ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑΤΟΝ
Twelfth Book
Twelfth Book
Chapter 1
In the first five chapters of Book 12, Eusebius demonstrates the harmony (symphōnia) between Platonic political and educational philosophy and the traditions of the Hebrews. In chapters 1–2: Eusebius quotes Plato’s Laws (Book 1) on the necessity of primary faith/trust (pistis) in divine laws before philosophical investigation. He shows how the biblical model provides simple scripture reading for spiritual novices alongside deep allegorical instruction (deuterōsis) for mature scholars, matching Jesus’s praise of the "faithful and wise steward."
| 1.1 Ὁ δωδέκατος ἡμῖν τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Προπαρασκευῆς ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἤδη τὰ ἐνδέοντα τῷ προτέρῳ τῆς Πλάτωνος πρὸς τὰ Ἑβραίων λόγια συνῳδίας, ὡς ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ συμφώνου λύρας, ἀποδώσει, τὴν καταρχὴν ἐξ ἀπολογίας τῆς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς βλασφημουμένης ἡμῶν πίστεως ληψόμενος. | 1.1 The twelfth book of our Evangelical Preparation will render from this point forward the remaining items necessary to demonstrate the harmony of Plato’s writings with the Hebrew oracles, like the concordant tuning of a lyre—taking its beginning from a defense of our faith, which is slandered among the many. |
| 1.2 «Εἴτε μὲν τοίνυν ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ἐπιτιμᾷ τις τῇ τε Λακωνικῇ καὶ τῇ Κρητικῇ πολιτείᾳ, λόγος ἂν ἕτερος εἴη· τὰ γοῦν λεγόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἴσως ἐγὼ μᾶλλον ἔχοιμ’ ἂν ὑμῶν ἀμφοτέρων λέγειν. ὑμῖν γὰρ εἰ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἷς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων, μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα ἐᾷν ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ μιᾷ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται θέντων θεῶν, καὶ ἄν τις ἄλλως λέγῃ, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἀκούοντας· γέρων δὲ εἴ τίς τι ξυννοεῖ τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἄρχοντά τε καὶ ἡλικιώτην μηδενὸς ἐναντίον νέου ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.» «Ὀρθότατά γε, ὦ ξένε, κελεύεις.» | 1.2 [Plato, Laws I, 634d–e]: "Whether anyone rightly or wrongly censures the Lacedaemonian and Cretan polities is another matter; but as for what is said by the majority, I might perhaps be better able to state it than either of you. For even if your laws are reasonably well established, one of the finest of your laws would be that which forbids any young man to inquire which of them are well made or not, but commands all with one voice and from one mouth to agree that all things are well established since gods instituted them, and if anyone speaks otherwise, not to tolerate hearing it at all. But if an old man perceives anything regarding your laws, he may make such statements to a magistrate or an equal in age, but in the presence of no young person." "You order most rightly, stranger." |
| 1.3 Εἰκότως δῆτα καὶ ἡ Ἑβραίων προλαβοῦσα γραφὴ τῆς τῶν θείων γραφῶν συνέσεώς τε καὶ θεωρίας τὴν πίστιν προτάττει δι’ ὧν φησιν· «Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνῆτε.» Καὶ αὖθις· «Ἐπίστευσα, διὸ καὶ ἐλάλησα.» | 1.3 Fittingly, then, the ancient scripture of the Hebrews also sets faith (pistis) before the comprehension and contemplation of divine scriptures, when it says: "If you do not believe, neither shall you understand." [Isa 7:9 LXX] And again: "I believed, therefore I spoke." [Ps 115:1 LXX / 2 Cor 4:13] |
| 1.4 Ἔνθεν καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν τοῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσαγομένοις καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀτελέσιν, ὡς ἂν τὰς ψυχὰς νηπίοις, ἁπλούστερον ἡ ἐν ταῖς θείαις γραφαῖς ἀνάγνωσις παραδίδοται μετὰ τοῦ δεῖν πιστεύειν ὡς θεοῦ λόγοις τοῖς ἐμφερομένοις παρακελεύεσθαι· τοῖς δὲ τὴν ἕξιν προβεβηκόσι καὶ πολιοῖς τὸ φρόνημα ἐμβαθύνειν καὶ δοκιμάζειν τὸν νοῦν τῶν λεγομένων ἐπιτέτραπται. Τούτους δὲ παισὶν Ἑβραίων δευτερωτὰς φίλον ἦν ὀνομάζειν, ὥσπερ ἑρμηνευτὰς καὶ ἐξηγητὰς ὄντας τῆς τῶν γραφῶν διανοίας. | 1.4 Hence among us, to those who are newly introduced and imperfect in their disposition—being infants in their souls—the reading in the divine scriptures is handed down in a simpler fashion, accompanied by the exhortation that it is necessary to believe the contents as the words of God; but to those advanced in disposition and grey-haired in understanding, it is permitted to delve deeply and test the inner sense of what is said. These persons the children of the Hebrews were accustomed to call deuterōtai [mishnah commentators/interpreters], as being interpreters and expositors of the meaning of the scriptures. |
Chapter 2
| 2.1 «Οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα εἴποιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς ὅτι σὺ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ὡς ἔοικας, ὦ Τυρταῖε, μάλιστα τοὺς πρὸς τὸν ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν πόλεμον γιγνομένους ἐπιφανεῖς. Φαίη ταῦτα ἄν που καὶ ὁμολογοῖ;» «Τί μήν;» | 2.1 [Plato, Laws I, 629a–630c]: "Should we not then say after this: You, Tyrtaeus, seem to praise above all those who become illustrious in foreign and external war. Would he say this, perhaps, and agree?" "Of course." |
| 2.2 «Ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τούτων ἔτι φαμὲν ἀμείνους εἶναι καὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ πολέμῳ γιγνομένους ἀρίστους διαφανῶς. Ποιητὴν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς μάρτυρα ἔχομεν Θέογνιν, πολίτην τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Μεγαρέων, ὅς φησι· Πιστὸς ἀνὴρ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀντερύσασθαι ἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ, Κύρνε, διχοστασίῃ. | 2.2 "And yet, noble as these men are, we claim that those who prove themselves best in the greatest war are far superior. We too have a poet as witness, Theognis, a citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says: 'A faithful man, O Cyrnus, is worth his weight in gold and silver in a dreadful civil strife.' |
| 2.3 Τοῦτον δέ φαμεν ἐν πολέμῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ ἀμείνονα ἐκείνου πάμπολυ γίνεσθαι, σχεδὸν ὅσον ἀμείνων δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθοῦσαι μετὰ ἀνδρείας αὐτῆς μόνης. Πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐν στάσεσιν οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἄνευ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς· διαβάντες δὲ εὖ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐθέλοντες ἀποθνήσκειν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ὡς φράζει Τυρταῖος, τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰσὶ πάμπολλοι, ὧν οἱ πλεῖστοι γίγνονται θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων, ἐκτὸς δή τινων εὖ μάλα ὀλίγων. | 2.3 Now we say that such a man proves far superior in a much harder war than that other—almost as much superior as justice, temperance, and wisdom, when combined with courage, are better than courage alone. For a man could never prove faithful and sound in civil strife without total virtue; whereas, as Tyrtaeus states, there are vast numbers of mercenaries capable of standing firm and choosing to die in battle, the majority of whom turn out to be audacious, unjust, insolent, and almost the most foolish of all men, save for a very few. |
| 2.4 Ποῖ δὴ τελευτᾷ νῦν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος; Καὶ τί φανερόν ποτε ποιῆσαι βουληθεὶς λέγει ταῦτα; Δῆλον ὅτι τόδε, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ὁ τῇδε καὶ ὁ παρὰ Διὸς νομοθέτης, πᾶς τε οὗ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μάλιστα βλέπων ἀεὶ θήσει τοὺς νόμους· ἔστι δ’, ὥς φησι Θέογνις, αὕτη πιστότης ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ἥν τις δικαιοσύνην ἂν τελείαν ὀνομάσειε.» | 2.4 To what end, then, does this argument now lead us? And what did it wish to make clear in saying these things? Clearly this: that more than anything else, both the lawgiver here and the one from Zeus—and every lawgiver who is of any worth—will frame his laws looking strictly toward the highest virtue. And this virtue, as Theognis says, is faithfulness in times of danger, which one might name complete justice." |
| 2.5 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν ὁ σωτήριος λόγος ὁμοῦ συζεύξας τῇ πίστει τὴν φρόνησιν τὸν κατ’ ἀμφότερα κεκοσμημένον τοῖς αὐτοῦ λόγοις ἐγκρίνει λέγων· «Τίς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πιστὸς καὶ φρόνιμος οἰκονόμος;» Καὶ αὖθις· «Εὖ, δοῦλε ἀγαθὲ καὶ πιστέ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγα ἦσθα πιστός, ἐπὶ πολλῶν σε καταστήσω.» Σαφῶς γοῦν ἐν τούτοις οὐ τὴν ἄλογον πίστιν ἀποδέχεσθαι παρίστησιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀρεταῖς συνεζευγμένην, εἰ δὴ τοιαῦται φρόνησις καὶ ἀγαθωσύνη. | 2.5 And among us, the saving Word, yoking wisdom together with faith, approves the man adorned in both respects by His words, saying: "Who then is the faithful and wise steward?" [Luke 12:42] And again: "Well done, good and faithful servant; you were faithful over a few things, I will set you over many." [Matt 25:21] Plainly in these passages He demonstrates that He does not accept an irrational faith, but one yoked with the greatest virtues—if indeed wisdom and goodness are such. |
Chapter 3
In this chapter, citing Plato's Laws (Book 10) on the soul’s immortality and post-mortem active concern for the living, Eusebius correlates this with 2 Maccabees, where the deceased prophet Jeremiah intercedes for his people.
| 3.1 «Εἴς τινα γὰρ οὖν μοι καιρὸν φαινόμεθα εὖ τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους διεξελθεῖν, ὡς ἄρα αἱ τῶν τελευτησάντων ψυχαὶ δύναμιν ἔχουσί τινα τελευτήσασαι καὶ τῶν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους πραγμάτων ἐπιμελοῦνται. Ταῦτα ἀληθεῖς μέν, μακροὶ δέ εἰσι περιέχοντες λόγοι. Πιστεύειν δὲ ταῖς τε ἄλλαις φήμαις χρεὼν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὕτω πολλαῖς καὶ σφόδρα παλαιαῖς οὔσαις, πιστεύειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἄνπερ μὴ παντάπασιν ἄφρονες φαίνωνται.» | 3.1 [Plato, Laws XI, 926e–927a]: "For we seem to have done well in reviewing the former arguments showing that the souls of the dead retain a certain power after death and take thought for human affairs. The arguments containing these truths are true, though long. One must believe the other traditions about such matters, being so numerous and exceedingly ancient; and one must also believe those who legislate that these things are so, unless they appear altogether foolish." |
| 3.2 Καὶ ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ δὲ τῶν Μακκαβαίων λέγεται Ἱερεμίας ὁ προφήτης μετὰ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ βίου εὐχόμενος ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ, ὡς φροντίδα ποιούμενος τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀνθρώπων. Δεῖν δέ φησι καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τούτοις πιστεύειν. | 3.2 And in the book of the Maccabees [2 Macc 15:12–14], Jeremiah the prophet is said to appear in a vision after his departure from life, praying for the people, as taking thought for men upon the earth. And Plato states that one ought to believe these things. |
Chapter 4
In chapters 4–5, Quoting Plato’s Republic (Book 2) on the role of foundational myths (mythoi) and noble stories in early education, Eusebius argues that the Hebrews long practiced this strategy—feeding beneficial scriptural narratives to children while spiritual leaders tested, approved, or rejected texts through the discernment of the Holy Spirit.
| 4.1 «Λόγων δὲ δισσὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ’ ἕτερον;» «Ναί.» «Παιδευτέον δ’ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν;» «Οὐ μανθάνω,» ἔφη, «πῶς λέγεις.» «Οὐ μανθάνεισ,» ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, «ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; Τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. Πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.» «Ἔστι ταῦτα.» | 4.1 [Plato, Republic II, 376e–377a]: "Are there not two forms of speech, the one true and the other false?" "Yes." "Must we educate in both, but first in the false?" "I do not understand," he said, "how you mean." "Do you not understand," said I, "that we first tell stories (mythoi) to children? And this, broadly speaking, is false, though there are true things in them. And we use stories for children before physical exercises." "That is so." |
| 4.2 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. Καὶ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις δὲ τὰς τῆς ἐνθέου γραφῆς ἱστορίας τοῖς νηπίοις τὰς ψυχὰς ἁπλούστερον ὥσπερ τινὰς μύθους ἔθος ἐστὶ παραδιδόναι, τοῖς δ’ ἐγγεγυμνασμένοις τὴν ἕξιν τὰς τῶν λόγων βαθυτέρας καὶ δογματικὰς θεωρίας διὰ τῆς καλουμένης δευτερώσεως καὶ σαφηνείας τῶν λανθανόντων τοὺς πολλοὺς νοημάτων. | 4.2 Thus far Plato. And among the Hebrews, it is the custom to hand down the histories of inspired Scripture to those who are infants in soul in a simpler manner, as a kind of stories; but to those trained in habit, the deeper and dogmatic contemplations of the texts are imparted through the so-called deuterōsis [detailed exposition] and clarification of concepts hidden from the many. |
Chapter 5
| 5.1 «Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ’ ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; Μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ.» | 5.1 [Plato, Republic II, 377a–c]: "Do you not know, then, that the beginning of every work is the most important part, especially for anything young and tender? For it is then above all that it is molded and receives whatever impression one wishes to stamp upon each individual." |
| 5.2 «Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.» «Ἆρ’ οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις ἅς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς;» | 5.2 "Precisely so." "Shall we then so carelessly permit children to hear any chance stories composed by anyone, and to take into their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those which we think they ought to hold when they reach adulthood?" |
| 5.3 «Οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν.» «Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ’ ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον. Τοὺς δ’ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισί, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν. Ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.» | 5.3 "We shall not permit it in any way." "First of all then, as it seems, we must supervise the story-makers, and whichever good story they compose we must select, but whichever is not, we must reject. And we shall persuade nurses and mothers to tell the selected stories to the children, and to mold their souls with stories far more than their bodies with their hands. But most of those they tell now must be thrown out." |
| 5.4 Καὶ ταῦτα πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος πεφύλακτο παρ’ Ἑβραίοις. Οἱ γὰρ ἔχοντες πνεῦμα θεῖον, διακριτικὸν πνευμάτων, ἐδοκίμαζον τὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐξ ἁγίου πνεύματος λεγόμενά τε καὶ γραφόμενα, τὰ δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα ἀπεδοκίμαζον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ψευδοπροφητῶν λόγους. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς νηπίους ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν ὠφελιμωτάταις διηγήσεσιν, ὥσπερ τισὶ μυθολογίαις, γονεῦσί τε καὶ τροφοῖς ἔθος ἦν κατεπᾴδειν, προπαρασκευῆς ἕνεκα τῆς εἰς ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἐσομένης θεοσεβείας. | 5.4 And these principles were observed among the Hebrews prior to Plato. For those possessing a divine spirit, capable of discerning spirits, tested those things spoken and written rightly and from the Holy Spirit, while they rejected those that were not of such a kind, just as they rejected the words of the false prophets. Nay, it was even the custom for parents and nurses to chant the most beneficial narratives from the divine scriptures—as if they were edifying stories—to infant children, for the sake of preliminary preparation for the godliness that would belong to them as mature men. |
Chapter 6
In this chapter, Eusebius presents an extensive passage from Plato’s Gorgias (523a–527b) detailing the myth of post-mortem judgment. In this dialogue, Socrates describes how souls are stripped naked of worldly titles, bodies, and status to stand before divine judges (Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, and Minos). The judges examine the bare soul for marks of injustice, perjury, and vice. Those with curable offenses undergo purifying punishment, while irredeemable tyrants become eternal warnings to others. Socrates urges Callicles to live a genuinely righteous and philosophical life rather than seeking worldly power.
Eusebius concludes the chapter by correlating Plato's pagan account of post-mortem accountability with Christian doctrine, citing the Apostle Paul (2 Cor 5:10, Rom 2:6–11) to show that all people must stand before the judgment seat of God to be rendered according to their deeds.
Eusebius concludes the chapter by correlating Plato's pagan account of post-mortem accountability with Christian doctrine, citing the Apostle Paul (2 Cor 5:10, Rom 2:6–11) to show that all people must stand before the judgment seat of God to be rendered according to their deeds.
| 6.1 «Ἄκουε δή,» φασί, «μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν.» | 6.1 [Plato, Gorgias 523a]: "Listen then," they say, "to a very fine story, which you will regard as a myth, as I suppose, but I as an actual account; for what I am about to tell you I shall relate as true." |
| 6.2 Καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα· «Τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, βεβιωκότα, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι.» | 6.2 [523a]: And a little further on: "That he who has passed through life justly and piously, when he dies, goes to the Isles of the Blessed to dwell in all happiness far from evils; but he who has lived unjustly and impiously goes to the prison of retribution and justice, which they call Tartarus." |
| 6.3 Καὶ αὖθις μετ’ ὀλίγα· «Ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. Καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δὴ δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ.» | 6.3 [523e]: And again a little further on: "Next, all these must be judged naked; for they must be judged when dead. And the judge himself must be naked and dead, contemplating with his very soul the very soul of each person immediately upon death, stripped of all relatives and leaving all that worldly ornament behind on earth, so that the judgment may be truly just." |
| 6.4 Καὶ ἐξῆς ἐπιφέρει· «Ταῦτά ἐστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν· ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ’ ἀλλήλοιν. | 6.4 [524a–b]: And next he adds: "These are the things, Callicles, which I have heard and believe to be true; and from these accounts I reckon that the following happens: death, as it seems to me, happens to be nothing other than the separation of two things, the soul and the body, from one another." |
| 6.5 Ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ, ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἔνδηλα πάντα· οἷον, εἴ τινος ἦν μέγα τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως. | 6.5 [524b–c]: "And when they are separated, each of them retains its own condition no less than when the person was alive: the body keeping its own nature with its treatments and afflictions, all plainly visible. For example, if someone’s body was large by nature or nurture or both during life, his corpse remains large after death; and if he was stout, it remains stout after death, and so on for the rest." |
| 6.6 Καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾷν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός· ἢ μαστιγίας εἴ τίς ἦν, καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος. | 6.6 [524c–d]: "And if again he made a practice of wearing long hair, his corpse is long-haired too; or if he was a rogue who bore the traces of floggings as scars on his body—whether from whips or other wounds in life—his body can be seen after death retaining these; or if someone had broken or twisted limbs in life, these too remain in death." |
| 6.7 Καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἦν πάντα, ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον. Ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ’ ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. | 6.7 [524d–525a]: "And in a word, whatever physical condition a person cultivated while alive, all or most of these traits remain clearly visible for a time after death. The very same thing, then, seems to me to apply to the soul as well, Callicles: all things are manifest in the soul once it is stripped of the body—both its natural traits and the impressions that the man came to hold in his soul through his pursuit of each course of action." |
| 6.8 Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου, κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστη ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τετράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατείας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως αὐτὴν ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. | 6.8 [525c–526a]: "So when they arrive before the judge—those from Asia coming before Rhadamanthus—Rhadamanthus sets them down and inspects the soul of each, not knowing whose it is, but often having seized the Great King or some other ruler or potentate, he perceives nothing healthy in the soul, but sees it scourged and full of scars from perjuries and injustice, which each of his actions stamped upon his soul—everything crooked through falsehood and arrogance, with nothing straight because it was reared without truth. And under the influence of license, luxury, insolence, and incontinence in conduct, he sees the soul laden with disproportion and disgrace; and seeing it, he sends it away in dishonor straight to the prison house, where upon arrival it will endure the fitting punishments." |
| 6.9 Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι ὑπὸ ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι, ἢ παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίνωνται. | 6.9 [525b]: "Now it is fitting for everyone who undergoes punishment—when rightly punished by another—either to become better and profit thereby, or to become an example to others, so that others, seeing him suffer whatever he suffers, may be struck with fear and become better." |
| 6.10 Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν, ὅμως δὲ δι’ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. | 6.10 [525b–c]: "Those who are benefited and pay the penalty at the hands of gods and men are those who commit curable sins; nevertheless, their benefit comes through pains and agonies both here and in Hades, for it is impossible to be delivered from injustice in any other way." |
| 6.11 Οἳ δ’ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. | 6.11 [525c]: "But those who have committed the ultimate wrongs and through such deeds have become incurable—from these the examples are made. These men themselves no longer derive any profit, being incurable, but others profit who behold them suffering the greatest, most painful, and most fearful agonies for all time on account of their sins, hung up simply as examples there in the prison house in Hades, a spectacle and a warning to the unjust who continually arrive." |
| 6.12 Ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ. Οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῦς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. | 6.12 [525d–e]: "One of whom I say Archelaus will be, if Polus speaks the truth, and any other tyrant who is like him. And I think that the majority of these examples are drawn from tyrants, kings, potentates, and public administrators; for through their power they commit the greatest and most impious offenses." |
| 6.13 Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δὲ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. | 6.13 [525e–526a]: "Homer also bears witness to this; for he portrayed kings and potentates as those punished in Hades for all time—Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Tityus. But Thersites, or any other private person who was wicked, no one portrayed as held by great punishments as if incurable; for I suppose it was not in his power to do such harm, wherefore he was happier than those who had the power." |
| 6.14 Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲ μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον, ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ γενόμενον τοῦ ἀδικεῖν δικαίως διαβιῶναι· ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ ἔσονται καὶ ἄλλοι ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ. | 6.14 [526a–b]: "Yet indeed, Callicles, it is from among the powerful that men who become exceedingly wicked arise; nevertheless, nothing prevents good men from arising among them too, and those who do so are worthy of utmost admiration. For it is difficult, Callicles, and worthy of great praise, to live out one's life justly when given great license to do wrong; yet few such men exist. For indeed both here and elsewhere there have been, and I think there will be again, good men possessing this virtue of managing justly whatever is entrusted to them." |
| 6.15 Εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν εἰς τοῦς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείης ὁ Λυσιμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται. Τῶν δὲ δικαστῶν, ὅπερ ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ’ ὅστις οὔθ’ ὧν τινῶν, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι. | 6.15 [526b–c]: "Indeed, one man became especially renowned among the rest of the Greeks—Aristides, son of Lysimachus; but the majority of rulers, my good sir, turn out bad. Now as for the judges, as I was saying, whenever that Rhadamanthus takes hold of such a person, he knows nothing else about him—neither who he is nor who his parents are—except that he is a wicked man; and perceiving this, he dispatches him to Tartarus, having marked whether he seems curable or incurable." |
| 6.16 Ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. Ἐνίοτε δ’ ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ’ ἀληθείας ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ψυχήν, μάλιστα μέν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. | 6.16 [526c]: "And he, having arrived there, suffers what is fitting. But sometimes, beholding another soul that has lived piously and with truth—the soul of a private citizen or someone else, especially, as I say, Callicles, of a philosopher who has minded his own business and not meddled in affairs during his life—he is filled with admiration and sends it off to the Isles of the Blessed." |
| 6.17 Ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός· ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει. Ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἔχων χρύσεον σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν. | 6.17 [526c–d]: "Aeacus does these very same things; and each of these two holds a rod as he judges. But Minos sits presiding alone, holding a golden scepter, just as Homer's Odysseus says he saw him, 'holding a golden scepter, dispensing justice among the dead.'" |
| 6.18 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν, πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι, ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὤν, καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. | 6.18 [526d–e]: "I, for my part, Callicles, am persuaded by these accounts, and I consider how I may present my soul as healthy as possible to the judge. Therefore, bidding farewell to the honors of the multitude, and practicing the truth, I shall truly endeavor, as far as I am able to be as good as possible, both to live and, when I die, to die." |
| 6.19 Παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι· | 6.19 [526e]: "And I exhort all other men as well, so far as I am able; and in turn I exhort you to this life and to this contest, which I say is worth all the contests here on earth." |
| 6.20 Καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις, ἣν νῦν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλ’ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνον, τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος ἄγῃ, χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε καὶ σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ. | 6.20 [526e–527a]: "And I reproach you because you will not be able to help yourself when your trial and judgment come—the one I was just speaking of—but when you go before that judge, the son of Aegina, and he takes hold of you and leads you away, you will gape and grow dizzy no less than I would here and you would there; and perhaps someone will strike you ignominiously on the cheek and outrage you in every way." |
| 6.21 Τάχα δ’ οὖν ταυτὶ μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. Καὶ οὐδέν γ’ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν. | 6.21 [527a–b]: "Perhaps now this seems to you to be told as an old wives' tale, and you despise it. And it would indeed be no wonder to despise these things if, in searching somewhere, we could find better and truer things than them." |
| 6.22 Νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων, μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.» | 6.22 [527a–b]: "But as it is, you see that although there are three of you—the wisest of the Greeks today, you, Polus, and Gorgias—you are unable to demonstrate that one ought to live any other life than this one, which appears beneficial there in the afterlife as well. Instead, among so many arguments, while others are refuted, this argument alone remains steadfast: that one must beware of doing injustice rather than suffering it, and above all a man must practice not seeming to be good, but being good, both in private and in public." |
| 6.23 Ὁ μὲν δὴ Πλάτων τὸν Αἰακὸν καὶ τὸν Μίνω καὶ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν ὑπέθετο τῶν τετελευτηκότων δικαστὰς ἔσεσθαι, ὁ δὲ θεῖος λόγος μαρτύρεται πάντας δεῖν παραστήσεσθαι τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα κομίσηται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον. | 6.23 [Eusebius]: Thus Plato supposed that Aeacus, Minos, and Rhadamanthus would be the judges of those who have died; but the divine Word testifies that all must stand before the judgment seat of God, that each one may receive what is due for the things done through the body, whether good or bad [2 Cor 5:10]. |
| 6.24 Καὶ πάλιν· «Ἐν ἡμέρᾳ,» φησίν, «ὅτε κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὃς ἀποδώσει ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ· τοῖς μὲν καθ’ ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰώνιον, τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός, θλῖψις καὶ στενοχωρία ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου τοῦ κατεργαζομένου τὸ κακόν, Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνος· οὐ γάρ ἐστι διαστολή.» | 6.24 And again: "On the day," it says, "when God shall judge the secrets of men, He who will render to each according to his works: to those who by perseverance in good work seek glory, honor, and immortality, eternal life; but to those who are self-seeking and disobey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, there will be wrath and fury, tribulation and distress upon every soul of man who does evil, of the Jew first and also of the Greek; for there is no partiality." [Rom 2:6–11] |
Chapter 7
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Plato’s Second Letter on withholding profound divine doctrines from the uneducated, lest they mock what requires long, arduous effort to refine like gold.
| 7.1 «Εὐλαβοῦ μέντοι μή ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους· σχεδὸν γάρ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς καταγελαστότερα ἀκούσματα, οὐδ’ αὖ πρὸς τοὺς εὐφυεῖς θαυμαστότερά τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικώτερα. Πολλάκις δὲ λεγόμενα καὶ ἀεὶ ἀκουόμενα καὶ πολλὰ ἔτη μόγις, ὥσπερ χρυσός, ἐκκαθαίρεται μετὰ πολλῆς πραγματείας.» | 7.1 [Plato, Letter II 314a]: "Take care, however, lest these matters ever fall among uneducated people; for almost, as it seems to me, there are no sayings more laughable than these to the multitude, nor on the other hand any more wonderful and inspiring to the naturally gifted. But when spoken often and continually heard over many years, they are barely purified like gold after great labor." |
Chapter 8
In this chapter, Eusebius pairs Plato's warning with Christ's directive not to cast pearls before swine (Matt 7:6) and Paul's reflection on the spiritual man (1 Cor 2:14). He then quotes Plato's Laws (Book 3) to show that true wisdom consists of internal alignment between reason and passion rather than superficial literacy or cleverness, closing with a brief quote from Plato's Statesman on not being overly scrupulous about mere words.
| 8.1 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν ὁ σωτήριος λόγος φησί· «Μὴ δῶτε τὸ ἅγιον τοῖς κυσί, μηδὲ βάλλητε τοὺς μαργαρίτας ὑμῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν χοίρων.» Καὶ· «Ὁ ψυχικὸς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ· μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστί.» «Καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσι πλέον, ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τοὐναντίον. Ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας ἔγωγ’ ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν, εἰ ἄρα μου καταμανθάνετε, ὦ ξένοι, ὃ λέγω.» «Μανθάνομέν γε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.» | 8.1 And among us, the saving Word says: "Do not give what is holy to the dogs, nor cast your pearls before swine." [Matt 7:6] And: "For the natural man does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him." [1 Cor 2:14] [Plato, Laws III 689a–b]: "And indeed, in the case of an individual man, whenever noble principles residing in his soul effect nothing further, but rather the exact opposite—all these I would call the most dissonant ignorances, both of a city and of each individual citizen, though not those of craftsmen, if you grasp what I mean, strangers." "We grasp it, dear friend, and we agree with what you say." |
| 8.2 «Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω κείσθω δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτα ἀμαθαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενον, καὶ ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον, ἂν καὶ πάνυ λογιστικοί τε ὦσι καὶ πάντα τὰ κομψὰ καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα διαπεπονημένοι ἅπαντα, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτοις ὡς σοφούς τε προσρητέον, ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπιστῶνται, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δοτέον ὡς ἔμφροσι. | 8.2 [689d–e]: "Let this then be laid down as decided and declared: that to those citizens who are ignorant in these matters nothing regarding office is to be entrusted, and they are to be reproached as ignorant even if they are exceedingly proficient in reasoning and have thoroughly labored through all subtle arts and whatever promotes quickness of mind; but those who possess the opposite condition are to be addressed as wise, even if, as the saying goes, they know neither their letters nor how to swim, and offices are to be given to them as men of sound mind." |
| 8.3 Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτ’ ἂν ἄνευ φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀλλ’ ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιότατ’ ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, ἧς ὁ μὲν κατὰ λόγον ζῶν μέτοχος, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος οἰκοφθόρος καὶ περὶ πόλιν οὐδαμῇ σωτήρ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀμαθαίνων ταῦτα ἑκάστοτε φανεῖται.» | 8.3 [689d–e]: "For how, my friends, without harmony could even the smallest form of prudence arise? It is impossible. But the finest and greatest of harmonies may most justly be called the greatest wisdom, of which he who lives according to reason is a partaker, whereas he who falls short of it will always appear as a destroyer of the home and in no way a savior of the city, but rather completely ignorant regarding these matters." |
| 8.4 Ταῦτα μέν μοι ἀπὸ τῶν Νόμων κείσθω. Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν Πολιτικῷ περὶ τοῦ μὴ πάνυ τι περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς λέξεις σπουδάζειν τάδε φησί· «Καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες· κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσῃ φρονήσεως.» | 8.4 Let these extracts from the Laws be established for me. And the same author, in the Statesman [283e], concerning not being overly scrupulous about names and phrases, says as follows: "Well said, Socrates; and if you guard against being over-earnest about words, you will appear richer in wisdom into your old age." |
Chapter 9
In this chapter, Eusebius notes how biblical figures (Moses, Saul, and Jeremiah) hesitated to accept leadership, and compares this to Socrates' argument in Plato's Republic (Book 1) that true leaders do not seek office for self-interest, accepting rule only out of necessity or compensation.
