ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΕΚΤΟΝ
Sixth Book
Sixth Book
ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ
Preface
Preface
Eusebius introduces the core objective of Book 6: having refuted the validity and power of the pagan oracles in previous books, he now turns to exposing their false doctrines regarding Fate. He argues that the demons behind the oracles possess no true divine foreknowledge or power to assist humanity. Instead, as their own champion (Porphyry) admits, they merely guess the future by observing the astrological movements of the stars, operating no differently from human astrologers.
| 1. Τοῦ περὶ τῶν χρηστηρίων τρόπου διὰ τῶν προδιηνυσμένων αὐτάρκως ἡμῖν ἀπεληλεγμένου, καὶ τῆς θείας δυνάμεως τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν διὰ τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς αὐτοῦ διδασκαλίας τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἅμα καὶ βιωφελὲς ἐπιδεδειγμένης, ὅτι δὴ διὰ μόνης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὐ δι’ ἄλλης, τῶν ἐξ αἰῶνος τὸν πάντα βίον ἐπισκοτισάντων τε καὶ λυμηναμένων δαιμονικῶν φαντασμάτων ἐλευθερία πᾶσιν ὑπῆρχεν ἀνθρώποις, φέρε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ εἱμαρμένης ψευδοδοξουμένων αὐτοῖς τὸν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπευθύνωμεν λόγον, ὡς ἂν μὴ διὰ μόνης τῆς τοῦ τρόπου μοχθηρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἀληθῶς αὐτοῖς δοξαζομένων, φαῦλοι καὶ ἀδρανεῖς ὄντες οἱ τὰ χρηστήρια κινεῖν νενομισμένοι δαίμονες δειχθεῖεν. | 1. Having sufficiently refuted in the preceding books the character and methods of the oracles, and having demonstrated through the evangelical teaching of our Savior the divine grandeur and practical benefit of His doctrine—namely, that through it alone, and through no other, liberation was granted to all humanity from the demonic phantoms that throughout the ages darkened and ruined all human life—come now, let us direct our discourse to their false opinions regarding Fate (Heimarmene). This will show that the demons reputed to inspire the oracles are proved base and powerless, not only through the wickedness of their methods, but also through the incorrect and untrue doctrines they hold. |
| 2. Σκέψαι δ’ οὖν εἰ μὴ καὶ σοὶ θείας ἀλλότριος ὢν δυνάμεως ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν ὑποπεσεῖται λόγος, ἔκ τε ὧν παραθήσομαι ἀνατρεπτικῶν τοῦ περὶ εἱμαρμένης καὶ αὐτόθεν ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου, καθ’ ὃν τὰς μαντείας ποιεῖσθαι λέγονται. | 2. Consider, then, whether the account concerning them will not appear to you as well to be entirely destitute of divine power, both from the arguments I shall set forth in refutation of Fate, and directly from the very manner in which they are said to produce their divinations. |
| 3. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ δυνάμει κρείττονι τὴν τῶν μελλόντων γνῶσιν προειληφέναι φασὶν αὐτούς, ἐκ θεωρίας δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως ὁμοίως ἀνθρώποις τὰ μέλλοντα καταστοχάζεσθαι· οὕτως οὐδὲν δύνασθαι οὔτ’ ὠφελεῖν οὔτε τι τὸ παράπαν ἐνεργεῖν αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ τὰ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, φασί. Τούτων δὲ ἔλεγχος αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ὁ τῶν δαιμόνων προήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐπέγραψε Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας, ὧδε λέγων πρὸς λέξιν· | 3. For they do not claim that these demons possess advance knowledge of the future through any superior divine power, but rather that, like human astrologers, they merely conjecture future events from observing the motions of the stars. Thus, they say, these spirits have no power either to assist or to effect anything at all, except what accords with Fate. The refutation of these claims comes from none other than that chief spokesman of the demons himself [Porphyry], who, in the work he entitled On the Philosophy from Oracles, writes word for word as follows: |
Chapter 1
| 1.1 «“Ἃ γὰρ λέγουσιν οἱ θεοί, εἴπερ τὰ μεμοιραμένα γινώσκοντες λέγουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων φορᾶς δηλοῦσιν, καὶ τοῦτο σχεδὸν πάντες ἐξέφηναν οἱ ἀψευδεῖς τῶν θεῶν.”» | 1.1 "For whatever the gods declare, if indeed they speak knowing what is decreed by fate, they reveal from the course of the stars; and this nearly all the unerring gods have made plain." |
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1.2
Εἶθ’ ἑξῆς ὑποβάς φησιν·
«“Ἐρωτηθεὶς ὁ Ἀπόλλων τί τέξεται ἡ γυνή, ἐκ τῶν ἄστρων εἶπεν ὅτι θῆλυ, ἐκ τοῦ σπορίμου ἐπιγνοὺς χρόνου. Λέγει δ’ οὕτως· ‘Ἐκφύεται γαίηθεν ὁδῶν, ὄθι λείμακες ὄμβρου διψοσύνῃ κατέμαρψαν ὅλον πόμα μητέρος αὐτῆς, ἔνδον ὀρινομένης χρόνον ἄρκιον· οὔ τι δὲ κοῦρον, ἀλλὰ κόρην· Φοίβη γὰρ ἐΰσκοπος ἤροσεν ἁγνὴν Κύπριν, ἐπειγομένην θῆλυν γόνον, ὦ φίλε, σεῖο.’”» |
1.2
And further on he adds:
"Apollo, when asked what a pregnant woman would bear, stated from the position of the stars that it would be a female, calculating it from the time of conception. He speaks thus: 'She grows up from the paths of the earth, where the meadows In their thirst caught all the rainfall drink of her mother, While she was stirred within for a sufficient time; No boy at all, but a girl; for far-seeing Phoebe Has planted pure Venus, hastening a female offspring, O my friend, for thee.'" |
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1.3
«Ἰδοὺ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σπορίμου, ὅτι Σελήνη ἐπὶ Ἀφροδίτην ἐφέρετο, εἶπεν ὅτι θῆλυ γεννηθήσεται. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς νόσους ἐκεῖθεν προλέγουσιν. Ἐπάκουσον γάρ·
‘Ἦ μάλα μιν κακὸς ἰὸς ἐνὶ στέρνοισι δαμάζει, πνεύμονος ἀλγινόεσσαν ὑπερβλύζων κακότητα.’» |
"Notice how, from the time of conception, because the Moon (Phoebe) was moving toward Venus (Cypris), he declared that a female child would be born. Furthermore, they even predict diseases from that same source. Hear, for instance:
'Truly a evil venom subdues him within his chest, Overflowing the painful malice of the lung.'" |
| 1.4 «Καὶ ἑξῆς, οἷς ἐπιλέγει· ‘Ταῦτα δὲ Μοιράων νόος ἤγαγεν, ἠδὲ κελαινὴν εἰς ἔριν ἐστήριξε, κακηπελίῃσι δαμάζειν, ὑψιπόλοιο Κρόνοιο κακὴν ὑπ’ ἀταρπὸν ἰόντος.’» | 1.4 "And next, to which he adds: 'And these things the mind of the Fates brought upon him, and established In dark strife, to subdue him with feeble infirmities, When high-encircling Saturn was traveling along an evil path.'" |
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1.5
«Καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερα·
‘Ἀλλά σε μόρσιμον ἦμαρ ἀναπλῆσαι βιότοιο ἀλγινόεις βροτολοιγὸς ἐπισπέρχων Κρόνῳ ἄντα σπεύσατο, σῆς δὲ θέμειλον ἀπὸ φρενὸς ἠΐστωσε· τοὔνεκα καὶ πατέρος θεοειδέος ἱερὸν ἦτορ φευγέμεναι κακοεργὸν ἐπηπείλησεν Ἄρηα.’» |
"And after other matters:
'But painful, mortal-destroying Mars, rushing in opposition to Saturn, Hastened for thee to fulfill the allotted day of life, And swept away the foundation from thy mind; Wherefore also the sacred heart of thy godlike father Threatened to flee from baneful Mars.'" |
| 1.6 Ταῦτα μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκ θείας αὐτῶν δυνάμεως μαντεύονται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἄστρων ἐπιτηρήσεως κατὰ τοὺς μαθηματικῶν λόγους, ὡς μηδὲν ἐν τούτῳ διαφέρειν ἀνθρώπων μηδέ τι κρεῖττον καὶ φύσεως θειοτέρας ἔργον ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. | 1.6 These passages prove that they do not give oracles out of any divine power of their own, but from observing the stars according to the calculations of astrologers (mathematici). Consequently, in this respect they differ in no way from human beings, nor do they demonstrate any work superior to human nature or of a more divine quality. |
| 1.7 Θέα δ’ ὡς καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐκτὸς καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τῇ τῶν ἄστρων ἀνατιθέντες φορᾷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεις. | 1.7 Observe, too, how they do away with human free will, attributing not only external circumstances and things beyond our control to the motion of the stars, but even our moral choices and intentions. |
Chapter 2
Continuing his citations from Porphyry’s On the Philosophy from Oracles, Eusebius demonstrates that Apollo attributes human inclinations, courage, and suffering directly to astrological configurations (e.g., Mars controlling a man's nativity, or Saturn afflicting a man's life). Eusebius points out the absurdity of worshipping gods who themselves shudder before Fate and are powerless to avert even their own destruction.
