ἡ δὲ αὖ που παρ’ ἡμῖν κόρη καὶ δέσποινα, εὐφρανθεῖσα τῇ τῆς χορείας παιδείᾳ, οὐκ ᾠήθη δεῖν κεναῖς χερσὶν ἀθύρειν, κἀνοπλίᾳ δὲ παντελεῖ κοσμηθεῖσα οὕτω τὴν ὄρχησιν διαπεραίνειν· ἃ δὴ πάντως μιμεῖσθαι πρέπον ἂν εἴη κόρους τε ἅμα καὶ κόρας.» |
19.3
And he also says in the seventh book of the Laws:
"That it will be necessary, then, for boys and girls to learn both to dance and to exercise; and for the boys there should be male dance instructors, and for the girls female dance instructors, so that they may work out in a manner no less suitable." And in the same work he also sets down these things: "And our Maiden and Mistress [Athena], delighting in the culture of the dance, did not think it right to play with empty hands, but having adorned herself in full armor, thus performed the dance; which things it would be altogether fitting for boys and girls alike to imitate." |
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19.4
Καὶ πολεμεῖν δὲ γυναιξὶν ὧδέ πῃ νομοθετεῖ·
«Ἐν δὲ τούτοις μισθοῖς, οἰκοῦντας ξένους, διδάσκειν τε πάντα ὅσα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμόν ἐστι μαθήματα τοὺς φοιτῶντας ὅσα τε πρὸς μουσικήν, οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατὴρ βούληται, φοιτῶντα, ὃν δ’ ἂν μή, ἐῶντα τῆς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον πάντα ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ὡς τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν γεννητόρων ὄντας, παιδευτέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. |
19.4
And he legislates for women to engage in war as well, speaking to this effect:
"And for these wages, resident foreigners are to teach all the lessons pertaining to war to those who attend, as well as those pertaining to music—not attending only if the father wishes it, and leaving off education if he does not, but as the saying goes, every man and child must be educated out of necessity as far as possible, as belonging to the state rather than to their parents. |
| 19.5 Ταὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα, ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν· καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἴποιμ’ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον.» | 19.5 And my law would say these exact same things concerning females, just as concerning males—that females ought to practice equally. And without fearing anything, I would state this principle regarding neither horsemanship nor gymnastics: that while it would be fitting for men, it would not be fitting for women." |
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19.6
Καὶ πάλιν ἑξῆς ὑποβάς φησι·
«Γυμνάσια τιθῶμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πάντα τοῖς σώμασι διαπονήματα τοξικῆς τε καὶ πάσης ῥίψεως καὶ πελταστικῆς καὶ ἁπάσης ὁπλομαχίας καὶ διεξόδων τακτικῶν καὶ ἁπάσης πορείας στρατοπέδων καὶ στρατοπεδεύσεων καὶ ὅσα εἰς ἱππικὴν μαθήματα ξυντείνει. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τε εἶναι δεῖ κοινούς, ἀρνυμένους μισθὸν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄνδρας, καὶ κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας· κόρας μὲν οὔσας ἔτι πᾶσαν ἐν ὅπλοις ὄρχησιν καὶ μάχην μεμελετηκυίας, γυναῖκας δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναιρέσεως ὅπλων ἁμμένας.» |
19.6
And proceeding further, he says again:
"Let us establish gymnasiums and all physical exercises pertaining to war: archery, all forms of throwing, light-armed skirmishing, all armed combat, tactical maneuvers, all marching of camps and encampments, and whatever lessons contribute to horsemanship. For there must be public teachers for all these things who receive pay from the state, and the pupils of these must be the boys and men in the city, and the girls and women skilled in all these things—the girls, while still young, having practiced every dance in arms and combat, and the women engaged in tactical maneuvers, formations, and the laying down and picking up of arms." |
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19.7
Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τούτοις ὁ Ἑβραίων ἐπινεύσειε λόγος, ἀντιφθέγξεται δὲ τἀναντία, μηδ’ ἐπ’ ἀνδρῶν ῥώμαις, μὴ ὅτι γε γυναικῶν τὴν ἐν πολέμοις ἀνατιθεὶς κατόρθωσιν, πάντα δὲ εἰς θεὸν ἀνάγων καὶ τὴν παρὰ τοῦδε συμμαχίαν. λέγει δ’ οὖν·
«Ἐὰν μὴ κύριος οἰκοδομήσῃ οἶκον, εἰς μάτην ἐκοπίασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες αὐτόν· ἐὰν μὴ κύριος φυλάξῃ πόλιν, εἰς μάτην ἠγρύπνησεν ὁ φυλάσσων.» |
19.7
But the doctrine of the Hebrews would by no means consent to these things, but voices the exact opposite—placing successful outcome in war not upon the strength of men, let alone women, but referring all things to God and alliance with Him. At any rate, it says:
"Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it labor in vain; unless the Lord guards the city, the guard keeps watch in vain." |
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19.8
Ὁ δέ γε θαυμαστὸς φιλόσοφος θέα ὡς καὶ εἰς τὸν γυμνικὸν εἰσάγει τὰς γυναῖκας ἀγῶνα, ὧδέ πῃ λέγων·