| 9.1 Τῆς παρ’ Ἑβραίοις γραφῆς πρῶτον εἰσαγούσης Μωσέα παραιτούμενον τὴν τοῦ λαοῦ προστασίαν δι’ ὧν πρὸς τὸν χρηματίζοντα ἔφησε· «Δέομαι, κύριε, προχείρισαι ἄλλον τὸν δυνάμενον, ὃν ἀποστελεῖς,» κἄπειτα τὸν Σαοὺλ κρυπταζόμενον πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀναδέξασθαι τὴν βασιλείαν, καὶ τὸν προφήτην Ἰερεμίαν ὑποπαραιτούμενον, ἐπάκουσον ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τὸ εὔλογον τῆς παραιτήσεως συνίστησι, λέγων οὕτως· | 9.1 Since the Scripture among the Hebrews first introduces Moses declining the leadership of the people when he said to the one giving the oracle: "I pray, Lord, appoint another capable person whom You will send," [Exod 4:13] and next Saul hiding himself so as not to receive the kingdom [1 Sam 10:22], and the prophet Jeremiah demurring [Jer 1:6]—listen to how Plato also establishes the reasonableness of declining office, speaking thus: |
| 9.2 «Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ’, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἐλάττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. | 9.2 [Plato, Republic I 346e]: "Is it not then already clear, Thrasymachus, that no art or office provides what is beneficial to itself, but, as we were saying long ago, it provides and commands what is for the subject, considering the interest of that weaker one, but not that of the stronger?" |
| 9.3 Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἑκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἐπανορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέποτε ἑαυτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ’ ἑαυτῷ ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. Ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ζημίαν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ.» | 9.3 [346e–347a]: "For these very reasons I, my dear Thrasymachus, was also saying just now that no one is willing to rule voluntarily and to take in hand the troubles of others to set them right, but demands a wage; because he who intends to exercise his art properly never acts for his own best interest nor commands for himself when commanding according to his art, but for the subject. On account of which, as it seems, a reward must exist for those who are going to be willing to rule—either money or honor, or a penalty if he does not rule." |
Chapter 10
In this chapter, Eusebius demonstrates how Plato's famous passage from Republic II—describing the ultimate fate of the truly righteous man who suffers torture, execution, and dishonor while maintaining inner justice—serves as a prophetic parallel to the historical experiences of the Hebrew prophets, the Christian apostles, and the Christian martyrs.
| 10.1 Τῶν παρ’ Ἑβραίοις λογίων τοὺς παρ’ αὐτοῖς προφήτας καὶ δικαίους ἄνδρας ὕβρεις ἐσχάτας καὶ προπηλακισμοὺς πάντα τε κίνδυνον εὐθαρσῶς ὑπομεῖναι διδασκόντων, τὰ συνῳδὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος καὶ περὶ τοῦτου δόξης μάθοις ἂν ἀπὸ τῶνδε αὐτοῦ τῶν φωνῶν, ἃς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τέθειται τῆς Πολιτείας· | 10.1 Since the oracles among the Hebrews teach that their prophets and righteous men courageously endured the utmost insults, abuse, and every danger, you may learn how Plato’s opinion accords with this concerning the righteous man from his very words, which he laid down in the second book of the Republic: |
| 10.2 «Τὸν δ’ οὖν τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρ’ αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ’ Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν, ἀλλ’ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. Ἀφαιρετέον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν. Εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι. Ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. | 10.2 [Plato, Republic II 361b–c]: "Having set up such a man, let us now in our argument place the righteous man beside him—a simple and noble man, who, according to Aeschylus, desires not to seem but to be good. We must take away his seeming so. For if he seems to be righteous, honors and gifts will belong to him because he seems to be such. It would then be unclear whether he were such for the sake of justice or for the sake of gifts and honors. |
| 10.3 Γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τῆς μεγίστης ἀδικίας, ἵνα βεβασανισμένος ᾖ εἰς δικαιοσύνην, τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς γιγνομένων· ἀλλ’ ἔστω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὢν δὲ δίκαιος.» | 10.3 [361c–d]: He must be stripped of everything except justice, and placed in a condition opposite to the former; for though doing no wrong, let him have the greatest reputation for unrighteousness, so that he may be tested for justice by not being swayed by bad reputation and what comes from it. But let him be unshakeable until death, seeming through life to be unrighteous, though being righteous." |
| 10.4 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· «Λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δή, κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. Ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκοπήσεται τὼ ὀφθαλμώ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν.» | 10.4 [361e–362a]: And shortly after he adds: "It must be said, then: and indeed, even if it is said somewhat crudely, do not suppose that I say it, O Socrates, but rather those who praise unrighteousness above justice. They will say this: that the righteous man disposed in this way will be whipped, tortured, bound, have both eyes gouged out, and finally, having suffered every evil, will be impaled, and will realize that one ought not to desire to be righteous, but to seem so." |
| 10.5 Ταῦτα λόγοις ὁ Πλάτων· ἔργοις δὲ πολὺ πρότερον οἱ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις δίκαιοι καὶ προφῆται μνημονεύονται τὰ εἰρημένα πάντα πεπονθέναι, οἵ γε δικαιότατοι ὄντες ὡς ἀδικώτατοι «ἐλιθάσθησαν, ἐπρίσθησαν, ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρας ἀπέθανον, περιῆλθον ἐν μηλωταῖς καὶ αἰγείοις δέρμασιν, ὑστερούμενοι, θλιβόμενοι, κακουχούμενοι, ἐν ἐρημίαις πλανώμενοι καὶ ὄρεσι καὶ σπηλαίοις καὶ ταῖς ὀπαῖς τῆς γῆς, ὧν οὐκ ἦν ἄξιος ὁ κόσμος.» | 10.5 These things Plato expressed in words; but in deeds long before, the righteous and prophets among the Hebrews are remembered to have suffered all the things described—who, though being the most righteous, were treated as the most unrighteous: "They were stoned, they were sawn in two, they died by the sword, they went about in sheepskins and goatskins, destitute, afflicted, mistreated—wandering in deserts and mountains, and in caves and holes of the earth—of whom the world was not worthy." [Heb 11:37–38] |
| 10.6 Καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι δὲ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν τὴν ἀνωτάτω δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ εὐσέβειαν μετιόντες, δόξαν δὲ ἀδικίας παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περιβαλλόμενοι, ὁποῖα ἔπασχον αὐτῶν πάρεστιν ἐπακοῦσαι λεγόντων· «Θέατρον ἐγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἀγγέλοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις.» Καὶ· «Μέχρι τῆς ἄρτι ὥρας καὶ πεινῶμεν καὶ διψῶμεν καὶ γυμνητεύομεν καὶ κολαφιζόμεθα καὶ ἀστατοῦμεν· λοιδορούμενοι εὐλογοῦμεν, διωκόμενοι ἀνεχόμεθα, δυσφημούμενοι παρακαλοῦμεν· ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν.» | 10.6 And the apostles of our Savior, pursuing the highest justice and piety, yet clothed with the reputation of unrighteousness among the many, suffered things which one may hear from their own words: "We have become a spectacle to the world, and to angels, and to men." [1 Cor 4:9] And: "Up to the present hour we both hunger and thirst, and are poorly clothed, and beaten, and homeless; when reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we encourage; we have become as the refuse of the world." [1 Cor 4:11–13] |
| 10.7 Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσέτι δεῦρο οἱ γενναῖοι τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν μάρτυρες καθ’ ὅλης τῆς ἀνθρώπων οἰκουμένης οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιοί τε καὶ εὐσεβεῖς ἀσκοῦντες ὅσα δὴ κατέλεξεν ὁ Πλάτων πεπόνθασιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐμαστιγώθησαν, δεσμά τε καὶ στρέβλας ὑπέμειναν, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐξεκόπησαν τὼ ὀφθαλμώ, καὶ τέλος πάντα τὰ δεινὰ παθόντες ἀνεσκινδυλεύθησαν. Ὧν οὐδένα παρ’ Ἕλλησιν ἐπιζητήσας ὅμοιον ἂν εὕροις, ὡς εἰκότως τινὰ φάναι τὸν φιλόσοφον οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ θεσπίσαι διὰ τούτων περὶ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν διαπρεπόντων ἐν εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ ἀληθεῖ δικαιοσύνῃ. | 10.7 But even down to this day, the noble witnesses of our Savior throughout the whole inhabited world, practicing not the seeming but the being righteous and pious, have suffered all the things that Plato listed. For they too were whipped, endured bonds and tortures, had both eyes gouged out, and finally, suffering all terrible things, were impaled. Searching among the Greeks, you would find no one like them; so that one might reasonably say that the philosopher did nothing other than prophesy through these words concerning those among us who excel in piety and true righteousness. |
Chapter 11
Chapter 11: Eusebius links Moses’s account of the Garden of Eden and the temptation of Adam and Eve by the serpent to Diotima's myth of Eros in Plato’s Symposium (203b–c). He claims Plato disguised Eden as the "Garden of Zeus," the serpent's deceit as Penia (Poverty), and Adam as Porus (Resourcefulness, son of Metis).
| 11.1 Μώσεως κατά τινας ἀπορρήτους λόγους ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως θεοῦ τινα παράδεισον γεγονέναι φάντος, κἀν τούτῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἠπατῆσθαι διὰ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τοῦ ὄφεως, ἄντικρυς μονονουχὶ τὰ ῥήματα μεταποιήσας ὁ Πλάτων ἐπάκουσον οἷα ἐν Συμποσίῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀλληγορῶν τέθεικεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ παραδείσου τοῦ θεοῦ κῆπον Διὸς ὀνομάσας, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ὄφεως καὶ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοῦ γενομένης ἀπάτης Πενίαν ἐπιβουλεύουσαν ὑποθέμενος, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρός, ὃν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μῆτίς τε καὶ πρόνοια υἱὸν ὅσπερ ἀρτιγενῆ προὐβέβλητο, υἱὸν Μήτιδος Πόρον ἀποκαλέσας, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ φάναι, ὁπηνίκα συνίστατο ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, εἰπών, οὕτω τὸν κόσμον ἀλληγορήσας τοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν κάλλους ἕνεκα. Λέγει δ’ οὖν αὐτοῖς ῥήμασι τάδε· | 11.1 [Eusebius]: Since Moses declared according to certain esoteric accounts that in the beginning of the world's creation there was a paradise of God, and that in it humanity was deceived through the woman by the serpent, listen to how Plato—having virtually transformed the very words—sets down allegorically in the Symposium, calling the Garden of God the "Garden of Zeus," positing Penia (Poverty) plotting intrigue in place of the serpent and its deceit, calling Porus (Resourcefulness) the son of Metis (Wisdom) in place of the first man whom God’s counsel and providence brought forth as a newly born son, and saying that this occurred "when Aphrodite was born"—meaning when this ordered world was formed, allegorizing the cosmos on account of its beauty. He says in these exact words: |
| 11.2 «Ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, εἱστιῶντο οἱ θεοί, οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μήτιδος υἱὸς Πόρος. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαιτήσουσα, οἷα δὴ εὐωχίας οὔσης, ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία, καὶ ἦν περὶ τὰς θύρας. Ὁ οὖν Πόρος μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος—οἶνος γὰρ οὔπω ἦν—εἰς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κῆπον εἰσελθὼν βεβαρημένος εὗδεν. Ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου, κατακλίνεταί τε παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκύησε τὸν Ἔρωτα.» Τοιαῦτα μὲν δή τινα καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων ἐμφερῶς Μωσεῖ ὑπῃνίξατο. | 11.2 [Plato, Symposium 203b–c]: "When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a feast, including Porus, the son of Metis. And when they had dined, Penia arrived to beg, as was natural when a feast was taking place, and she was about the doors. Now Porus, intoxicated with nectar—for wine did not yet exist—went into the Garden of Zeus and, heavy with drink, fell asleep. Penia then, scheming because of her own poverty to have a child by Porus, lay down beside him and conceived Eros." Such things did Plato hint at in these passages, closely matching Moses. |
Chapter 12
Chapter 12: Eusebius pairs the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib (Genesis 2:20–22) with Aristophanes' speech on primeval double-humans in the Symposium (189d, 190d–e), arguing that Plato understood the biblical account of primordial unity but assigned it to a comedic character to mock and adapt it.
| 12.1 Πάλιν εἰρηκότος Μώσεως· «Τῷ δὲ Ἀδὰμ οὐχ εὑρέθη βοηθὸς ὅμοιος αὐτῷ. Καὶ ἐπέβαλεν ὁ θεὸς ἔκστασιν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀδάμ, καὶ ὕπνωσε· καὶ ἔλαβε μίαν τῶν πλευρῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀνεπλήρωσε σάρκα ἀντ’ αὐτῆς. Καὶ ᾠκοδόμησε κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὴν πλευράν, ἣν ἔλαβεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ, εἰς γυναῖκα,» μὴ συνεὶς ὁ Πλάτων οἵᾳ εἴρηται διανοίᾳ, δῆλος μέν ἐστιν οὐκ ἀγνοήσας τὸν λόγον, Ἀριστοφάνει δ’ αὐτὸν, οἷα κωμῳδῷ χλευάζειν εἰωθότι καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀνατίθησιν, ἐν Συμποσίῳ τάδε λέγοντα αὐτὸν εἰσάγων· | 12.1 [Eusebius]: Again, Moses having said: "But for Adam there was not found a helper suitable for him. And God cast a deep trance upon Adam, and he slept; and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in its place. And the Lord God built the rib which He had taken from Adam into a woman," [Gen 2:20–22] Plato—not understanding with what meaning this was said, though clearly not ignorant of the account—attributes it to Aristophanes, as a comic poet accustomed to mocking even sacred matters, introducing him saying these things in the Symposium: |
| 12.2 «Δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῆς. Ἡ γὰρ πάλαι ἡμῶν φύσις οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἦν ἥπερ νῦν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλη. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τρία ἦν τὰ γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν δύο, ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτον προσῆν κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οὗ νῦν ὄνομα λοιπόν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἠφάνισται· ἀνδρόγυνον γὰρ τότε μὲν ἦν καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὄνομα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, τοῦ τε ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θήλεος.» | 12.2 [Plato, Symposium 189d]: "First you must learn human nature and its afflictions. For our nature long ago was not the same as it is now, but different. For first of all, there were three sexes among human beings, not two as now, male and female, but there was also a third combining both, of which now only the name remains while the thing itself has disappeared; for the androgynous was then one form and name shared from both, male and female." |
| 12.3 Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς διασύρας τὰ αὐτῷ συνήθη ἐπιφέρει λέγων· «Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν ὁ παρ’ αὐτῷ Ζεὺς ἔτεμνε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δίχα, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὦτα τέμνοντες καὶ μέλλοντες ταριχεύειν, ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ᾠὰ ταῖς θριξίν. Ὅντινα δὲ τέμοι, τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα ἐκέλευε τό τε πρόσωπον μεταστρέφειν καὶ τὸ τοῦ αὐχένος ἥμισυ πρὸς τὴν τομήν, ἵνα θεώμενος τὴν αὑτοῦ τμῆσιν κοσμιώτερος εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἰᾶσθαι ἐκέλευεν.» | 12.3 [190d–e]: Then next, after mocking in his usual manner, he continues, saying: "Having said these things, Zeus cut human beings in two, just as those who slice sorb-apples to pickle them, or as those who cut eggs with hairs. And whichever one he cut, he ordered Apollo to turn its face and half of its neck toward the cut, so that observing his own division the human might be more orderly, and he ordered him to heal the rest." |
Chapter 13
Chapter 13: Eusebius connects the early, sinless state of humanity in Eden—living naked in a realm provided for directly by God without agricultural labor—to Plato's description of the Golden Age under the Reign of Kronos in the Statesman (Politicus 271e–272b).
| 13.1 Μώσεως τὸν πρῶτον τῶν γηγενῶν βίον ὑπογράψαντος ἐν παραδείσῳ θεοῦ γεγονέναι, θεόν τε αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι ἐν ἀχρημάτῳ καὶ ἀκτήμονι διαγωγῇ, ἄσπαρτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φύεσθαι, γυμνούς τε εἶναι τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα περιβολῆς, ἐπάκουσον τοῦ φιλοσόφου μονονουχὶ αὐτὰ δὴ ταῦτα Ἑλληνικῇ τῇ φωνῇ διερμηνεύοντος. Λέγει δ’ οὖν· | 13.1 [Eusebius]: Moses having outlined that the original life of the earth-born took place in the Paradise of God, that God guided them in a moneyless and possessionless existence, that all things grew for them unsown and unplowed, and that they were naked of the clothing adopted later—listen to the philosopher translating almost these very same things into the Greek language. He says then: |
| 13.2 «Θεὸς ἔνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, καθάπερ νῦν ἄνθρωποι, ζῷον ὂν ἕτερον θειότερον, ἄλλα γένη φαυλότερα αὑτῶν νομεύουσι. Νέμοντος δ’ ἐκείνου πολιτεῖαί τε οὐκ ἦσαν οὐδὲ κτήσεις γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων· ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες, οὐδὲν μεμνημένοι τῶν πρόσθεν· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπῆν πάντα, καρποὺς δὲ ἀφθόνους εἶχον ἀπό τε δένδρων καὶ δρυῶν καὶ πολλῆς ὕλης, οὐχ ὑπὸ γεωργίας φυομένους, ἀλλ’ αὐτομάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς. Γυμνοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄστρωτοι, θυραυλοῦντες τὰ πολλὰ ἐνέμοντο· τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὡρῶν αὐτοῖς ἄλυπον ἐκέκρατο, μαλακὰς δὲ εὐνὰς εἶχον, ἀναφυομένης ἐκ γῆς πόας ἀφθόνου. Τὸν δὴ βίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀκούεις μὲν τὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Κρόνου· τόνδε δ’, ὡς λόγος ἐπὶ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν νῦν, παρὼν αὐτὸς ᾔσθησαι.» | 13.2 [Plato, Statesman 271e–272a]: "God Himself tended them and was their guardian, just as now human beings, being a different and more divine creature, tend other lesser species. And when He tended them, there were no political constitutions nor ownership of women and children; for all came back to life out of the earth, remembering nothing of their former lives. But all such things were absent, and they had abundant fruit from trees and woods and rich vegetation, not produced by agriculture, but the earth yielding it spontaneously. And they lived for the most part in the open air, naked and without bedding; for the temperament of the seasons was painless to them, and they had soft couches, as abundant grass grew up from the earth. Such a life, Socrates, you hear was that of those under Kronos; but this present life, said to be under Zeus, you have experienced yourself." |
Chapter 14
Chapter 14: Citing the conversation between Eve and the serpent in Genesis 3:1–5, Eusebius points to a passage in the Statesman (272b–c) where Plato muses on whether humans in the age of Kronos could converse with animals to gather wisdom.
| 14.1 Πάλιν Μώσεως ἀναγράψαντος ὅτι ἦν ὁ ὄφις φρονιμώτερος πάντων τῶν θηρίων, οἷά τε εἶπεν ὁ ὄφις τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ὄφει, καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας τοῦ ὄφεως ἐκθεμένου, ὁ Πλάτων οἷα γράφει ἐπάκουσον· | 14.1 [Eusebius]: Again, Moses having recorded that the serpent was wiser than all the beasts, and what the serpent said to the woman and the woman to the serpent, setting forth the conversations of the serpent—listen to what Plato writes: |
| 14.2 «Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν οἱ τρόφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου, παρούσης αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς καὶ δυνάμεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίοις διὰ λόγων δύνασθαι ξυγγίνεσθαι, κατεχρῶντο τούτοις σύμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, μετά τε θηρίων καὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων ὁμιλοῦντες, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι παρὰ πάσης φύσεως εἴ τινά τις ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα ᾔσθετό τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς ξυναγυρμὸν φρονήσεως, εὔκριτον ὅτι τῶν νῦν οἱ τότε μυρίως πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν διέφερον. | 14.2 [Plato, Statesman 272b–c]: "If, then, the nurslings of Kronos, having so much leisure and the power to converse through speech not only with human beings but also with beasts, made full use of all these opportunities for philosophy—conversing both with beasts and with one another, and inquiring from every nature whether any creature, possessing some private power, perceived something distinct from the rest for the gathering of wisdom—it is easy to judge that those of that time differed ten thousandfold in happiness compared to those of today. |
| 14.3 Εἰ δ’ ἐμπιπλάμενοι σίτων ἄδην καὶ πότων διελέγοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ θηρία μύθους, οἷοι δὴ καὶ τανῦν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγονται, καὶ τοῦθ’, οὕτως γε κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν ἀποφήνασθαι, καὶ μάλα εὔκριτον. Ὅμως δ’ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν ἀφῶμεν, ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν μηνυτής τις ἱκανὸς φανῇ, ποτέρως οἱ τότε τὰς ἐπιθυμίας εἶχον περί τε ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων χρείας.» | 14.3 [272c–d]: But if, gorging themselves to excess with food and drink, they recounted to one another and to the beasts such fables as are even now told about them, this too—at least to declare my opinion—is very easy to judge. Nevertheless, let us leave these things aside until some competent informant appears to show us how those of that time held their desires regarding knowledge and the use of speech." |
Chapter 15
In this chapter, Eusebius demonstrates how Plato modeled the structural framework of his Laws after the Mosaic Torah. He explains that just as Moses prefaced his legislation in Genesis with primeval history—recounting the Great Deluge, post-diluvian human life, and the deeds of ancient God-fearing patriarchs alongside those who transgressed—Plato similarly prefaced his legal treatise with an account of antiquity.
Eusebius cites Plato's Laws (Book III, 676a–677d), where Socrates discusses periodic global catastrophes, the survival of mountain shepherds after a great flood, and the loss of urban arts and vices. He concludes by noting that Plato, following Moses' pattern of grounding law in sacred history, proceeds to trace post-flood Greek and Near Eastern history (including the Trojan War, Sparta, and Persia) before introducing his actual system of laws.
Eusebius cites Plato's Laws (Book III, 676a–677d), where Socrates discusses periodic global catastrophes, the survival of mountain shepherds after a great flood, and the loss of urban arts and vices. He concludes by noting that Plato, following Moses' pattern of grounding law in sacred history, proceeds to trace post-flood Greek and Near Eastern history (including the Trojan War, Sparta, and Persia) before introducing his actual system of laws.
| 15.1 Μώσης νομοθεσίαν ἀνθρώποις καταβεβλημένος ἐνόμισεν αὑτῷ δεῖν ἀρχαιολογίας ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις· μνημονεύει δὲ τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ καὶ τοῦ μετ’ αὐτὸν βίου τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν παρ’ Ἑβραίοις θεοφιλῶν, καὶ τῶν δὲ ἄλλως ἐν πλημμελείαις ἐξητασμένων τὴν πολιτείαν ὑφηγεῖται, κατάλληλον οἷς ἐνομοθέτει τὴν περὶ τούτων ἡγησάμενος ἱστορίαν ἔσεσθαι. | 15.1 [Eusebius]: Moses, when laying down a body of laws for human beings, considered that he ought to include an account of antiquity in his prefaces. Thus, he mentions the Deluge and the subsequent life of humanity, and then sets forth the life and conduct of ancient men among the Hebrews who were beloved of God, as well as those examined under various transgressions, holding that the historical account regarding these matters would be fitting for the laws he was enacting. |
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15.2
Καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δὲ ὡσαύτως, παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νόμων γραφήν, τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ Μωσεῖ ζηλοῖ τρόπον· ἐν προοιμίοις γοῦν τῶν Νόμων τῇ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἀρχαιολογίᾳ κέχρηται, κατακλυσμοῦ μνημονεύσας καὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν βίου· ἀρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ τρίτου τῶν Νόμων ἐπάκουσον ἅ φησιν·
«Ἆρ’ οὖν οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι ὑμῖν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν τινὰ δοκοῦσι; Ποῖοι δή; Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί.» |
15.2
And Plato likewise, when proceeding to the writing of his laws, emulates the same method as Moses. In the prefaces of the Laws, at any rate, he employs his own account of antiquity, having mentioned the flood and the manner of life after the flood. Beginning then the third book of the Laws, listen to what he says:
[Plato, Laws III 676a–677a]: "Do you think, then, that the ancient accounts hold any truth?" "Which accounts?" "That many destructions of human beings have occurred through floods and diseases and many other causes, in which only a small remnant of the human race was left." "Certainly such a view is completely persuasive to everyone." |
| 15.3 «Φέρε δή, νοήσωμεν μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην, τὴν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ γενομένην. Τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοηθέντες; Ὡς οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες τὴν φθορὰν σχεδὸν ὄρειοί τινες ἂν εἶεν νομεῖς, ἐν κορυφαῖς που σμικρὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διασεσωσμένα γένους. Δῆλον.» | 15.3 [677a–b]: "Come then, let us consider one of these many destructions, the one that occurred by the flood." "What kind of circumstance should we conceive regarding it?" "That those who then escaped the destruction would likely be certain mountain shepherds, small embers of the human race preserved somewhere on the peaks." "That is clear." |
| 15.4 «Καὶ δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους γε ἀνάγκη που τῶν ἄλλων ἀπείρους εἶναι τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους μηχανῶν εἴς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονεικίας, καὶ ὁπόσα ἄλλα κακουργήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπινοοῦσιν. Εἰκὸς γοῦν. Θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς θαλάττῃ κατοικούσας ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι. Θῶμεν. Οὐκοῦν ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως εὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν;» | 15.4 [677b–d]: "And indeed such men must surely be inexperienced in the other arts and in the devices in cities used against one another for greed and rivalry, and whatever other villainies they devise against each other." "Likely enough." "Let us assert then that the cities in the plains and those dwelling near the sea were completely destroyed at that time." "Let us so assert." "Shall we not then state that all tools perished, and if any serious invention of art existed—whether belonging to statesmanship or any other wisdom—all these things vanished at that time?" |
| 15.5 Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερά φησιν· «Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγωμεν ἔχειν τότε, ὅτε ἐγένετο ἡ φθορά, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα, μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δὲ ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ;» | 15.5 [677e]: And after other remarks he says: "Shall we not say then that human affairs stood in this condition at the time when the destruction occurred: immense, terrifying solitude, but an abundant, vast extent of land?" |
| 15.6 Ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτερα εἰπὼν ἐπεξέρχεται βίους τῶν μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ἀνθρώπων, εἶθ’, ὥσπερ Μωσῆς τὴν τῶν πάλαι θεοφιλῶν Ἑβραίων πολιτείαν ἐπισυνάπτει τῇ μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ὑφηγήσει, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὁμοίως μετὰ τοὺς βίους τῶν μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ πειρᾶται ἀρχαιολογεῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὰ Ἑβραίων, τῶν τε ἐπὶ Τροίας μνημονεύει, καὶ τῆς πρώτης ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείας, Περσῶν τε, καὶ τῶν παρὰ τούτοις εἴτ’ ὀρθῶς εἴτε καὶ μὴ βεβιωκότων· εἶτα μετὰ τὴν τούτων ἱστορίαν ἀπάρχεται τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως, κἀν τούτῳ Μωσεῖ κατακολουθήσας. | 15.6 [Eusebius]: Having spoken these and other such things, he details the lives of human beings after the flood. Then, just as Moses attaches the constitution of the God-fearing Hebrews of old to his narrative of events after the flood, so Plato similarly, after describing the lives of those after the flood, attempts to recount Greek antiquity as Moses did that of the Hebrews—mentioning the events at Troy, the original constitution in Lacedaemon, and the Persians, along with those among them who lived either rightly or otherwise. Then, after the history of these peoples, he begins the arrangement of his laws, in this too having followed Moses. |
Chapter 16
In this chapter, Eusebius demonstrates how Plato’s philosophy of law aligns with the Mosaic foundation of legislation. Eusebius argues that Moses rooted all governance in piety toward the Supreme God, teaching that human goods flow from divine goods and that all virtue looks toward the supreme ruling Mind (God).
To prove Plato adopted this principle, Eusebius quotes a lengthy passage from Plato's Laws (Book I, 631b–632d). In it, the Athenian Stranger explains that laws must prioritize divine goods (wisdom, temperance, justice, courage) over human goods (health, beauty, strength, wealth), using reason to order all civic and personal life. Eusebius pairs this with Christ's teaching from the Gospels ("Seek first the kingdom...") and concludes by showing how Moses appointed pious, just leaders to oversee every aspect of communal life according to these same divine priorities.