| 2.1 «Οὕτως καὶ ὁ Ἀπόλλων περί τινος, ἅμα καὶ τὴν περὶ στρατείαν προθυμίαν ἀφηγούμενος πόθεν αὐτῷ γίνεται, ἔφη· ’Ἄρεα κραιπνὸν ἔχει γενεθλήιον, ὅς μιν ὀρίνει, οὐδέ ἑ ταρχύσει· Ζηνὸς γὰρ ἐπέχραε βουλή, ἥ οἱ κῦδος ἄρειον ἀπ’ Ἄρεος εὐθὺς ὀρέξει.’ Καὶ πάλιν ἐπ’ ἄλλου· ’Εὐχαίτης ἐπέκειτο Κρόνος, στυγεροῖσι δὲ κέντροις ἄλγυνεν παιδὸς Ταλαοῦ δυσπέμφελον ἠῶ.’» | 2.1 "Thus Apollo also concerning a certain man, while explaining whence came the man’s zeal for military service, said: 'Swift Mars holds his natal star, which rouses him, Nor shall he bury him; for the counsel of Zeus pressed hard, Which straightway shall offer him better glory from Mars.' And again concerning another: 'Long-haired Saturn pressed heavily upon him, and with hateful goads Grieved the stormy morning of the son of Talaus.'" |
| 2.2 Εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ τὴν εἱμαρμένην οἱ γενναῖοι θεοὶ πεφρίκασιν ὡς ὁμολογεῖν μηδὲ κεραυνουμένοις αὐτῶν τοῖς ἱεροῖς δύνασθαι ἐπαμύνειν. Πολλὴ ἄρ’ ἂν γένοιτ’ ἐλπὶς ἀνθρώποις εὐχομένοις τυχεῖν βοηθείας παρὰ τῶν μηδὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαρήγειν δυνατῶν! Τί δὲ χρὴ λοιπὸν εὐσεβεῖν καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς προσκυνεῖν καὶ θεραπεύειν, μηδὲν οἵους τε καθόλου μηδ’ ἑαυτοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν; Ἄκουε δ’ οὖν ἅ φησιν ὁ χρησμός· | 2.2 To such a degree have these noble gods shuddered before Fate that they confess themselves unable to protect even their own sacred shrines when struck by lightning! Great indeed would be the hope of men praying to receive help from those who cannot even succor themselves! What need is there, then, to practice piety toward the gods, or to bow before and serve them, when they are utterly incapable of helping even themselves? Hear, then, what the oracle says: |
Chapter 3
Apollo admits that his own sacred shrine was destroyed because even Zeus cannot predict what the Fates will do. Thus Eusebius says, we should worship the Lord of Fate (the One True God) for He alone has the power to alter the "unchangeable decrees" of Fate and grant true spiritual freedom.
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3.1
«Οὕτω καὶ ναῶν μοῖραι καὶ ἱερῶν, καὶ αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τὸ ἱερὸν μεμοίρατο κεραυνωθῆναι, ὥς φησιν· ’Ὦ ζαθέης γεγαῶτες Ἐριχθονίοιο γενέθλης, ἔτλητ’ ἐλθέμεναι καὶ ἐμὴν ἐρεεινέμεν ὀμφήν, ὅπποθι δηϊωθῇ περικαλλέος ἕδρανα σηκοῦ. Κλῦτε δαφνηρεφέων μυχατῶν ἄπο θέσκελον ὀμφήν· εὖτ’ ἂν ἄνω πνείοντες ὑπηέριοι κελάδοντες τρίβωνται πατάγοισιν ἐναντία δηριόωντες— κρυμὸς δ’ αὖ περὶ κόσμον ἀπείρονα νήνεμος ἔσται— μηδὲ διεξερύγησιν ἔχῃ κεκακωμένος αἰθήρ, αἰθαλόεις περὶ γαῖαν, ὅπῃ τύχεν, ἔκπεσε πυρσός· τὸν μὲν δὴ θῆρές τε κατ’ οὔρεα δειμαίνοντες φεύγουσιν πυμάτοις ὑπὸ κεύθεσιν, οὐδὲ μένουσιν εἰσιδέειν ὄσσοισι καταιβάσιον Διὸς ἔγχος. Τοῦ μὲν καὶ νηοὶ μακάρων καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ ἠλιβάτων τ’ ὀρέων κορυφαὶ νῆές τ’ ἐνὶ πόντῳ δάμνανται ζαπύροις πωτήμασιν ἐμπελάοντος· καὶ δ’ αὐτὴ πληγεῖσα Ποσειδάωνος ἑταίρη πολλάκις ἠχήεσσ’ ἀναχάζεται Ἀμφιτρίτη. Ὑμεῖς οὖν καὶ ἄτλητον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἄλγος ἔχοντες, τέτλατε Μοιράων ἀμετάτροπα δήνεα θυμῷ· ταῖσι γὰρ Οὐρανίδαο Ζηνὸς κατένευσε κάρηνον, ὅττι κε δινήσωσι μένειν ἀσάλευτον ἀτράκτοις. Αἶσα γὰρ ἦν δολιχοῖσι χρόνοις περικαλλέα σηκὸν πυρσῶν αἰώρῃσι διϊπετέεσσι δαμῆναι.’» |
3.1
"Thus also the lots of temples and sacred places were cast, and the very temple of Apollo himself was allotted to be struck by lightning, as he says: 'O inhabitants born of the divine race of Erechtheus, You have endured to come and inquire of my divine voice, Where the seat of my most beautiful shrine has been destroyed. Hear the wondrous voice from my laurel-shaded recesses: Whenever noisy winds blowing aloft in the upper air Clash against one another, contending with loud crashes— While a windless frost again enfolds the boundless world— Nor can the afflicted air contain its eruption, A glowing bolt falls upon the earth, wherever it chances. Beholding this, the beasts upon the mountains flee in terror To the deep covert spaces, nor do they endure To look with their eyes upon the descending spear of Zeus. By its fiery flights, when it draws near, even the temples of the blessed ones, And tall trees, and the peaks of lofty mountains, and ships on the sea are overcome; And even Amphitrite herself, the roaring consort of Poseidon, When struck, often retreats. Do you therefore, though holding unbearable pain in your hearts, Endure in your soul the unchangeable decrees of the Fates; For to them the head of Heavenly Zeus nodded assent, That whatever they spin upon their spindles must remain unshakable. For it was fated that in long process of time the magnificent shrine Should be subdued by firebolts falling from Zeus.'" |
| 3.2 Εἰ δὴ οὖν Μοιρῶν ἀτράκτοις καὶ τῶν σεβασμίων θεῶν οἱ ναοὶ καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν δώματα δάμναται ζαπύροις πωτήμασι, τίς ἂν ἔτι λείποιτο ἐλπὶς θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς τῶν πεπρωμένων ἀποφυγῆς; Εἰ δὲ καὶ μηδεμία ἐκ θεῶν ὑπάρχοι βοήθεια, δεῖ δὲ ἐξ ἅπαντος “τετλάναι Μοιράων ἀμετάτροπα δήνεα θυμῷ”, τίς ἡ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ματαία σπουδή; εἴποι ἄν τις. | 3.2 If, then, by the spindles of the Fates even the temples and sacred dwellings of the revered gods are subdued by fiery bolts, what hope remains for mortal men to escape what is fated? And if no help exists from the gods, but we must by all means "endure in our soul the unchangeable decrees of the Fates," what is this vain earnestness concerning the gods? one might ask. |