«Γυναιξὶ δὲ, κόραις μὲν ἀνήβοις γυμναῖς στάδιον καὶ δίαυλον καὶ ἔφιππον καὶ δόλιχον, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ δρόμῳ ἁμιλλωμέναις· ταῖς δὲ τρισκαιδεκέτεσι μέχρι γάμου μενούσαις κοινωνίας, μὴ μακρότερον εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν μηδ’ ἔλαττον ὀκτωκαίδεκα· πρεπούσῃ δὲ στολῇ ταύταις ἐσταλμέναις καταβατέον ἐπὶ τὴν ἅμιλλαν τούτων τῶν δρόμων. |
19.8
Consider how this wondrous philosopher introduces women even into athletic competition, speaking thus:
"For women, then: for un-pubescent girls, competing naked in the single-stadium dash, the double-stadium dash, the horse race, and the long race on the track itself; but for those who are thirteen years old and remaining unmarried up to the time of marriage, not older than twenty years nor younger than eighteen, let them enter the contest for these races dressed in suitable attire. |
| 19.9 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ δρόμους ἀνδράσι τε καὶ γυναιξὶ ταῦτ’ ἔστω· τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἰσχύν, ἀντὶ μὲν πάλης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ νῦν ὅσα βαρέα, τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάχην, ἵνα τε πρὸς ἕνα διαμαχομένους καὶ δύο πρὸς δύο.» | 19.9 And let these be the rules for running races for both men and women. As for tests of strength, instead of wrestling and such heavy events as exist now, let there be combat in armor, fighting one against one and two against two." |
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19.10
Καὶ ἑξῆς εἰπών·
«Ταυτὸν δὴ καὶ τοὺς περὶ ὁπλομαχίαν ἄκρους παρακαλοῦντας, χρὴ τούτους νομοθετεῖν κελεύειν·» ἐπιφέρει λέγων· «Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν θηλειῶν ἔστω νομοθετούμενα, τῶν μέχρι γάμων.» |
19.10
And after saying:
"Likewise, inviting the masters in armed combat, one must command them to legislate these things," he adds, saying: "And let the same things be legislated concerning females up to the time of their marriage." |
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19.11
Εἶτα πάλιν τούτοις ἑξῆς συνάψας τοὺς περὶ πελταστικῆς καὶ παγκρατίου καὶ τόξου λίθων τε ἐκ χειρὸς βολῆς καὶ διὰ σφενδόνης νόμους, ἵππων τε πέρι ἀγῶνος, πάλιν κἀνταῦθα περὶ τῶν θηλειῶν ἐπάγει λέγων·
«Θηλείας δὲ περὶ τούτων νόμοις μὲν καὶ ἐπιτάξεσιν οὐκ ἄξιον βιάζεσθαι τῆς κοινωνίας· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παιδευμάτων εἰς ἔθος ἰόντων ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχηται καὶ μὴ δυσχεραίνῃ παῖδας ἢ παρθένους κοινωνεῖν, ἐᾶν καὶ μὴ ψέγειν.» |
19.11
Then next, attaching to these the laws regarding light-infantry fighting, the pankration, archery, throwing stones by hand and with a sling, and contests on horseback, he again introduces the topic of females here, saying:
"Regarding females in these matters, it is not worth compelling their participation by laws and commands; but if, from their previous training becoming habitual, their nature accepts it and they do not object as girls or maidens to participate, let them do so and do not blame them." |
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19.12
Τοσαῦτα τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὰ περὶ γυναικῶν. τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ θαυμάσιος ὅδε τυγχάνει νόμος·
«Ἐάν τις παῖδας θηλείας καταλίπῃ, δι’ ἀδελφῶν τε καὶ ἀδελφιδῶν ἐπανιών, ἔμπροσθεν μὲν τῶν ἀρρένων, ὕστερον δὲ θηλειῶν ἐνὶ γένει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ τῶν γάμων χρόνου συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀμετρίαν δικαστὴς σκοπῶν κρινέτω, γυμνοὺς μὲν τοὺς ἄρρενας, γυμνὰς δὲ ὀμφαλοῦ μέχρι θεώμενος τὰς θηλείας.» Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς δεῖν αὐτάς φησι γυμνὰς χορεύειν ἐν ἕκτῳ τῶν Νόμων λέγων οὕτως· |
19.12
Such are Plato’s rules regarding women. And the following astonishing law happens to be his as well:
"If anyone leaves behind female children, coming down through brothers and nephews—first to males and later to females in one line of kinship—let a judge examine and judge the proportion and disproportion of the time for marriage, viewing the males naked, and viewing the females naked down to the navel." Furthermore, he says they must dance naked at the festivals, speaking thus in the sixth book of the Laws: |
| 19.13 «Τῆς οὖν τοιαύτης σπουδῆς ἕνεκα χρὴ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ποιεῖσθαι χορεύοντάς τε καὶ χορευούσας, κούρους τε καὶ κόρας, καὶ ἅμα δὴ θεωροῦντάς τε καὶ θεωρουμένους μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἡλικίας τινὸς ἐχούσης εἰκυίας προφάσεις, γυμνοὺς καὶ γυμνὰς μέχρι περ αἰδοῦς σώφρονος ἑκάστων.» | 19.13 "For the sake of such serious purpose, then, it is necessary to make the playful gatherings of dancing youths and maidens, both viewing and being viewed with reason and at a suitable age affording reasonable pretexts—naked, both male and female, as far as the modest shame of each permits." |
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19.14
Πρὸς τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐπάκουσον καὶ τῶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ περὶ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας νόμου.