To prove Plato adopted this principle, Eusebius quotes a lengthy passage from Plato's Laws (Book I, 631b–632d). In it, the Athenian Stranger explains that laws must prioritize divine goods (wisdom, temperance, justice, courage) over human goods (health, beauty, strength, wealth), using reason to order all civic and personal life. Eusebius pairs this with Christ's teaching from the Gospels ("Seek first the kingdom...") and concludes by showing how Moses appointed pious, just leaders to oversee every aspect of communal life according to these same divine priorities.
| 16.1 Μώσεως τὴν πᾶσαν αὑτοῦ νομοθεσίαν τήν τε κατ’ αὐτὸν πολιτείαν εὐσεβείας τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ ἀναρτήσαντος, ἀπό τε τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ τὴν καταρχὴν τῆς νομοθεσίας πεποιημένου, ἔπειτα τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἐξέρχεσθαι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διδάξαντος, τά τε θεῖα ἐπὶ τὸν πάντων ἡγεμόνα νοῦν, αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεόν, ἀναθέντος, θέα ὅπως καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος τοῖς αὐτοῖς βαίνων ἴχνεσιν ἐπιμέμφεται μὲν τοῖς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέταις, τὸν δ’ ἀρέσκοντα Μωσεῖ νόμον ἐκδιδάσκει, λέγων οὕτως· | 16.1 [Eusebius]: Since Moses hung his entire system of legislation and his civil governance upon piety toward the God of all things, making his beginning of legislation from the Creator of all, then teaching that human goods issue forth from divine goods, and referring divine goods back to the ruling Mind of all—namely God Himself—see how the philosopher, walking in the selfsame footsteps, criticizes the lawgivers of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians and sets forth the law that is pleasing to Moses, speaking thus: |
| 16.2 «Πῇ δὴ οὖν σε ἔτ’ ἂν ἐβουλόμην διελόμενον λέγειν αὐτός τ’ ἀκούειν; βούλει σοι φράζω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε. Ἐχρῆν εἰπεῖν, οἱ Κρητῶν νόμοι οὐκ εἰσὶ μάτην διαφερόντως ἐν πᾶσιν εὐδόκιμοι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἔχουσι γὰρ ὀρθῶς τοὺς αὐτοῖς χρωμένους εὐδαίμονας ἀποτελοῦντες· ἅπαντα γὰρ τἀγαθὰ πορίζουσι. | 16.2 [Plato, Laws I 631b]: "How then would I have wished you to distinguish these in your exposition, and how would I myself wish to hear them? Do you want me to tell you?" "By all means, Stranger." "You ought to have said: The laws of the Cretans are not in vain exceptionally renowned among all the Greeks; for they are correct in rendering those who use them happy, since they supply all goods. |
| 16.3 Διττὰ δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα· ἥρτηται δὲ ἐκ τῶν θείων θάτερα· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δέχηται τὰ μείζονα πόλις, κτᾶται καὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα· εἰ δὲ μή, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐλάττονα ὧν ἡγεῖται ὑγεία, κάλλος δὲ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰσχὺς εἴς τε δρόμον καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πάσας κινήσεις τῷ σώματι, τέταρτον δὲ πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός, ἀλλ’ ὀξὺ βλέπων, ἄνπερ ἅμ’ ἕπηται φρονήσει. | 16.3 [631b–c]: Now goods are twofold: some human, others divine; and the former are dependent upon the divine ones. And if a city accepts the greater goods, it acquires the lesser as well; but if not, it is deprived of both. The lesser goods are those led by health, second is beauty, third is strength for running and for all other physical movements of the body, and fourth is wealth—not blind, but keen-sighted, provided it follows wisdom. |
| 16.4 Ὃ δὴ πρῶτον αὖ τῶν θείων ἡγεμονοῦν ἐστιν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ φρόνησις, δεύτερον δὲ μετὰ νοῦν σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ’ ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκείνων ἔμπροσθεν τέτακται φύσει, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τακτέον οὕτω. | 16.4 [631c–d]: That which stands first among the divine goods is prudence (practical wisdom); second, after mind, is a temperate disposition of soul; and from these, mixed with courage, the third would be justice; and fourth is courage. All these are by nature placed prior to the human goods, and indeed so must the lawgiver order them. |
| 16.5 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἄλλας προστάξεις τοῖς πολίταις εἰς ταῦτα βλεπούσας αὐτοῖς εἶναι διακελευστέον, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα εἰς τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ θεῖα εἰς τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν σύμπαντα βλέπειν. | 16.5 [631d–e]: After these things, he must command the citizens that all other injunctions be given with a view toward these—the human goods looking toward the divine, and all the divine looking toward the governing Mind. |
| 16.6 Περί τε γάμους ἀλλήλοις ἐπικοινουμένους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς τῶν παίδων γεννήσεσι καὶ τροφαῖς, ὅσοι τε ἄρρενες καὶ ὅσαι θήλειαι, νέων τε ὄντων καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἰόντων μέχρι γήρως, τιμῶντα ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τούτων ὁμιλίαις τάς τε λύπας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ξυμπάντων τε ἐρώτων τὰς σπουδὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον καὶ παραπεφυλαχότα ψέγειν τε ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐπαινεῖν δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων.» | 16.6 [631e–632a]: Concerning marriages contracted with one another, and after these in the birth and upbringing of children—both males and females, while young and as they advance into older age up to senility—he must properly exercise care by honoring and dishonoring them, observing and guarding their griefs, pleasures, and desires in all their interactions, as well as the pursuits of all their loves, censuring and praising them rightly through the laws themselves." |
| 16.7 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα φησί· «Κατιδὼν δὲ ὁ θεὶς τοὺς νόμους πᾶσι τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, ὅπως πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσας ὁ νοῦς ἑπόμενα σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀποφήνῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλούτῳ μηδὲ φιλοτιμίᾳ. | 16.7 [632c]: And shortly after he says: "And having surveyed all these things, the founder of the laws will set guardians over them—some proceeding by prudence, others by true opinion—so that Mind, having bound all these together, may show them following temperance and justice, but not wealth nor ambition. |
| 16.8 Οὕτως, ὦ ξένοι, ἔγωγε ἤθελον ἂν ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἔτι νῦν βούλομαι, διεξελθεῖν πῶς ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Διὸς λεγομένοις νόμοις, τοῖς τε τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος, οὓς Μίνως τε καὶ Λυκοῦργος ἐθέτην, ἔνεστί τε πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ ὅπῃ τάξιν εἰληφότα διάδηλά ἐστι τῷ περὶ νόμων ἐμπείρῳ τέχνῃ τε καί τισιν ἔθεσι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἡμῖν οὐδαμῶς ἐστι καταφανῆ.» | 16.8 [632c–d]: In this way, strangers, I would have wished you—and even now still wish—to explain how all these things are present in the so-called laws of Zeus and those of Pythian Apollo, which Minos and Lycurgus established, and in what way their arrangement is clearly evident to one experienced in laws by art and certain customs, though to the rest of us they are by no means manifest." |
| 16.9 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν δὲ εἴρηται· «Ζητεῖτε πρῶτον τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν.» Ἀλλὰ καὶ Μώσης πολὺ πρότερον ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ θεοῦ διδασκαλίας τὴν ἀρχὴν πεποιημένος, ἐξῆς τε ἐφαρμόσας τὴν κατ’ αὐτὸν πολιτείαν καὶ τὰ περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου νόμιμα, τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄρχοντας καὶ φύλακας καθίστησι τοὺς τῷ θεῷ ἱερωμένους, ὡς καὶ τὰ λόγια διδάσκει, ἄνδρας δικαίους, μισοῦντας ὑπερηφανίαν, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας. | 16.9 [Eusebius]: And among us also it has been said: "Seek first the kingdom and righteousness, and all these things shall be added to you." [Matt 6:33] But Moses, far earlier having made his beginning from the doctrine concerning God, and subsequently fitting to it his form of government along with laws regarding contracts and common life, appointed over all things rulers and guardians dedicated to God—as the sacred oracles teach—just men, hating arrogance, some proceeding through prudence, and others through true opinion. |
Chapter 17
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato's Laws (Book I, 643b–d), where the Athenian Stranger argues that true education must begin in childhood through directed play and early training toward one's ultimate virtue or calling. Eusebius asserts that Moses established this exact principle centuries earlier in Deuteronomy (6:6–7) by commanding parents to impress God's words upon their children from an early age—a practice maintained by the Jewish people.
| 17.1 «Λέγω οὖν καί φημι τὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐκ παίδων εὐθὺς μελετᾶν παίζοντά τε καὶ σπουδάζοντα ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἑκάστοις προσήκουσιν· οἷον τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι γεωργὸν ἤ τινα οἰκοδόμον, τὸν μὲν οἰκοδομοῦντά τι τῶν παιδικῶν οἰκοδομημάτων παίζειν χρή, τὸν δ’ αὖ γεωργοῦντα, καὶ ὄργανα ἑκατέρῳ σμικρά, τῶν ἀληθινῶν μιμήματα, παρασκευάζειν τὸν τρέφοντα αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ὅσ’ ἂν ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι προμανθάνειν, οἷον τέκτονα μετρεῖν ἢ σταθμᾶσθαι, καὶ πολεμικὸν ἱππεύειν παίζοντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἄλλο ποιοῦντα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν παιδιῶν ἐκεῖσε τρέπειν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τῶν παίδων, οἷ ἀφικομένους αὐτοὺς δεῖ τέλος ἔχειν. | 17.1 [Plato, Laws I 643b–d]: "I say then, and I declare, that anyone who is going to be a good man at anything must practice that very thing right from childhood, both in play and in earnest, in all things appropriate to the matter. For instance, he who is going to be a good farmer or a builder must, on the one hand, play at building toy structures, and on the other, play at farming; and the one who rears each of them must supply small tools, copies of the real ones. And indeed, whatever necessary lessons must be learned beforehand he must learn in advance—for example, a carpenter learning to measure or weigh, and a warrior learning to ride in play or doing something else of the kind—and try through play to direct the pleasures and desires of the children whither they must go when they reach their goal. |
| 17.2 Κεφάλαιον δὴ παιδείας λέγομεν τὴν ὀρθὴν τροφήν, ἣ τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα ὅτι μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου, ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρα αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς.» | 17.2 [643d]: For we say that the chief point of education is right nurture, which will lead the soul of the child at play as much as possible toward love of that in which he will need to be a complete master in the virtue of the matter when he becomes a man." |
| 17.3 Καὶ τοῦτο προλαβὼν Μωσῆς ἐνομοθέτησεν εἰπών· «Καὶ ἔσται τὰ ῥήματα ταῦτα, ὅσα ἐγὼ ἐντέλλομαί σοι σήμερον, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ σου, καὶ προβιβάσεις αὐτὰ τοῖς υἱοῖς σου.» Ὃ δὴ καὶ πράττειν σύνηθες παισὶν Ἑβραίων, ἐξ ἁπαλῆς ἡλικίας τοὺς νέους ἅπαντας τοῖς τῆς θεοσεβείας παιδεύμασιν ἀνατρέφουσι· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ εἰς δεῦρο κατά τι πάτριον ἔθος παρὰ τῷ Ἰουδαίων ἔθνει σπουδάζεται. | 17.3 [Eusebius]: And Moses, having anticipated this, legislated saying: "And these words, which I command you today, shall be in your heart and in your soul, and you shall teach them diligently to your sons." [Deut 6:6–7] Which indeed is custom for the children of the Hebrews to do: from early youth they rear all their young in the teachings of piety; and down to this day, according to ancestral custom, this is diligently practiced among the Jewish nation. |
Chapter 18
In this chapter, Eusebius cites additional passages from Plato's Laws (Book I, 643e–644b; Book II, 653a–c) defining true education not as technical or commercial training, but as moral formation that aligns a person's emotional habits (pleasures, pains, loves, andhatreds) with reason. He then demonstrates that King David in Psalm 34 and Solomon in Proverbs taught this same principle of moral habituation—learning to turn from evil and love what is good—long before Plato.
| 18.1 «Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ’ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀόριστον γένηται. Νῦν γὰρ ὀνειδίζοντες ἐπαινοῦντές τε ἑκάστων τὰς τροφὰς λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά, τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον, ἐνίοτε εἰς τε τὰς καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τοιούτων μάλα πεπαιδευμένων σφόδρα ἀνθρώπων. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡγουμένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι παιδείαν ὁ νῦν λόγος ἂν εἴη, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. | 18.1 [Plato, Laws I 643e–644a]: "Let not that which we call education remain indefinite. For now, when censuring or praising the nurture of each person, we speak of one of us as educated and another as uneducated, even though the latter are sometimes men exceedingly educated in retail trade, ship-owning, or other such pursuits. For our present discourse, as it seems, would not regard these things as education, but rather the education directed toward virtue from childhood, which makes a person desirous and enamored of becoming a perfect citizen, knowing how to rule and be ruled with justice. |
| 18.2 Ταύτην τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ’ ἂν μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. | 18.2 [644a–b]: This nurture, having marked it off, this discourse of ours would now wish, as it seems to me, to call 'education' alone; whereas that which aims at money or power or some other cleverness apart from mind and justice, it would call vulgar and illiberal, and not at all worthy to be named education. |
| 18.3 Ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδ’ ἐν ὀνόματι διαφερώμεθα αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὁμολογηθεὶς μενέτω, ὡς οἵ γε ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν παιδείαν μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀνδράσι παραγιγνόμενον· καὶ εἴ ποτε ἐξέρχεται, δυνατὸν δέ ἐστιν ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τοῦτο ἀεὶ δραστέον διὰ βίου παντὶ κατὰ δύναμιν.» | 18.3 [644b]: But let us not quarrel over names; rather let the statement just agreed upon by us stand: that those who are rightly educated generally become good men, and that education must in no way be dishonored, as it is the primary and finest thing that comes to the best of men. And if ever it strays, but is capable of being set right, this must always be done throughout life by everyone to the best of their power." |
| 18.4 Καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ τῶν Νόμων ἐπιλέγει· «Παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγινομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μή πω δυναμένων λόγον λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὕτη ἔσθ’ ἡ συμφωνία ξύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις.» | 18.4 [Plato, Laws II 653a–c]: And in the second book of the Laws he adds: "I define education as the virtue that first comes to children: if pleasure and friendship and pain and hatred are rightly implanted in the souls of those not yet able to grasp reason, and when they do grasp reason they harmoniously agree with it that they have been rightly habituated by appropriate customs—this harmony in its entirety is virtue, but that part of it trained rightly regarding pleasures and pains, so as to hate what one ought to hate right from the beginning to the end, and to love what one ought to love, if you isolate this by reason and call it education, you would, in my view, call it rightly." |
| 18.5 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. Προλαβὼν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Δαβὶδ ἐν ψαλμῳδίαις, μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ μισεῖν καὶ στέργειν διδάσκων ἃ δεῖ στέργειν, τάδε φησί· «Δεῦτε, τέκνα, ἀκούσατέ μου· φόβον κυρίου διδάξω ὑμᾶς. Τίς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ θέλων ζωήν, ἀγαπῶν ἡμέρας ἰδεῖν ἀγαθάς; Παῦσον τὴν γλῶσσάν σου ἀπὸ κακοῦ, καὶ χείλη σου τοῦ μὴ λαλῆσαι δόλον. Ἔκκλινον ἀπὸ κακοῦ καὶ ποίησον ἀγαθόν· ζήτησον εἰρήνην καὶ δίωξον αὐτήν.» | 18.5 [Eusebius]: Thus speaks Plato. But David, having anticipated him in the Psalms, teaching to hate what ought to be hated and to love what ought to be loved, says as follows: "Come, children, listen to me; I will teach you the fear of the Lord. Who is the man who desires life, loving to see good days? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking deceit. Turn away from evil and do good; seek peace and pursue it." [Psalm 34:11–14] |
| 18.6 Καὶ ὁ Σολομῶν ὁμοίως· «Ἀκούσατε,» φησί, «παῖδες, παιδείαν πατρός· δῶρον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν δωροῦμαι ὑμῖν· τῶν ἐμῶν νόμων μὴ ἐπιλανθάνησθε.» Καὶ πάλιν· «Κτῆσαι σοφίαν, κτῆσαι σύνεσιν· μὴ ἐπιλάθῃ.» Καὶ· «Εἰπὸν τὴν σοφίαν σὴν ἀδελφὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν γνώριμον περιποίησαι σεαυτῷ.» Καὶ· «Ὁδοὺς ἀσεβῶν μὴ ἐπέλθῃς, μηδὲ ζηλώσῃς ὁδοὺς παρανόμων.» Μυρία δ’ ἂν εὕροις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς Ἑβραίων γράμμασι, παιδευτικὰ πρὸς εὐσεβείας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀνάληψιν, νέοις ὁμοῦ καὶ τελείοις τὴν ἡλικίαν προσήκοντα. | 18.6 And Solomon likewise says: "Hear, children, the instruction of a father; for I give you a good gift: do not forget my laws." [Prov 4:1–2] And again: "Acquire wisdom, acquire understanding; do not forget." [Prov 4:5] And: "Say to wisdom, 'You are my sister,' and acquire prudence as a friend for yourself." [Prov 7:4] And: "Do not enter the paths of the ungodly, nor envy the ways of the lawless." [Prov 4:14] And one could find ten thousand other such passages in the writings of the Hebrews, educational toward the attainment of piety and virtue, fitting for the young and the mature alike. |
Chapter 19
In this chapter, Eusebius cites the divine oracle given to Moses ("See that you make everything according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain," Exod 25:40) and Christian scriptural teaching regarding the earthly tabernacle as a copy of heavenly realities (Heb 8:5). He then pairs this with Plato's Republic (Book VI, 500c–501c), where Socrates describes the philosopher-statesman as a painter who gazes upon the divine archetype (θεῖον παράδειγμα) and paints human soul and society into the likeness of God (θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον).
| 19.1 τοῦ θείου χρησμοῦ φήσαντος Μωσεῖ· «Ὅρα, ποιήσεις πάντα κατὰ τὸν τύπον τὸν δειχθέντα σοι ἐν τῷ ὄρει,» τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ λόγου σαφέστερον εἰπόντος, οἵτινες «ὑποδείγματι καὶ σκιᾷ ἐλάτρευον τῶν ἐπουρανίων,» εἰκόνα τε ἄντικρυς τῶν ἐν νοητοῖς θειοτέρων τὰ παρὰ Μωσεῖ σύμβολα περιέχειν διδάσκοντος, ἐπάκουσον ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τὰ ὅμοια διερμηνεύει ἐν ἕκτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὧδε γράφων· | 19.1 [Eusebius]: When the divine oracle said to Moses: "See that you make everything according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain," [Exod 25:40] and when the holy word says even more clearly that some "served a copy and shadow of heavenly things," [Heb 8:5] directly teaching that the symbols given by Moses contain an image of divine, intelligible realities—listen to how Plato interprets the very same things, writing as follows in the sixth book of the Republic: |
| 19.2 «Θεῷ δὴ καὶ κόσμῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. | 19.2 [Plato, Republic VI 500c–d]: "For by holding converse with what is divine and orderly, the philosopher becomes orderly and divine as far as is possible for a human being; but there is great slander in everything. |
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19.3
— Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. — Ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται, ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; — Ἥκιστά γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς. |
19.3
— Altogether so, indeed. — If, then, I said, some necessity should arise for him to practice applying what he sees there to the habits of men both in private and in public life, and not merely to mold himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman of self-control, justice, and the whole of civic virtue? — Least of all, he said. |
| 19.4 — Ἀλλ’ ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι; | 19.4 — But if the many perceive that we speak the truth about him, will they be harsh with philosophers and disbelieve us when we say that a city could never otherwise be happy unless painter-craftsmen who use the divine pattern outline it? |
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19.5
— Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἐάν περ αἴσθωνται. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; — Λαβόντες, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον· |
19.5
— They will not be harsh, he said, if they perceive it. But what manner of outline do you mean? — Taking the city and the habits of men like a tablet, I said, first of all they would make it clean, which is by no means easy. |
| 19.6 ἀλλ’ οὖν οἶσθ’ ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκαιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιήσειαν. | 19.6 — But at any rate, you know that in this they would differ immediately from all others: in being unwilling to touch either an individual or a city, or to write laws, until they either received it clean or made it so themselves. |
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19.7
— Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη. — Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας; — Τί μήν; |
19.7
— And rightly so, he said. — Do you not think, then, that after this they would sketch out the form of the constitution? — Of course. |
| 19.8 — Ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ’ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον. | 19.8 — Then, I suppose, as they work, they would look frequently in both directions—toward that which is by nature just and noble and temperate and all such things, and again toward that which exists among human beings—producing the human image by mixing and blending from various pursuits, judging from that which Homer called godlike and divine when it appears among men. |
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19.9
— Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. — Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν, ἕως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν.» |
19.9
— Rightly, he said. — And they would erase one thing, I suppose, and paint in another, until they made human characters as acceptable to God as possible." |
Chapter 20
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato's Laws (Book II, 659d–660a), where the Athenian Stranger explains that educational songs serve as "incantations" (ἐπῳδαί) designed to harmonize a child's feelings of pleasure and pain with the law, camouflaged as playful songs because young souls cannot endure unmixed seriousness. Eusebius concludes that this principle explains why Hebrew children are trained from youth to sing and meditate upon the inspired Psalms and hymns composed by the divine prophets.
| 20.1 «Δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν περιφερόμενος ἥκειν, ὡς ἄρα παιδεία μέν ἐσθ’ ἡ παίδων ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθὸν εἰρημένον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις καὶ πρεσβυτάτοις δι’ ἐμπειρίαν ξυνδεδογμένον ὡς ὄντως ὀρθός ἐστιν· | 20.1 [Plato, Laws II 659d–660a]: "It seems to me that our argument has come round for a third or fourth time to the same point—that education is the drawing and leading of children toward the right reason spoken by the law, and agreed upon as truly right by the most respectable and oldest men through their experience. |
| 20.2 ἵν’ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεθειμένοις, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπηται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἷσπερ ὁ γέρων, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπῳδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἣν λέγομεν συμφωνίαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι, καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσί τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα ἐν ἡδέσι τέ τισι σιτίοις καὶ πόμασι τὴν χρηστὴν πειρῶνται τροφὴν προσφέρειν οἷς μέλει τούτων, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν ἐν ἀηδέσιν, ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται. | 20.2 In order, then, that the soul of the child may not become accustomed to feeling pleasure and pain contrary to the law and those established by the law, but may follow along, rejoicing and grieving at the very same things as the old man, for the sake of these things there have now come to be what we call 'songs'—which are really incantations for souls, earnest efforts directed toward producing this harmony we speak of. But because the souls of the young cannot bear serious exertion, they are called 'play' and 'songs' and practiced as such—just as those whose duty it is try to offer healthy nourishment to the sick and infirm in pleasant foods and drinks, but unpalatable nourishment for bad things, so that they welcome the one and are rightly accustomed to hate the other. |
| 20.3 Ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ ὀρθὸς νομοθέτης ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ ἐπαινετοῖς πείσει τε καὶ ἀναγκάσει μὴ πείθων, τὰ τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ ἀνδρείων καὶ πάντως ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισι μέλη ποιοῦντας ὀρθῶς ποιεῖν.» | 20.3 And in the same way, the true lawmaker will persuade—and compel where persuasion fails—the poet to express in fine and commendable language the postures of temperate, brave, and thoroughly good men in rhythms, and their songs in musical modes, composing them rightly." |
| 20.4 Εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν θείων προφητῶν πεποιημένας ᾠδὰς καὶ τοὺς εἰς θεὸν ὕμνους μελετᾶν οἱ παῖδες ἐθίζονται. | 20.4 [Eusebius]: Reasonably, therefore, among us as well, children are accustomed to practice the songs composed by the divine prophets and the hymns addressed to God. |
Chapter 21
In this chapter, Eusebius demonstrates how Plato's view of true happiness, wealth, and virtue parallels the Hebrew Psalms.
Vs 1-5: Eusebius quotes Plato’s Laws (Book II, 660e–662a), where the Athenian Stranger argues that poetry must teach that the just man is happy regardless of physical strength, health, or wealth. Conversely, worldly goods (wealth like Cinyras or Midas, beauty, or long life) are maximum evils to an unjust man. Plato insists that lawgivers must compel poets to align their rhythms and harmonies with this moral truth.
Vs 6: Eusebius observes that these principles directly reflect King David's Psalms. He points out that the Book of Psalms opens with the exact same distinction ("Blessed is the man who walks not in the counsel of the ungodly...", Psalm 1:1) and warns against trusting in earthly riches ("If riches flow, do not set your heart upon them", Psalm 62:10; and Psalm 49:16). He concludes that Plato's moral philosophy matches the Hebrew Scriptures nearly word for word.
| 21.1 «Τοὺς ποιητὰς ἀναγκάζετε λέγειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος, ἐάν τε μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἐάν τε σμικρὸς καὶ ἀσθενὴς ᾖ, καὶ ἐὰν πλουτῇ καὶ μή· ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ μὲν Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον, ᾖ δὲ ἄδικος, ἄθλιός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀνιαρῶς ζῇ. | 21.1 [Plato, Laws II 660e–661a]: "You compel the poets to say that the good man, being temperate and just, is happy and blessed, whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be wealthy or not; but that if he should be wealthier than Cinyras or Midas, yet be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery. |
| 21.2 Καὶ “οὔτ’ ἂν μνησαίμην,” φησὶν ὑμῖν ὁ ποιητής, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς λέγει, “οὔτ’ ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην,” ὃς μὴ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα καλὰ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης πράττοι καὶ κτῷτο, καὶ δὴ καὶ δηΐων τοιοῦτος ὢν ὀρέγοιτ’ ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενος· ἄδικος δὲ ὢν μήτε τολμῴη ὁρῶν φόνον αἱματόεντα μήτε νικῴη θέων Θρῃκιον Βορέην, μηδ’ ἄλλο αὐτῷ μηδὲν τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν γίγνοιτό ποτε· τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγεται. | 21.2 [661a–b]: And 'I would neither mention,' says your poet [Tyrtaeus], if he speaks rightly, 'nor hold in any account a man' who does not perform and acquire all called noble things with justice—and who, being such a man, does not reach out against the enemy standing close at hand; but if he be unjust, let him neither dare look upon bloody slaughter, nor defeat in running the Thracian Boreas, nor let any other of the things called good ever belong to him. For the things called good by the many are not spoken of rightly. |
| 21.3 Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος· μυρία δὲ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαισθήτως ἔχειν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τυραννοῦντα ὅ τι ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ τὸ δὴ τέλος ἁπάσης μακαριότητος εἶναι τὸ πάντα ταῦτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὅτι τάχιστα. | 21.3 [661b–c]: For it is said that health is best, beauty second, and wealth third; and ten thousand other good things are spoken of—such as keen sight and hearing and having all senses sharp, and moreover to do whatever one desires as a ruler, and indeed the crown of all blessedness, having acquired all these things, to become immortal as quickly as possible. |
| 21.4 Ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγώ που τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτά ἐστι ξύμπαντα δικαίοις μὲν καὶ ὁσίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄριστα κτήματα, ἀδίκοις δὲ κάκιστα ξύμπαντα, ἀρξάμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ παράπαν ζῆν μέγιστον μὲν κακὸν τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον ἀθάνατον ὄντα καὶ κεκτημένον πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πλὴν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης, ἔλαττον δέ, ἐὰν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῴη. | 21.4 [661c–d]: But you and I surely say this: that all these things are excellent possessions for just and holy men, but for unjust men they are altogether worst, beginning with health. Indeed, to see, hear, perceive, and live at all is the greatest evil for all time if one is immortal while possessing all the so-called goods except justice and all virtue; but a lesser evil if such a person lives for as short a time as possible. |
| 21.5 Ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν οἶμαι τοὺς παρ’ ὑμῖν ποιητὰς ἅπερ ἐγὼ πείσετε καὶ ἀναγκάσετε, καὶ ἔτι τούτοις ἑπομένους ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας ἀποδόντας παιδεύειν οὕτω τοὺς νέους ὑμῶν. Ἢ γὰρ ὁρᾶτε; Ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ λέγω σαφῶς τὰ μὲν κακὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις κακά· τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὄντως ἀγαθά, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς κακά. Ὅπερ οὖν ἠρόμην, ἆρα ξυμφωνοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἢ πῶς;» | 21.5 [661d–662a]: I suppose you will persuade and compel the poets among you to say these very things that I say, and to give them fitting rhythms and harmonies so as to educate your young in this way. For do you not see? For I state clearly that so-called evils are goods to the unjust, but evils to the just; whereas real goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the bad. As I asked then, do you and I agree, or how stands it?" |
| 21.6 Οὐ πόρρω ταῦτα τυγχάνει τῶν τοῦ Δαβὶδ ψαλμῶν, οὓς προλαβὼν θείῳ πνεύματι συνέταξε δι’ ᾠδῶν καὶ ὕμνων, τίς μὲν ὁ ἀληθῶς μακάριος, τίς δὲ ὁ τούτῳ ἐναντίος παιδεύσας. Ἐντεῦθεν γοῦν αὐτῷ καὶ κατάρχεται ἡ βίβλος φήσαντι· «Μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃς οὐκ ἐπορεύθη ἐν βουλῇ ἀσεβῶν,» καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Ἃ δὴ μεταβαλὼν ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ δεῖν τοὺς ποιητὰς λέγειν, «ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ σώφρων ὢν καὶ δίκαιος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος· ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα ᾖ ἄδικος, ἄθλιός ἐστιν.» Ἧ καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν ὁ Δαβὶδ ὧδέ πως ἐξέδωκε διὰ τῶν ψαλμῶν εἰπών· «Πλοῦτος ἐὰν ῥέῃ, μὴ προστίθεσθε καρδίαν.» Καὶ πάλιν· «Μὴ φοβοῦ ὅταν πλουτήσῃ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅταν πληθυνθῇ ἡ δόξα τοῦ οἴκου αὐτοῦ.» Ἐπιπλῆς δ’ ἂν εὕροις ἕκαστα τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ φιλοσόφῳ πρὸς λέξιν κείμενα δι’ ὅλης τῆς ἱερᾶς τῶν ψαλμῶν γραφῆς. | 21.6 [Eusebius]: These views are not far removed from the Psalms of David, which he composed beforehand under the divine Spirit through songs and hymns, teaching who is truly blessed and who is his opposite. From this very point, at any rate, his book begins, saying: "Blessed is the man who walks not in the counsel of the ungodly," [Psalm 1:1] and the like. Having recast these truths, Plato says the poets must teach "that the good man, being temperate and just, is happy and blessed; but if he be unjust, he is wretched." And David expressed this very thing again in the Psalms, saying: "If riches flow, do not set your heart upon them," [Psalm 62:10] and again: "Be not afraid when a man becomes rich, and when the glory of his house is increased." [Psalm 49:16] Abundantly, indeed, you would find each of the things spoken by the philosopher set down word for word throughout the whole of the sacred writing of the Psalms. |
Chapter 22
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Plato's recognition (Laws II 657a–b) that establishing unalterable, naturally correct musical forms requires divine sanction. He notes that the Hebrews followed this exact practice by restricting liturgical songs exclusively to those inspired by the Divine Spirit.
| 22.1 «Νομοθετικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑπερβαλλόντως. Ἀλλ’ ἕτερα φαῦλα ἂν εὕροις αὐτόθι· τοῦτο δ’ οὖν τὸ περὶ μουσικὴν ἀληθές τε καὶ ἄξιον ἐννοίας, ὅτι δυνατὸν ἄρα ἦν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετεῖσθαι βεβαίως θαρροῦντα μέλη τὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα φύσει παρεχόμενα. Τοῦτο δὲ θεοῦ ἢ θείου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς ἂν εἴη.» | 22.1 [Plato, Laws II 657a–b]: "It is legislative and political in the highest degree. But you might find other poor things there; nevertheless, this regarding music is true and worthy of reflection: that it was indeed possible to legislate confidently concerning such things—establishing melodies that naturally possess correctness. But this would belong to a god or to some divine man." |
| 22.2 Εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις νενομοθέτητο μηδὲ ἄλλους ὕμνους καὶ ᾠδὰς ἐν ταῖς θείαις διδασκαλίαις ἀποδέχεσθαι ἢ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου πνεύματος διὰ τῶν θείων καὶ προφητικῶν ἀνδρῶν πεποιημένας, τά τε τούτοις κατάλληλα μέλη τῷ συνήθει παρ’ αὐτοῖς ᾀδόμενα τρόπῳ. | 22.2 [Eusebius]: Reasonably, therefore, among the Hebrews also it was legislated not to receive any other hymns and songs into divine instruction except those composed by the Divine Spirit through holy and prophetic men, as well as the suitable melodies sung among them according to customary practice. |
Chapter 23
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato (Laws II 658e–659c) on the role of judges in the arts: critical evaluation must not bow to popular theatrical applause but must be guided by virtue, wisdom, and courage. Eusebius links this to the ancient Hebrew canonization process, where only spirit-filled judges possessed the discrimination to endorse prophetic texts and reject uninspired works.