| 3.3 Τί δὲ δεῖ λοιβῆς τε κνίσης τε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων γέρας τοῖς μηδὲ τούτων ἀξίοις ἀπονέμειν, εἰ κατ’ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖν δύνανται; Ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν δοτῆρας οἴεσθαι χρῆν αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ ἣν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ὡμολόγουν αἰτίαν. | 3.3 Why must we assign drink-offerings and the steam of sacrifice, and the honor derived from them, to those who are not even worthy of them, if they can benefit us in no way? For we ought not even to consider them givers of good things, seeing that they themselves confessed to being the cause of the opposite. |
| 3.4 Εἰ γὰρ πέπρωται ἀνθρώποις εἴτε τι ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τι καὶ ἐναντίον, ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ παρέσται τοῦτο καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ τῶν θεῶν. Μόνην ἄρα τὴν Ἀνάγκην θεραπευτέον, σμικρά, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μηδὲν φροντίσαντας τῶν θεῶν, μήτε λυπεῖν μήτε εὐεργετεῖν δυναμένων. | 3.4 For if it is fated for human beings whether something good or something contrary shall happen, it will occur of necessity and will be present whether the gods wish it or not. Therefore, Necessity alone ought to be worshipped, while taking little—or rather no—thought for the gods, who are capable neither of harming nor of doing good. |
| 3.5 Εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν Μοιρῶν μόνος ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐπιστατεῖ θεός, καὶ μόνος καὶ τούτων ὑπάρχει κύριος—“ταῖσι γάρ”, φησί, “Οὐρανίδαο Ζηνὸς κατένευσε κάρηνον, ὅττι κε δινήσωσι μένειν ἀσάλευτον ἀτράκτοις”—τί δὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ὑπερθέμενος τὸν παμβασιλέα καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης δεσπότην μόνον θεὸν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖς, καὶ μόνον ἀγαθῶν δοτῆρα καὶ σωτῆρα; Ὅτι δὴ μόνῳ αὐτῷ καὶ ἃ φῄς “Μοιράων ἀμετάτροπα δήνεα” τρέπειν καὶ μεταλλάττειν ῥᾴδιον· ὡς μήτ’ ἀνάγκῃ μήτε εἱμαρμένῃ τὸν τῷ παμβασιλεῖ θεῷ καθωσιωμένον καὶ μόνον αὐτὸν εὐσεβοῦντα δουλεύειν, οἷα δὲ ἐλεύθερον καὶ παντὸς ἀφειμένον δεσμοῦ ταῖς ἐνθέοις καὶ σωτηριώδεσιν οἰκονομίαις ἀκωλύτως ἐφέπεσθαι. Ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τοιαῦτα προφαίνει λόγος, ὁ δ’ ἔμπαλιν ὅρα διὰ τίνων φησὶ τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λύεσθαι. | 3.5 If, however, the God over all alone oversees the Fates, and He alone is master over them—for "to them," he says, "the head of Heavenly Zeus nodded assent, that whatever they spin upon their spindles must remain unshakable"—why do you not set all else aside and confess that the Sovereign King and Master of Fate alone is God, and the sole Giver of good things and Savior? For to Him alone it is easy to turn and alter even what you call the "unchangeable decrees of the Fates." Thus, the person consecrated to the Sovereign King God and worshipping Him alone does not serve as a slave to necessity or fate, but as one who is free and released from every bond, follows without hindrance His divine and saving dispensations. True reason demonstrates such truths; but see, on the other hand, by what means he [Porphyry] claims that the decrees of fate are annulled. |
Chapter 4
Eusebius cites Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles, where a god admits that a person is unfit to receive divine possession because he is bound by natural astrological conditions. To counteract this, the god prescribes apotropaic magical rites. Eusebius severely criticizes Apollo: if magic can untie or alter the decrees of Fate, why did Apollo fail to use magic to save his own temple from being burned by lightning? Furthermore, by encouraging magic instead of philosophy, Apollo exposes his base and deceptive character.
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4.1
Δεηθέντος γάρ τινος καταδέξασθαι θεόν, εἰπὼν ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἀνεπιτήδειός ἐστι διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ φύσεως καταδεδέσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποτροπιασμοὺς ὑπαγορεύσας, ἐπάγει·
«’Ῥιπῇ δαιμονίῃ γὰρ ἅλις ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀλκὴ σαῖσι γοναῖς, ἃς χρή σε φυγεῖν τοίαισι μαγείαις.’» |
4.1
For when someone requested to receive a god into himself, the god declared that the man was unsuitable because he was bound fast by nature; and after prescribing apotropaic incantations for this reason, he added:
"'For demonic force with rushing power has fallen abundantly Upon thy birth, which thou must escape by such sorceries.'" |
| 4.2 Δι’ ὧν καὶ σαφῶς δεδήλωται ὅτι ἡ μαγεία ἐν τῷ λύειν τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης παρὰ θεῶν ἐδόθη εἰς τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ταύτην παρατρέπειν. | 4.2 Through these verses it is clearly shown that magic was given by the gods to untie the decrees of Fate in order to divert it in whatever way possible. |
| 4.3 Ταῦτά σοι ὁ Πορφύριος, οὐκ ἐγώ. Ὁ τοίνυν μαγείαις παραινῶν λύειν τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης, πῶς αὐτὸς θεὸς ὢν τὰ πεπρωμένα κατὰ τοῦ ἰδίου ναοῦ κεραυνῷ πιμπραμένου μὴ ἔλυσεν; Ὁ δὲ δὴ μαγεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φιλοσοφεῖν παρορμῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη δῆλος ὁποῖος ὢν τυγχάνει τὸν τρόπον; Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις καὶ ψεύδεσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὁ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ· | 4.3 These are Porphyry's statements to you, not mine! How is it, then, that he who advises men to undo the decrees of Fate through magic did not himself, being a god, undo what was fated when his own temple was set on fire by lightning? And in urging men to practice magic rather than philosophy, how could it fail to be clear what sort of character he possesses? In addition to all this, the same author confesses that the gods even tell lies: |
Chapter 5
Eusebius quotes Porphyry’s candid admissions regarding why oracles frequently lie:
1) Demonic spirits themselves lack precise knowledge of planetary motions and their true outcomes. 2) Atmospheric conditions constrain and force oracle spirits to give false answers.