«Τούτῳ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἕπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ὅδε. — Τίς; — Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὖ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὑτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.» |
19.14
In addition to all these things, listen also to those regulations in the Republic concerning the law that women should be held in common:
"To this," I said, "follows the law consistent with the previous ones, as I think, which is this: — What is it? — That these women shall all be common to all these men, and that no woman shall cohabit with any man individually; and that the children in turn shall be common, so that neither parent knows his own offspring, nor any child its parent." |
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19.15
Καὶ ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει·
«Εἰκός, ἔφη. — Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθόσον οἷόν τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οἰκίας τε καὶ ξυσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον κεκτημένου, ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμιγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης, οἶμαι, τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μίξιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν; — Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἀλλ’ ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις, αἳ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἕλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεών.» |
19.15
And next he adds:
"Likely enough," he said. "You, then, as their lawgiver," I said, "having selected the women just as you did the men, will hand them over as far as possible of like nature. And they, having common dwellings and common mess-halls, with no one possessing any such thing privately, will live together; and being mixed together both in the gymnasiums and in the rest of their upbringing, they will, I think, be led by inherent necessity to intercourse with one another. Or do I not seem to you to speak of necessities? — Not by geometrical necessities," he said, "but by amorous necessities, which are likely sharper than those for persuading and drawing the common people." |
| 19.16 Ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν ἴσως τις ἑτέρως διηγήσεται τὴν τοῦ λόγου διάνοιαν, μὴ τὸ νομιζόμενον φὰς ὑποβάλλειν· μὴ γὰρ ἀδιαστόλως εἰπεῖν πάσας εἶναι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, ὡς καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀκολασταίνειν ἐξεῖναι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐξουσίᾳ κεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας διανέμησιν αὐτῶν· οὕτω γὰρ εἶναι κοινάς, ὡς ἂν καὶ τὰ δημόσια χρήματα φαίη τις εἶναι κοινά, οἷς προσήκει διανεμόμενα πρὸς τῶν ἐπιτετραμμένων. Καὶ δὴ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἐχέτω. | 19.16 Now perhaps someone will interpret the meaning of this passage differently, claiming it does not imply what is commonly thought—arguing that he did not state indiscriminately that all women are common so as to allow anyone who pleases to act licentiously, but that their assignment to men lies under the authority of the rulers. For they would be common in the same sense that one might say public funds are common, which properly ought to be distributed by those placed in charge. Be that as it may. |
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19.17
Τί δ’ ἂν εἴποις μαθὼν ὡς καὶ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς φῶς τὰ κυούμενα προστάττει, λέγων ὧδε;
«Γυναικὶ μέν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀρξαμένῃ ἀπὸ εἰκοσαέτιδος μέχρι τεσσαρακονταέτιδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει· ἀνδρὶ δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῇ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι πεντεκαιπεντηκονταετοῦς.» |
19.17
What would you say upon learning that he commands not even to bring to light what is conceived, speaking thus?
"For a woman," I said, "beginning at twenty years of age up to forty, to bear children for the state; and for a man, when he has passed the sharpest peak of running, to sire children for the state from that time up to fifty-five years." |
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19.18
Οἷς ἐπιλέγει·
«Ὅταν δὲ δὴ, οἶμαι, αἵ τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομέν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγίνεσθαι ᾗ ἂν ἐθέλωσι.» Καὶ ἐπιλέγει· «Διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν μὴ εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέν, ἐὰν γένηται· ἐὰν δέ τις βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.» Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ γυναικῶν ἀγωγῆς τοιαῦτα. τὰ δὲ περὶ ἔρωτος ἐκθέσμου ἐπάκουσον οἷα τυγχάνει. |
19.18
To which he adds:
"When, however, both the women and the men pass the age for siring, we shall leave them free, I suppose, to associate with whomever they wish." And he adds: "Directing them to be particularly eager, if possible, not to bring any conception to light if one occurs; but if anyone should force it through, to dispose of it on the understanding that there is no nurture for such a child." Such are his teachings regarding the conduct of women. Listen now to what his teachings are concerning unlawful love. |
Chapter 20
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato’s Phaedrus (255c–256e) describing the psychological and physical mechanics of erotic attraction between an older lover (erastes) and a younger beloved (eromenos). Plato outlines two outcomes:
Eusebius sharply contrasts Plato’s leniency toward pederasty and homoerotic attraction with the Mosaic Law (Leviticus & Deuteronomy), which strictly condemns such practices under penalty of death. He criticizes Plato for failing to institute a death penalty for pederasty in his Laws while penalizing far lesser infractions (such as failing to report found treasure).
The Philosophical/Ascetic Path: The lovers exercise self-control (enkrateia), subjugating their desires to live a life of virtue and philosophical harmony.
The Non-Philosophical/Imperfect Path: The lovers succumb occasionally to physical intimacy. Even so, Plato asserts that they still gain a noble reward in the afterlife because their bond originated in love's divine madness.