| 23.1 «Συγχωρῶ γε τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, μάλιστα δὲ ἥτις ἕνα τὸν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ διαφέροντα. | 23.1 [Plato, Laws II 658e–659a]: "I myself grant this much to the many: that music ought to be judged by pleasure—not, however, that of just anyone, but almost that music is finest which delights the best and sufficiently educated, and especially that which delights the one individual preeminent in virtue and education. |
| 23.2 Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἀρετῆς φαμὲν δεῖσθαι τοὺς τούτων κριτάς, ὅτι τῆς τε ἄλλης μετόχους αὐτοὺς εἶναι δεῖ φρονήσεως καὶ δὴ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας. | 23.2 [659a]: On this account we say that the judges of these matters need virtue, because it is necessary that they partake not only of wisdom in general, but especially of courage. |
| 23.3 Οὔτε γὰρ παρὰ θεάτρου δεῖ τόν γε ἀληθῆ κριτὴν κρίνειν μανθάνοντα καὶ ἐκπληττόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θορύβου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀπαιδευσίας, οὔτ’ αὖ γιγνώσκοντα δι’ ἀνανδρίαν καὶ δειλίαν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος, οὗπερ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπεκαλέσατο μέλλων κρίνειν, ἐκ τούτου ψευδόμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ῥᾳθύμως τὴν κρίσιν· οὐ γὰρ μαθητής, ἀλλὰ διδάσκαλος, ὥς γε τὸ δίκαιον, θεατῶν τῶν μᾶλλον ὁ κριτὴς καθίζει, καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενος τοῖς τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ προσηκόντως μηδὲ ὀρθῶς ἀποδιδοῦσι θεαταῖς.» | 23.3 [659a–c]: For the true judge ought not to judge by learning from the audience or being overwhelmed by the noise of the crowd and his own lack of education; nor again, knowing better, out of unmanliness and cowardice, casually render a false judgment from the very mouth with which he invoked the gods when about to judge. For as is right, the judge sits not as a student but as a teacher of the spectators, opposing those viewers who render pleasure in an improper and incorrect manner." |
| 23.4 Καὶ παρ’ Ἑβραίοις τὸ παλαιὸν οὐ τοῦ πλήθους ἦν τὸ κρίνειν τοὺς ἐκ θείου πνεύματος προφερομένους λόγους καὶ τὰς ἐνθέους ᾠδάς, ἀλλ’ ἦσαν βραχεῖς καὶ σπάνιοι, μέτοχοι καὶ αὐτοὶ θείου πνεύματος διακριτικοῦ τῶν λεγομένων, οἷς καὶ μόνοις ἐξῆν ἐγκρίνειν καὶ ἀφιεροῦν τὰς προφητῶν βίβλους, τὰς δὲ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων ἀποδοκιμάζειν. | 23.4 [Eusebius]: And among the Hebrews in ancient times it was not for the crowd to judge words spoken by the Divine Spirit and inspired songs; rather, there were a few rare men, themselves partakers of the Divine Spirit discerning of what was spoken, to whom alone it was permitted to approve and sanctify the books of the prophets, and to reject those of persons not of such character. |
Chapter 24
In this chapter, Quoting Plato (Laws II 671b–672a), Eusebius presents the concept of regulated symposia, where controlled drinking under sober supervisors softens souls for moral molding and instills "divine fear" (reverence and shame). Eusebius explains that Christian and Hebrew gatherings similarly maintain modest order during devotional singing.
| 24.1 «Καὶ ὅπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐβουλήθη, ὁ τὴν τῷ τοῦ Διονύσου χορῷ βοήθειαν ἐπιδεῖξαι καλῶς λεγομένην, εἰς δύναμιν εἴρηκε. Σκοπώμεθα δὴ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτω γέγονεν. Θορυβώδης μέν που ὁ ξύλλογος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης προϊούσης τῆς πόσεως ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀεὶ ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενος, ὅπερ ὑπεθέμεθα κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι γίγνεσθαι περὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. — Ἀνάγκη. | 24.1 [Plato, Laws II 671a–b]: "And what the argument intended in the beginning—to show that the assistance to the chorus of Dionysus was rightly spoken of—it has stated according to its power. Let us consider if this has come to pass. Such a gathering is necessarily tumultuous, becoming even more so as drinking progresses, which we assumed at the beginning was necessary regarding the matters now under discussion. — Necessity indeed. |
| 24.2 — Πᾶς δέ γε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ κουφότερος αἴρεται καὶ γέγηθέ τε καὶ παρρησίας ἐμπίμπλαται καὶ ἀνηκουστίας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν πέλας, ἄρχων δ’ ἱκανὸς ἀξιοῖ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεγονέναι. — Τί μήν; | 24.2 [671b]: — And every man lifts himself lighter, rejoices, is filled with frankness, and becomes deaf to his neighbors in such a state, deeming himself a capable ruler over himself and others. — Of course. |
| 24.3 — Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν, ὅταν γίγνηται ταῦτα, καθάπερ σίδηρον, τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστ’ εὐαγώγους ξυμβαίνειν τῷ δυναμένῳ τε καὶ ἐπισταμένῳ παιδεύειν τε καὶ πλάττειν, καθάπερ ὅτ’ ἦσαν νέαι; | 24.3 [671b–c]: — Did we not say that when these things happen, the souls of the drinkers, becoming red-hot like iron, become softer and younger, so that they happen to be easily led by one able and knowledgeable in educating and molding, just as when they were young? |
| 24.4 Τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτόν, ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην, οὗ νόμους εἶναι δεῖ συμποτικούς, δυναμένους τὸν εὔελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον ἐκεῖνον γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀναισχυντότερον τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ οὐ θέλοντα τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ μούσης ὑπομένειν, ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πάντα τούτοις τἀναντία, καὶ εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν οἵους τε εἶναι μετὰ δίκης, ὃν αἰδῶ τε καὶ αἰσχύνην θεῖον φόβον ὠνομάκαμεν. — Ἔστι ταῦτα. — Τούτων δέ γε τῶν νόμων εἶναι νομοφύλακας καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας.» | 24.4 [671c–672a]: — And that this molder is the same good lawgiver as then, whose symposiastic laws must be capable of causing that man who becomes hopeful, confident, and overly shameless, unwilling to endure order and his proper turn of silence, speech, drinking, and music, to be willing to do all the opposite of these—and capable of sending in with justice that finest counter-fighting fear to oppose incoming dishonorable confidence, which divine fear we have named reverence and shame. — That is so. — And as guardians and co-creators of these laws, there must be sober and untroubled men." |
| 24.5 Εἰκότως τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾠδὰς καὶ ὕμνους εἰς θεὸν πεποιημένους ᾄδειν παραδέδοται, τοῦ προσήκοντος κόσμου τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν φυλάκων ἐπιμελομένων. | 24.5 [Eusebius]: Reasonably, therefore, it has been handed down to us as well at banquets to sing songs and hymns composed to God, with the guardians among us taking care for appropriate order. |
Chapter 25
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Plato (Laws II 673e–674c) advocating strict restrictions on wine consumption—prohibiting its use for soldiers on campaign, slaves, magistrates while in office, judges, council members, and during daytime or procreation. Eusebius shows that Moses anticipated these principles by forbidding priests from drinking wine while serving in the Tabernacle (Lev 10:8–9) and regulating Nazarite vows (Num 6:2–3). He adds that Solomon warned rulers against wine (Prov 31:4–5), and Paul similarly restricted Timothy’s wine usage strictly to medical necessity (1 Tim 5:23).
| 25.1 «Εἰ μέν τις πόλις, ὡς οὔσης σπουδῆς, τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι τῷ νῦν εἰρημένῳ χρήσεται μετὰ νόμων καὶ τάξεως, ὡς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν εἵνεκα μελέτῃ χρωμένη, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν μὴ ἀφέξεται ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τοῦ κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μηχανωμένη, τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ἅπασι τούτοις χρηστέον· εἰ δ’ ὡς παιδιᾷ τε, καὶ ἐξέσται τῷ βουλομένῳ, καὶ ὅταν βούληται, καὶ μεθ’ ὧν ἂν βούληται, πίνειν μετ’ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὧντινωνοῦν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν τιθείμην ταύτην τὴν ψῆφον, ὡς δεῖ ποτε μέθῃ χρῆσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων χρείας προσθείμην ἂν τῷ Καρχηδονίων νόμῳ, μηδέποτε μηδένα ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου γεύεσθαι τοῦτου τοῦ πόματος, ἀλλ’ ὑδροποσίαις συγγίγνεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν μήτε δοῦλον μήτε δούλην γεύεσθαι μηδέποτε, μηδὲ ἄρχοντας τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ὃν ἂν ἄρχωσι, μηδ’ αὖ κυβερνήτας μηδὲ δικαστὰς ἐνεργοὺς ὄντας οἴνου γεύεσθαι τὸ παράπαν, μηδὲ ὅστις βουλευσόμενος εἰς βουλὴν ἀξίαν τινὰ λόγου συνέρχεται, μηδέ γε μεθ’ ἡμέραν μηδένα τὸ παράπαν, εἰ μὴ σωμασκίας ἢ νόσων ἕνεκα, μηδ’ αὖ νύκτωρ, ὅταν ἐπινοῇ τις παῖδας ποιεῖσθαι ἀνὴρ ἢ καὶ γυνή. Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πάμπολλα ἄν τις λέγοι, ὡς τοῖς νοῦν τε καὶ νόμον ἔχουσιν ὀρθὸν οὐ ποτέον οἶνος, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐδ’ ἀμπελώνων ἂν πολλῶν δέοι οὐδ’ ᾗτινι πόλει, τακτὰ δὲ τἄλλα ἂν εἴη γεωργήματα καὶ πᾶσα ἡ δίαιτα.» | 25.1 [Plato, Laws II 673e–674c]: "If any city shall use the practice now mentioned with laws and order as a serious matter, employing it as a exercise for the sake of temperance, and shall not abstain from other pleasures in like manner and by the same reasoning, devising means to master them—this way all these things must be used. But if as play, and it shall be permitted to whoever wishes, whenever he wishes, and with whomever he wishes, to drink alongside whatever other practices, I would not give my vote that this city or this man should ever use drunkenness. Rather, even more than the practice of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, I would add to the law of the Carthaginians: that no one on a military camp should ever taste this drink, but abide in water-drinking for that entire time; and in the city that neither male nor female slave ever taste it, nor magistrates during the year in which they govern, nor again helmsmen or judges while on duty taste wine at all; nor anyone coming together to a council worthy of account to deliberate; nor anyone at all during the day, except for physical exercise or sickness; nor again by night, when a man or woman intends to beget children. And one could mention very many other reasons why wine is not to be drunk by those who possess mind and right law; so that according to this reasoning, no city would need many vineyards, but all other agricultural products and the whole lifestyle would be regulated." |
| 25.2 Καὶ Μωσῆς δὲ προλαβὼν μὴ δεῖν τοὺς ἱερέας οἴνου ἀπογεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἱερουργίας καιρόν, νομοθετεῖ φάσκων· «Καὶ ἐλάλησε κύριος τῷ Ἀαρὼν λέγων· Ὀἶνον καὶ σίκερα οὐ πίεσθε σὺ καὶ οἱ υἱοί σου μετὰ σοῦ, ἡνίκα ἂν εἰσπορεύησθε εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν τοῦ μαρτυρίου ἢ προσπορευομένων ὑμῶν πρὸς τὸ θυσιαστήριον, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀποθάνητε· νόμιμον αἰώνιον εἰς τὰς γενεὰς ὑμῶν.» Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ τοῖς εὐχὴν εὐχομένοις νομοθετεῖ λέγων· «Ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, ὃς ἂν μεγάλως εὔξηται εὐχὴν ἀφαγνίσασθαι ἁγνείαν κυρίῳ, ἀπὸ οἴνου καὶ σίκερα ἁγνισθήσεται, καὶ ὄξος ἐξ οἴνου καὶ ὄξος ἐκ σίκερα οὐ πίεται.» Ἀλλὰ καὶ Σολομῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς εἴργει τῆς χρήσεως, λέγων· «Μετὰ βουλῆς πάντα ποίει, μετὰ βουλῆς οἰνοπότει. Οἱ δυνάσται θυμώδεις εἰσίν, οἶνον μὴ πινέτωσαν, ἵνα μὴ πιόντες ἐπιλάθωνται τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν πόνων.» Καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος δὲ νόσων ἕνεκα ἐπιτρέπει Τιμοθέῳ λέγων· «Ὀλίγῳ οἴνῳ χρῶ διὰ τὸν στόμαχόν σου καὶ τὰς πυκνάς σου ἀσθενείας.» | 25.2 [Eusebius]: And Moses, having anticipated that priests must not taste wine at the time of sacred service, legislates saying: "And the Lord spoke to Aaron, saying: Wine and strong drink you shall not drink, you and your sons with you, whenever you enter into the tabernacle of testimony or when approaching the altar, so that you do not die—a perpetual law throughout your generations." [Lev 10:8–9] And the same prophet legislates for those taking a vow, saying: "A man or a woman, whoever shall grandly vow a vow to purify themselves in purity to the Lord, shall be purified from wine and strong drink, and vinegar from wine and vinegar from strong drink he shall not drink." [Num 6:2–3] Nay, Solomon also restrains rulers and judges from its use, saying: "Do everything with counsel; drink wine with counsel. Rulers are passionate; let them not drink wine, lest in drinking they forget wisdom and labor." [Prov 31:4–5 Septuagint variant] And the Apostle permits it to Timothy for sickness, saying: "Use a little wine for your stomach's sake and your frequent infirmities." [1 Tim 5:23] |
Chapter 26
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Plato (Republic VI 499c–d) asserting that the realization of the ideal, philosophy-governed state is not impossible, whether in the past, present (in some distant "barbarian" region), or future, whenever the Muse of philosophy gains control over a city.
| 26.1 «Εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ὄψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία, καὶ ἔστι, καὶ γενήσεταί γε, ὅταν αὐτὴ ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. Οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.» | 26.1 [Plato, Republic VI 499c–d]: "If then there is some necessity for those who are preeminent in philosophy to take charge of a city—whether it has occurred in the boundless past time, or is even now the case in some barbarian place far out of our sight, or will happen hereafter—we are ready to contend in argument for this: that the state mentioned has existed, does exist, and will indeed come to be whenever this Muse herself becomes master of a city. For it is not impossible to come into being, nor do we speak of impossible things." |
Chapter 27
In this chapter, Quoting Plato (Laws I 626d–645b), Eusebius presents the concept of the internal struggle: conquering oneself is the greatest victory, while being conquered by oneself is the worst defeat. Plato describes human passions as opposing cords pulling us toward virtue or vice, with the "golden and sacred cord of reason" (the public law) being the gentle guide we must follow. Eusebius links this directly to the Pauline doctrine of internal spiritual warfare (Rom 7:22–23; 2:15).
| 27.1 «— Αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; — Ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἐθέλοιμ’ ἂν προσαγορεύειν· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐπονομάζεσθαι· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον ἐποίησας, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἀνευρήσεις ὅτι νῦν δὴ ὀρθῶς ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἐρρέθη τὸ πολεμίους εἶναι πάντας πᾶσι δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστους αὐτοὺς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. | 27.1 [Plato, Laws I 626d–e]: "— But how ought one to consider oneself in relation to oneself—as an enemy toward an enemy, or how else do we put it? — O Athenian Stranger—for I should not wish to call you a Crotian; for you seem to me rather to deserve being named after the goddess Athena; for having rightly brought the argument back to the beginning, you have made it clearer, so that you will more easily find that what was just said by us was correct: that all are enemies to all, publicly and privately, each individually to themselves. |
| 27.2 — Πῶς εἴρηκας, ὦ θαυμάσιε; — Κἀνταῦθα, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νικᾶν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν πασῶν νικῶν πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρίστη, τὸ δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε ἅμα καὶ κάκιστον. Ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πολέμου ἐν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σημαίνει.» | 27.2 [626e–627a]: — How do you mean, marvelous man? — Even here, Stranger, to conquer oneself is of all victories the first and best, while to be conquered by oneself is of all things the most shameful and worst. For these expressions signify that a war against ourselves exists within each of us." |
| 27.3 Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερα τούτοις προστίθησι λέγων· «Οὐκοῦν ἕνα μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον αὑτὸν τιθῶμεν; — Ναί. — Δύο δὲ κεκτημένον ἐν αὑτῷ ξυμβούλω ἐναντίω τε καὶ ἄφρονε, ὼ προσαγορεύομεν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην; — Ἔστι ταῦτα. — Πρὸς δὲ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν αὖ δόξας μελλόντων, οἷν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις λογισμὸς ὅ τί ποτ’ αὐτῶν ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον, ὃς γενόμενος δόγμα πόλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται.» | 27.3 [644c–d]: And after other matters he adds to these, saying: "— Shall we then set each one of us down as a single unit? — Yes. — But possessing in himself two foolish and opposing counselors, which we call pleasure and pain? — That is so. — And in addition to these two, again, opinions of future things, of which the common name is 'expectation', and the specific name for expectation before pain is 'fear', and 'confidence' for expectation before its opposite. And over all these is reason, deciding whatever among them is better or worse, which, when it becomes the common decree of a city, is named 'law'." |
| 27.4 Καὶ ἐξῆς φησιν· «Τόδε δ’ ἴσμεν, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῖν οἷον νεῦρα ἢ σμήρινθοί τινες ἐνοῦσαι σπῶσί τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ἐναντίαι οὖσαι ἐπ’ ἐναντίας πράξεις, οὗ δὴ διωρισμένη ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία κεῖται. Μιᾷ γάρ φησιν ὁ λόγος δεῖν τῶν ἕλξεων ξυνεπόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ μηδαμῇ ἀπολειπόμενον ἐκείνης ἀνθέλκειν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεύροις ἕκαστον, ταύτην δ’ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀγωγὴν χρυσῆν καὶ ἱεράν, τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν νόμον ἐπικαλουμένην, ἄλλας δὲ σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηρᾶς, τὴν δὲ μαλακὴν ἅτε χρυσῆν οὖσαν, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας παντοδαποῖς εἴδεσιν ὁμοίας· δεῖν δὲ τῇ καλλίστῃ ἀγωγῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀεὶ ξυλλαμβάνειν· ἅτε γὰρ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καλοῦ μὲν ὄντος, πράου τε καὶ οὐ βιαίου, δεῖσθαι ὑπηρετῶν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀγωγὴν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ χρυσοῦν γένος νικᾷ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ περὶ θαυμάτων ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν μῦθος ἀρετῆς σεσωσμένος ἂν εἴη, καὶ τὸ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἥττω εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ φανερὸν ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον ὃ νοεῖ, καὶ ὅτι πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτην, τὸν μὲν λόγον ἀληθῆ λαβόντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ περὶ τῶν ἕλξεων τούτῳ ἑπόμενον δεῖ ζῆν· | 27.4 [644d–645b]: And next he says: "— But this we know: that these passions in us, like cords or strings existing within, drag us and pull against one another, being opposite, toward opposite actions, where indeed the distinction between virtue and vice lies. For reason says that each person ought always to follow one of these pullings and never abandon it, but pull against the other cords; and that this is the golden and sacred guidance of reason, called the common law of the city, while the others are hard and iron, but this one is soft as it is golden, whereas the others resemble all kinds of forms. And one must always assist the finest guidance of the law; for since reason is beautiful, gentle, and unviolent, its guidance needs helpers, so that the golden race in us may conquer the other races. And thus the myth concerning us as puppets would be preserved for virtue, and the meaning of being stronger or weaker than oneself would become clearer in a way, and that both city and private individual—the individual having received in himself the true logos concerning these pullings, ought to live following it; |
| 27.5 πόλιν δὲ ἢ παρὰ θεῶν τινὸς ἢ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τούτου γνόντος ταῦτα λόγον παραλαβοῦσαν, νόμον θεμένην, αὑτῇ τε ὁμιλεῖν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν· οὕτω κακία δὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ σαφέστερον ἡμῖν διηρθρωμένον ἂν εἴη.» | 27.5 [645b]: and the city, having received this logos either from some god or from this very person who understood these things, having established it as law, ought to conduct itself both internally and with other cities. Thus vice and virtue would be articulated more clearly for us." |
| 27.6 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος τὰ ὅμοια διδάσκει λόγος φάσκων· «Συνήδομαι δὲ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου,» καὶ πάλιν· «μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων,» ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις παραπλήσια. | 27.6 [Eusebius]: And among us, the divine word teaches similar things, saying: "For I delight in the law of God according to the inward man, but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind," [Rom 7:22–23] and again: "their thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another," [Rom 2:15] and whatever other passages are similar to these. |
Chapter 28
In this chapter, Eusebius cites Plato (Laws X 896c–d) establishing that the soul is prior and superior to the physical body, making it the primary cause of good, evil, justice, and injustice. Eusebius shows that Moses held the exact same view of the soul's moral agency and responsibility as reflected in scriptural legislation (e.g., Lev 5:1).
| 28.1 «— Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα τοῦ σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαι τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γέγονεν ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος. — Ἀνάγκη. | 28.1 [Plato, Laws X 896c–d]: "— We surely remember having agreed in the former discussions that if the soul should appear to be older than the body, then the things of the soul would also be older than those of the body. — Most certainly. — Then ways, dispositions, wishes, reasonings, true opinions, cares, and memories would have come into being prior to the length, breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, if indeed soul is prior to body. — Necessarily so. |
| 28.2 — Ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;» Καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεκάτου τῶν Νόμων προκείσθω. Συνᾴδει δὲ αὐτοῖς ὁ Μωϋσῆς πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς νόμοις εἰπών· «Καὶ ἐὰν ψυχὴ ἁμάρτῃ καὶ ποιήσῃ πλημμέλημα,» καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἐμφερῶς εἴρηται παρ’ αὐτῷ. | 28.2 [896c–d]: — Is it not then necessary after this to agree that the soul is the cause of good things and evil, of beautiful and shameful, of just and unjust, and of all opposites, if indeed we shall posit it as the cause of all things?" And let these passages be set forth from the tenth book of the Laws. And Moses agrees with them, often saying in the laws: "And if a soul shall sin and commit a trespass," [Lev 5:1] along with whatever is stated similarly by him. |
Chapter 29
In this chapter, Eusebius demonstrates how Plato’s description of the true philosopher aligns with Hebrew Scripture concerning ascetic devotion, detachment from worldly affairs, and divine assimilation (homoiosis theoi):
vs 1: Eusebius opens by referencing Jeremiah (Lamentations 3:27–28) regarding the soul bearing a yoke in youth and sitting alone in silence, and notes how Hebrew prophets lived isolated lives in mountains and caves to focus solely on God. He introduces Plato as expressing this same ideal.
vs 2-11: Quoting the famous "Digression" from Plato's Theaetetus (172c–175e), Plato describes the true philosopher (the "philosophical leader"). Such thinkers do not know the way to the marketplace, courts, or political assemblies, and remain ignorant of civic gossip, noble lineage, or wealth. While their physical bodies reside in the city, their minds roam the cosmos ("measuring what is below the earth and above the heavens"). Plato illustrates this with the famous anecdote of Thales falling into a well while stargazing, drawing the mockery of a clever Thracian maid—a status shared by all philosophers who appear inept in daily affairs.
vs 12–13: When the worldly man (the sharp, litigious mind) is drawn upward into abstract discussions on justice, injustice, and human happiness, the roles invert: the worldly lawyer staggers, grows dizzy, stammers, and appears foolish to free men.
vs 14–21: Plato states that evil cannot be eradicated from the mortal realm, making it necessary to escape to the divine realm as quickly as possible. This escape is defined as assimilation to God (homoiosis theoi) through justice, holiness, and wisdom. True strength lies in moral uprightness, whereas cunning without virtue is mere ignorance. Those who practice injustice are punished by being conformed to the pattern of the ungodly, carrying their miserable nature into both this life and the next.
| 29.1 Τῆς παρ’ Ἑβραίοις γραφῆς περὶ τοῦ σπουδῇ φιλοσοφοῦντος φασκούσης· «Ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ ὅταν ἄρῃ ζυγὸν ἐν νεότητι αὐτοῦ· καθήσεται κατὰ μόνας, καὶ σιωπήσεται, ὅτι ᾖρεν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ.» Καὶ περὶ τῶν θεοφιλῶν προφητῶν, ὡς ἄρα δι’ ἀκρότητα φιλοσοφίας ἐν ἐρημίαις καὶ ὄρεσι καὶ σπηλαίοις διῆγον, πρὸς μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντες, ἐπάκουσον τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὅπως καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν τοιόνδε τοῦ βίου τρόπον ἐκθειάζει, ὧδέ πῃ περὶ τοῦ ἄκρως φιλοσοφοῦντος διεξιών· | 29.1 [Eusebius]: While the Hebrew Scripture says concerning the earnest philosopher: "It is good for a man when he bears a yoke in his youth; he shall sit alone and keep silence, because he has taken it upon himself," [Lam 3:27–28] and concerning the God-beloved prophets, that because of the height of their philosophy they passed their lives in deserts, mountains, and caves, having their minds fixed on God alone—listen to Plato, how he himself exalts such a way of life, discoursing somewhere thus concerning the supreme philosopher: |
| 29.2 «— Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τούς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφία λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον, ἢ βουλευτήριον, ἤ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔθ’ ὁρῶσιν οὔτ’ ἀκούουσι. Σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ’ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. | 29.2 [Plato, Theaetetus 172c–e]: "— Let us speak then, as it seems, since it pleases you, concerning the leaders; for why should anyone speak of those who spend their time poorly in philosophy? These men, surely, from their youth first of all do not know the way to the marketplace, nor where the court is, or the council-chamber, or any other common assembly of the city; and laws and decrees, spoken or written, they neither see nor hear. The eager strivings of political clubs for office, gatherings, dinners, and revels with flute-girls—it does not enter their minds even in a dream to engage in them. |
| 29.3 Εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τί γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῳ κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάσσης λεγόμενοι χόες. Καὶ ταῦτα πάντα οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ πέταται, κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν ἑαυτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. | 29.3 [173d–e]: Whether anything has gone well or ill in the city, or what evil has come to someone from his ancestors, whether men or women, escapes him more than the gallons of the sea, as the saying goes. And all these things he does not even know that he does not know; for he does not abstain from them for the sake of good repute, but in reality his body alone lies and resides in the city, while his mind, considering all these things small and worth nothing, disdaining them, flies everywhere, according to Pindar, measuring the things beneath the earth and upon its surface, stargazing above the sky, and searching out the whole nature of every existing thing in its entirety, lowering itself to nothing near at hand. |
| 29.4 — Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; — Ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. | 29.4 [174a]: — How do you mean this, Socrates? — Just as a witty and charming Thracian maidservant is said to have mocked Thales, Theodore, when he was stargazing and looking upward and fell into a well, saying that he was eager to know the things in heaven, but what was before him and at his feet escaped him. |
| 29.5 Ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. Τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι πράττει, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δέ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματα ἔχει διερευνώμενος. Μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἢ οὔ; | 29.5 [174a–c]: The same jest suffices for all who spend their lives in philosophy. For in reality such a man is unaware of his neighbor and fellow citizen—not only what he does, but almost whether he is a human being or some other creature. But what man is, and what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from others, he seeks out and takes trouble investigating. For you understand, Theodore, or do you not? |
| 29.6 — Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. — Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θρᾴτταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. | 29.6 [174c]: — I do, and you speak the truth. — Therefore, my friend, when such a man associates with each person individually and publicly, as I was saying at the beginning, whenever he is forced in court or somewhere else to converse about what is at his feet and before his eyes, he provides laughter not only to Thracian women but to the rest of the crowd, falling into wells and every perplexity through inexperience; and his awkwardness is terrible, giving an impression of stupidity. |
| 29.7 Ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἔν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἔνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. | 29.7 [174c–e]: For in verbal abuses he has nothing personal to insult anyone with, since he knows no evil of anyone from lack of practice; being at a loss, therefore, he appears ridiculous. And in praises and the boastings of others, not pretending but being openly seen to laugh, he seems to be a babbler. |
| 29.8 Τύραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν νομέων, οἷον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἤ τινα βουκόλον, ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῷον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· | 29.8 [174e–175a]: For when a tyrant or king is praised, he thinks he is hearing one of the herdsmen—such as a swineherd, shepherd, or cowherd—being congratulated for drawing much milk; but he considers that tyrants herd and milk an animal more difficult and treacherous than those. |
| 29.9 ἄγροικον δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἧττον τῶν νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. Γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ, ὅστις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθη κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν, εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. | 29.9 [175a–b]: And such a ruler, he thinks, necessarily becomes boorish and uneducated through lack of leisure no less than the herdsmen, walled in his mountain pen. And when he hears of ten thousand acres of land or even more as a marvelous amount of property, it seems very small to hear, accustomed as he is to looking at the entire earth. |
| 29.10 Τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὁρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν, οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὁτῳοῦν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων, ἢ καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος, ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ’ Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἵα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχῃ, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ, οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. | 29.10 [175b–d]: And when they sing the praises of lineages, how noble someone is for being able to show seven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks the praise belongs to people seeing altogether dimly and on a small scale, unable through lack of education to look always at the whole, nor to calculate that myriads of grandfathers and ancestors have existed for every person, among whom rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks have often been ten thousand in number for anyone. But when men pride themselves on a catalog of twenty-five ancestors, or trace themselves back to Heracles son of Amphitryon, it appears absurd to him because of their petty calculation—that the twenty-fifth ancestor above Amphitryon was whatever sort of person he happened to be by fortune, and the fiftieth above him; he laughs at their inability to calculate and free the foolish soul of vanity. |
| 29.11 Ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ’ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορῶν. — Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. | 29.11 [175d–e]: In all these matters, then, such a person is laughed at by the many, appearing arrogant on the one hand, as it seems, and on the other hand ignorant of what is at his feet and perplexed in every detail. — You describe altogether what happens, Socrates. |
| 29.12 — Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ «τί ἐγώ σε ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ;» εἰς σκέψιν αὖ τῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ «εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τε αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον,» ἢ βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπίσκεψιν, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν· περὶ πάντων τούτων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα Θρᾴτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει, οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσι πᾶσιν. | 29.12 [175e–176a]: — But whenever he himself drags someone upward, my friend, and one is willing to step out from 'How do I wrong you or you me?' into the consideration of justice and injustice itself, what each of them is and how they differ from all things or from each other; or from 'whether a king is happy having much gold' to an examination concerning kingship and human happiness and misery in general, what sort of things they are and in what way it belongs to human nature to acquire the one and avoid the other—concerning all these things, when that small, sharp, legal mind must again render an account, he in turn gives the reverse: dizzy from hanging at a high altitude and looking suspended from above out of unfamiliarity, dismayed, perplexed, and stammering, he provides laughter not to Thracian women, nor to any other uneducated person—for they do not notice—but to all who have been raised in a manner opposite to slaves. |
| 29.13 Οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι, μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ’ αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἐλευθέρως, οὐδ’ ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. | 29.13 [175e–176a]: This then is the character of each, Theodore: the one raised in reality in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher, for whom it is unblameworthy to appear simple and worth nothing when he falls into slavish services—such as not knowing how to pack a bed-roll, or season a dish, or deliver flattering speeches; the other able to serve all such things sharply and keenly, but not knowing how to throw his cloak over his right shoulder like a free man, nor having mastered the harmony of speeches to rightly hymn the true life of gods and happy men. |
| 29.14 — Εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ’ ἀνθρώπους εἴη. — Ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. | 29.14 [176a–b]: — If you persuaded all men, Socrates, of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among human beings. — But it is impossible for evils to be destroyed, Theodore; for there must always be something opposed to the good; nor can they be established among the gods, but they haunt mortal nature and this region of necessity. |
| 29.15 Διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. Φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ’ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι. | 29.15 [176b–c]: Wherefore it is necessary to attempt to flee from here to there as quickly as possible. And flight is assimilation to God as far as possible; and assimilation is to become just and holy with wisdom. But indeed, my good sir, it is not altogether easy to persuade men that not for the reasons the many say—that one ought to flee vice and pursue virtue so that one may not seem bad and may seem good—for these reasons the one is to be practiced and the other not, so that one may not seem bad and may seem good. |
| 29.16 Ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. Θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. Περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἡ οὐδένειά τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. | 29.16 [176c–d]: For these things are the so-called old wives' babble, as it appears to me. But let us state the truth thus: God is in no way unjust, but as just as possible, and there is nothing more like Him than whichever of us becomes as just as possible. Concerning this lies the true capability of a man, as well as his worthlessness and unmanliness. |
| 29.17 Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. Τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ’ ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. | 29.17 [176d–177a]: For the knowledge of this is true wisdom and virtue, while ignorance of it is manifest ignorance and vice. Other apparent capabilities and wisdoms appearing in political power become vulgar, and in arts, craft-like. To the one acting unjustly and saying or doing impious things, it is by far best not to concede that he is clever through villainy. |
| 29.18 Ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ’ ἄνδρες οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. Λεκτέον οὖν τἀληθές, ὅτι τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται. Ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν. | 29.18 [177a–b]: For they glory in the reproach, and think they hear that they are no babblers, mere burdens on the earth, but men such as ought to exist in a city to be saved. The truth must therefore be told: that they are so much more what they do not think they are, precisely because they do not think it. For they are ignorant of the penalty of injustice, which one ought least of all to be ignorant of. For it is not what they think—stripes and death, which they sometimes suffer doing no wrong—but a penalty impossible to escape. |
| 29.19 — Τίνα δὴ λέγεις; — Παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι, | 29.19 [176e–177a]: — Which penalty do you mean? — Patterns, my friend, standing in reality—the divine pattern most happy, and the godless most miserable; not seeing that this is so, through stupidity and extreme folly they do not notice that they are becoming like the one through unjust actions, and unlike the other, |
| 29.20 οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην, ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται. Ἂν δὲ εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιότητα διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται. | 29.20 [177a–b]: for which they pay the penalty, living the life conforming to that which they resemble. And if we say that unless they are freed from their cleverness, even when they die that place pure of evils will not receive them, but here they will always hold the likeness of their conduct, evil men associating with evil men—these things they will hear altogether as clever and villainous men hearing from some fools. |
| 29.21 — Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες. — Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. Ἓν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν· ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι, καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν.» | 29.21 [177b–c]: — Very much so, Socrates. — I know it, my companion. One thing, however, happens to them: whenever they must individually give and receive an account concerning what they criticize, and are willing manfully to endure for a long time and not run away unmanfully, then strangely, my good sir, in the end they are not pleased with themselves concerning what they say, and that rhetoric somehow fades away, so that they seem no different from children." |
Chapter 30
In this chapter, Eusebius pairs Platonic principles with parallel biblical passages (Paul, Proverbs, Psalms, Deuteronomy, Exodus), contrasting worldly wisdom with divine wisdom, condemning greed, and advocating detachment from political power and assimilation to God.