Yet ignorant worshippers force them to speak anyway. Eusebius concludes that Porphyry himself inadvertently proves the fraudulence of pagan divination.
1) Demonic spirits themselves lack precise knowledge of planetary motions and their true outcomes. 2) Atmospheric conditions constrain and force oracle spirits to give false answers.
Yet ignorant worshippers force them to speak anyway. Eusebius concludes that Porphyry himself inadvertently proves the fraudulence of pagan divination.
| 5.1 «“Ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς φορᾶς τὴν ἀκριβῆ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων συμβάσεις ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι ἀνθρώποις, καὶ οὐ μόνον τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καί τισι τῶν δαιμονίων· ὅθεν καὶ ψεύδονται περὶ πολλῶν ἐρωτηθέντες.”» | 5.1 "Furthermore, accurate knowledge of the celestial course and its outcomes is incomprehensible to human beings, and not to them only, but also to certain of the demonic spirits; hence they tell falsehoods when questioned about many things." |
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5.2
Τούτοις αὖθις ἐπιλέγει· «“Καὶ τὸ περιέχον ἀναγκάζον ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι τὰ μαντεῖα, οὐ τοὺς παρόντας ἑκόντας προστιθέναι τὸ ψεῦδος. Πολλάκις γοῦν προλέγουσιν ὅτι ψεύσονται· οἱ δὲ μένουσι καὶ λέγειν ἀναγκάζουσι διὰ τὴν ἀμαθίαν.”» |
5.2
To these remarks he adds further: "And the surrounding atmosphere forces the oracles to prove false, so that those present do not intentionally add the falsehood. At any rate, they often forewarn that they will speak falsely, yet the petitioners remain and force them to speak out of ignorance." |
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5.3
Εἶπε γοῦν ὁ Ἀπόλλων ποτέ, τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς καταστάσεως, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, πονηρᾶς τοῦ περιέχοντος·
«’Κλεῖε βίην κάρτος τε λόγων· ψευδηγόρα λέξω.’» Καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἅπερ ἔφαμεν, δηλώσει τὰ ἑξῆς λόγια. |
5.3
For instance, Apollo once said, when the state of the surrounding air was foul (as we have shown):
"'Restrain the force and power of words; I shall speak lies!'" And that these things we have said are true, the following oracles will demonstrate. |
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5.4
Ἔφη γοῦν τις κληθεὶς τῶν θεῶν·
«’Σήμερον οὐκ ἐπέοικε λέγειν ἄστρων ὁδὸν ἱρήν· ἕδρανα μαντοσύνης γὰρ ἐν ἄστρασι νῦν πεπέδηται.’» Καὶ ἐπιλέγει· «“Πέφηνεν ἄρα πόθεν πολλάκις τὸ ψεῦδος συνίσταται.”» |
5.4
At all events, one of the gods when invoked declared:
"'Today it is not fitting to declare the sacred path of the stars, For the seats of prophecy among the stars are now fettered.'" And Porphyry adds: "It has thus been revealed whence falsehood so frequently arises." |
Chapter 6
In this passage, Eusebius presents a detailed philosophical and theological critique of astrological determinism and absolute fate. He argues that:
1) True divinity and good spirits cannot deceive or subject human beings to blind mechanical fate dictated by the stars.
2) Free will and human choice are real. If fate ruled everything, moral endeavor, philosophy, virtue, laws, punishment, and piety would become meaningless, rendering God the cause of evil.
3) Humans consist of both body (bound by nature/external circumstances) and a rational soul (endowed with divine freedom and a built-in moral law). The soul is capable of overcoming physical impulses and external suffering.
4) The ultimate demonstration of the soul's freedom over physical necessity and fate is seen in the Christian martyrs, who willingly endure severe torture and death out of devotion to God.
1) True divinity and good spirits cannot deceive or subject human beings to blind mechanical fate dictated by the stars.
2) Free will and human choice are real. If fate ruled everything, moral endeavor, philosophy, virtue, laws, punishment, and piety would become meaningless, rendering God the cause of evil.
3) Humans consist of both body (bound by nature/external circumstances) and a rational soul (endowed with divine freedom and a built-in moral law). The soul is capable of overcoming physical impulses and external suffering.
4) The ultimate demonstration of the soul's freedom over physical necessity and fate is seen in the Christian martyrs, who willingly endure severe torture and death out of devotion to God.