Eusebius sharply contrasts Plato’s leniency toward pederasty and homoerotic attraction with the Mosaic Law (Leviticus & Deuteronomy), which strictly condemns such practices under penalty of death. He criticizes Plato for failing to institute a death penalty for pederasty in his Laws while penalizing far lesser infractions (such as failing to report found treasure).
| 20.1 «Ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι ἔν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμιλίαις, τότε δὴ ἡ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκείνου πηγὴ, ὃν ἵμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόμασε, πολλὴ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστὴν, ἡ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ, ἡ δ’ ἀπομεστουμένου ἔξω ἀπορρεῖ· καὶ οἷον πνεῦμα ἤ τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἁλομένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὡρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἰόν, ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον, καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν, ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὖ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ ἀπορεῖ, καὶ οὔθ’ ὅ τι πέπονθεν οἶδεν, οὐδ’ ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἀπ’ ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολελαυκὼς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει.» | 20.1 "And when he spends time doing this and draws near with physical touch in gymnasiums and in other gatherings, then the fountain of that stream—which Zeus, when enamored of Ganymede, named 'desire'—flowing abundantly toward the lover, partly sinks into him, and partly overflows outward as he becomes filled. And just as a gust of wind or an echo, bouncing off smooth and solid surfaces, travels back to the place from which it started, so the stream of beauty goes back into the beautiful youth through his eyes, reaching the place where it is naturally suited to enter the soul. Unfurloughing the passages of the wings, it waters them, causes them to sprout feathers, and fills the soul of the beloved with love in return. He is in love, then, but perplexed as to what it is; he neither knows what he has experienced nor can he express it, but like one who has caught an eye infection from another, he cannot give a reason for it." |
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20.2
Καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἑξῆς·
«Ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκείνῳ παραπλησίως μέν, ἀσθενεστέρως δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι· καὶ δή, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅ τι λέγοι πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον, καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδρα εὔνουν ἀσπαζόμενος· ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, οἷός ἐστι μὴ ἀπαρνηθῆναι τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἐρῶντι, εἰ δεηθείη τυγχάνειν. ... |
20.2
And he adds next:
"He desires in a manner similar to his lover, though more faintly, to see him, touch him, kiss him, and lie down beside him; and indeed, as is natural, he quickly does these things thereafter. Thus, in their lying down together, the lover's unruly horse has something to say to the charioteer, claiming the right to enjoy a small reward in exchange for many labors; while the beloved’s horse has nothing to say, but swelling with desire and perplexity, embraces the lover and kisses him, greeting him as a deeply affectionate friend. And whenever they lie together, he is disposed not to refuse to grant his own part of the favor to the lover if he should ask to obtain it. ... |
| 20.3 Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας, μακάριον καὶ ὁμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ κόσμιοι ὄντες.» | 20.3 If, then, the better elements of the mind prevail, leading them into an ordered life and philosophy, they pass their life here below in blessedness and harmony, being masters of themselves and orderly." |
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20.4
Εἶτα μεθ’ ἕτερα ἐπιλέγει·
«Ἐὰν δὲ διαίτῃ φορτικωτέρᾳ τε καὶ φιλοτίμῳ χρήσωνται, τάχ’ ἄν που ἐν μέθαις ἤ τινι ἄλλῃ ἀμελείᾳ τὼ ἀκολάστω αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίω λαβόντε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, συναγαγόντε εἰς ταὐτό, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρεσιν εἱλέσθην καὶ διεπραξάσθην· καὶ διαπραξαμένω τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρῶνται μὲν αὐτῇ, σπάνια δέ, ἅτε οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράττοντες. |
20.4
Then, after other matters, he adds:
"If, however, they adopt a coarser lifestyle, devoted to honor rather than wisdom, then perhaps in drunkenness or some other moment of carelessness, the two unruly draft-animals, catching their souls off guard, bring them together into the same place, choose that choice which is deemed blessed by the multitude, and accomplish it. And having accomplished it once, they continue to indulge in it thereafter, though sparingly, since they are doing what has not been approved by their whole mind. |
| 20.5 Φίλω μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτω, ἧττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἀλλήλοιν διά τε τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένω διάγουσι, πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ἡγουμένω ἀλλήλοιν δεδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι, ἃς οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἔχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. | 20.5 These two also remain friends to one another—though less so than the former—both during their love and after passing beyond it, believing that they have given and received the greatest pledges to each other, which it would be unlawful to break and ever come into enmity. |
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20.6
Ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἄπτεροι μέν, ὡρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἆθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἔτι ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργμένοις ἤδη τῆς ὑπουρανίου πορείας, ἀλλὰ φανὸν βίον διαγαγόντας εὐδαιμονεῖν μετ’ ἀλλήλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν.
Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ οὕτω θεῖα σοι δωρήσεται ἡ παρ’ ἐραστοῦ φιλία.» |
20.6
And at their end, though wingless when they depart from the body, they have nevertheless gained the impulse to grow wings, so that they carry off no small prize for their erotic madness. For it is not the law for those who have already initiated their heavenly journey to pass into darkness and the subterranean path below the earth, but rather to lead a bright life, faring happily alongside one another, growing wings together for the sake of love.