| 30.1 Καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν περὶ πάσης τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις σοφιστείας εἴρηται· «Ἡ γὰρ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστί. Γέγραπται γάρ· Ἀπολῶ τὴν σοφίαν τῶν σοφῶν, καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν τῶν συνετῶν ἀθετήσω. Ποῦ σοφός; Ποῦ γραμματεύς; Ποῦ συζητητὴς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου;» | 30.1 [Eusebius]: And among us it has been said concerning all human sophistry: "For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and I will set aside the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this age?" [1 Cor 1:19–20, 3:19] |
| 30.2 Ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δεῖν μηδὲν σμικρολόγον φρονεῖν τοὺς κατὰ θεὸν φιλοσοφοῦντας διδασκόμεθα ἐν οἷς εἴρηται· «Σκοπούντων ἡμῶν οὐ τὰ βλεπόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα· τὰ γὰρ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα αἰώνια.» | 30.2 But also regarding the principle that those who philosophize according to God must entertain no petty thoughts, we are taught in the passages where it is said: "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporary, but the things which are not seen are eternal." [2 Cor 4:18] |
| 30.3 Καὶ περὶ τοῦ τὴν κακίαν περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν θνητὸν βίον εἰλεῖσθαί φησί που ὁ θεῖος λόγος· «Ἐξαγοραζόμενοι τὸν καιρόν, ὅτι αἱ ἡμέραι πονηραί εἰσιν.» Καὶ «Ἀρκετὸν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἡ κακία αὐτῆς.» Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ προφήτης· «Ἀρὰ καὶ κλοπὴ καὶ μοιχεία καὶ φόνος κέχυται ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ αἵματα ἐφ’ αἵμασι μίσγουσι.» | 30.3 And concerning evil hovering around the earth and mortal life, the divine word says somewhere: "Redeeming the time, because the days are evil." [Eph 5:16] And: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." [Matt 6:34] And the prophet also says: "Cursing and theft and adultery and murder are poured out upon the land, and blood touches blood." [Hosea 4:2] |
| 30.4 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ φεύγειν ἐνθένδε παρὰ τὸν θεόν φησιν ὁ Μωϋσῆς· «Ὀπίσω κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ σου πορεύσῃ, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν κολληθήσῃ.» Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν διδάσκει λέγων· «Ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν ἅγιός ἐστι.» | 30.4 And concerning fleeing from here to God, Moses says: "You shall walk after the Lord your God, and to Him you shall cleave." [Deut 13:4] And the same writer teaches us to imitate God, saying: "You shall be holy, for the Lord our God is holy." [Lev 19:2] |
| 30.5 Δίκαιον δὲ καὶ ὁ Δαυὶδ τὸν θεὸν εἰδὼς ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς μιμητὰς γενέσθαι παρορμῶν φησι· «Δίκαιος κύριος, καὶ δικαιοσύνας ἠγάπησεν.» Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς πλούτου καταφρονεῖν ἐπαίδευσε λέγων· «Πλοῦτος ἐὰν ῥέῃ, μὴ προστίθεσθε καρδίαν.» Καὶ «Μὴ φοβοῦ ὅταν πλουτήσῃ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅταν πληθυνθῇ ἡ δόξα τοῦ οἴκου αὐτοῦ· ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν αὐτὸν λήψεται τὰ πάντα, οὐδὲ συγκαταβήσεται αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα αὐτοῦ.» | 30.5 And David, knowing that God is just and urging us to become imitators of Him, says: "The Lord is just, and He has loved justice." [Ps 11:7] And he himself instructed us to despise wealth, saying: "If riches flow in, do not set your heart upon them." [Ps 62:10] And: "Be not afraid when a man becomes rich, and when the glory of his house is increased; for in his death he shall take nothing away, nor shall his glory descend with him." [Ps 49:16–17] |
| 30.6 Ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρχὰς θαυμάζειν ἐδίδασκεν ἐν τούτοις· «Μὴ πεποίθατε ἐπ’ ἄρχοντας, ἐφ’ υἱοὺς ἀνθρώπων, οἷς οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρία. Ἐξελεύσεται τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπελεύσεται εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ· ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπολοῦνται πάντες οἱ διαλογισμοὶ αὐτοῦ.» | 30.6 Nor indeed did he teach us to admire human rulers, in these words: "Put not your trust in princes, nor in the sons of men, in whom there is no salvation. His spirit shall go forth, and he shall return to his earth; in that day all his thoughts shall perish." [Ps 146:3–4] |
Chapter 31
In this chapter, citing Plato's Laws (Book 2), Eusebius notes Plato's approval of noble falsehoods (educational allegories) for civic virtue, comparing this to anthropomorphic descriptions of God in Scripture (e.g., God sleeping, showing jealousy, or feeling anger).
| 31.1 [Πλάτων, Νόμων Β] «— Νομοθέτης δὲ οὗ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ᾕρηκ’ ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὅ τι τούτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν ἐψεύσατό ποτε καὶ δυνάμενον μᾶλλον ποιεῖν μὴ βίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἑκόντας πάντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια; — Καλὸν μὲν ἀλήθεια, ὦ ξένε, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πείθειν.» | 31.1 [Plato, Laws 2, 663d–e]: "— A lawgiver of even small utility, even if the matter were not as our argument has now established it to be, if he dared to tell a falsehood to the young for their good in any other matter, could he ever have told a lie more profitable than this, or one more capable of causing all men to do all just things willingly rather than by force? — Truth, O stranger, is a noble thing and an enduring one; yet it seems not easy to persuade men of it." |
| 31.2 Μυρία δ’ ἂν εὕροις τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς Ἑβραίων γραφαῖς, ὡς ἂν περὶ θεοῦ ζηλοῦντος, ἢ ὑπνοῦντος, ἢ ὀργιζομένου, ἤ τισιν ἄλλοις ἀνθρωποπαθέσιν ἐνεχομένου ἐπ’ ὠφελείᾳ τῶν δεομένων τοῦ τοιοῦδε τρόπου παρειλημμένα. | 31.2 [Eusebius]: And you may find ten thousand such things in the Scriptures of the Hebrews, introduced for the benefit of those needing such a mode of instruction—as when speaking of God as being jealous, or sleeping, or becoming angry, or being subject to other human passions. |
Chapter 32
In this chapter, quoting Plato's Republic (Book 5), Eusebius highlights Plato's view that women share the same essential capacities for virtue, study, and civic leadership as men (differing only in relative physical strength). He links this to the universal reach of Hebrew education, which welcomes all classes, sexes, and ethnicities.
| 32.1 [Πλάτων, Νόμων Β] «— Ἄρ’ οὖν ἡμῖν τά γε ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογεῖται; — Τοῦ πέρι; — Τὸ δεῖν πάντα ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα, ἐλεύθερον καὶ δοῦλον, θῆλύν τε καὶ ἄρρενα, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ ἐπᾴδουσαν μὴ παύεσθαί ποτε ταῦτα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, ἁμωσγέπως ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόμενα καὶ πάντως παρεχόμενα ποικιλίαν, ὥστ’ ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα τῶν ὕμνων τοῖς ᾄδουσι καὶ ἡδονήν. — Πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογοῖτ’ ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα οὕτω πράττεσθαι;» | 32.1 [Plato, Laws 2, 665c]: "— Are these things then agreed upon by us as before? — Concerning what? — That every man and child, free and slave, female and male, and the whole city singing continuously to itself the whole city through, should never cease repeating those things which we have gone through, constantly changing them somehow and providing endless variety, so that there may be a certain insatiability and pleasure in the hymns for those who sing them. — How could it not be agreed that these things ought to be so done?" |
| 32.2 Καὶ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ δὲ τῆς Πολιτείας ὅμοια τούτοις γράφει τάδε λέγων· «— Οἶσθά τι οὖν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν τήν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἑψημάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δή τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν ἐστι πάνυ ἡττώμενον; | 32.2 [Plato, Republic 5, 455c–d]: And in the fifth book of the Republic, Plato writes similar things, saying: "— Do you know of any practice engaged in by human beings in which the male sex does not excel the female in all these respects? Or shall we speak at length of weaving and the care of baked goods and cooked dishes, in which the female sex seems to be something, where it is also most ridiculous of all when defeated? |
| 32.3 — Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους· γυναῖκες μέντοι πολλαὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις. — Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ’ ἀνδρός, διότι ἀνήρ, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζῴοιν, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνήρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός. | 32.3 [455d–e]: — You speak truly, he said, that one sex is far superior to the other in virtually everything; yet many women are better than many men in many things, but on the whole it is as you say. — There is no occupation, then, my friend, among those who manage a city, that belongs to a woman because she is a woman, nor to a man because he is a man; but the natural capacities are distributed similarly in both living beings, and a woman participates in all occupations according to nature, and a man in all, though in all of them woman is weaker than man. |
| 32.4 — Πάνυ γε. — Ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδέν; — Καὶ πῶς; — Ἀλλ’ ἔστι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική, ἡ δ’ οὔ, καὶ μουσική, ἡ δ’ ἄμουσος φύσει; — Τί μήν; — Καὶ γυμναστικὴ δὲ ἄρα οὐδὲ πολεμική, ἡ δὲ ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική; — Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. — Τί δέ; Φιλόσοφός τε καὶ μισόσοφος; Καὶ θυμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ἄθυμος; — Ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα. | 32.4 [455e–456a]: — Certainly. — Shall we then assign everything to men, and nothing to a woman? — How could we? — But there is, I suppose, as we shall say, one woman naturally suited for medicine and another not, and one musical and another unmusical by nature? — What else? — And is one woman athletic or warlike, and another unwarlike and no lover of athletics? — I think so. — What then? Is one a lover of wisdom and another a hater of wisdom? And one high-spirited and another spiritless? — These things are so too. |
| 32.5 — Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἡ δ’ οὔ· ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξάμεθα; — Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν. | 32.5 [456a]: — There is then a woman suited for guardianship, and another not; or did we not select such a nature for the men who are guardians too? — Just such a nature indeed. |
| 32.6 — Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσῳ ἀσθενεστέρα, ἡ δὲ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστί. — Φαίνεται. — Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι συνοικεῖν τε καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν, ἐπείπερ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ ξυγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.» | 32.6 [456a–b]: — The nature of woman and man is therefore the same as regards the guardianship of the city, except in so far as one is weaker and the other stronger. — So it appears. — And such women, then, are to be selected to dwell with and share the guardianship with such men, since they are capable and akin to them in nature." |
| 32.7 Εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ ὁ παρ’ ἡμῖν λόγος ὑποδέχεται πᾶν γένος οὐ μόνον ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναικῶν, οὐδ’ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρων καὶ Ἑλλήνων, εἰς τὴν κατὰ θεὸν παιδείαν τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαν. | 32.7 [Eusebius]: Reasonably, therefore, our doctrine also welcomes every class, not only of men but also of women, and not only of free men and slaves but also of barbarians and Greeks, into instruction and philosophy according to God. |
Chapter 33
In this chapter, citing Plato's Laws (Book 1), Eusebius argues that a community or flock cannot be judged by its worst members or by disordered assemblies lacking good leaders; true judgment must look to those who practice genuine piety under proper instruction.
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33.1
[Πλάτων, Νόμων Α] «— Σκεψώμεθα δὴ πῇ τῇδε. Φέρε, εἴ τις αἰγῶν τροφὴν καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτό, κτῆμα ὡς ἔστι καλόν, ἐπαινοῖ, ἄλλος δέ τις ἑωρακὼς αἶγας χώρας νεμομένας αἰπόλου ἐν ἐργασίμοις χωρίοις δρώσας κακὰ διαψέγοι, καὶ πᾶν θρέμμα ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων ἰδὼν οὕτω μέμφοιτο, τὸν τοιούτου ψόγον ἡγούμεθα ὑγιὲς ἄν ποτε ψέξαι καὶ ὁτιοῦν;
— Καὶ πῶς;» Καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα· |
33.1
[Plato, Laws 1, 638c–d]: "— Let us examine it in this way: Come, if someone should praise the rearing of goats and the animal itself as a fine possession, and someone else having seen goats grazing without a goat-herd in cultivated lands doing damage should criticize them, and seeing every flock without a ruler or under bad rulers should thus fault them—do we consider that the criticism of such a person would ever criticize anything soundly?
— How could it?" And a little further on: |
| 33.2 «— Τί δ’ ἐπαινέτην ἢ ψέκτην κοινωνίας ἧστινοσοῦν, ᾗ πέφυκέ τε εἶναι ἄρχων μετ’ ἐκείνου τε ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη ποτὲ ὀρθῶς αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ κοινωνοῦσαν μετ’ ἄρχοντος, ἀεὶ δὲ ἄναρχον ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων ξυνοῦσαν· οἰόμεθα δή ποτε τοὺς τοιούτους θεωροὺς τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνιῶν χρηστόν τι ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι; — Πῶς δ’ ἄν;» | 33.2 [638d–e]: "— What about a praiser or censurer of any partnership whatsoever, which by nature has a ruler and is useful with him—if he should never have seen it correctly maintaining partnership with a ruler, but always without a ruler or joining with bad rulers—do we suppose that such observers of such partnerships will ever criticize or praise anything worthily? — How could they?" |
| 33.3 Οὐ δὴ χρὴ καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν, εἴ τινες φαίνοιντο δίχα προστάτου καὶ ἄρχοντος ἢ μετὰ κακῶν ἀρχόντων δρῶντες κακά, ψέγειν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῶν διδασκαλεῖον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρθῶς μετιόντων τὸ θεοσεβὲς πολίτευμα θαυμάζειν. | 33.3 [Eusebius]: Neither then ought men among us—if certain persons appear acting evilly apart from a leader and ruler or under bad rulers—to criticize our entire school, but rather to admire the godly polity from those who pursue it rightly. |
Chapter 34
In the chapters 34 to 36, Eusebius pairs Platonic passages (Laws 7 & 4, Republic 4) with Solomon's Proverbs regarding praise only after death, avoiding extreme wealth or poverty, and honoring parents and elders.
| 34.1 Ἐν ταῖς Παροιμίαις Σολομῶνος συντόμως φερομένου τοῦ «Μνήμη δικαίων μετ’ ἐγκωμίων, ὄνομα δὲ ἀσεβῶν σβέννυται,» καὶ πάλιν εἰρημένου τοῦ «Μὴ μακαρίσῃς ἄνδρα πρὸ τελευτῆς αὐτοῦ,» ἐπάκουσον ὅπως τὴν διάνοιαν ἑρμηνεύει λέγων ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ ἑβδόμῳ τῶν Νόμων· | 34.1 [Eusebius]: In the Proverbs of Solomon, it being concisely expressed that "The memory of the just is with praise, but the name of the impious is extinguished," [Prov 10:7] and again it being said, "Call no man blessed before his death," [Sirach 11:28 / Prov] listen to how Plato interprets this meaning in the seventh book of the Laws: |
| 34.2 «— Τῶν πολιτῶν ὁπόσοι τέλος ἔχοιεν τοῦ βίου κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξειργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίπονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες, ἐγκωμίων αὐτοὺς τυγχάνειν πρέπον ἂν εἴη. — Πῶς δ’ οὔ; | 34.2 [Plato, Laws 7, 801e]: "— As many of the citizens as have reached the end of life, having accomplished noble and laborious deeds in body or soul and having been obedient to the laws, it would be fitting that they obtain praises. — How could it not be so? |
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34.3
— Τούς γε μὴν ἔτι ζῶντας ἐγκωμίοις τε καὶ ὕμνοις τιμᾶν οὐκ ἀσφαλές, πρὶν ἂν ἅπαντά τις τὸν βίον διαδραμὼν τέλος ἐπιστήσηται καλόν. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἡμῖν ἔστω κοινὰ ἀνδράσι τε καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἀγαθαῖς διαφανῶς γενομένοις.»
«Πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ πενίαν μή μοι δῷς,» τοῦ Σολομῶνος φήσαντος ἐν Παροιμίαις, ὁ Πλάτων ἐν δ’ Πολιτείας φησίν· «— Ἕτερα δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξιν εὑρήκαμεν, ἃ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μή ποτε αὐτοὺς λήσῃ εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύντα. — Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; |
34.3
[802a]: — To honor those who are still living with praises and hymns is not safe, until someone has run through his entire life and set a noble end upon it. And let all these things be common to us for men and women who have manifestly become good."
[Eusebius]: "Give me neither riches nor poverty," [Prov 30:8] Solomon having said in Proverbs, Plato in the fourth book of the Republic says: "— Other things, as it seems, we have found for our guardians, which must be guarded against in every way lest they ever slip into the city unnoticed. — What sort of things are these? |
Chapter 35
| 35.1 — Πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ πενία· ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφὴν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ἐμποιοῦντος, τῆς δ’ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ.» Κακοεργία δέ ἐστι πᾶσα πρᾶξις ἄτιμος. | 35.1 [Plato, Republic 4, 421d]: — Wealth, I said, and poverty; as the one produces luxury, idleness, and innovation, and the other illiberality and wrongdoing in addition to innovation." [Eusebius]: And wrongdoing (kakoergia) is every dishonorable action. |
Chapter 36
| 36.1 Πάλιν Μωϋσέως ἐν τοῖς νόμοις φάντος· «Ἕκαστος πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ μητέρα φοβείσθω,» καὶ «Τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα σου, ἵνα εὖ σοι ᾖ,» καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὁμοίως Μωϋσεῖ καὶ τιμᾶν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ὧδέ πως φησὶν ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις· «Πᾶς δὴ νοῦν ἔχων φοβεῖται καὶ τιμᾷ γονέων εὐχάς, εἰδὼς πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιτελεῖς γενομένας.» Καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ φησί· «Πᾶς ἡμῖν αἰδείσθω τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ· τὸν δὲ προέχοντα εἴκοσιν ἡλικίας ἔτεσιν ἄρρενα ἢ θῆλυν νομίζων ὡς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα διευλαβείσθω.» | 36.1 [Eusebius]: Again, Moses having said in the Laws: "Let each fear his father and his mother," [Lev 19:3] and "Honor your father and your mother, that it may go well with you," [Exod 20:12] Plato similarly to Moses speaks thus concerning honoring and fearing in the Laws: "Every man having sense fears and honors the prayers of parents, knowing that for many people and on many occasions they are brought to fulfillment." [cf. Laws 11, 931c] And again in another place he says: "Let everyone among us respect his elder in word and deed; and considering an adult twenty years older, male or female, as a father or mother, let him hold them in reverence." [cf. Laws 9, 879c] |
Chapter 37
In chapters 37 to 42, Eusebius aligns specific Platonic legal statutes (Republic 5, Laws 8 & 9) with the Mosaic Law (Exodus). In this chapter, there is the prohibiting of the enslavement of one's own people (Hebrews by Hebrews / Greeks by Greeks).
| 37.1 Μωϋσέως ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἀπαγορεύσαντος Ἑβραίοις Ἑβραίους δουλεύειν, καὶ φήσαντος· «Ἐὰν κτήσῃ παῖδα Ἑβραῖον, ἓξ ἔτη δουλεύσει σοι· τῷ δὲ ἑβδόμῳ ἔτει ἐξαποστελεῖς αὐτὸν ἐλεύθερον,» καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὁμοίως ἐν Πολιτείᾳ φησί· «— Μηδὲ Ἕλληνα ἄρα δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι μήτε αὐτούς, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Ἔλλησιν οὕτω ξυμβουλεύειν; — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· μᾶλλόν τ’ ἂν οὖν οὕτω πρὸς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ἀπέχοιντο.» | 37.1 [Eusebius]: Moses in the Laws having forbidden Hebrews to enslave Hebrews, saying: "If you purchase a Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve you, and in the seventh year you shall send him forth free," [Exod 21:2] Plato similarly says in the Republic: "— Neither then should they themselves possess a Greek slave, nor advise the other Greeks to do so? — Most certainly, he said; and thus they would rather turn against the barbarians and abstain from one another." [Plato, Republic 5, 469c] |
Chapter 38
In this chapter, there is the forbidding of the moving of boundary markers (Laws 8).
| 38.1 [Πλάτων, Νόμων Η] «Μὴ κινείτω γῆς ὅρια μηδεὶς μήτε οἰκείου πολίτου γείτονος μήτε ὁμοτέρμονος, ἐν ἐσχατιαῖς κεκτημένου ἄλλῳ ξένῳ γειτονῶν, νομίσας τὸ τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ’ εἶναι.» Καὶ ἑξῆς φησιν· «Ὅς δ’ ἂν ἐπεργάζηται τὰ τοῦ γείτονος, ὑπερβαίνων τοὺς ὅρους, τὸ μὲν βλάβος ἀποτινέτω, τῆς δὲ ἀναιδείας ἅμα καὶ ἀνελευθερίας ἕνεκα ἰατρευόμενος διπλάσιον τοῦ βλάβους ἄλλο ἐκτισάτω τῷ βλαφθέντι.» | 38.1 [Plato, Laws 8, 842e]: "Let no one move land boundary markers, neither of a fellow citizen who is a neighbor nor of one on the border, possessing land at the edges neighboring another stranger, considering that to move what is immovable is truly this." And next he says: "Whoever encroaches upon his neighbor's land, crossing over the boundaries, let him pay for the damage, and by way of cure for his shamelessness and illiberality let him pay another double the damage to the injured party." [Laws 8, 843c] |
Chapter 39
In this chapter there is the rejection of ancestral guilt for children unless a family incurs repeated capital crimes (Laws 9).
| 39.1 [Πλάτων, Νόμων Θ] «Ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, πατρὸς ὀνείδη καὶ τιμωρίας παίδων μηδενὶ συνέπεσθαι, πλὴν ἐάν τις τινὶ πατὴρ καὶ πάππος καὶ πάππου πατὴρ ἐφεξῆς ὄφλωσι θανάτου δίκην.» | 39.1 [Plato, Laws 9, 856d]: "In a word, let no disgrace or punishment of a father follow any of his children, unless someone's father, grandfather, and great-grandfather in succession have incurred the penalty of death." |
Chapter 40
In this chapter, there is the restitution penalties for theft (double damages / fourfold-fivefold in Mosaic law)
| 40.1 Μωϋσέως νόμου φάντος· «Ἐὰν κλέψῃ τις μόσχον ἢ πρόβατον, καὶ σφάξῃ αὐτὸ ἢ ἀποδῶται, πέντε μόσχους ἀποτίσει ἀντὶ τοῦ μόσχου, καὶ τέσσαρα πρόβατα ἀντὶ προβάτου· ἐὰν δὲ καταλειφθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ κλέμμα, ἀπὸ μόσχου καὶ ὄνου ἕως προβάτου, ζῶντα διπλᾶ ἀποτίσει,» ἐπάκουσον ὡς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τούτοις ἕπεται λέγων· «Κλέπτῃ δέ, ἐάν τε μέγα ἐάν τε μικρὸν κλέπτῃ τις, εἷς αὖ νόμος ἐπικείσθω καὶ μία δίκης τιμωρία σύμπασι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ κλαπὲν χρεὼν διπλάσιον πρῶτον ἐκτίνειν, ἐὰν ὄφλῃ τις τὴν τοιαύτην δίκην καὶ ἱκανὴν ἔχῃ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἀποτίνειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κλήρου· ἐὰν δὲ μή, δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ ἢ πείσῃ τὸν καταδικασάμενον.» | 40.1 [Eusebius]: The Law of Moses having said: "If anyone steals a calf or a sheep and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five calves for the calf and four sheep for the sheep; but if the theft remains and is found alive in his hand, from calf to donkey to sheep, he shall pay double alive," [Exod 22:1, 4] listen to how Plato also follows these things, saying: "Regarding a thief, whether someone steals a great thing or a small thing, let one law apply and one penalty of judgment for all. For first he must pay double the stolen property, if someone incurs such a judgment and has sufficient other property to pay beyond his land-allotment; but if not, let him be bound until he pays or persuades the prosecutor." [Plato, Laws 9, 857a] |
Chapter 41
In this chapter there is justification for killing a thief breaking in by night.
| 41.1 Πάλιν Μωϋσέως φάντος· «Ἐὰν δὲ ἐν τῷ διορύγματι εὑρεθῇ ὁ κλέπτης καὶ πληγεὶς ἀποθάνῃ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ φόνος,» συνᾴδει κἀν τούτῳ λέγων ὁ Πλάτων· «Νύκτωρ φῶρα εἰς οἰκίαν ἰόντα ἐπὶ κλοπῇ χρημάτων ἐὰν ἑλὼν κτείνῃ τις, ἔστω καθαρός· καὶ ἐὰν λωποδύτην ἀμυνόμενος ἀποκτείνῃ, καθαρὸς ἔστω.» | 41.1 [Eusebius]: Again, Moses having said: "If the thief is found breaking in and is struck and dies, there is no blood-guilt for him," [Exod 22:2] Plato agrees, saying also in this matter: "If someone catches and kills a thief entering a house by night to steal money, let him be pure; and if he kills a mugger in self-defense, let him be pure." [Plato, Laws 9, 874b–c] |
Chapter 42
In this chapter there is Legal procedures and exile/destruction of animals that cause human death (Exodus 21 vs. Laws 9).
| 42.1 [Πλάτων, Νόμων Θ] «Ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα ὑποζύγιον ἢ ζῷον ἄλλο τι φονεύσῃ τινά, πλὴν τῶν ὅσα ἐν ἀγῶνι τῶν δημοσίᾳ τιθεμένων ἀθλεύοντά τι τοιοῦτον δράσῃ, ἐπεξίτωσαν μὲν οἱ προσήκοντες τοῦ φόνου τῷ κτείναντι, δικαζόντων δὲ τῶν ἀγρονόμων οἷσιν ἂν καὶ ὁπόσοις προστάξῃ ὁ προσήκων, τὸ δὲ ὄφλον ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τῆς χώρας ἀποκτείναντας διορίσαι.» Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων· ὁ δὲ Μωϋσῆς προλαβών φησιν· «Ἐὰν δὲ κερατίσῃ ταῦρος ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, λίθοις λιθοβοληθήσεται ὁ ταῦρος, καὶ οὐ βρωθήσεται τὰ κρέα αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ κύριος τοῦ ταύρου ἀθῷος ἔσται.» | 42.1 [Plato, Laws 9, 873e–874a]: "If a beast of burden or any other animal kills someone—except those doing such a thing while competing in public games—let the relatives prosecute the slayer for murder, and let the land-officers judge, whomsoever and as many as the relative appoints; and having slain the condemned beast outside the borders of the land, let them banish it." [Eusebius]: These are the words of Plato; and Moses anticipating him says: "And if a bull gores a man or a woman and they die, the bull shall be stoned with stones, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the bull shall be guiltless." [Exod 21:28] |
Chapter 43
Eusebius quotes Ezekiel 22:18–20 (the refining of mixed metals in a furnace) to introduce Plato’s Republic (414b–415c), specifically the "Noble Lie" regarding the metallic natures (gold, silver, bronze, iron) within human souls and the guardians' duty to preserve civic harmony.