| 6.1 Ἀρά σοι πέπαυται λοιπὸν τὰ τῆς ἀμφιβόλου γνώμης, ὅτι μηδέν τι ἦν θεῖον ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν χρησμοῖς; πῶς γάρ ποτε τὸ θεῖον ψεύσαιτ’ ἄν, τὴν φύσιν ὂν ἀψευδέστατον, εἴ γε ἀψευδὲς τὸ θεῖον; πῶς δὲ ἀγαθὸς δαίμων ταῖς ψευδολογίαις ἀπατήσειέ ποτε τοὺς χρωμένους; πῶς δ’ ἂν εἴη κρεῖττον ἀνθρώπου τὸ τῇ τῶν ἄστρων φορᾷ πεπεδημένον; | 6.1 Have you at last put an end to the doubts of your mind, recognizing that there was nothing divine in the oracles of the gods? For how could the Divine ever lie, being by nature most truthful, if indeed the Divine is without falsehood? And how could a good demon ever deceive those who consult him by means of lying words? Or how could that which is bound fast to the motion of the stars be superior to man? |
| 6.2 θνητὸς μὲν οὖν ἀνὴρ βραχεῖαν ἀρετῆς σπουδὴν εἰσενεγκάμενος οὔποτ’ ἂν ψεύσαιτο, τἀληθὲς προτιμᾶν προθέμενος, οὐδ’ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ ἄστρων φορὰν αἰτιάσαιτο ψευσάμενος· ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τῷ σώματι πῦρ τις ἢ σίδηρον προσφέροι, διαφθείρειν ἐξαναγκάζων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐλευθεροστομῶν ἀντιφθέγξεται· «ἴτω μὲν πῦρ, ἴτω δὲ φάσγανα· τέμνε, κάταιθε σάρκας, ἐμπλήσθητί μου πίνων κελαινὸν αἷμα· πρόσθε γὰρ κάτω γῆς εἶσιν ἄστρα, γῆ δ’ ἄνεισ’ ἐς οὐρανόν, πρὶν ἐξ ἐμοῦ σοι θῶπ’ ἀπαντῆσαι λόγον.» | 6.2 Even a mortal man, having brought to bear a small exertion of virtue and having chosen to prefer the truth, would never lie, nor would he blame the necessity of Fate or the motion of the stars when he lies. But even if someone should bring fire or iron against his body, forcing him to destroy the truthful word, he will speak out freely against this, saying: "Let fire come, let swords come! Cut, burn my flesh, gorge yourself drinking my dark blood! For sooner shall stars pass beneath the earth and the earth rise into the sky than a flattering word from me shall meet you!" |
| 6.3 τὸ δέ γε λαοπλάνον καὶ ἀπατηλὸν δαιμόνιον σκήπτεται τοὺς ἄφρονας σοφιζόμενον, ἵν’ ἐν οἷς ἂν τῆς τοῦ μέλλοντος προρρήσεως ἀποπίπτοι, καταφυγὴν αὐτῷ τῆς ἀλογίας τὴν εἱμαρμένην πορίζοιτο. | 6.3 The spirit (daimonion), however, deceiving and beguiling the people, invents pretenses to play the sophist with the foolish, so that whenever it falls short in its prophecy of the future, it may provide itself with Fate as a refuge for its irrationality. |
| 6.4 πάντα δ’ εἱμαρμένης διὰ τῶν χρησμῶν ἀναρτήσας ὁ δαίμων, καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπροαιρέτου κινήσεως ἀνελών, ἀνάγκῃ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καταδουλώσας, θέα εἰς οἷον κακῶν δογμάτων ὄλεθρον τοὺς αὐτῷ πειθομένους καταβέβληκεν. | 6.4 Thus the demon, having hung everything upon Fate through his oracles, and having done away with what is in our power arising from self-chosen motion—subjugating even this to necessity—see into what a destructive pit of evil doctrines he has cast those who obey him! |
| 6.5 εἰ γὰρ ἄστροις καὶ εἱμαρμένῃ οὐ μόνα τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ λογισμὸν προθυμίας ἀναθετέον, καί τις ἀπαραίτητος ἀνάγκη τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ἐκβιάζεται γνώμας, οἰχήσεταί σοι φιλοσοφία, οἰχήσεται καὶ εὐσέβεια· οὐδέ τις ἦν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς, οὐδέ τις θεοφιλία, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ἀσκήσει πόνων καρπὸς ἐπάξιος, ἀνάγκης καὶ εἱμαρμένης τὴν αἰτίαν πάντων ἀναδεδεγμένης. | 6.5 For if not only external events but even the inclinations of our reasoning must be attributed to the stars and to Fate, and an unalterable necessity coerces human judgments, then philosophy is gone, and piety is gone! Nor would there be any praise of virtue for noble men, nor any love from God, nor any worthy fruit from the labors of discipline, since necessity and Fate have taken upon themselves the cause of all things. |
| 6.6 οὐ δὴ οὖν προσήκει καταμέμφεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον πλημμελοῦσιν, οὐδέ γε τοῖς ἀσεβέσι καὶ ἐπιρρητοτάτοις, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς σπουδαίους θαυμάζειν· ταύτῃ δὲ, ὡς ἔφην, οἰχήσεται καὶ τὸ μέγα τῆς φιλοσοφίας κλέος, οὐκ αὐτοπροαιρέτου μελέτης καὶ ἀσκήσεως, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων ἀνάγκης ἀπῃωρημένον. | 6.6 Consequently, it would not be right to fault those who err in life, nor those who are impious and most notorious, nor to admire those who are virtuous. In this way, as I said, the great renown of philosophy will vanish, being hung not upon self-chosen study and practice, but upon the necessity of the stars. |
| 6.7 ὅρα οὖν εἰς οἷον κακῶν δογμάτων βυθὸν οἱ θαυμάσιοι θεοὶ καταβεβλήκασι, καὶ σκέψαι ὡς εἰς ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία κακὰ παρορμᾷ καὶ προτρέπει τουτὶ τὸ δόγμα, ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ παντὸς βίου ἀθρόως κατεργαζόμενον. | 6.7 See, then, into what a deep abyss of evil doctrines these wonderful gods have cast men! Consider how this doctrine urges and impels men toward licentiousness, injustice, and countless other evils, accomplishing the total overthrow of all human life at once. |
| 6.8 εἰ γοῦν τις αὐτόθεν πιστεύσειε τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς τῶν θεῶν χρησμοῖς, ὅτι τε τὸ ἀληθεύειν καὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι οὐχ ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἦν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀπαραιτήτου εἱμαρμένης, καὶ τὸ θέλειν ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἢ ἐπ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν πρακτέων ὁρμᾶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ θέλειν τὰ τοιάδε, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειεν ἀμελεῖν καὶ καταρρᾳθυμεῖν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μὴ ἄνευ καμάτων καὶ πόνων καὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίας κατορθοῦσθαι δυναμένοις; | 6.8 If, for example, someone should outright believe the wondrous oracles of the gods—that speaking truth or lying was not our own doing, but belonged to unyielding Fate, and that willing to go forth to war or to engage in any other action, or not willing to do such things, were likewise fated—how would he not choose to be negligent and slothful in all things that cannot be brought to success without toil, labor, and our own earnest eagerness? |
| 6.9 εἰ γὰρ ἐξ εἱμαρμένης τόδε τι γενήσεσθαι νομίζοι, εἴτε πονοίημεν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ σπουδάζοιμεν εἴτε καὶ μή, πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις ἐθελήσειε τὸ ῥᾷον αἱρεῖσθαι, παρεὶς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμελῶν, ὡς ἐξ εἱμαρμένης καὶ ἀνάγκης γενησομένου τοῦ πραχθησομένου; | 6.9 For if one should suppose that a given thing will happen by Fate whether we labor and exert ourselves for it or not, how would anyone not wish to choose the easier path, abandoning himself and taking no care, on the grounds that whatever action is to be done will happen by Fate and necessity? |
| 6.10 ὅθεν καὶ λεγόντων ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πολλῶν ὅτι «ἄρα πραχθήσεται τοῦτο, εἴ γε εἵμαρταί μοι, καὶ τί με χρὴ παρέχειν ἐμαυτῷ πράγματα;» | 6.10 Hence one may hear the common people saying: "This will surely happen if it is fated for me; so why should I cause trouble for myself?" |
| 6.11 εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ὁρμῶν οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως οἰκείας τοῦτ’ ἔπραττεν, ἐλαυνόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ λῃστείαν καὶ τυμβωρυχίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἤτοι ἀνοσιουργίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἢ κοσμίους καὶ σώφρονας ἐπιτηδεύσεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἀκόλουθον τῷ περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγῳ. | 6.11 For if he who goes to war did not act out of his own choice, but was driven by external necessity, it is clear that the same applies to him who turns to robbery, grave-robbing, and other acts of unholiness and licentiousness, or to orderly and temperate pursuits—for this would be the logical conclusion of the argument concerning Fate. |