Such great and divine things, O youth, will the friendship of a lover bestow upon you." |
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20.7
Τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰ Πλάτωνος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ Μωσέως, ὃς διαρρήδην τούτοις ἐναντία νομοθετεῖ, μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ τὴν κατὰ παιδεραστῶν προσήκουσαν προφερόμενος δίκην. φησὶ γοῦν·
«Ὃς ἂν κοιμηθῇ μετὰ ἄρσενος κοίτην γυναικός, βδέλυγμα ἐποίησαν ἀμφότεροι· θανάτῳ θανατούσθωσαν, ἔνοχοί εἰσιν.» καὶ· «Ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κοιμώμενος μετὰ ἄρσενος κοίτην γυναικός.» Τί δεῖ τανῦν ἀπελέγχειν, ὡς παρεὶς ὁ σοφώτατος τὸν παιδεραστὴν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις ἠξίωσε κατὰ παιδεραστῶν θανάτου δίκην ὁρίσασθαι), προστάττει θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν οἰκέτην τὸν μὴ καταμηνύσαντα θησαυρὸν ὑφ’ ἑτέρου τινὸς εὑρημένον; Ἐπάκουσον δὲ καὶ τῶνδε, ἵνα μή με συκοφαντεῖν ὑπολάβῃς. |
20.7
Such are the teachings of Plato—but not those of Moses, who explicitly legislates the exact opposite to these, proclaiming with a loud voice the appropriate judgment against pederasts. At any rate, he says:
"Whosoever lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; let them surely be put to death, for they are guilty." And again: "Cursed is everyone who lies with a male as with a woman." What need is there now to refute how this 'wisest' man, while letting the pederast go unpunished (for not even in the Laws did he deem it worthy to define a death penalty against pederasts), commands that a servant be punished with death if he fails to report a treasure found by someone else? Listen also to these following points, lest you suppose that I am misrepresenting him. |
Chapter 21
In this concluding chapter of Book 13, Eusebius brings his critique of Plato to a climax by comparing Platonic legislation from the Laws with Mosaic law from Exodus and Deuteronomy:
Found Treasure & Slaves (21.1–21.2): Plato assigns the death penalty to a slave who fails to report found treasure, yet treats a master's killing of his own slave as a mere ritual impurity (katharsis).
Homicide & Assault Laws (21.3–21.11): Plato lays down complex rules for manslaughter, passion-driven killings, and kin-murder, offering relatively light penalties (short-term exile) for passionate homicides while mandating death for slaves who kill free citizens in self-defense. By contrast, Eusebius presents Mosaic legislation, which establishes strict penalties for murder and kidnapping while offering refuge for accidental deaths and protecting slaves from lethal abuse and physical blinding.
Property & Agricultural Ethics (21.12–21.14): Plato prescribes severe public flogging (stroke-for-grape) for a slave who eats fruit without permission. In contrast, Mosaic law permits passersby to eat grapes or grain to satisfaction in another's field and commands harvesters to leave gleanings for the poor, stranger, orphan, and widow.
Conclusion: Eusebius concludes that while Plato has thousands of admirable ideas, Christians reject his flaws in favor of divine revelation, completing his evaluation of Platonic philosophy.
| 21.1 «Ὅ τι δ’ ἂν ὁ θεός, φησίν, ἀναιρῇ περὶ τῶν κτημάτων καὶ τοῦ κινήσαντος, τοῦθ’ ἡ πόλις ὑπηρετοῦσα ταῖς μαντείαις δράτω τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐλεύθερος ὁ μηνύσας ᾖ, δόξαν ἀρετῆς κεκτήσθω, μὴ μηνύων δὲ κακίας· δοῦλος δὲ ἂν ᾖ, ὁ μηνύσας ἐλεύθερος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὀρθῶς γίγνοιτ’ ἄν, ἀποδιδούσης τῷ δεσπότῃ τὴν τιμήν· μὴ μηνύων δὲ θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω.» | 21.1 "Whatever the god declares," he says, "concerning property and the person who moved it, let the city carry out in service to the oracles of the god. And if the informant is a free man, let him possess a reputation for virtue, but if he fails to inform, for vice; if he is a slave, the one who informs should rightly be made free by the city, with the city paying the valuation to his master; but if he fails to inform, let him be punished with death." |
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21.2
Κἀνταῦθα μὲν ἐζημίωται θανάτῳ οὐχ ὁ παρακινήσας τι τῶν ἀπειρημένων, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἑτέρου πλημμελήσαντος μὴ καταμηνύσας. καὶ ἄλλως δὲ καθαρὸν ἀποφαίνει δεσπότην, εἰ τὸν ἴδιον δοῦλον θυμῷ φονεύσειε. λέγει δ’ οὖν·
«Δοῦλον δὲ κτείνας ἑαυτοῦ μὲν καθηράσθω, ἐὰν δὲ ἀλλότριον θυμῷ, διπλῇ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτισάτω τῷ κεκτημένῳ.» |
21.2
And in this case, it is not the person who moved any of the forbidden things who is punished with death, but the person who failed to inform when someone else offended. Furthermore, Plato declares a master pure from guilt if he slays his own slave in anger. At any rate, he says:
"He who kills his own slave shall undergo purification; but if he kills another’s slave in anger, let him pay twice the damage to the owner." |