| 43.1 Τῆς προφητικῆς γραφῆς λεγούσης· «Υἱὲ ἀνθρώπου, ἰδοὺ γεγόνασί μοι ὁ οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ ἀναμεμιγμένοι πάντες χαλκῷ καὶ κασσιτέρῳ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ μολίβδῳ, ἐν μέσῳ καμίνου ἀργυρίου ἀναμεμιγμένοι εἰσίν. διὰ τοῦτο εἰπόν· Τάδε λέγει Κύριος· Ἀνθ’ ὧν ἐγένεσθε πάντες εἰς σύγκρασιν μίαν, διὰ τοῦτο ἐγὼ εἰσδέξομαι ὑμᾶς, καθὼς εἰσδέχεται ἄργυρος καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος καὶ μόλιβδος καὶ κασσίτερος εἰς μέσον καμίνου, τοῦ ἐκφυσῆσαι εἰς αὐτοὺς πῦρ, τοῦ χωνευθῆναι»· καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὡσαύτως· ἐπάκουσον ἅ φησιν· | 43.1 While the prophetic Scripture says: "Son of man, behold, the house of Israel has become to me all mixed together with copper, tin, iron, and lead; in the midst of a silver furnace they are mixed together. Therefore say: Thus says the Lord: Because you have all become a single mixture, therefore behold, I will gather you, just as silver, copper, iron, lead, and tin are gathered into the midst of a furnace, to blow fire upon them in order to melt them;" so too Plato speaks similarly; listen to what he says: |
| 43.2 «Οὐκοῦν ἀκούετε λοιπὸν τοῦ μύθου. ἐσμὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, διότι τιμιώτεροί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ’ ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς. | 43.2 "Listen then to the rest of the myth. 'All of you in the city are indeed brothers,' as we shall tell them in our myth-making, 'but God, when modeling you, mixed gold into the generation of those among you who are fit to rule, because they are most precious; and silver into those who are auxiliaries; and iron and copper into the farmers and other craftsmen. |
| 43.3 ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες ἅπαντες, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῷτε, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἂν ἀργυροῦν, καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ χρυσοῦν ἔκγονον, καὶ τἄλλα πάντα ἐξ ἀλλήλων οὕτως. | 43.3 Since you are all akin, for the most part you will produce offspring like yourselves; yet sometimes a silver child might be born from gold, or a golden child from silver, and all the rest likewise from one another. |
| 43.4 τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεὸς ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ γένωνται, μηδ’ οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξωσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὅ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται, καὶ ἐὰν σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελεήσωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀπονέμοντες ὤσουσιν ἢ εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ γεωργούς, καὶ ἐὰν αὖ ἐκ τούτων ἢ ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῇ τις, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακήν, τοὺς δ’ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν, ὡς χρησμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς διαφυλάξῃ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν;» | 43.4 Therefore, first and foremost, God commands the rulers that there is nothing they should guard so well, nor watch so intently, as the offspring—to see what has been commingled in their souls. And if their own child should be born with an alloy of copper or iron, they shall in no way show pity, but assigning to it the status appropriate to its nature, they shall push it down among the craftsmen or farmers. And if again from these an offspring should be born with an alloy of gold or silver, honoring them, they shall raise them up—some to the guard, and others to the auxiliary force; for there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed whenever a man of iron or copper acts as its guardian.' Do you have any contrivance, then, by which they might be persuaded of this myth?" |
Chapter 44
Eusebius pairs Ezekiel 34:2–4 and John 10:11–12 (the contrast between the Good Shepherd and self-serving hirelings) with Plato’s Republic I (345c–345e), where Socrates argues against Thrasymachus that a true ruler or shepherd works exclusively for the good of his flock, not for personal gain.
| 44.1 Τῆς παρ’ Ἑβραίοις προφητείας φασκούσης πρὸς τοὺς προεστῶτας τοῦ πλήθους· «Ὦ ποιμένες Ἰσραήλ, μὴ βόσκουσι ποιμένες ἑαυτούς; οὐ τὰ πρόβατα βόσκουσιν οἱ ποιμένες; ἰδοὺ τὸ γάλα κατεσθίετε, καὶ τὰ ἔρια περιβάλλεσθε, καὶ τὸ παχὺ σφάζετε, καὶ τὰ πρόβατά μου οὐ βόσκετε· καὶ τὸ ἀπολωλὸς οὐκ ἐζητήσατε, καὶ τὸ συντετριμμένον οὐ κατεδήσατε, καὶ τὸ πλανώμενον οὐκ ἐπεστρέψατε»· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ σωτηρίου λόγου φάσκοντος· «Ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ καλὸς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ τίθησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων, ὁ δὲ μισθωτὸς καὶ οὐκ ὢν ποιμήν, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδια τὰ πρόβατα, καταλείπει αὐτά», ἐπάκουσον καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὅπως ποτὲ ταῦτα διερμηνεύει· | 44.1 While the prophecy among the Hebrews declares to the leaders of the people: "O shepherds of Israel, do shepherds feed themselves? Do not the shepherds feed the sheep? Behold, you consume the milk, clothe yourselves with the wool, and slaughter the fatlings, but you do not feed my sheep. You have not sought the lost, nor bound up the broken, nor returned the strayed;" and while the saving Word also declares: "The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep; but the hireling, who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, abandons them," listen also to how Plato interprets these matters in the first book of the Republic: |
| 44.2 «Νῦν δ’ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε—ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα—ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾤου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ’ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἑστιάσασθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστήν, ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ ποιμενικῇ δ’ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ, ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς ὥστ’ εἶναι βελτίστην ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γε ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι. οὕτω δὴ ᾤμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ’ ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἴει ἄρχειν;» | 44.2 "Now do you see, Thrasymachus—for let us examine what was said before—that while at first you defined the true physician, you later thought it unnecessary to maintain the same precision for the true shepherd; instead, you think he fattens the sheep, insofar as he is a shepherd, not with an eye to what is best for the sheep, but like a diner about to feast at a banquet, or again like a merchant looking to sell them, rather than a shepherd. But the shepherd's art surely cares for nothing other than that over which it is set, to provide what is best for it, since its own needs—so as to be the best art—have been sufficiently provided for, so long as it lacks nothing of being the shepherd's art. Thus I believed just now that it was necessary for us to agree that every rule, insofar as it is a rule, considers what is best for nothing other than that which is ruled and cared for, both in public and private governance. But do you think that those who rule in cities—those who are truly rulers—rule willingly?" |
Chapter 45
Eusebius connects Isaiah 26:18 (LXX: conceiving and bringing forth the spirit of salvation through the fear of the Lord) with Plato’s Theaetetus (151a), where Socrates describes his maieutic (midwifric) art in helping soul-laboring students give birth to ideas.
| 45.1 Τῆς παρ’ Ἑβραίοις προφητείας λεγούσης· «Ἐκ τοῦ φόβου σου, Κύριε, ἐν γαστρὶ ἐλάβομεν καὶ ὠδινήσαμεν καὶ ἐτέκομεν πνεῦμα σωτηρίας», ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ τάδε λέγοντα Σωκράτην ποιεῖ· «Πάσχουσι δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀναπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται.» | 45.1 While the prophecy among the Hebrews says: "From fear of thee, O Lord, we conceived, were in labor, and brought forth the spirit of salvation," Plato in the Theaetetus represents Socrates saying these things: "Those who associate with me experience the same thing as women in labor: for they suffer labor pains and are filled with perplexity night and day, far more than women do. And my art is able to arouse and to soothe this labor pain." |
Chapter 46
In this chapter, Eusebius compares Ezekiel’s vision of the four-faced composite creatures (Ezekiel 1:1–10) with Socrates’ multipart soul model in Republic IX (588b–589b)—the many-headed beast (desires), the lion (spiritedness), and the inner human (reason).
| 46.1 Τοῦ προφήτου Ἰεζεκιὴλ φήσαντος· «Ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐμὲ χεὶρ Κυρίου, καὶ εἶδον, καὶ ἰδοὺ πνεῦμα ἐξαῖρον ἤρχετο ἀπὸ βορρᾶ», καὶ ἐξῆς εἰπόντος· «Καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ὡς ὁμοίωμα τεσσάρων ζῴων. καὶ ἡ ὅρασις αὐτῶν ὡς ὁμοίωμα ἀνθρώπου ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ πρόσωπα τέσσαρα τῷ ἑνί. καὶ ὁμοίωσις τῶν προσώπων αὐτῶν, πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπου καὶ πρόσωπον λέοντος ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῖς τέσσαρσι, καὶ πρόσωπον μόσχου ἐξ ἀριστερῶν τοῖς τέσσαρσι, καὶ πρόσωπον ἀετοῦ τοῖς τέσσαρσι», καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὁμοίως ἄκουσον ἅ φησι· | 46.1 When the prophet Ezekiel states: "The hand of the Lord came upon me, and I looked, and behold, a stormy wind came out of the north," and next says: "And in the midst of it was the likeness of four living creatures. And this was their appearance: they had the likeness of a man, and each one had four faces. As for the likeness of their faces, each had the face of a man and the face of a lion on the right side, and the face of an ox on the left side, and the face of an eagle;" hear how Plato likewise says: |
| 46.2 «Νῦν δή, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἣν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν. — Πῶς; ἔφη. — Εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῇ ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων οἵαν ἔλεγε. — Ποίαν τινά; ἦ δ’ ὅς. — Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἥ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται συμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι. |
46.2
"‘Now then,’ I said, ‘let us reason with him, since we have agreed upon the respective power that acting unjustly and acting justly possess.’ ‘How?’ he asked. ‘By shaping an image of the soul in speech, so that he who says those things may realize what he was saying.’ ‘What kind of image?’ he asked. ‘One of those creatures,’ I said, ‘such as ancient mythologies claim used to exist—like the Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, and many other composite forms said to have grown together into a single shape.’ |
| 46.3 — Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. — Πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλῳ καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὑτοῦ ταῦτα πάντα. — Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον· ὅμως δ’ , ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος, πεπλάσθω. | 46.3 ‘They are indeed so told,’ he said. ‘Mould then a single form of a multifaceted, many-headed beast, having a ring of heads of tame and wild animals, capable of changing and growing all these out of itself.’ ‘That is the work of a clever sculptor,’ he said; ‘nevertheless, since speech is more malleable than wax and such materials, let it be moulded.’ |
| 46.4 — Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον. — Ταῦτ’, ἔφη, ῥᾴω, καὶ πέπλασται. — Σύναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πῃ ξυμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις. — Ξυνῆπται, ἔφη. — Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἑνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἓν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον. | 46.4 ‘Mould then one other form of a lion, and one of a human being; but let the first form be by far the largest, and the second next in size.’ ‘These,’ he said, ‘are easier, and are moulded.’ ‘Join them then into one, three existing together, so that they are somehow fused with one another.’ ‘They are joined,’ he said. ‘Now mould around them on the outside the single image of a human being, so that to one who cannot see what is inside, but sees only the outer shell, it appears to be one creature—a human being.’ |
| 46.5 — Περιπέπλασται, ἔφη. — Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, διότι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φήσει ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἕλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων ὁπότερον ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ξυνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐᾶν αὐτὰ ἐν αὑτοῖς δάκνεσθαί τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα. | 46.5 ‘It has been moulded around,’ he said. ‘Let us then say to the one who asserts that it pays for this human being to act unjustly and that doing justice is unprofitable, that he is saying nothing other than that it pays him to feast and strengthen the multifaceted beast, as well as the lion and all that pertains to the lion, while starving the human being and making him weak, so that he is dragged wherever either of those beasts leads him; and that he should not accustom one part to the other nor make them friends, but allow them to bite, fight, and devour one another.’ |
| 46.6 — Παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ’ ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν. — Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασσεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὑτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει; — Κομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινοῦσα.» |
46.6
‘Entirely so,’ he said; ‘that is precisely what the praiser of injustice would say.’ ‘On the other hand, would not the advocate of justice say that one ought to act and speak in such a way that the inner human being will have complete mastery over the person, and will take care of the many-headed beast like a farmer—feeding and taming the gentle heads, while preventing the wild ones from growing, making the lion's nature an ally, and caring for all in common, making them friends with one another and with himself, and so nurture them?’ ‘Precisely so,’ he said, ‘that is what the praiser of justice says.’"
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Chapter 47
In this chapter, Eusebius links the twelve tribes of Israel to Plato’s division of the ideal state in Laws VI (758e, 760b) into twelve administrative districts and tribal military units.
| 47.1 Τοῦ παντὸς Ἑβραίων ἔθνους εἰς δώδεκα φυλὰς διεσταλμένου, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ὁμοίως τοῦτο χρῆναι δεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ πολιτῶν φυλάξαι νομοθετεῖ, λέγων ὧδε· «Δώδεκα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ χώρα πᾶσα εἰς δύναμιν ἴσα μόρια νενεμήσθω. φυλὴ δὲ μία τῷ μορίῳ ἑκάστῳ ἐπικληρωθεῖσα κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν παρεχέτω πέντε οἷον ἀγρονόμους τε καὶ φυλάρχους.» Καὶ πάλιν φησί· «Ταξιάρχους αὐτοῖς προβάλλεσθαι μὲν τους αἱρεθέντας στρατηγοὺς δώδεκα, ἑκάστῃ φυλῇ ταξίαρχον.» | 47.1 While the entire nation of the Hebrews was divided into twelve tribes, Plato likewise legislates that this structure ought to be maintained among his own citizens, writing thus: "Let our entire territory be divided into twelve equal parts as far as possible. And let one tribe, assigned by lot to each part, provide annually five officers, such as country wardens and tribal commanders." And again he says: "The twelve elected generals shall appoint for them taxiarchs, one taxiarch for each tribe." |
Chapter 48
In this chapter, Eusebius parallels ancient Jerusalem (an inland, mountainous, self-sufficient city) with the ideal city described in Plato’s Laws IV (704a–705b), noting that proximity to the sea corrupts citizens through commerce, greed, and unstable morals.
| 48.1 Τῆς παρὰ παισὶν Ἑβραίων πάλαι πρότερον συνεστώσης βασιλικῆς μητροπόλεως, ἄποθεν μὲν θαλάσσης οὔσης, ἐν ὄρεσι δὲ κατῳκισμένης, πάμφορόν τε γῆν κεκτημένης, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαύτην τινὰ εἶναι δεῖν φησι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοῦ κατοικιζομένην ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις. λέγει δὲ ὧδε· | 48.1 Since the ancient royal metropolis established among the children of the Hebrews was situated far from the sea, founded in the mountains, and possessed a land rich in all produce, Plato likewise asserts in the Laws that the city founded by him ought to be of a similar nature. He speaks as follows: |
| 48.2 «— Τόδε δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ὃ βουλόμενος μᾶλλον ἐπερωτῶ, πότερον ἐπιθαλαττίδιος ἔσται τις ἢ χερσαία. — Σχεδόν, ὦ ξένε, ἀπέχει θαλάττης γε ἡ πόλις, ἧς πέρι τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα ἡμῖν, εἴς τινας ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους. — Τί δέ; λιμένες ἆρ’ εἰσὶν κατ’ αὐτῆς, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀλίμενος; — Εὐλίμενος μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ γε, ὡς δυνατόν ἐστι μάλιστα, ὦ ξένε. |
48.2
"‘Now this is what I wish to ask further concerning it: whether it will be coastal or inland.’ ‘The city, Stranger, about which we have just spoken, is distant from the sea by about eighty stades.’ ‘What then? Are there harbors near it, or is it altogether harborless?’ ‘On the contrary, Stranger, it is as well-harbored as possible in that respect.’ |
| 48.3 — Παπαῖ, οἷον λέγεις. τί δέ; περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα πότερα πάμφορος, ἢ καί τινων ἐπιδεής; — Σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεής. — Γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ’ ἔσται τις πλησίον; — Οὐ πάνυ, διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται· παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείργασται χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον. — Τί δέ; πεδίων τε καὶ ὀρῶν καὶ ὕλης πῶς μέρος ἑκάστων ἡμῖν εἴληχε; — Προσέοικε τῇ τῆς ἄλλης Κρήτης φύσει ὅλῃ. — Τραχυτέραν αὐτὴν ἢ πεδινωτέραν ἂν λέγοις; — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | 48.3 ‘Ha! What a thing to say! What about the surrounding country? Is it fertile in all produce, or lacking in some things?’ ‘Lacking in almost nothing.’ ‘Will there be a neighboring city close by?’ ‘Not at all, which is why it is being settled; for an ancient emigration from the region left this land deserted for an immeasurable time.’ ‘What about the proportion of plains, mountains, and forests assigned to us?’ ‘It resembles the nature of the rest of Crete as a whole.’ ‘Would you say it is rougher or more level?’ ‘Much rougher.’ |
| 48.4 — Οὐ τοίνυν ἀνίατος ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθαλαττία τε ἔμελλεν εἶναι καὶ εὐλίμενος καὶ μὴ πάμφορος, ἀλλ’ ἐπιδεὴς πολλῶν, μεγάλου τινὸς ἔδει σωτῆρός γε αὐτῇ καὶ νομοθετῶν θείων τινῶν, εἰ μὴ πολλά τε ἔμελλεν ἤθη καὶ ποικίλα καὶ φαῦλα ἕξειν τοιαύτῃ φύσει γενομένη· νῦν δὲ παραμύθιον ἔχει τὸ τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίων. | 48.4 ‘Then it would not be incurable as regards the acquisition of virtue. For if it were coastal, well-harbored, and not self-sufficient, but lacking in many things, it would need some great savior and divine lawgivers if it were not to acquire many diverse and base habits by being of such a nature; but as it is, its eighty stades distance provides consolation. |
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48.5
ἐγγύτερον μέντοι τοῦ δέοντος κεῖται τῆς θαλάττης, σχεδὸν ὅσον εὐλιμενωτέραν φῄς αὐτὴν εἶναι. ὅμως δὲ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο. πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρᾳ τὸ μὲν παρ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα· ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιπλᾶσα ἑαυτήν, ἤθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὑτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως. παραμύθιον δὲ δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πάμφορος εἶναι κέκτηται· τραχεῖα δὲ οὖσα δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν πολύφορός τ’ εἴη καὶ πάμφορος ἅμα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχουσα, πολλὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἂν παρεχομένη, νομίσματος ἀργυροῦ καὶ χρυσοῦ πάλιν ἀντεπίμπλατο ἄν· οὗ μεῖζον κακόν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πόλει ἀνθ’ ἑνὸς ἓν οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο εἰς γενναίων καὶ δικαίων ἠθῶν κτῆσιν.»
Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοσούτων ἡμῖν καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἀποδεδειγμένων, σκεψώμεθα ὅπως τὸν τῆς παρ’ Ἑβραίοις παιδείας τρόπον δι’ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν ἀποδεξάμενος τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν παραιτεῖται, γράφων ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὧδε· |
48.5
It lies, however, nearer to the sea than it ought, roughly to the extent that you say it is well-harbored. Yet one must be thankful even for this. For the sea being adjacent to a land is a pleasant thing for daily life, but in truth a very salty and bitter neighbor; for filling the city with commerce and retail moneymaking, it breeds fickle and treacherous habits in the soul, making the city faithless and friendless toward itself and toward other men likewise. As a consolation against this, the city possesses a land rich in all produce; yet being rough, it is clear that it could not be both abundant in export and self-sufficient at the same time. For if it had that feature, providing a large export, it would in turn be filled with silver and gold currency—than which no greater evil, so to speak, could befall a city for the acquisition of noble and just character.’"
Now, since so many points have been demonstrated by us up to this stage, let us examine how, after accepting the Hebrew method of instruction through what we have stated, he declines the Greek method, writing thus in the tenth book of the Republic: |
Chapter 49
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes extensive excerpts from Book X of Plato’s Republic (595b–601b) to demonstrate that Greek poets do not possess genuine knowledge. Socrates argues that poetic, imitative art (mimesis) acts as a corruption of the mind, standing at a third remove from the truth. If Homer and Hesiod had possessed real expertise in medicine, statesmanship, military strategy, or education—such as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, or even Protagoras—they would have been sought out as active leaders or teachers rather than left to wander as itinerant rhapsodes. Consequently, poets create mere images (eidola) of virtue, using meter, rhythm, and verbal embellishment as visual and auditory tricks to charm audiences who lack critical discernment.
| 49.1 «Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθω — οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοὺς μιμητικούς — λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. — Πῇ δή, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις; — Ῥητέον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. | 49.1 "Let it be said as between us—for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other imitative ones—that all such things seem to be a corruption of the mind of those who hear them, at least for as many as do not possess the antidote, which is knowing them for what they actually are." "In what way," he said, "and with what in mind do you say this?" "It must be told," I said, "even though a certain friendship and respect for Homer that I have held since childhood hinders me from speaking. |
| 49.2 ἔοικε γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ’ ὃ λέγω ῥητέον. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.» | 49.2 For he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these fine tragic poets. Yet a man must not be honored above the truth, but what I say must be spoken." "By all means," he said. |
| 49.3 Εἶθ’ ἐξῆς ἐπιλέγει· «Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον Ὁμήρῳ, μηδὲ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐρωτῶντες, εἰ ἰατρικός τις ἦν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητὴς μόνον ἰατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὥσπερ Ἀσκληπιός, ἢ τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους· μηδ’ αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτὸν ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐῶμεν. | 49.3 Then next he adds: "Let us not, then, demand an account from Homer or any other of the poets regarding other matters, asking them whether any of them was skilled in medicine and not merely an imitator of medical speech—asking what people any poet, ancient or modern, is said to have made healthy, as Asclepius did, or what disciples in medicine he left behind as Asclepius left his descendants. Nor again let us question him about the other crafts, but let us pass them by. |
| 49.4 περὶ δὲ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων, ὧν ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων, καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους· ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα γινώσκειν ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι’ ἄλλους πολλοὺς πολλαὶ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί. | 49.4 Concerning the greatest and finest things that Homer attempts to speak about—wars, military command, the administration of cities, and the education of human beings—it is surely right to ask him and inquire: ‘Dear Homer, if you are not at a third remove from the truth regarding virtue, a creator of an image—whom we defined as an imitator—but even at a second remove, and were capable of knowing what pursuits make human beings better or worse in private and in public life, tell us which city was better governed through you, as Lacedaemon was through Lycurgus, and many other cities, large and small, through many others? |
| 49.5 σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα· σὲ δὲ τίς; ἕξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν; — Οὐκ οἴομαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· οὔκουν λέγεταί γε, οὐδ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν Ὁμηριδῶν. — Ἀλλὰ δὴ τίς πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἄρχοντος ἢ συμβουλεύοντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται; — Οὐδείς. | 49.5 What city attributes to you the credit of having been a good lawgiver who benefited them? For Charondas so benefited Italy and Sicily, and we have Solon; but who so credits you? Will anyone be able to name one?’ ‘I think not,’ said Glaucon; ‘at least, none is claimed even by the Homeridae themselves.’ ‘Well then, is any war recorded as having been successfully waged during Homer’s time under his command or counsel?’ ‘None.’ |
| 49.6 — Ἀλλ’ οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἤ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεω πέρι τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιδος τοῦ Σκύθου; — Οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. | 49.6 ‘Well then, are many ingenious inventions for the crafts or other practical pursuits recorded as the works of a wise man, as is told of Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis the Scythian?’ ‘By no means is any such thing told.’ |
| 49.7 — Ἀλλὰ δή, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἳ ἐκεῖνον ἠγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ὁδόν τινα παρέδοσαν βίου Ὁμηρικήν, ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; | 49.7 ‘Well then, if not in public, is Homer said to have been in private a leader in education to certain individuals while he lived, who loved him for his companionship and handed down to posterity a Homeric way of life—just as Pythagoras himself was uniquely beloved for this, and his followers even now distinguish themselves among others by calling their manner of life Pythagorean?’ |
| 49.8 — Οὐδ’ αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ ἐστί. | 49.8 ‘No, again,’ he said, ‘nothing of the sort is recorded. For Creophylus, O Socrates, the companion of Homer, would appear even more ridiculous in respect to education than his name implies, if what is said about Homer is true. |
| 49.9 λέγεται γάρ που ὡς πολλὴ ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη. — Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλ’ οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τε ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ γινώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ’ ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ’ αὐτῶν; | 49.9 For it is said somewhere that there was great neglect toward him during his own lifetime.’ ‘Indeed it is said,’ I replied. ‘But do you suppose, O Glaucon, that if Homer had truly been able to educate people and make them better, being capable of knowing these things rather than merely imitating them, he would not have made many companions and been honored and beloved by them? |
| 49.10 ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν παρεστάναι, ἰδίᾳ συγγινόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκεῖν οἷοί τε ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιστατήσωσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι· | 49.10 Why, Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and very many others are able, by conferring privately, to convince their contemporaries that they will be unable to manage either their own household or their city unless they supervise their education; and for this wisdom they are so intensely loved that their companions almost carry them around on their shoulders. |
| 49.11 Ὅμηρον δὲ ἄρα οἱ ἐπ’ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἷός τε ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνίναι ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ, καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν, ὅπῃ ᾔεσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν; | 49.11 Would contemporaries have allowed Homer or Hesiod to wander about rhapsodizing if they had been capable of benefiting human beings in virtue? Would they not rather have clung to them more than to gold, forcing them to stay at home with them; or, if they could not persuade them, would they not have escorted them wherever they went until they had received a sufficient education?’ |
| 49.12 — Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. — Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὀμήρου ἀρξάμενοι πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσι, τῆς δ’ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι; ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαίων περὶ σκυτοτομίας, καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαίουσιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσι; | 49.12 ‘You seem to me, O Socrates,’ he said, ‘to speak the absolute truth.’ ‘Shall we not then establish, starting from Homer, that all the poets are imitators of images of virtue and of the other things about which they compose, but never touch the truth? Just as we were saying a moment ago, the painter will make what seems to be a shoemaker, though he himself understands nothing of shoemaking, to viewers who likewise do not understand it, but judge merely by colors and shapes.’ |
| 49.13 — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. — Οὕτω δή, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαίοντα, ἀλλ’ ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγῶν θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τι λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάν τε περὶ στρατηγίας, ἐάν τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· | 49.13 ‘Entirely so.’ ‘In the same way, I think, we shall say that the poet also uses words and phrases to lay on certain colors belonging to each of the crafts, though he himself understands nothing except how to imitate; so that to others like him, who judge from words, whether he speaks about shoemaking in meter, rhythm, and harmony, he seems to speak exceedingly well, or whether he speaks about generalship or anything else whatever— |
| 49.14 οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν, ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ, ἢ οὔ; — Ἔγωγ’, ἔφη.» | 49.14 so powerful is the natural enchantment that these things possess. For when the works of the poets are stripped of the colors of music and spoken plain by themselves, I think you know what they look like. For you have seen them, have you not?’ ‘I have indeed,’ he said.” |
| 49.15 Καὶ τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων εὖ μοι ἔχειν δοκεῖ βραχέα ἄττα τῶν Πλάτωνος διελθεῖν, δι’ ὧν λογικώτερον τὸν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ προνοίας συνίστησι λόγον, τοῖς Ἑβραίων κἀν τούτῳ παριστάμενος δόγμασι. πρῶτα δὲ θεασώμεθα ὅπως τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀθέων ἐκτίθησι· | 49.15 Since these matters stand thus, it seems good to me to review briefly certain passages of Plato through which he constructs his discourse on God and providence in a more logical manner, agreeing in this respect also with the doctrines of the Hebrews. But first, let us observe how he sets forth the opinions of the atheists: |
Chapter 50
In this chapter, Eusebius excerpts Plato’s Laws X (888e–892c) to refute materialist atheism and establish the ontological priority of the soul and divine providence. Plato criticizes natural philosophers and sophists who claim that the universe arose through blind chance (tyche) and nature (physis), rendering the gods, morality, and justice mere artificial human conventions (nomoi). Socrates/the Athenian Stranger counters that these thinkers fundamentally misidentify "nature" by treating physical elements (fire, water, earth, air) as primary. Because the soul (psyche) is originative, self-moving, and prior to all material bodies, mental attributes—such as intellect (nous), art (techne), law (nomos), and purpose—precede physical matter, demonstrating that the cosmos is governed by divine mind rather than unguided physical processes.
| 50.1 «Λέγουσί πού τινες ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην. — Οὐκοῦν καλῶς; — Εἰκός γέ τοί που σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ὀρθῶς λέγειν· ἑπόμενοί γε μὴν αὐτοῖς σκεψώμεθα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν τί ποτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι διανοούμενοι. |
50.1
"Some people say, I believe, that all things that come into being, have come into being, or will come into being, do so partly by nature, partly by art, and partly through chance." "Is that not a good statement?" "It is likely, surely, that wise men speak correctly; let us, however, follow them and examine what those on that side actually intend by this." |
| 50.2 — Πάντως. — Ἔοικε, φασί, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότατα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. | 50.2 "By all means." "They say it seems that the greatest and finest of things are accomplished by nature and chance, and the smaller things by art—which, receiving from nature the generation of the primary and great works, moulds and crafts all the smaller ones, which we indeed all designate as technical." |
| 50.3 — Πῶς λέγεις; — Ὧδ’ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης τε καὶ ἄστρων πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων· | 50.3 "How do you mean?" "I shall state it even more clearly. They say that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art; and that the bodies that come next—those of the earth, sun, moon, and stars—have come into being through these, which are completely inanimate. |
| 50.4 τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά, καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα ἂν κατ’ οὐρανόν, καὶ ζῷα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων, οὐ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλ’ ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιάς τινας ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ’ εἴδωλ’ ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷα γραφικὴ γεννᾷ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι. ἃ δ’ αὖ, εἴ τι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἄρα γεννῶσι τῶν τεχνῶν, εἶναι ταύτας ὁπόσαι τῇ φύσει ἐκοίνωσαν τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν, οἷον αὖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γεωργικὴ καὶ γυμναστική. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν σμικρόν τι μέρος εἶναί φασι κοινωνοῦν φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ τὸ πολύ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δέ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς θέσεις. | 50.4 And being carried along by chance according to the capacity of each, where they happened to meet in a suitable and fitting way—hot with cold, or dry with moist, and soft with hard, and all such things as were mingled out of necessity by the combination of opposites according to chance—in this way and by these means they generated the whole heaven and everything in heaven, as well as all animals and plants, all the seasons having been produced from these; not through intellect, they say, nor through any god, nor through art, but, as we say, by nature and chance. And art, coming into existence later from these—itself mortal and born of mortal elements—afterwards generated certain playthings that do not share much in truth, but are certain images akin to the arts themselves, such as painting generates, as well as music and whatever arts are helpmates to these. And if the arts do generate anything serious, it is those that share their power with nature, such as medicine, agriculture, and gymnastics. And indeed, politics too, they say, shares a small part with nature, but mostly with art; and so all legislation exists not by nature, but by art, whose positions are not true." |
| 50.5 — Πῶς λέγεις; — Θεούς, ὦ μακάριε, πρῶτον εἶναί φασιν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλῃ, ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖς συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ’ ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ νόμοις, ἀλλ’ οὐ δή τινι φύσει. | 50.5 "How do you mean?" "They say, my good friend, that gods exist first of all by art, not by nature, but by certain laws, and these differ in different places according to how each group agreed among themselves when legislating. Moreover, they claim that what is noble by nature is one thing, and by law another; and as for what is just, it does not exist by nature at all, but men continue disputing with one another about it and constantly changing it; and whatever changes they make and whenever they make them, those are valid at that time, having come into being by art and laws, but certainly not by any nature. |
| 50.6 ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὦ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιότατον, ὅ τι τις ἂν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειαί τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἵους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, ἑλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἑτέροισι κατὰ νόμον. — Οἷον διελήλυθας, ὦ ξένε, λόγον, καὶ ὅσην λώβην ἀνθρώπων νέων δημοσίᾳ πόλεσί τε καὶ ἰδίοις οἴκοις.» |
50.6
All these things, my friends, belong to men held to be wise among the young—both prose writers and poets—who assert that the most just thing is whatever someone wins by force. Whence impieties infect young people, as if gods do not exist of the kind the law commands one to think about; and seditions arise because of these things, as they drag men toward the life that is correct according to nature—which is in truth to live as master over others, rather than serving others according to law." "What a discourse you have recounted, Stranger, and what a ruin of young people both publicly to cities and to private households!"