| 6.12 πῶς οὖν ὁ ταῦτα μὴ ἐξ αὑτοῦ ἡγούμενος ἐγχειρεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης, προσέξοι ἄν ποτε τῷ νουθετοῦντι καὶ διδάσκοντι μὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδιδόναι ἔκδοτον τοῖς προειρημένοις; | 6.12 How, then, could one who believes that he does not undertake these things from his own initiative, but under external necessity, ever pay attention to an advisor or teacher who instructs him not to give himself up to the aforementioned evils? |
| 6.13 εἴποι γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τὸν νουθετοῦντα, ὡς καὶ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν τισὶν εἴρηται· «τί με, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, νουθετεῖς; ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ δήπου ἐστὶν ἐπ’ ἐμοί, τὸ μεταβάλλειν τὴν προαίρεσιν· ἡ γὰρ εἱμαρμένη προκατείληφε. | 6.13 For he might say to his advisor, as has been said by some before us: "Why do you admonish me, friend? For changing my purpose is surely not up to me; Fate has already claimed me. |
| 6.14 τί οὖν δεῖ συντετάσθαι πρὸς ἃ οὐδὲ προθυμεῖσθαι δυνήσομαι, εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦτο καθείμαρταί μοι; προθυμήσομαι δέ, εἰ καθείμαρται, καὶ ἄνευ τῆς σῆς διδασκαλίας ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀγόμενος. τί οὖν μάτην σεαυτῷ ἐνοχλεῖς; | 6.14 Why then must I strive for things toward which I cannot even be eager, unless this too has been fated for me? And I shall be eager if it is fated, driven by Fate even without your teaching. Why then do you trouble yourself in vain? |
| 6.15 ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὸ σὲ παραινεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν φήσεις κατὰ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ παραινεῖν καὶ πείθειν ἐμὲ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ κἀν τούτῳ τί χρὴ σπουδάζειν; ἀργὴ γὰρ καὶ ἀνωφελὴς ἡ παραίνεσις. εἰ γὰρ εἵμαρταί μοι, φιλοπονήσω· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἵμαρται, ματαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σπουδὴν ἀμφοτέρους συμβήσεται.» | 6.15 And even if you say that your admonishing and teaching are performed out of necessity to advise and persuade me of such things, even so, why should one exert effort? For admonition is idle and unprofitable. If it is fated for me, I shall work hard; if it is not fated, it will result in both of us making a vain effort." |
| 6.16 πῶς δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπορρᾳθυμῶν εἴποι ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν δόξαν· «ἄγε, μηδαμῶς φιλοπονήσω, μηδὲ μάτην ἐνοχλήσω ἐμαυτῷ· γενήσεται γὰρ τὸ εἱμαρτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης;» ὁ δὲ περί τι σπουδάζων, ἢ διδάσκων ἢ προτρέπων ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἄλλον, καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ μή, τό τε ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι, καὶ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς νουθετοῦντας, πῶς οὐκ ἐναργῶς ἐλέγχεται τὸ μὲν ἔργον καταλιπὼν τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, τὸ δὲ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὄνομα αὐτῷ συνάπτων μόνον; | 6.16 And how would he who holds this opinion not rather say to himself in his sloth: "Come, let me by no means work hard, nor trouble myself in vain, for what is fated will happen by necessity"? But as for the man who exerts himself over something—either teaching or encouraging himself or another, considering both obedience and disobedience, sinning and not sinning, rebuking those who sin and praising those who advise—how is he not clearly exposed as having abandoned in practice the reality of what is in our power and free will, while merely attaching the name of "Fate" to it? |
| 6.17 ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ἧς κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν ἄριστα διοικεῖται τὸ ζῷον, τῷ τοῦ κακοῦ προσαγορεύοι ὀνόματι. οὕτω γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἐναργῶς ἑαυτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα μὴ βιαζομένων ὑπ’ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰτίας ἐν τῷ παιδεύειν τοὺς υἱεῖς καὶ μαστίζειν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἁμαρτήσαντας, καὶ ἐν τῷ τόδε τι βούλεσθαι καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοτελῶς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας κινήσεις ἀφικνουμένων, ἁμαρτάνοι ἂν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων γίνεσθαι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, πρὸς τὸ παραλύειν τάς τε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίας καὶ τὰς εἰς ἄλλους γινομένας παρακλήσεις καὶ νουθετήσεις, ἐξ ὧν ὁρῶμεν μάλιστα κατορθούμενα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα. | 6.17 It is as if someone should call the nature of the good (by whose presence a living being is best governed) by the name of evil. For since we clearly perceive in ourselves that we are not forced by any other cause when educating our sons, or when whipping servants who have sinned, or when willing or not willing a particular thing, but rather arrive at such movements autonomously out of our own power, anyone who says these things happen by Fate would be in error—undermining our own zeal and the exhortations and admonitions given to others, through which we see human affairs brought to proper success. |
| 6.18 καὶ μὴν καὶ νόμους ἀνατρέποι ἂν οὗτος ὁ λόγος τοὺς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώποις κειμένους. τί γὰρ δεῖ προστάττειν ἢ ἀπαγορεύειν τοῖς ὑφ’ ἑτέρας ἀνάγκης κατεσχημένοις; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας δεήσει κολάζειν μὴ παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ἡμαρτηκότας, οὐδὲ τοῖς τὰ κάλλιστα πράττουσι τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν, ὧν ἑκάτερον πολλὴν αἰτίαν παρέσχηκεν εἰς ἀναστολὴν ἀδικίας καὶ εἰς εὐποιίας ἑτοιμότητα. | 6.18 Furthermore, this argument would overthrow the laws that have been established for men for the sake of the common good. For why command or forbid those who are held fast by another necessity? Nor would it be necessary to punish those who sin, if they did not sin through their own fault, nor to confer honors upon those who do the noble deeds—both of which provide great cause for restraining injustice and encouraging readiness for good works. |
| 6.19 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβειαν ἀνατρέποι ἂν ἥδε ἡ δόξα, εἴ γε μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁ θεός, μηδὲ μὴν αὐτοὶ οἱ τῶνδε χρησμῳδοί, μήτ’ εὐχομένοις μήτ’ εὐσεβοῦσι συμβάλλονται, εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκαις πεπεδημένοις. | 6.19 Indeed, this opinion would also overthrow piety toward the Divine, if God contributes nothing to us, nor do the oracle-singers themselves, when we pray or practice piety, bound as we would be by the necessities of Fate. |
| 6.20 τὸ δὲ δίκην ἀψύχων λέγειν κινεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς, τῇδε καὶ τῇδε ὑπό τινος ἔξωθεν δυνάμεως νευροσπαστουμένους, εἰς τὸ ἐπάναγκες ἐθελῆσαι τάδε πρᾶξαι, καὶ ἑλέσθαι παρὰ προαίρεσιν ἕτερα, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀναιδὲς καὶ ἀναισχυντότατον; ἐπείπερ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανόμεθα ἑαυτῶν ἡμετέρᾳ ὁρμῇ καὶ κινήσει τάδε τινὰ προθυμουμένων, καὶ ἀμελούντων, πάλιν ἑαυτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, καὶ παρὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κατορθούντων ἢ μὴ κατορθούντων, καὶ ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου βιαζομένων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἑκουσίῳ γνώμῃ αἱρουμένων, τὰ δὲ φευγόντων καὶ παραιτουμένων ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προαιρέσεως; | 6.20 And to say that we are moved like inanimate things, pulled like puppets this way and that by some external power, forced to will these things and to choose other things contrary to our purpose—how could this not be shameless and most impudent? For we clearly perceive ourselves desiring certain things and neglecting others by our own impulse and motion; we take hold of ourselves again, and by this cause we succeed or fail, coerced by nothing else, but choosing some things with voluntary judgment and avoiding and declining others out of our own free choice. |