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21.3
Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐπάκουσον αὐτοῦ τῶν νόμων, οὓς περὶ φονέων διετάξατο·
«Ἂν ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ἀπροβουλεύτως ὀργῇ τινι γένηται πραχθέν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, καθάπερ ἄνευ θυμοῦ κτείναντι προσῆκέ τῳ πάσχειν, πασχέτω· δύο δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔτη φευγέτω, κολάζων τὸν αὑτοῦ θυμόν.» |
21.3
Listen also to this among his laws, which he laid down concerning killers:
"If anyone slays a free man with his own hand, and the deed is done unawares in a fit of rage, let him suffer in other respects as is fitting for one who slays without anger; but let him go into exile for two years of necessity, chastising his own temper." |
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21.4
Καὶ τούτῳ προστίθησιν ἑξῆς ἕτερον τοιόνδε νόμον·
«Ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μέν, μετ’ ἐπιβουλῆς δὲ κτείνας, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν αὖ, τρία δὲ ἔτη, καθάπερ ἅτερος ἔφευγε τὰ δύο, φευγέτω, μεγέθει θυμοῦ πλείω τιμωρηθεὶς χρόνον.» |
21.4
And to this he adds immediately another law of this sort:
"He who slays in anger, but with premeditation, shall in other respects be treated according to the former rule, but let him go into exile for three years—just as the other fled for two—being punished with a longer time because of the greatness of his rage." |
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21.5
Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς περὶ τοῦ δεύτερον φονεύσαντος τοιάδε νομοθετεῖ·
«Ἐὰν δὲ αὖθίς ποτε κατελθὼν ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν ἡττηθεὶς ὀργῇ πράξῃ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, φυγὼν μηκέτι κατέλθῃ.» |
21.5
Then next, concerning one who commits murder a second time, he legislates as follows:
"If either of them, upon returning, is again overcome by anger and does this same thing, let him go into exile and never return." |
| 21.6 Καὶ πάλιν ἑξῆς φησιν· «Ἐὰν δέ, ὃ γίγνεται μέν, ὀλιγάκις δέ, διὰ θυμὸν πατὴρ ἢ μήτηρ υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα πληγαῖς ἤ τινι τρόπῳ βιαίῳ κτείνῃ, καθάρσεις μὲν τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις καθαίρεσθαι καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς τρεῖς ἀπενιαυτεῖν, κατελθόντων δὲ τῶν κτεινάντων ἀπαλλάττεσθαι γυναῖκά τε ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπὸ γυναικός, καὶ μήποτ’ ἔτι κοινῇ παιδοποιήσασθαι.» | 21.6 And again next he says: "If—a thing that happens, though rarely—a father or mother slays a son or daughter with blows or by some violent means in a fit of anger, let them undergo the same purifications as the others and go into exile for three years; and when those who committed the slaying return, let wife be separated from husband and husband from wife, and let them never again produce children together." |
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21.7
Καὶ τούτοις ἐπιφέρει·
«Γυναῖκα δὲ γαμετὴν ἐὰν ἀνὴρ δι’ ὀργὴν κτείνῃ τινά, ἢ γυνή τις ἑαυτῆς ἄνδρα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἐργάσηται, καθαίρεσθαι τοὺς αὐτοὺς καθαρμούς, τριετεῖς δὲ ἀπενιαυτήσεις διατελεῖν. κατελθὼν δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτό τι δράσας τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν ἱερῶν μὴ κοινωνείτω, μηδὲ ὁμοτράπεζος γιγνέσθω ποτέ. |
21.7
And to these he adds:
"If a husband slays his lawful wife through rage, or if a woman does this same thing likewise to her own husband, let them undergo the same purifications and complete three-year exiles. And when the one who did such a deed returns, let him not share in sacred rites with his own children, nor ever sit at the same table. |
| 21.8 καὶ ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφήν, ἢ ἀδελφὴ ἀδελφὸν ἢ ἀδελφὴν θυμῷ κτείνῃ, τὰ μὲν τῶν καθαρμῶν καὶ ἀπενιαυτήσεων, καθάπερ εἴρηται τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, εἰρήσθω δεῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τούτοις· ὧν δ’ ἀδελφούς τε ἀδελφῶν καὶ γονέας ἐστέρηκε παίδων, τούτοις δὲ συνέστιος αὐτὸς μηδέποτε γιγνέσθω, μηδὲ κοινωνὸς ἱερῶν. | 21.8 And if a brother slays a brother or sister in anger, or a sister slays a brother or sister, let the matters regarding purifications and exiles be declared necessary for them just as was said for parents and offspring; and let the killer never share the hearth with those whom he has deprived of brothers, nor with parents deprived of children, nor share in sacred rites. |