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| 50.7 Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερά φησιν· «Ἀλλά γε δὴ πάλιν λέγε μοι, Κλεινία, καὶ σύ· κοινωνὸν γὰρ δεῖ σε εἶναι τῶν λόγων· κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα τῶν πάντων ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δ’ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον. ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλ’ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. — Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. |
50.7
And after other matters he says:
"Come now, Cleinias, tell me again in turn—for you must share in the discourse—it seems that the one saying these things considers fire, water, earth, and air to be the primary elements of all things, calling these very things 'nature', while soul is derived from them later. Indeed, it seems not merely a risk, but that he actually signifies this to us in his argument." "By all means." |
| 50.8 — Ἆρ’ οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων; σκόπει πάντα λόγον ἐξετάζων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ’ ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι. — Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. — Εὖ λέγεις· ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ δή, πειρῶ φράζειν. — Ἔοικε τοίνυν ἀηθεστέρων ἁπτέον εἶναι λόγων.» |
50.8
"Have we not then, by Zeus, discovered as it were a kind of fountainhead of senseless opinion among as many men as have ever touched upon inquiries concerning nature? Examine every argument as you inspect it; for it is no small difference if those who touch upon impious arguments, and lead others in them, should appear to use their arguments not well, but erroneously." "It seems to me, then, that this is the case." "You speak well; but try to explain in what way." "It seems, then, that one must touch upon somewhat unfamiliar arguments."
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| 50.9 Καὶ μετὰ βραχέα ἐπιλέγει· «Ψυχήν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστί, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἀπάσης ἄρχει παντὸς μᾶλλον. εἰ δ’ ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης γε αὐτῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος; — Ἀνάγκη. |
50.9
And after a short space he adds:
"Almost everyone, my companion, seems to have been ignorant of what kind of thing the soul happens to be and what power it possesses, concerning its other properties and especially its origin—that it is among the primary things, having come into being before all bodies, and that it governs their every change and rearrangement more than anything else. But if these things are so, must not that which is akin to the soul have come into being prior to things belonging to the body, since the soul itself is older than the body?" "Necessarily." |
| 50.10 — Δόξα δὴ καὶ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἴη· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο, ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτοὶ ἐπονομάζουσι, τούτου ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ. — Πῶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; | 50.10 "Opinion, care, intellect, art, and law would then be prior to hard, soft, heavy, and light; and indeed, the great and primary works and actions would belong to art, being among the first, while those belonging to nature, and nature itself—which they do not name correctly—would be secondary and derived from art and intellect." "How not correctly?" |
| 50.11 — Φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα· εἰ δὲ φανήσεται ψυχὴ πρῶτον, οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ ἀήρ, ψυχὴ δ’ ἐν πρώτοις γεγενημένη, σχεδὸν ὀρθότατα λέγοιτ’ ἂν εἶναι διαφερόντως φύσει. ταῦτ’ ἔσθ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἂν ψυχήν τις ἐπιδείξῃ πρεσβυτέραν οὖσαν σώματος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐδαμῶς. — Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.» |
50.11
"By 'nature' they intend to mean origin concerning the primary elements; but if the soul shall appear primary—not fire nor air—and the soul was generated among the primary things, it would be said most correctly that the soul is preeminently nature. These things are so, if one can demonstrate that the soul is older than the body, but otherwise by no means." "You speak most truly."
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Chapter 51
In this chapter, Eusebius brings together extended passages from Plato’s late dialogues—Laws X (893b–899d) and Philebus (28c–30d)—to confirm his overarching thesis: that the world is governed not by irrational chance, but by a supreme, provident divine Intellect (Nous) operating through the priority of Soul (Psyche).
In the selection from Laws X, the Athenian Stranger demonstrates that self-motion is the ultimate, primary principle of all movement. Because self-generated movement is the defining property of soul, soul is necessarily prior to physical body and material elements. Soul leads all cosmic cycles, utilizing primary mental movements (will, deliberation, foresight) to direct the secondary physical movements of matter. Because the celestial order moves with mathematical regularity resembling the uniform rotation of a sphere, it must be governed by the best, most virtuous soul aligned with divine mind.
The excerpt from Philebus reinforces this cosmological argument through a micro-macro analogy. Socrates argues that just as our physical bodies derive their small, fragile elements (fire, water, earth, air) from the vast, pristine elements of the cosmos, so too must our individual souls and intellects derive from a supreme cosmic Soul and royal Intellect (Nous) inherent in the nature of Zeus (the divine source).
In the selection from Laws X, the Athenian Stranger demonstrates that self-motion is the ultimate, primary principle of all movement. Because self-generated movement is the defining property of soul, soul is necessarily prior to physical body and material elements. Soul leads all cosmic cycles, utilizing primary mental movements (will, deliberation, foresight) to direct the secondary physical movements of matter. Because the celestial order moves with mathematical regularity resembling the uniform rotation of a sphere, it must be governed by the best, most virtuous soul aligned with divine mind.
The excerpt from Philebus reinforces this cosmological argument through a micro-macro analogy. Socrates argues that just as our physical bodies derive their small, fragile elements (fire, water, earth, air) from the vast, pristine elements of the cosmos, so too must our individual souls and intellects derive from a supreme cosmic Soul and royal Intellect (Nous) inherent in the nature of Zeus (the divine source).
| 51.1 Ἄγε δή, θεὸν εἴ ποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον· ἐπί γε ἀπόδειξιν τὴν αὑτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶ, σπουδῇ πάσῃ παρακεκλήσθων· ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἐπεισβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον. καί μοι ἐλεγχομένῳ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήσεσι τοιαῖσδε ἀσφαλέστατα ἀποκρίνεσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τάδε. | 51.1 Come now, if ever we ought to invoke God, let it now be done in this way: let the gods be invoked with all earnestness for the demonstration of themselves, that they exist; and holding fast as to some safe anchor-cable, let us enter upon our present discourse. And to me, when tested by such inquiries, it seems safest to answer in the following manner. |
| 51.2 Ὦ ξένε, ὁπόταν φῇ τις, ἆρα ἕστηκε μὲν πάντα, κινεῖται δὲ οὐδὲν, ἢ τούτῳ πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ μένει; Τὰ μὲν κινεῖταί που, φήσω, τὰ δὲ μένει. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐν χώρᾳ τινὶ τά τε ἑστῶτα ἕστηκε καὶ τὰ κινούμενα κινεῖται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἐν μιᾷ ἕδρᾳ που τοῦτο ἂν δρῴη, τὰ δὲ ἐν πλείοσι. | 51.2 "O Stranger, whenever someone asks: 'Does everything stand still and nothing move, or is it entirely the opposite? Or do some things move and others remain still?' 'Some things move, I suppose,' I shall say, 'and others remain still.' 'Do not then both the things that stand still remain, and the things that move move, within some space?' 'How could it be otherwise?' 'And some things would do this in one location, I suppose, and others in several.'" |
| 51.3 Τὰ τὴν τῶν ἑστώτων ἐν μέσῳ λαμβάνοντα δύναμιν λέγεις, φήσομεν, ἐν ἑνὶ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἑστᾶναι λεγομένων κύκλων στρέφεται περιφορά; Ναί. | 51.3 "'Do you mean,' we shall say, 'that things possessing the power of standing fixed in the middle move in one place, just as the revolution of circles said to be standing still rotates?' 'Yes.'" |
| 51.4 Καὶ ἐξῆς ἐπιλέγει· Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τῇδε εἴπωμεν, καὶ ἀποκρινώμεθα πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· εἰ σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίνα ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; | 51.4 And next he adds: "Let us speak further in this way, and answer ourselves again: 'If all things should come to a standstill together, as most thinkers of this sort venture to say, which among the mentioned motions must necessarily be the first to arise among them?' |
| 51.5 Τὴν αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν δήπου κινοῦσαν. ὑπ’ ἄλλου γὰρ οὐ μή ποτε ἔμπροσθεν μεταπέσῃ, μηδεμιᾶς γ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης ἔμπροσθεν μεταπτώσεως. | 51.5 'That which moves itself, surely. For it will never be transformed by another beforehand, since no transformation existed among them previously.' |
| 51.6 Ἀρχὴν ἄρα κινήσεων πασῶν καὶ πρώτην ἔν τε ἑστῶσι γενομένην καὶ ἐν κινουμένοις οὖσαν, τὴν ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν, φήσομεν ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην μεταβολῶν πασῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοιουμένην ὑφ’ ἑτέρου, κινοῦσαν δὲ ἕτερα, δευτέραν. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. | 51.6 'We shall assert then by necessity that the self-moving motion—being the origin of all motions and the first to arise among resting things and present among moving things—is the oldest and mightiest of all transformations, while that which is altered by another and moves other things is secondary.' 'You speak most truly.'" |
| 51.7 Ὁπότε δὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἐσμὲν τοῦ λόγου, τόδε ἀποκρινώμεθα. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐὰν ἴδωμέν που ταύτην γενομένην ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ ἢ ἐνύδρῳ ἢ πυροειδεῖ, κεχωρισμένῳ ἢ καὶ ξυμμιγεῖ, τί ποτε φήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθος ἐνεῖναι; | 51.7 "When we have reached this point in the discourse, let us answer this. 'What sort of thing?' 'If we should see this motion arising somewhere in earthly, watery, or fiery matter—whether separated or mixed—what state shall we say is present in such a thing?' |
| 51.8 Μῶν ἆρά με ἐρωτᾷς εἰ ζῆν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὅταν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῇ; Ναί. Ζῆν· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί δὲ, ὅταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισι ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῆν ὁμολογητέον; Οὐκ ἄλλο. Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός· ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν; | 51.8 'Are you asking me whether we shall say it is alive when it moves itself?' 'Yes.' 'Alive—how could it be otherwise?' 'What then, when we see soul in certain things, must we acknowledge anything other than that this same thing is alive?' 'Nothing else.' 'Hold now, by Zeus: would you not wish to conceive three things concerning each item?' |
| 51.9 Πῶς λέγεις; Ἓν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἓν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἓν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο. Πῶς; Τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν, τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν προτεινόμενον ἐρωτᾶν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν; | 51.9 'How do you mean?' 'One being the essence, one the definition of the essence, and one the name. And indeed, there are two questions concerning everything that exists.' 'How?' 'Sometimes each of us, when the name is proposed, asks for its definition; and at other times, when the definition itself is proposed, asks in turn for the name. Do we wish to mean something like this now?' |
| 51.10 Τὸ ποῖον; Ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον εἰς ἴσα μέρη ἐν ἄλλοισί τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ὄνομα μὲν ἄρτιον, λόγος δὲ ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη. Ναί. | 51.10 'What sort of thing?' 'There is a thing divided into two equal parts among other things and in number. To this thing in terms of number, the name is "even," and the definition is "a number divisible into two equal parts."' 'Yes.' |
| 51.11 Τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. Μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἐάν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἐάν τε τοὔνομα τὸν λόγον ἄρτιον ὀνόματι καὶ λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμὸν προσαγορεύοντες, ταὐτὸν ὄν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. | 51.11 'That is the sort of thing I mean. Do we not address it as the same thing in both ways—whether, when asked for the definition, we give the name, or when asked for the name, we give the definition, addressing it in name and definition as "even," calling a number divided into two parts the same thing?' 'Entirely so.' |
| 51.12 ᾯ δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν; Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φὴς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἥνπερ τοὔνομα, ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν; | 51.12 'That to which "soul" is the name, what is its definition? Have we any other than the one just stated—the motion capable of moving itself?' 'Do you say that self-motion is the definition possessing the very same essence as the name which we all address as "soul"?' |
| 51.13 Φημί γε. εἰ δ’ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρ’ ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις, ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αἰτία ἅπασιν; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη γε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. | 51.13 'I certainly do. And if this is so, do we still feel that it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that soul is identical with the first origin and motion of things that are, have been, and will be, and again of all their opposites, since it has been shown to be the cause of all transformation and motion in all things?' 'No, but it has been most sufficiently demonstrated that soul is the oldest of all things, having become the origin of motion.' |
| 51.14 Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι’ ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γινομένη κίνησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδὲν, δευτέρα τε καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτό ἄν τις ἀριθμεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστὴν, τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή; | 51.14 'Is not then that motion which comes to be in another through something else—never affording self-motion in itself to anything—secondary, and as many fractional numbers down as one might wish to count it, being in truth the transformation of an inanimate body?' |
| 51.15 Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. Ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν. | 51.15 'Correctly, then, and authoritatively, most truly, and most completely should we have said that soul came into being prior to body, while body is secondary and posterior, naturally ruled by the governing soul.' 'Most truly indeed.'" |
| 51.16 Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. | 51.16 "We remember, surely, having agreed in what preceded that if soul should appear to be older than body, the attributes of soul would also be older than those of body." "Entirely so." |
| 51.17 Τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαι τε καὶ μνῆμαι πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος. Ἀνάγκη. | 51.17 "Dispositions, character, wills, reasonings, true opinions, cares, and memories would have come into being prior to bodily length, breadth, depth, and strength, if indeed soul is prior to body." "Necessarily." |
| 51.18 Ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων, εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | 51.18 "Is it not then necessary after this to agree that soul is the cause of good things and bad, noble and base, just and unjust, and all opposites, if indeed we shall place it as the cause of all things?" "How could it be otherwise?" |
| 51.19 Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι; Τί μήν; Μίαν, ἢ πλείους; Πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρινοῦμαι· δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδέν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι. | 51.19 "Must we not then say that soul—which directs and inhabits all things that move everywhere—also directs the heaven?" "What else?" "One soul, or several?" "Several; I shall answer on their behalf: let us set down no fewer than two—the beneficent one and that capable of working the opposite." |
| 51.20 Σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας. Εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν, φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων ξυγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσαι κινήσεις σωμάτων ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν καὶ διάκρισιν καὶ σύγκρισιν καὶ τούτοις ἑπομένας θερμότητας, ψύξεις, βαρύτητας, κουφότητας, σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν, λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, αὐστηρὸν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν, καὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ψυχὴ χρωμένη, νοῦν μὲν προσλαμβάνουσα αἰεὶ θεῖον ὀρθῶς θεοῖς ὀρθὰ καὶ εὐδαίμονα παιδαγωγεῖ πάντα, ἀνοίᾳ δὲ ξυγγενομένη πάντα αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεργάζεται. | 51.20 "You have spoken very correctly. Very well. Soul leads all things in heaven, earth, and sea by its own motions, whose names are: to will, to consider, to care for, to deliberate, to form opinions correctly and falsely, rejoicing, grieving, trusting, fearing, hating, loving—and all primary motions akin to these which, taking over the secondary motions of bodies, lead all things to growth, decay, separation, combination, and the accompanying heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hard and soft, white and black, sour, sweet, and bitter. Using all these, soul—always taking to itself divine intellect—correctly guides all things rightly and happily for gods; but joining with folly, it works out entirely the opposite to these." |
| 51.21 τιθῶμεν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν; ἢ ἔτι διστάζομεν εἰ ἑτέρως πως ἔχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Πότερον οὖν δὴ ψυχῆς τὸ γένος ἐγκρατὲς οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ πάσης τῆς περιόδου γεγονέναι φῶμεν τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ ἀρετῆς πλῆρες, ἢ τὸ μηδέτερα κεκτημένον; βούλεσθε οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε ἀποκρινώμεθα; Πῶς; | 51.21 "Shall we set down that these things are so, or do we still doubt whether it is otherwise?" "By no means." "Which kind of soul then shall we say has become master of heaven and earth and the whole revolution—that which is wise and full of virtue, or that possessing neither?" "Do you wish us to answer to these things thus?" "How?" |
| 51.22 Εἰ μὲν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, φῶμεν, ἡ ξύμπασα οὐρανοῦ ὁδὸς ἅμα καὶ φορὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντων ἁπάντων νοῦ κινήσει καὶ περιφορᾷ καὶ λογισμοῖς ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ ξυγγενῶς ἔρχεται, δῆλον ὡς τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν φατέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς καὶ ἄγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην ὁδὸν ἐκείνην. Ὀρθῶς. | 51.22 "'If, O wondrous friend,' we shall say, 'the whole path and course of heaven and all things in it possess a nature similar to the motion, revolution, and reasonings of intellect, and proceed in kinship with it, it is clear that we must say the best soul takes care of the whole cosmos and guides it along that very path.'" "Correct." |
| 51.23 Εἰ δὲ μανικῶς τε καὶ ἀτάκτως ἔρχεται, τὴν κάκην. Καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθότατα. Τίνα οὖν δὴ νοῦ κίνησις φύσιν ἔχει; τοῦτο ἤδη χαλεπὸν, ὦ φίλοι, ἐρώτημα ἀποκρινόμενον εἰπεῖν ἐμφρόνως. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ὑμῖν δίκαιον τανῦν προσλαμβάνειν. Εὖ λέγεις. | 51.23 "'But if it proceeds frantically and disorderly, then the evil soul.'" "And this too is most correct." "'What nature then does the motion of intellect possess?' This is now a difficult question, my friends, to state wisely in reply; wherefore it is right that I too assist you in the answer." "You speak well." |
| 51.24 Μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν. | 51.24 "Let us not then make our reply by looking directly at it, as if gazing into the sun, bringing night upon ourselves at noon, as though we shall ever see and adequately know intellect with mortal eyes; but looking toward an image of the thing questioned, we may see more safely." |
| 51.25 Πῶς λέγεις; Ἧι προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς, τῶν δέκα κινήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν, ἣν συναναμνησθεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγὼ κοινῇ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ποιήσομαι. Κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις. Μεμνήμεθα τοίνυν τοῦτό γε τοσοῦτον τῶν τότε, ὅτι τῶν ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μένειν ἔθεμεν. Ναί. | 51.25 "How do you mean?" "Whichever motion intellect resembles, let us take the image of the ten motions, recalling which together with you I shall make our joint answer." "You would speak most excellently." "We remember then at least this much from that time—that we set down some of all things as moving, and others as staying still." "Yes." |
| 51.26 Τῶν δ’ αὖ κινουμένων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἐν πλείοσι φερόμενα. Ἔστι ταύτῃ. Τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τῶν ἐντόρνων οὐσῶν μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν. | 51.26 "And of moving things, some move in one place, and others move in several locations." "It is so." "Now of these two motions, that which moves in one place must always move around some center—a imitation of turned circles—and must be in every way as intimate and similar as possible to the revolution of intellect." |
| 51.27 Πῶς λέγεις; Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ δήπου καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕνα λόγον καὶ τάξιν μίαν ἄμφω κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες νοῦν τήν τε ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην κίνησιν, σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε φανεῖμεν φαῦλοι δημιουργοὶ λόγῳ καλῶν εἰκόνων. | 51.27 "How do you mean?" "Saying that both intellect and the motion carried in one place—likened to the revolutions of a turned sphere—move according to the same things, in the same way, in the same place, around the same things, toward the same things, and according to one principle and order, we should never appear to be poor craftsmen of noble images in speech." |
| 51.28 Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν αὕτη γε ἡ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως μηδὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μηδ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ μηδὲ περὶ ταὐτὰ μηδὲ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ μηδ’ ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένη μηδ’ ἐν κόσμῳ μηδ’ ἐν τάξει μηδ’ ἔν τινι λόγῳ κίνησις ἀνοίας ἂν αὖ πάσης εἴη ξυγγενής. | 51.28 "You speak most correctly." "Therefore that motion which is never carried in the same way, nor according to the same things, nor in the same place, nor around the same, nor toward the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor in structure, nor according to any principle, would be akin to all folly." |
| 51.29 Εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀληθέστατα. Τανῦν δὴ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἔτι διαρρήδην εἰπεῖν ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν. | 51.29 "It would indeed be most truly so." "Now then it is no longer difficult to say explicitly that, since soul is that which leads all things around for us, we must necessarily say that the revolution of heaven is led around, cared for, and ordered either by the best soul or its opposite." |
| 51.30 Ὦ ξένε, ἀλλ’ ἐκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις. τόδε δὲ προσυπάκουσον ἔτι. | 51.30 "O Stranger, from what has now been said, it is not pious to say otherwise than that one soul—or several—possessing all virtue leads these around." "You have listened most excellently to the arguments, Cleinias; but listen further to this." |
| 51.31 Τὸ ποῖον; Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ’ οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον; Τί μήν; Περὶ ἑνὸς δὴ ποιησώμεθα λόγους, οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἁρμόττοντες ἡμῖν τὰ ἄστρα φανοῦνται. | 51.31 "What sort of thing?" "If soul leads around the sun, moon, and other stars, does it not also lead each individual one?" "What else?" "Let us make arguments concerning one, which will appear to us fitting for all the stars." |
| 51.32 Τίνος; Ἥλιον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ, ψυχὴν δὲ οὐδείς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου σώματος οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζῶντος οὔτε ἀποθανόντος τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλὰ ἐλπὶς πολλὴ τὸ παράπαν τὸ γένος ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀναίσθητον πάσαις ταῖς τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεσι περιπεφυκέναι, νοητὸν δὲ εἶναι. μόνῳ νῷ δὴ καὶ νοήματι λάβωμεν αὐτοῦ πέρι τὸ τοιόνδε. | 51.32 "Concerning which one?" "Every human sees the body of the sun, but no one sees its soul—nor indeed the soul of any other body, living or dead, of any living creatures. But there is great hope that this whole class of thing is naturally imperceptible to all senses of the body, but intelligible. By mind alone and thought let us grasp this concerning it." |
| 51.33 Ποῖον; Ἥλιον εἰ περιάγει ψυχὴ, τριῶν ἓν λέγοντες δρᾶν σχεδὸν οὐκ ἀποτευξόμεθα. Τίνων; | 51.33 "What sort of thing?" "If soul leads the sun around, we shall hardly fail by saying it does one of three things." "Which ones?" |
| 51.34 Ὡς ἢ ἐνοῦσα ἐντὸς τῷ περιφερεῖ τούτῳ φαινομένῳ σώματι πάντῃ διακομίζει τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἡ παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχὴ πάντῃ περιφέρει· ἤ ποθεν ἔξωθεν σῶμα αὑτῇ πορισαμένη πυρὸς ἤ τινος ἀέρος, ὡς λόγος ἐστί τινων, ὠθεῖ βίᾳ σώματι σῶμα· ἢ τρίτον αὐτὴ ψιλὴ σώματος οὖσα, ἔχουσα δὲ δυνάμεις ἄλλας τινὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας, θαύματι ποδηγεῖ. Ναί. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη, τούτων ἕν γέ τι δρῶσαν ψυχὴν πάντα διάγειν. | 51.34 "That either dwelling inside this visible revolving body it carries such a thing everywhere, just as the soul in us carries us around everywhere; or procuring for itself a body from somewhere outside—of fire or some air, as is the account of some—it pushes body by body with force; or thirdly, being itself bare of body, but possessing certain other extraordinary powers, it guides it by a wonder." "Yes, it is necessary that doing one of these things, soul leads all things." |
| 51.35 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῶν Νόμων εἴρηται τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. καὶ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ δὲ ἐπάκουσον ὅπως τὴν αὐτὴν κατασκευάζει διάνοιαν· Πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σοφοὶ, ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι· διὰ μακροτέρων δ’, εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα. | 51.35 These things then have been said by the philosopher in the tenth book of the Laws. And in the Philebus listen to how he establishes the same idea: "For all the wise agree, genuinely exalting themselves, that intellect is king for us over both heaven and earth. And perhaps they speak well; but if you wish, let us make the examination of this class at greater length." |
| 51.36 Λέγε ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ὑπολογιζόμενος ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος. Καλῶς εἶπας. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε ἐπανερωτῶντες. Πῶς; Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν; | 51.36 "Speak as you wish, Socrates, taking no account of length for us, as you will not incur our displeasure." "You have spoken well. Let us begin then by questioning again in this way." "How?" "Whether, Protarchus, we should say that the totality of things and this so-called universe are governed by the power of unreason, chance, and whatever happens, or the opposite—as those before us used to say—that intellect and a certain wondrous wisdom organize and steer it throughout?" |
| 51.37 Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες· ὃ μὲν γὰρ δὴ σὺ λέγεις, οὐδ’ ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι, οὐδ’ ἂν δόξαιμι. | 51.37 "Nothing of the same sort, wondrous Socrates! For what you say now does not even seem pious to me; but to say that intellect orders all these things is worthy of the sight of the cosmos, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the whole revolution—and I would never say nor think otherwise concerning them." |
| 51.38 Βούλει δή τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον ξυμφήσωμεν, ὡς ταῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει; καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ’ ἀτάκτως ἔχειν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην; Ἴθι δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων λόγον νῦν ἡμῖν ἄθρει. | 51.38 "Do you wish then that we too agree with what was acknowledged by those before us, that these things are so? And that we not only think we ought to speak the views of others without danger, but also share the risk and take part in the blame when a formidable man says these things are not so, but in disorder?" "How could I not wish it?" "Come then, observe the following argument concerning these things now for us." |
| 51.39 Λέγε μόνον. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορῶμέν που, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοί φασιν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ συστάσει; Καὶ μάλα. Χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπὸ ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις. Φέρε δὴ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν λάβε τὸ τοιόνδε. | 51.39 "Only speak." "Do we not see somewhere that what pertains to the nature of the bodies of all living creatures—fire, water, spirit, and earth (as those tossed in a storm say)—are present in their composition?" "Very much so; for we are truly tossed in a storm by perplexity in our present arguments." "Come then, take the following concerning each of the elements in us." |
| 51.40 Ποῖον; Ὅτι σμικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρ’ ἡμῖν ἕνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὂν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἑνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταὐτόν. Οἷον πῦρ ἔστι μέν που παρ’ ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ’ ἐν τῷ παντί. | 51.40 "What sort of thing?" "That each of these in us is small, weak, in no way pure, and possessing a power not worthy of its nature. Take it in one case and think the same concerning all. For instance, fire exists somewhere in us, and it exists in the universe." |
| 51.41 Τί μήν; Οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μέν τι τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ’ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλήθει τε θαυμαστὸν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμῃ τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ. Καὶ μάλα ἀληθὲς ὃ λέγεις. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντὸς πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπ’ ἐκείνου τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἅπαντ’ ἴσχει ταῦτα; Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς. | 51.41 "What else?" "Is not the fire in us small, weak, and poor, while that in the universe is marvelous in quantity, beauty, and every power belonging to fire?" "What you say is very true." "What then? Is the fire of the universe nourished, generated, and ruled by the fire in us, or on the contrary does my fire, yours, and that of all other living creatures hold all these things from that cosmic fire?" "You ask a question not even worthy of an answer." |
| 51.42 Ὀρθῶς. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἶμαι, περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινῇ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε φανείη; | 51.42 "Correct. For you will speak, I think, concerning the earth here in animals and that in the universe, and of the other things I asked a little earlier—you will answer in the same way." "Who in their right mind, answering otherwise, would ever appear sane?" |
| 51.43 Σχεδὸν οὐδ’ ὁστισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑξῆς ἕπου. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα ἆρ’ οὐκ εἰς ἓν συγκείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα; Τί μήν; Ταὐτὸν δὴ λάβε καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν· διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὂν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. | 51.43 "Scarcely anyone at all. But follow what comes next in order. Seeing all these things just mentioned gathered into one, did we not name it 'body'?" "What else?" "Take the same thing concerning this which we call the cosmos; for in the same manner it would be a body, being composed of the same elements." "You speak most correctly." |
| 51.44 Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεταί τε καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπείπομεν εἴληφέ τε καὶ ἔχει; Καὶ τοῦθ’ ἕτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως. Τί δέ; ἆρα τόδε ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς; | 51.44 "Does the body in us derive its nourishment entirely from this cosmic body, receiving and holding all those things we just mentioned concerning them, or vice versa?" "This too is another question, Socrates, not worthy of asking." "What then? Is this next question worthy of asking, or how will you say?" |
| 51.45 Λέγε τὸ ποῖον. Τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἆρ’ οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν; Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν. Πόθεν, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὂν ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα; Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. | 51.45 "Tell me what it is." "Shall we not say that the body in us has a soul?" "It is clear that we shall say so." "Whence, my dear Protarchus, did it receive it, unless the body of the universe happened to be ensouled, possessing the same things as this body of ours, and in every way finer?" "It is clear that it came from nowhere else, Socrates." |
| 51.46 Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνὸν, τοῦτ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ψυχήν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἰατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθὲν καὶ ἀσκούμενον πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν. Ἀλλ’ οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ’ ἂν λόγον ἔχοι. | 51.46 "For we surely do not think, Protarchus, that those four principles—Limit, the Unlimited, the Combination, and the genus of Cause present as a fourth in all things—which provides soul in our bodies, produces physical exercise, cures the body when it stumbles, and composing and practicing other things in other cases is called all-varied wisdom—we do not think that while these same principles exist in the whole heaven and in great portions, and moreover noble and pure, Cause has failed to devise among them the nature of the finest and most honorable things." "That would by no means make sense." |
| 51.47 Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, μετ’ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἑπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ καὶ πέρας ἱκανὸν, καί τις ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φαύλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιότατα. Δικαιότατα δῆτα. | 51.47 "If not this, then following that other argument we should speak better, saying—as we have often said—that there is in the universe much Unlimited and sufficient Limit, and a Cause over them of no mean order, ordering and arranging years, seasons, and months, most justly called Wisdom and Intellect." "Most justly indeed." |
| 51.48 Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλὰ, καθότι φίλον ἑκάστοις λέγεσθαι. | 51.48 "Yet wisdom and intellect could never come to be without soul." "No indeed." "You will say then that in the nature of Zeus there resides a royal soul and a royal intellect through the power of the Cause, and in other gods other noble qualities, according to whatever is dear to each to be called." |
Chapter 52
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes an extensive passage from Plato’s Laws (Book X, 899d–905d) where the Athenian Stranger argues against young sceptics who believe that the gods exist but do not care about human affairs (providence / epimeleia). Plato reasons that because the gods are perfectly good, wise, and powerful, they cannot be lazy, negligent, or indifferent to small details; every tiny part of the universe is arranged systematically for the good of the whole.
At the conclusion (52.32–52.33), Eusebius provides his own commentary: he argues that Plato’s deep philosophical arguments are simply expanded, paraphrased versions of much older, concise Hebrew Scriptures. Eusebius compares Plato’s insights to Psalm 139:7–10 ("If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there..."), Psalm 19:1, Isaiah 40:26, Wisdom of Solomon 13:5, Romans 1:20, and Psalm 73:3 ("I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked").