| 6.21 οὕτω δὲ ἄρα ἐναργὴς ἦν ὁ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου λόγος, ὥστε ὁμοίως τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὁρᾶν, καὶ τόδ’ ἀκούειν, οὐ συλλογισμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείᾳ καταλαμβανομένων, συναισθέσθαι ἑαυτῶν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας βουλῆς ὁρμώντων, καὶ τάδε τινὰ αἱρουμένων, τινὰ δὲ ἀποστρεφομένων, ὥστε ἐξ ἅπαντος τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς φύσεως ἐνδίκως ὁμολογεῖσθαι. | 6.21 So clear, then, was the principle of free self-determination (autexousion) that—just as experiencing pain or pleasure, or seeing and hearing this or that, are grasped not by logical syllogism but by actual experience—we perceive that we act from ourselves and from our own counsel, choosing certain things and turning away from others. Thus the freedom and self-determination of the rational and intellectual nature within us is justly acknowledged by all. |
| 6.22 εἰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ προαίρεσιν μυρία συμβαίνοντα ἡμῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταράττοι, διαιρετέον ἐνταῦθα τὴν τῶν ἐν οἷς ἐσμὲν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν λόγον, καθ’ ὃν τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν γίνεται, ἐπιθεωρητέον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τούτων τὸ αἴτιον οὔτις ἄλογος ἀναδέξεται εἱμαρμένη, λόγος δὲ πάλιν ἄλλος τῆς τῶν ὅλων προνοίας ἀπηρτημένος. φέρ’ οὖν ἐπιμελῶς τὸ πρόβλημα ἐπισκεψώμεθα. | 6.22 And if countless things happening contrary to our choice confuse the majority of men, we must make a distinction here regarding the nature of the conditions in which we exist, and observe the principle according to which things not in our power take place. For in this way, no irrational Fate will take responsibility for these things, but rather another principle dependent upon the providence of the universe. Come, then, let us carefully examine the problem. |
| 6.23 Πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως ἐκ θεοῦ προνοίας εἶναί τε καὶ διοικεῖσθαι οἱ τῆς ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας θεσμοὶ διαγορεύουσιν. | 6.23 The laws of true piety proclaim that all things together exist and are governed by the providence of God. |
| 6.24 ἤδη δὲ κατ’ εἶδος ἰδίως ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἕξει, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ὁρμῇ καὶ φαντασίᾳ, τὰ δὲ λογισμῷ καὶ οἰκείᾳ κρίσει τε καὶ προαιρέσει κινούμενα, καὶ ἄλλα μὲν κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον γιγνόμενα, ἕτερα δὲ κατ’ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα τοῖς προηγουμένως γεγονόσι, ποικίλην καὶ πολύτροπον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συνεστήσατο διακόσμησιν, ἑκάστῳ γένει τῶν ὄντων ἰδίαν καὶ ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ φύσεως κατασκευὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου διανείμαντος. | 6.24 Specifically, however, each generated thing is moved according to its own kind: some by state (hexis), some by nature (physis), some by impulse and impression (horme/phantasia), and others by reason, private judgment, and choice (logismos/proairesis). Some things occur according to a primary principle, while others happen incidentally (kat' episymbebekos) to what has primarily occurred. Thus the Cause of all things established the rich and multifaceted order of the universe, assigning to each class of beings its own distinct natural constitution. |
| 6.25 σχολῇ μὲν οὖν τις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διεξέλθοι λόγον, τὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ῥᾷον ἂν καταμάθοι ὧδε· | 6.25 While it would take time to go through the account of other things, one may easily understand the matter of self-determination (autexousion) as follows: |
| 6.26 ἐπεὶ μὴ μονογενὲς χρῆμα μηδ’ ἐκ μιᾶς συνεστὼς φύσεως τυγχάνει ὢν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐκ δυοῖν δὲ ἐναντίων εἴληχε τὴν σύνοδον, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὀργάνου τῇ ψυχῇ δεδεμένου, τῆς δὲ νοερᾶς οὐσίας κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον ὑποστάσης λόγον, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀλόγου, τῆς δὲ λογικῆς τυγχανούσης, καὶ τοῦ μὲν φθαρτοῦ, τῆς δὲ ἀφθάρτου, καὶ θατέρου θνητοῦ, θατέρας δὲ ἀθανάτου, ὥσθ’ ἡμᾶς θηρσὶ μὲν ἀλόγοις ἀδελφὸν φέρειν τὸ σῶμα, ψυχὴν δὲ τῇ λογικῇ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ φύσει συγγενῆ· ταύτῃ τοι εἰκὸς τὸ διφυὲς τουτὶ βλάστημα, διττῆς ἅτε φύσεως κεκοινωνηκός, διττῷ καὶ διαφόρῳ τὸ ζῆν ἀπευθύνειν τρόπῳ, τοτὲ μὲν φύσει σώματος δουλεῦον, τοτὲ δὲ τῇ θειοτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσπαζόμενον ἐλευθερίαν· ὡς καὶ δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τοιαύτην τινὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, δι’ οὓς οἶδε λόγους αὐτός, κεκληρωμένον ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐπιμιξίαν. | 6.26 Since man is not a uniform creature nor composed of a single nature, but has received his conjunction from two opposite principles—body and soul (the body bound to the soul as an instrument incidentally, while the intellectual essence exists according to the primary design; the one being irrational, the other rational; the one corruptible, the other incorruptible; the one mortal, the other immortal)—we carry a body that is brother to irrational beasts, but a soul akin to the rational and immortal nature. Hence it is natural that this dual offspring, sharing in a two-fold nature, should direct its life in a two-fold and different manner: at times serving the nature of the body, and at other times embracing its own proper freedom through its divine portion. Thus the same man is both slave and free, having been allotted by God—for reasons He Himself knows—such a mixture of soul and body. |
| 6.27 εἰ δὴ οὖν τις τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἤτοι τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, εἱμαρμένης ὀνόματι χρώμενος, ὑπ’ αἰτίαν ἀνάγκης καταβάλλοι, διαμάρτοι ἂν τῆς οἰκείας προσηγορίας. εἰ γὰρ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκη τις ἦν ἀκώλυτος, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν προσόντων παραποδίζεται, μυρία τε ἔξωθεν ἄλλα συναντᾷ παρὰ φύσιν κατά τι συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι παρεπόμενα, πῶς ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν εἱμαρμένη καὶ φύσις; | 6.27 If, then, someone using the name of "Fate" should place natural events—whether of the body or of the soul—under the charge of necessity, he would miss the proper designation. For if the necessity of Fate were unalterable, yet many things belonging by nature to the body and soul are hindered, and countless other things meet them from the outside contrary to nature incidentally, how could Fate and nature be the same? |
| 6.28 εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράλλακτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, καὶ μὴ δύνασθαί τι παρ’ αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι (ἀνάγκην γὰρ εἶναι ἀπαραίτητον), πολλὰ δέ, ὡς ἔφην, παρὰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι συμβαίνει, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς τις ὀνομάζοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι λέγων εἱμαρμένην καὶ φύσιν. | 6.28 For if they say that Fate is unchangeable and that nothing can happen contrary to it (since it is an unalterable necessity), yet many things, as I said, happen contrary to nature in both soul and body, one would not speak correctly in saying that Fate and nature are the same. |