| 21.9 Ἀδελφὸς δὲ ἐὰν ἀδελφὸν κτείνῃ ἐν στάσεσι μάχης γενομένης, ἤ τινι τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ, ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, καθάπερ πολέμιον ἀποκτείνας ἔστω καθαρός. καὶ ἐὰν πολίτης πολίτην ὡσαύτως, ἢ ξένος ξένον. ἐὰν δὲ ἀστὸν ξένος, ἢ ξένον ἀστὸς ἀμυνόμενος κτείνῃ, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔστω τοῦ καθαρὸς εἶναι· καὶ ἐὰν δοῦλος δοῦλον, ὡσαύτως. ἐὰν δὲ αὖ δοῦλος ἐλεύθερον ἀμυνόμενος ἀποκτείνῃ, καθάπερ ὁ κτείνας πατέρα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχος ἔστω νόμοις. | 21.9 If a brother slays a brother in civil strife during a battle, or in some such manner, defending himself against the one who struck first, let him be clean as if he had slain an enemy. And if a citizen slays a citizen likewise, or a foreigner a foreigner. And if a foreigner slays a citizen, or a citizen a foreigner in self-defense, let it be on the same terms regarding being clean; and if a slave slays a slave, likewise. But if a slave slays a free man in self-defense, let him be subject to the same laws as one who slays his own father. |
| 21.10 Ὃς ἂν ἐκ προνοίας τε καὶ ἀδίκως ὁντιναοῦν τῶν ἐμφυλίων αὐτόχειρ κτείνῃ, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νομίμων εἰργέσθω, μήτε ἀγορὰν μήτε ἱερὰ μήτε λιμένας μήτε ἄλλον κοινὸν σύλλογον μηδένα μιαίνων, ἐάν τέ τις ἀπαγορεύῃ τῷ δράσαντι ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐὰν μή. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει ... ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιὼν δέον ἢ μὴ προαγορεύων εἰργέσθω τῶν ἐντὸς ἀνεψιότητος—τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὑπόδικος τῷ θέλοντι τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τελευτήσαντος γιγνέσθω.—Γυνὴ δὲ ἄνδρα ἑαυτῆς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι τρώσασα, ἢ ἀνὴρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, φευγέτω ἀειφυγίαν.» | 21.10 Whosoever slays with his own hand any fellow citizen with premeditation and unjustly, let him first be excluded from lawful places, polluting neither market nor temples nor harbors nor any other common gathering, whether any man forbids the doer these things or not. For the law forbids it... and he who fails to prosecute when he ought, or fails to proclaim it, let him be excluded from sacred rites up to the degree of cousinship—and secondly, let him be liable to prosecution by anyone willing to avenge the deceased.—If a woman wounds her own husband with intent to kill, or a man his own wife, let them flee into perpetual exile." |
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21.11
Τοιοῦτοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ φιλοσόφου νόμοι. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοὺς Μώσεως τούτοις ἀντιπαραβαλεῖν, ἐπάκουσον οἷα περὶ τῶν φονικῶν διατάττεται·
«Ἐὰν τίς τινα, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. εἰ δὲ οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς παρέδωκεν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, δώσω σοι τόπον οὗ φεύξεται ἐκεῖ ὁ φονεύσας. ἐὰν δὲ ἐπίθηταί τις τῷ πλησίον αὐτοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν δόλῳ καὶ καταφύγῃ, ἀπὸ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου μου λήψῃ αὐτὸν θανατῶσαι. ὃς τύπτει πατέρα αὐτοῦ ἢ μητέρα αὐτοῦ, θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. ἐὰν δὲ λοιδορῶνται δύο ἄνδρες, καὶ πατάξῃ τις τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ λίθῳ ἢ πυγμῇ, καὶ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ, κατακλιθῇ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν κοίτην, ἐὰν ἐξαναστὰς ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιπατήσῃ ἔξω ἐπὶ ῥάβδου αὐτοῦ, ἀθῷος ἔσται ὁ πατάξας· πλὴν τῆς ἀργίας αὐτοῦ ἀποτίσει καὶ τὰ ἰατρεῖα. ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ τις τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ ἢ τὴν παιδίσκην αὐτοῦ ἐν ῥάβδῳ, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ ὑπὸ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, δίκῃ ἐκδικηθήσεται. ἐὰν δὲ ἡμέραν μίαν ἢ δύο βιώσῃ, οὐκ ἐκδικηθήσεται· τὸ γὰρ ἀργύριον αὐτοῦ ἐστιν. ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τοῦ οἰκέτου ἢ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τῆς θεραπαίνης αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκτυφλώσῃ αὐτόν, ἐλευθέρους ἐξαποστελεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ αὐτῶν.» |
21.11
Such are the laws of the philosopher. But if it is necessary to compare the laws of Moses alongside these, listen to what is commanded concerning homicides:
"If anyone strikes a man and he dies, let him surely be put to death. But if he did not do it intentionally, but God delivered him into his hands, I will give you a place where the killer may flee. But if anyone sets upon his neighbor to kill him by deceit and flees, you shall take him from my altar to put him to death. He who strikes his father or his mother, let him surely be put to death. If two men quarrel, and one strikes his neighbor with a stone or with his fist, and he does not die, but is confined to bed: if the man rises and walks about outside on his staff, the one who struck him shall be unpunished; except that he shall pay for his lost time and the medical care. If anyone strikes his male or female servant with a rod, and they die under his hand, it shall surely be avenged. But if they survive a day or two, it shall not be avenged, for it is his money. If anyone strikes the eye of his male or female servant and blinds it, he shall send them away free in exchange for their eye." |