At the conclusion (52.32–52.33), Eusebius provides his own commentary: he argues that Plato’s deep philosophical arguments are simply expanded, paraphrased versions of much older, concise Hebrew Scriptures. Eusebius compares Plato’s insights to Psalm 139:7–10 ("If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there..."), Psalm 19:1, Isaiah 40:26, Wisdom of Solomon 13:5, Romans 1:20, and Psalm 73:3 ("I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked").
| 52.1 Τὸν δ’ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, παραμυθητέον. «ὦ ἄριστε δή,» φῶμεν, «ὅτι μὲν ἡγῇ θεοὺς, συγγένειά τις ἴσως σε θεία πρὸς τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄγει τιμᾶν καὶ νομίζειν εἶναι· κακῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀδίκων τύχαι ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι σφόδρα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἄγουσί σε πρὸς ἀσέβειαν, ἔν τε Μούσαις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμνούμεναι ἅμα καὶ ἐν παντοίοις λόγοις. | 52.1 "Now as for the man who believes that gods exist, but that they take no thought for human affairs, we must offer reassurance. Let us say to him: 'My good sir, that you believe in gods is perhaps due to a divine kinship leading you toward what is inborn in you—to honor them and hold that they exist. Yet the fortunes of evil and unjust men, both private and public—fortunes that in truth are not happy, though they are vehemently deemed happy in popular opinion—lead you unharmoniously into impiety, being sung out of tune both by the Muses and in all kinds of tales. |
| 52.2 ἢ καὶ πρὸς τέλος ἴσως ἀνοσίους ἀνθρώπους ὁρῶν ἐλθόντας γηραιοὺς, παῖδας παίδων καταλιπόντας ἐν τιμαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις, ταράττῃ τανῦν ὅταν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἰδὼν ἢ δι’ ἀκοῆς αἰσθόμενος, ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν αὐτὸς αὐτῶν τινι αὐτόπτης προστυχὼν πολλῶν ἀσεβημάτων καὶ δεινῶν γενομένων τισὶ δι’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐκ σμικρῶν εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀφικομένους· τότε διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλος εἶ μέμφεσθαι μὲν θεοὺς ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας τῶν τοιούτων διὰ ξυγγένειαν οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλων, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπό τε ἀλογίας ἅμα καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος δυσχεραίνειν θεοὺς εἰς τοῦτο νῦν τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθας, ὥστ’ εἶναι μὲν δοκεῖν αὐτοὺς, τῶν δ’ ἀνθρωπίνων καταφρονεῖν καὶ ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. | 52.2 Or perhaps, seeing impious men reaching old age at the end of their lives and leaving their children’s children in the highest honors, you are currently troubled when, having observed all these things either through sight or hearsay, or having personally encountered one of them yourself, you see that after many impieties and terrible deeds committed against certain people, they have risen from humble origins to tyrannies and the highest positions. Then, because of all such things, it is clear that you do not wish to blame the gods as being the cause of such matters owing to your kinship with them; yet being led along by irrationality, and at the same time being unable to feel indignation toward the gods, you have fallen into your present state—so that you think they exist, but hold human affairs in contempt and neglect.' |
| 52.3 ἵνα οὖν μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἔλθῃ σοι πάθος πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τὸ νῦν παρὸν δόγμα, ἀλλ’ ἐάν πως οἷόν τ’ ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι λόγοις αὐτὸ προσιὸν γενώμεθα δυνατοὶ, πειρώμεθα, συνάψαντες τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸν παράπαν οὐχ ἡγούμενον θεοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διεπερανάμεθα, τούτῳ τανῦν προσχρήσασθαι. | 52.3 Therefore, lest this present opinion turn into a greater malady of impiety, let us try—if we can somehow dispel it by arguments as it approaches—to make use of the following argument, joining it to that by which we previously dealt with the man who believes in no gods at all from the beginning. |
| 52.4 σὺ δ’, ὦ Κλεινία τε καὶ Μέγιλλε, ὑπὲρ τοῦ νέου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ἀποκρινόμενοι διαδέχεσθε· ἐὰν δέ τι δύσκολον ἐγγίγνηται τοῖς λόγοις, ἐγὼ σφῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ, δεξάμενος διαβιβῶ τὸν ποταμόν.» «Ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ σύ τε οὕτω ταῦτα δρᾶ ποιήσομέν τε ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἃ λέγεις.» | 52.4 And you, Cleinias and Megillus, take your turns answering on behalf of the young man, just as before; and if anything difficult arises in the course of our argument, I shall receive it from you, as I just did, and carry you across the river.'—'You speak rightly; do so, and we will do our part to fulfill what you ask as far as we can.' |
| 52.5 «Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως εἴη χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰσὶ θεοὶ οὐχ ἧττον, μᾶλλον δὲ, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει διαφερόντων. ἤκουε γάρ που καὶ παρῆν τοῖς νῦν δὴ λεγομένοις ὡς ἀγαθοί γε ὄντες πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπιμέλειαν οἰκειοτάτην αὑτῶν οὖσαν κέκτηνται.» «Καὶ σφόδρα γε ἐπήκουε.» | 52.5 'Well, it would probably not be difficult to demonstrate this at least: that the gods take care of small things no less—indeed, even more—than those that excel in size. For he certainly heard and was present when it was just said that, being good with respect to every virtue, they possess the care of all things as something most proper to themselves.'—'He certainly heard that.' |
| 52.6 «Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν κοινῇ συνεξεταζόντων τίνα λέγοντες ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. φέρε, τὸ σωφρονεῖν νοῦν τε κεκτῆσθαι φαμὲν ἀρετῆς, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία κακίας;» «Φαμέν.» «Τί δέ; ἀρετῆς μὲν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ κακίας;» | 52.6 'Next then, let us examine together by what virtue we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that self-control and possessing intelligence belong to virtue, and their opposites to vice?'—'We say so.'—'And what then? That courage belongs to virtue, and cowardice to vice?' |
| 52.7 «Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.» «Καὶ τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ τούτων, τὰ δὲ καλὰ φήσομεν;» «Ἀνάγκη.» «Καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαῦρα, θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἐροῦμεν;» «Καὶ ταῦθ’ οὕτως ὁμολογοῖ πᾶς ἄν.» | 52.7 'By all means.'—'And shall we call the latter shameful, and the former noble?'—'Necessarily.'—'And shall we say that any of these base qualities belong to us, if to anyone, but that no such thing, whether great or small, belongs to the gods?'—'Everyone would agree to this as well.' |
| 52.8 «Τί δέ; ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ τρυφὴν εἰς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς θήσομεν; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;» «Καὶ πῶς;» «Ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὐναντίον;» «Ναί.» «Τἀναντία ἄρα τούτοις εἰς τοὐναντίον;» «Τοὐναντίον.» «Τί οὖν; τρυφῶν δὴ καὶ ἀμελὴς ἀργός τε, ὃν ὁ ποιητὴς κηφῆσι κοθούροισι μάλιστα εἴκελον ἔφασκεν εἶναι, γίγνοιτ’ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος πᾶς ἡμῖν;» | 52.8 'What then? Shall we reckon neglect, idleness, and luxury as belonging to virtue of soul? Or how do you say?'—'How could we?'—'Rather to its opposite?'—'Yes.'—'The opposites of these, then, belong to the opposite?'—'To the opposite.'—'What then? Would a luxurious, neglectful, and idle person—whom the poet described as most like tailless drones—become such in our eyes?' |
| 52.9 «Ὀρθότατά γε εἰπών.» «Οὐκοῦν τόν γε θεὸν οὐ ῥητέον ἔχειν ἦθος τοιοῦτον ὅ γε αὐτὸς μισεῖ· τῷ δέ τι τοιοῦτον φθέγγεσθαι πειρωμένῳ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.» «Οὐ μὲν δή· πῶς γὰρ ἄν;» «Ὧι δὴ προσήκει μὲν πράττειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι διαφερόντως τινὸς, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ γένους τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελεῖται, τῶν σμικρῶν δὲ ἀμελεῖ· κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἐπαινοῦντες τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι πλημμελοῖμεν; σκοπῶμεν δὲ ὧδε. ἆρ’ οὐ κατὰ δύο εἴδη τὸ τοιοῦτον πράττει ὁ πράττων, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε ἄνθρωπος;» «Ποίω δὴ λέγομεν;» | 52.9 'Most correctly spoken.'—'Surely then, we must not say that God has a character such as he himself hates; nor should we permit anyone attempting to utter such a thing.'—'Certainly not; for how could we?'—'Now, if it belongs to someone to act and take care of something in an extraordinary way, but this person cares for the great things of that kind while neglecting the small—on what grounds could we praise such a statement without erring completely? Let us consider it thus: does not the one who acts, whether god or man, do such a thing in one of two ways?'—'Which two do we mean?' |
| 52.10 «Ἢ διαφέρον οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ, ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ, εἰ διαφέρει, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖ· ἢ ἔστιν ἄλλως πως γιγνομένη ἀμέλεια; οὐ γάρ που, ὅταν γε ἀδύνατον ᾖ τῶν πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τότε ἀμέλεια ἔσται τῶν σμικρῶν ἢ μεγάλων μὴ ἐπιμελουμένῳ, ὧν ἂν δυνάμει θεὸς ἢ φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐλλιπὴς καὶ μὴ δυνατὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γίγνηται.» «Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;» | 52.10 'Either believing that it makes no difference to the whole if the small things are neglected; or through indolence and luxury, if it does make a difference, he nevertheless neglects them. Or does neglect arise in any other way? For surely, when it is impossible to care for all things, there will be no neglect of small things or great when one fails to care for them—things which a god or some base person, being deficient and incapable, turns out unable to care for.'—'Of course not.' |
| 52.11 «Νῦν δὴ δύο ὄντες τρισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρινάσθωσαν, οἳ θεοὺς μὲν ἀμφότεροι ὁμολογοῦντες εἶναι, παραιτητοὺς δὲ ἕτερος, ὁ δὲ ἀμελεῖς τῶν σμικρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν θεοὺς ἀμφότεροί φατε γινώσκειν, καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν πάντα, λαθεῖν δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν δυνατὸν εἶναι τῶν ὁπόσων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ταύτῃ λέγετε ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;» «Οὕτως.» | 52.11 'Now then, let these two men answer the three of us—both agreeing that gods exist, but the one holding that they are easily persuaded by bribes, and the other that they neglect small things. First, you both say that the gods know, see, and hear all things, and that nothing of all those things subject to perception and knowledge can escape them. Do you say it is so in this regard, or how?'—'Just so.' |
| 52.12 «Τί δέ; δύνασθαι πάντα ὁπόσων αὖ δύναμίς ἐστι θνητοῖς τε καὶ ἀθανάτοις;» «Πῶς γὰρ οὐ συγχωρήσονται καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;» «Καὶ μὴν ἀγαθούς τε καὶ ἀρίστους ὡμολογήκαμεν αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πέντε ὄντες.» «Σφόδρα γε.» «Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ τρυφῇ ἀδύνατον αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν πράττειν ὁτιοῦν τὸ παράπαν, ὄντας γε οἵους λέγομεν; δειλίας γὰρ ἔγγονος ἔν γε ἡμῖν ἀργία, ῥᾳθυμία δὲ ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς.» | 52.12 'And what then? That they can do all things that are within the power of mortals and immortals?'—'How could they fail to concede that this is so as well?'—'And indeed, we have agreed, being five of us, that they are good and best.'—'Most certainly.'—'Is it not then impossible to agree that through indolence and luxury they do anything at all, being such as we say? For among us, idleness is the offspring of cowardice, and indolence comes from idleness and luxury.' |
| 52.13 «Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.» «Ἀργίᾳ μὲν δὴ καὶ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ οὐδεὶς ἀμελεῖ θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ μέτεστιν αὐτῷ που δειλίας.» «Ὀρθότατα λέγεις.» «Οὐκοῦν τὸ λοιπὸν, εἴπερ ἀμελοῦσι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων τῶν περὶ τὸ πᾶν, ἢ γινώσκοντες ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ, δρῷεν ἂν τοῦτο· ἢ τί τὸ λοιπὸν, πλὴν τὸ γινώσκειν τοὐναντίον;» «Οὐδέν.» | 52.13 'You speak most truly.'—'Through idleness and indolence, then, no god neglects anything, for cowardice has no share in him.'—'You speak most correctly.'—'What remains then, if indeed they neglect the small and few things in the universe, is that they would do so either knowing that there is no need at all to care for any such things—or what else remains except knowing the exact opposite?'—'Nothing.' |
| 52.14 «Πότερον οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε καὶ βέλτιστε, θῶμέν σε λέγοντα, ὡς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε καὶ δέον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἀμελοῦντας, ἢ γινώσκοντας ὅτι δεῖ, καθάπερ οἱ φαυλότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγονται ποιεῖν, εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βέλτιον πράττειν ὧν δὴ πράττουσι διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν οὐ ποιεῖν;» | 52.14 'Shall we then posit, my excellent friend, that you say they are ignorant and neglect them through ignorance when they ought to take care of them, or that they know they ought to, yet act as the basest of men are said to do—knowing that it is better to do other things than what they actually do, yet failing to do them because they are overcome by pleasures or pains?' |
| 52.15 «Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;» «Οὐκοῦν δὴ τά γε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα καὶ θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζῴων ἄνθρωπος.» «Ἔοικε γοῦν.» «Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι πάντα ὁπόσα θνητὰ ζῷα ἢ νοερά, ὧνπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.» «Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;» | 52.15 'How could that be?'—'Surely human affairs partake of an animate nature, and man is at the same time the most god-fearing of all living creatures.'—'So it seems, at least.'—'And indeed, we say that all living creatures, whether mortal or intelligent, are possessions of the gods, to whom the entire heaven also belongs.'—'How could it be otherwise?' |
| 52.16 «Ἤδη τοίνυν ἢ σμικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταῦτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς· οὐδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς ἀμελεῖν ἂν εἴη προσῆκον, ἐπιμελεστάτοις γε οὖσι καὶ ἀρίστοις. σκοπῶμεν γὰρ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις.» «Τὸ ποῖον;» «Τὸ περί τε αἰσθήσεως καὶ δυνάμεως, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοιν πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ χαλεπότητά ἐστον πεφυκότε;» «Πῶς λέγεις;» | 52.16 'Now then, let someone say whether these things are small or great to the gods; for in neither case would it be fitting for those who possess us to neglect us, since they are most careful and best. For let us consider this further in addition to those points.'—'What sort of point?'—'Regarding perception and power: are they not by nature opposed to one another with respect to ease and difficulty?'—'How do you mean?' |
| 52.17 «Ὁρᾶν μέν που καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ σμικρὰ χαλεπώτερον ἢ τὰ μεγάλα, φέρειν δὲ αὖ καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σμικρῶν καὶ ὀλίγων παντὶ ῥᾷον ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων.» «Καὶ πολύ γε.» «Ἰατρῷ δὴ προστεταγμένον ὅλον τι θεραπεύειν βουλομένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ, τῶν μὲν μεγάλων ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται, τῶν μορίων δὲ καὶ σμικρῶν ἀμελές· εἶθ’ ἕξει ποτὲ καλῶς αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν;» «Οὐδαμῶς.» | 52.17 'To see and hear small things is harder than large ones, but to bear, master, and take care of small and few things is easier for everyone than their opposites.'—'Much more so.'—'Now if a physician, appointed and willing and able to cure a whole body, should care for the large parts but neglect the small bits and parts, will the whole ever be well with him?'—'By no means.' |
| 52.18 «Οὐ μὴν οὐδέ γε κυβερνήταις οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδ’ οἰκονόμοις οὐδ’ αὖ τισι πολιτικοῖς οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ σμικρῶν πολλὰ ἢ μεγάλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι.» «Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;» | 52.18 'Nor indeed will many or great things be well for pilots, generals, household managers, statesmen, or anyone else of that kind, apart from the few or small details; for stonemasons say that large stones do not lie well without small ones.'—'How could they?' |
| 52.19 «Μὴ τοίνυν τὸν θεὸν ἀξιώσωμέν ποτε θνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὄντα τε σοφώτατον βουλόμενόν τε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον, ὧν μὲν ῥᾷον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, σμικρῶν ὄντων, μηδαμῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἀργὸν ἢ δειλόν τινα διὰ πόνους ῥᾳθυμοῦντα, τῶν δὲ μεγάλων.» | 52.19 'Let us never then deem God to be inferior to mortal craftsmen, who, the better they are, complete their appropriate works—both small and great—more accurately and perfectly by a single art; nor let us deem God—who is most wise, willing, and able to take care—to take no care at all of small things which are easier to care for, like someone idle or cowardly slacking off because of effort, while taking care only of the great.' |
| 52.20 «Μηδαμῶς δόξαν τοιαύτην περὶ θεῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἀποδεχώμεθα· οὐδαμῇ γὰρ οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτ’ ἀληθὲς τὸ διανόημα διανοοίμεθ’ ἄν.» «Δοκοῦμεν δέ μοι νῦν ἤδη καὶ μεγάλα μετρίως διειλέχθαι τῷ φιλαιτίῳ τῆς ἀμελείας πέρι θεῶν.» «Ναί.» «Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς. ἐπῳδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ καί τινων μύθων ἔτι.» «Ποίων, ὦ ἀγαθέ;» | 52.20 'By no means let us accept such an opinion about the gods, O stranger; for we would be entertaining a thought that is neither pious nor true.'—'And it seems to me that we have now discussed moderately well with the lover of fault-finding regarding the gods' alleged neglect.'—'Yes.'—'By compelling him through arguments to agree that he speaks incorrectly. Yet he seems to me still to need some incantations and some stories.'—'What kind, my good sir?' |
| 52.21 «Πείσωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ’ ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα, ὧν καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστον τὸ προσῆκον πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. τούτοις δέ εἰσιν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρότατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως, εἰς μερισμὸν τὸν ἔσχατον τέλος ἀπειργασμένοι· | 52.21 'Let us persuade the young man by our words that all things are arranged for the guardian of the universe with a view to the preservation and excellence of the whole, of which each part also suffers and acts what is fitting as far as it can. And over these, rulers have been assigned to each down to the smallest detail of passion and action, having perfected their end to the ultimate division; |
| 52.22 ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σὸν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεὶ, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν. σὲ δὲ λέληθε περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὡς γένεσις ἕνεκα ἐκείνου γίνεται πᾶσα, ὅπως ᾖ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουσα εὐδαίμων οὐσία, οὐχ ἕνεκα σοῦ γινομένη, σὺ δ’ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου. πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουργὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντεῖνον βέλτιστον, μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται. | 52.22 of which one part is your own, wretch, which ever stretches toward and looks to the whole, tiny though it be. But this very thing escapes you: that all generation comes to pass for the sake of that whole, so that a happy existence may belong to the life of the universe—it does not come to pass for your sake, but you for its sake. For every physician and every skilled craftsman works all things for the sake of the whole, striving toward what is best in common; he constructs the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. |
| 52.23 σὺ δὲ ἀγανακτεῖς ἀγνοῶν ὅπῃ τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀεὶ ψυχὴ συντεταγμένη σώματι τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ, τοτὲ δ’ ἄλλῳ, μεταβάλλει παντοίας μεταβολὰς, δι’ ἑαυτὴν ἢ δι’ ἑτέραν ψυχὴν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον, χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, ἵνα τὸ πρέπον ἕκαστον τῆς μοίρας λαγχάνῃ.» | 52.23 But you are aggrieved, being ignorant of how what concerns yourself turns out best for the whole and for you according to the power of our common origin. And since a soul, ever joined to a body at one time another, undergoes all kinds of changes on its own account or on account of another soul, no other work remains for the draught-player [God] except to transfer the character that becomes better to a better place, and the worse to a worse place, so that each may receive its fitting allotment.' |
| 52.24 «Πῇ λέγεις;» «Ἧιπερ ἂν ἔχοι λόγον ῥᾳστώνη ἐπιμελείας θεοῖς τῶν πάντων, ταύτῃ μοι δοκῶ φράζειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀεὶ βλέπων πλάττοι τις μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον, καὶ μὴ ξέμπολλα ἐξ ἑνὸς, ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, πρώτης ἢ δευτέρας ἢ καὶ τρίτης γενέσεως μετειληφότα, πλήθεσιν ἄπειρ’ ἂν εἴη τῆς μετατιθεμένης κοσμήσεως. νῦν δ’ ἐστὶ θαυμαστὴ ῥᾳστώνη τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ.» | 52.24 'In what way do you mean?'—'In the way that provides the gods with the greatest ease in caring for all things—that is how I seem to myself to explain it. For if someone were to reshape and transform all things looking always to the whole—such as making living water out of fire, and not many things out of one or one out of many, having partaken of a first, second, or third generation—the arrangements of the relocated order would be infinite in number. But as it is, there is a wonderful ease for the guardian of the universe.' |
| 52.25 «Πῶς αὖ λέγεις;» «Ὧδε. ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδεν ἡμῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐμψύχους οὔσας τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας καὶ πολλὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐν αὐταῖς οὖσαν, πολλὴν δὲ κακίαν, ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν γενόμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί· (γένεσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἦν ζῴων ἀπολομένου τούτοιν θατέρου·) καὶ τὸ μὲν ὠφελεῖν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς ὂν ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς διενοήθη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν βλάπτειν· ταῦτα πάντα ξυνιδὼν ἐμηχανήσατο ποῦ κείμενον ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρέχοι μάλιστ’ ἂν καὶ ῥᾴστα καὶ ἄριστα. | 52.25 'How do you mean again?'—'Thus: since our King observed that all actions are animated, containing much virtue and much vice, and that soul and body—though not eternal—are imperishable once brought into being (just like the gods according to law, for the generation of living beings would never have occurred if either of these two had been destroyed); and since he conceived that the good nature of the soul is always naturally suited to benefit, and the evil to harm—having perceived all these things, he devised where each of the parts should be placed so that virtue might conquer and vice be defeated in the universe in the easiest and best manner possible. |
| 52.26 μεμηχάνηται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ ποίαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οἰκίζεσθαι καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους· τῆς δὲ γενέσεως τοῦ ποίου τινὸς ἀφῆκε ταῖς βουλήσεσιν ἑκάστων ἡμῶν τὰς αἰτίας. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὢν τὴν ψυχὴν, ταύτῃ σχεδὸν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται ἅπας ἡμῶν ὡς τὸ πολύ.» «Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός.» | 52.26 He has devised, then, with a view to the whole, what sort of position each thing that becomes of a certain quality must receive to dwell in, and what places it must occupy; but he left the causes for the creation of that particular quality to the wills of each of us. For in whatever direction one sets his desire and whatever kind of soul he has, in that direction and of that kind almost every one of us becomes for the most part on each occasion.'—'That is at least probable.' |
| 52.27 «Μεταβάλλει μὲν τοίνυν πάνθ’ ὅσα μέτοχά ἐστι ψυχῆς, ἐν αὐτοῖς κεκτημένα τὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν· μεταβάλλοντα δὲ φέρεται κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον. σμικρότερα μὲν τῶν ἠθῶν μεταβάλλοντα ἐλάττω κατὰ τὸ τῆς χώρας ἐπίπεδον μεταπορεύεται, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀδικώτερα μεταπεσόντα εἰς βάθος τά τε κάτω λεγόμενα τῶν τόπων, ὅσα Ἅιδην τε καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπονομάζοντες σφόδρα φοβοῦνται καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦσι ζῶντές τε καὶ διαλυθέντες τῶν σωμάτων. μείζω δὴ ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὁπόταν μεταβάλλῃ διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυρὰν, ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ θείᾳ προσμίξασα γένηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἅγιον ὅλον, μετακομισθεῖσα εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον· ὅταν δὲ τἀναντία, ἐπὶ τἀναντία μεθιδρύσατο τὸν αὑτῆς βίον. | 52.27 'All things, therefore, that partake of soul undergo change, possessing within themselves the cause of their change; and as they change, they are borne along according to the order and law of destiny. Souls undergoing smaller changes in character move lesser distances across the level surface of the region; but those that fall deeper into injustice move into the depths and the so-called lower regions, which men name Hades and the like, fearing them greatly and dreaming of them both while living and when released from their bodies. And whenever a soul undergoes greater changes toward vice or virtue through its own willpower and strong association—whenever, coming into contact with divine virtue, it becomes exceptionally such, it also changes to a distinct, entirely holy place, being translated into some better region; but when the opposite occurs, it relocates its life to the opposite.' |
| 52.28 αὕτη τοι δίκη ἐστὶ θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν, ὦ παῖ καὶ νεανίσκε, ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν· κακίω μὲν γινόμενον πρὸς τὰς κακίους ψυχὰς, ἀμείνω δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀμείνους πορευόμενον ἔν τε ζωῇ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι θανάτοις πάσχειν τε ἃ προσῆκον δρᾶν ἐστι τοῖς προσφυέσι τοὺς προσφερεῖς καὶ ποιεῖν. | 52.28 'This is the justice of the gods who hold Olympus, O child and young man who deem yourself neglected by the gods: that he who becomes worse moves toward the worse souls, and he who becomes better toward the better souls, both in life and in all deaths, to suffer and do what is fitting for like to do to like. |
| 52.29 ταύτης τῆς δίκης οὔτε σὺ μήποτε οὔτ’ ἄλλος ἀτυχὴς γενόμενος ἐπεύξεται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν, ἣν πασῶν δίκην διαφερόντως ἔταξάν τε οἱ τάξαντες χρεών τε ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμεληθήσῃ ποτὲ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς· οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ’ ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ· τίσεις δὲ αὐτῇ τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν εἴτ’ ἐνθάδε μένων εἴτε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου διαπορευθεὶς εἴτε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἁγιώτερον ἔτι διακομισθεὶς τόπον. | 52.29 From this justice neither you nor any other unfortunate man will ever boast of having escaped—a justice which those who ordered it ordained above all other judgments, and which ought to be feared entirely. For you will never be neglected by it! You are not so small that you can sink into the depths of the earth, nor so high that you can fly up into heaven; but you shall pay to it the fitting retribution, whether remaining here, or traveling to Hades, or being carried across to a place even more sacred than these. |
| 52.30 ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη τῶν οὓς σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ σμικρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας ἀνοσιουργήσαντας, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον πράξαντας, ᾠήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι, καὶ ὡς ἐν κατόπτροις αὐτῶν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡγήσω καθεωρακέναι τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν, οὐκ εἰδὼς αὐτῶν τὴν συντέλειαν, ὅπῃ ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμβάλλεται. γινώσκειν δὲ αὐτὴν, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, πρὸς οὐδὲν δοκεῖς, ἥν τις μὴ γινώσκων οὐδ’ ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτὲ, οὐδὲ λόγον ξυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. | 52.30 The same argument applies to you regarding those men whom you saw rising from small beginnings to great height after committing unholy deeds or doing such things, and whom you thought had become happy instead of wretched; and in whose actions, as if in mirrors, you thought you had observed the complete neglect of all the gods, not knowing their final outcome—how it contributes to the whole. And you seem to think, O bravest of men, that there is no need to know this outcome; yet if someone does not know it, he could never see even an outline of truth, nor be capable of contributing a rational account of life regarding happiness or unfortunate fate. |
| 52.31 ταῦτα εἰ μέν σε πείθει Κλεινίας ὅδε καὶ ξύμπασα ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, περὶ θεῶν ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ὅ τι λέγεις, καλῶς ἄν σοι θεὸς αὐτὸς ξυλλαμβάνοι· εἰ δ’ ἐπιδεὴς ἔτι λόγου ἂν εἴης, λεγόντων ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν τρίτον ἐπάκουε, εἰ νοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχεις.» | 52.31 If these arguments persuade you, together with Cleinias here and all this assembly of ours, that you know not what you say about the gods, God himself may well assist you. But if you should still be in need of argument, listen to us as we speak to the third point, if you have any sense at all.'" |
Eusebius' Commentary
| 52.32 Τούτων ὁ νοῦς, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὰ ῥήματα, ἐν τοῖς Ἑβραίων λογίοις προκαταβέβληται συντομώτατα καὶ δι’ ὀλίγων τῆς διανοίας περιεχομένης. τό τε γὰρ «οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν δύσῃ κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βάθος, οὐδ’ ὑψηλὸς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ» ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη τῷ παρὰ τῷ Δαβὶδ τοῦτον ἔχοντι τὸν τρόπον· «ποῦ πορευθῶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματός σου, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου σου ποῦ φύγω; ἐὰν ἀναβῶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν, σὺ ἐκεῖ εἶ· ἐὰν καταβῶ εἰς τὸν Ἀίδην, πάρει. | 52.32 The thought of these passages—if not the exact words—has been laid down beforehand in the most concise manner in the Hebrew oracles, containing the meaning in few words. For the phrase, "You are not so small that you can sink into the depths of the earth, nor so high that you can fly up into heaven," would be similar to that found in David, which runs in this manner: "Where shall I go from thy spirit, and from thy face where shall I flee? If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; if I descend into Hades, thou art present. |
| 52.33 εἰ ἀναλάβοιμι πτέρυγας καὶ κατασκηνώσαιμι εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς θαλάσσης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἡ χείρ σου ὁδηγήσει·» ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ «οἱ οὐρανοὶ διηγοῦνται δόξαν θεοῦ, καὶ ποίησιν χειρῶν αὐτοῦ ἀναγγέλλει τὸ στερέωμα.» καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Ἠσαίᾳ τὸ «ἀναβλέψατε εἰς ὕψος τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὑμῶν, καὶ ἴδετε τίς κατέδειξε ταῦτα πάντα.» καὶ τὸ «ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς θεωρεῖται.» καὶ τὸ «τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης.» ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ «ἐζήλωσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνόμοις, εἰρήνην ἁμαρτωλῶν θεωρῶν» μεταπεφράσθαι μοι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος διὰ τοῦ «ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος σοι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν εἴη τῶν οὓς σὺ κατιδὼν ἐκ μικρῶν μεγάλους γεγονότας ἀνοσιουργήσαντας, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον πράξαντας, ᾠήθης ἐξ ἀθλίων εὐδαίμονας γεγονέναι.» καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα τούτοις ὁμοίως εἴρηται προύλαβε τὴν εἰς πλάτος ἐκτεθεῖσαν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑρμηνείαν ἐν τοῖς Ἑβραίων λόγοις. ἕκαστον δ’ οὖν αὐτῶν κατὰ μέρος εὕροις ἂν ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάζων τοῖς Ἑβραίων συμφερόμενον γράμμασιν. Ἑβραίων δὲ εἶναι λόγους οὐ μόνον τὰ παρὰ Μωσεῖ λόγιά φημι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μετὰ Μωσέα θεοφιλῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἴτε προφητῶν εἴτε καὶ ἀποστόλων τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, ὧν ἡ τῶν δογμάτων συμφωνία μιᾶς εἰκότως αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς προσηγορίας ἀξιώσειεν. | If I take up wings and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there thy hand shall lead me." Furthermore, also: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands." And again in Isaiah: "Lift up your eyes on high, and see who revealed all these things." And: "From the greatness and beauty of created things, their Creator is correspondingly perceived." And: "For his invisible attributes from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead." And also: "I was jealous of the lawless, when I beheld the peace of sinners"—this seems to me to have been paraphrased by Plato through the statement: "The same argument applies to you regarding those men whom you saw rising from small beginnings to great height after committing unholy deeds, whom you thought had become happy instead of wretched." And all the other things spoken in like manner anticipated in the Hebrew scriptures the interpretation set forth at length by Plato. Each of them in detail you could find, upon accurate examination, agreeing with the writings of the Hebrews. And by the 'words of the Hebrews,' I mean not only the oracles in Moses, but also those of the other God-beloved men after Moses, whether prophets or apostles of our Savior, the harmony of whose doctrines would reasonably deem them worthy of one and the same designation. |