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21.12
Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ Μώσεως. αὖθις δὲ ὁ Πλάτων τίνα τρόπον καὶ δι’ ὁποῖα πληγαῖς ἀπαραιτήτοις αἰκίζεσθαι τὸν οἰκέτην προστάττει ἐπάκουσον·
«Ὅταν τὴν γενναίαν νῦν λεγομένην σταφυλὴν ἢ τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα ὀπωρίζειν βούληται, ἐὰν μὲν ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων λαμβάνῃ, ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ καὶ ὁπόταν βούληται καρπούσθω· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων πείσας, ἑπόμενος τῷ λόγῳ τῷ μὴ κινεῖν ὅ τι μὴ κατέθετο, ἐκεῖνος ἀεὶ ζημιούσθω. ἐὰν δὲ δοῦλος μὴ πείσας τὸν δεσπότην τῶν χωρίων ἅπτηταί του τῶν τοιούτων, κατὰ ῥᾶγα βοτρύων καὶ σῦκον συκῆς ἰσαρίθμους πληγὰς τούτοις μαστιγούσθω.» |
21.12
Such are the laws of Moses. Now listen again to how and for what reasons Plato commands that a domestic slave be abused with unsparing blows:
"When someone wishes to gather the noble grape, as it is now called, or the so-called noble figs, if he takes from his own property, let him enjoy the fruit as he wishes and whenever he pleases; but if he takes from others after obtaining permission, following the principle of not moving what he did not lay down, let him always be exempt from penalty. But if a slave touches any of these without persuading the master of the estate, let him be whipped with as many lashes as there are grapes on the cluster and figs on the fig tree." |
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21.13
Τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ τῶνδε, οὐκ ἄξια τῆς Πλάτωνος μεγαλονοίας. ὡς δὲ σεμνὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα τὰ παρὰ Μωσεῖ, μάθοις ἂν ἐπακούσας ὧδέ πῃ λέγοντος·
«Ἐὰν δὲ εἰσέλθῃς εἰς ἀμπελῶνα τοῦ πλησίον, φαγῇ σταφυλήν, ὅσον ψυχήν σου ἐμπλησθῆναι, εἴς τ’ ἄγγος οὐκ ἐμβαλεῖς.» καὶ πάλιν· «Ἐὰν εἰσέλθῃς εἰς ἀμητὸν τοῦ πλησίον σου καὶ συλλέξῃς στάχυας ἐν ταῖς χερσί σου, δρέπανον οὐ μὴ ἐπιβάλλῃς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀμητὸν τοῦ πλησίον σου.» καὶ αὖθις· «Ἐὰν ἀμήσῃς ἀμητόν σου ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ σου, καὶ ἐπιλάθῃ δράγμα ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ σου, οὐκ ἐπαναστραφήσῃ λαβεῖν αὐτό· τῷ πτωχῷ καὶ τῷ προσηλύτῳ καὶ τῷ ὀρφανῷ καὶ τῇ χήρᾳ ἔσται, ἵνα εὐλογήσῃ σε κύριος ὁ θεός σου ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ τῶν χειρῶν σου. ἐὰν δὲ ἐλαιολογήσῃς, οὐκ ἐπαναστρέψεις καλαμήσασθαι τὰ ὀπίσω σου· τῷ προσηλύτῳ καὶ τῷ ὀρφανῷ καὶ τῇ χήρᾳ ἔσται. ἐὰν δὲ τρυγήσῃς τὸν ἀμπελῶνά σου, οὐκ ἐπανατρυγήσεις τὰ ὀπίσω σου· τῷ προσηλύτῳ καὶ τῇ χήρᾳ ἔσται ταῦτα.» |
21.13
Such are his rulings against these people—unworthy of Plato’s greatness of mind. But how noble and humane are the provisions of Moses, you may learn by listening to him speaking somewhat as follows:
"If you enter your neighbor’s vineyard, you may eat grapes until your soul is satisfied, but you shall not put any into a vessel." And again: "If you enter your neighbor’s standing grain and gather ears with your hands, you shall not put a sickle to your neighbor’s standing grain." And again: "When you reap your harvest in your field and forget a sheaf in your field, you shall not turn back to get it; it shall be for the poor, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, so that the Lord your God may bless you in every work of your hands. And when you gather your olives, you shall not turn back to glean what is behind you; it shall be for the stranger, the orphan, and the widow. And when you gather the grapes of your vineyard, you shall not glean what is behind you; these things shall be for the stranger and the widow." |
| 21.14 Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παρὰ Μωσεῖ. δῆλα δὲ τὰ Πλάτωνος, ἐν οἷς μυρία εὕροις ἂν ἀνεπίληπτα, ὧν δὴ μάλιστα τῶν παρ’ αὐτῷ τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ κράτιστα ἀποδεχόμενοι, τοῖς μὴ τοιούτοις μακρὰ χαίρειν φαμέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων ὧδε διεξωδευμένων, ἀποδοθείσης τε αἰτίας δι’ ἣν οὐ κατὰ Πλάτωνα φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγνώκαμεν, ὥρα καὶ τὰ τῆς λοιπῆς ὑποσχέσεως εἰς πέρας ἀγαγεῖν, καὶ τάς γε ἄλλας αἱρέσεις τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπιθεωρῆσαι φιλοσοφίας. | 21.14 And these are the teachings of Moses. Plato’s views are clear, among which you might find ten thousand unexceptionable things; indeed, while accepting the most noble and excellent of his writings above all, we say a long farewell to those that are not of such quality. But since these matters have been thoroughly traversed, and the reason has been rendered why we have resolved not to philosophize according to Plato, it is time to bring the rest of our promise to completion, and to examine the remaining schools of Greek philosophy. |