| 6.29 γένοιτ’ ἂν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἐν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν κατὰ λογισμὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν γιγνόμενα, οἷα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ σώματος, τὰ δὲ τούτοις μὲν συμβεβηκότα, ψυχῇ λέγω καὶ σώματι, ἑτέροις δὲ συντελούμενα κατὰ φύσιν· ἀλλ’ οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν οὔτε τοῦ σώματος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἔξωθεν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐνδίκως ἄν τις ἀποστεροίη τὸν αἴτιον. | 6.29 Thus, among the things in us, some come about through reasoning and choice that are in our power—such as the proper operations of the soul's nature; others occur according to the nature of the body; and others happen incidentally to these (to soul and body, I mean), but are accomplished naturally by other things. Yet no one could justly deprive the Creator of the cause—neither of what is in our power in the soul, nor of what is natural in the body, nor of what happens incidentally from external things. |
| 6.30 θεὸς γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ὅλων καὶ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δημιουργὸς ὢν ἀποπέφανται. καθόλου γὰρ περὶ πάντων ἀκουστέον τῆς θείας γραφῆς, τὸ «αὐτὸς εἶπε, καὶ ἐγενήθησαν· αὐτὸς ἐνετείλατο, καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν» ἀποφηναμένης. | 6.30 For God Himself is revealed as the Maker of all things: of those in our power, those according to nature, and those happening by circumstance. For concerning all things, we must hear divine Scripture, which declares: "He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." |
| 6.31 εἰ δὴ οὖν βουλομένοις ποτέ τινα ἕτερα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν γνώμην συμβαίνει, ὑπομνηστέον αὐτοὺς ὡς ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ διττὸν καὶ ἑτερογενὲς τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν συμπλοκῆς, λέγω δὴ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, παρ’ ὃ καὶ ψυχῆς οὐσία, τὴν φύσιν οὖσα νοερὰ καὶ λογική, ἐν νηπιάζοντι κατὰ φύσιν σώματι παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὴ χώραν ἀλόγου μετείληφε· καὶ νοῦς ὁ φρονήσεως οἰκεῖος ἀφραίνει πολλάκις κατά τι συμβεβηκός, παρατραπεὶς ἐν ὑπερβαλλούσαις φέρε σώματος ἀρρωστίαις. | 6.31 If, then, things happen to us contrary to our intention, we must remind men that this was precisely that dual and heterogeneous combination within us—I mean of soul and body—by reason of which the essence of the soul, being by nature intellectual and rational, comes to share unnaturally in the place of the irrational within a body that is naturally infant-like. And the mind, which is proper to wisdom, often acts foolishly by circumstance when overcome, for instance, by excessive bodily illnesses. |
| 6.32 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ γῆρας ἐπελθὸν σώματι κατὰ φύσιν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν κατορθωμάτων τὴν διάνοιαν ἀπεστέρησε, τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς τὸ λογικὸν παρὰ φύσιν ἀμβλῦναν. | 6.32 Often, too, old age coming upon the body according to nature deprives the mind of the achievements of its prime, dulling the rational capacity of the intellectual soul contrary to its nature. |
| 6.33 αἰκίαι δ’ αὖ πάλιν καὶ ἀλγηδόνες σώματι πηρώσεις τε ἐπισυμβᾶσαι παρὰ φύσιν, τὸ αὐθεκούσιον τῆς ψυχῆς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐξενίκησαν, ἐνδούσης ταῖς ἀλγηδόσι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συμπλοκήν· ὡς ἁλίσκεσθαι δεσμὸν ἄφυκτον ἐμποδὼν προβεβλῆσθαι τῷ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἐλευθέρῳ τοτὲ μὲν τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, τοτὲ δὲ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐπισυμβαίνοντα. | 6.33 Again, afflictions, pains, and maimings coming upon the body contrary to nature overcome the free will of the soul by circumstance, as it yields to pain because of its connection to the body; so that now the nature of the body, and now external accidents, present an inescapable bond in the way of the soul's freedom. |
| 6.34 ἦν δὲ ἄρα καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως εἰς τοσοῦτον ἧκον ἀρετῆς καὶ ἰσχύος ὡς ἀντιβαίνειν ἐπὶ πολλῶν τολμᾶν καὶ ἀντιλέγειν τῇ τε τοῦ σώματος φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν. | 6.34 Yet the power of free choice within us has reached such a degree of virtue and strength as to dare to resist in many things, speaking against both the nature of the body and external accidents. |
| 6.35 ἡ μέν γε τοῦ σώματος φύσις ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ὁρμὴν τὸν ἄνδρα καλεῖ, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ λόγῳ σώφρονι χαλινὸν ἐμβαλοῦσα τῷ πάθει κρείττων καθίσταται τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως· καὶ πάλιν ἡ μὲν πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ῥιγοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσαναγκάζουσα ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ φύσιν θεραπείας τε καὶ πληρώσεις παρακαλεῖ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις λόγοις σώφροσιν ἀναπεισθεῖσα, καί τινας ἀσκητικὰς προτροπὰς αὐθεκουσίως ἀγαπήσασα, πολυημέροις ἀσιτίαις καὶ καρτερίαις παρακρούεται τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, ἀρετῇ λογισμοῦ κρίνασα τοῦτο καὶ ἑλομένη. | 6.35 For example, the nature of the body calls a man toward sexual impulse, but the soul, placing a bridle upon passion through temperate reason, proves superior to the body's nature. And again, when the body forces hunger, thirst, cold, and the like, calling for natural remedies and fulfillments, free choice—persuaded by temperate reason and freely embracing ascetic disciplines—baffles the body's nature through multi-day fasts and endurances, judging and choosing this through the virtue of reason. |
| 6.36 καὶ αὖ πάλιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν πάσαις ἡδοναῖς χαίρει καὶ τῇ λείᾳ τῶν σωμάτων κινήσει, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀρετῆς ἐπιθυμίᾳ τὸν ἐπίπονον καὶ τραχὺν ἠσπάσατο βίον. | 6.36 And again, while the physical nature delights in all pleasures and the smooth motion of bodies, free choice, through desire for virtue, embraces the laborious and rough life. |
| 6.37 εἰσὶ δὲ οἳ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τραπέντες «μετήλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι.» | 6.37 And there are those who, turning to what is worse, "exchanged natural relations for that which is contrary to nature, men committing shameful acts with men." |
| 6.38 οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τῇ φύσει οὐ κατὰ πάντα ἐνδίδωσιν ὁ λογισμός, κρατεῖ δὲ ἐν πλείστοις, ὡς καὶ κρατεῖται, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄγει, τοτὲ δὲ αὐτὸς ἄγεται, ὡς καὶ πρὸ ὥρας ἔσθ’ ὅπη χερσὶν ἐπισπᾶσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ σώματος, ὅτε τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ μὴ λυσιτελὲς κριθείη. | 6.38 Thus reason does not yield to nature in all things, but prevails in most cases, even as it is sometimes prevailed upon; at times it leads, and at times it is led, so that sometimes it even brings about with its own hands the release from the body before its time, whenever life is judged to be no longer of benefit to it. |
| 6.39 εἰ μὲν οὖν πρὸς μόνην τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ὁ πᾶς ἀγὼν ἦν αὐτῷ, μέτριος ἂν ἦν οὗτος· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις βίον ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ μεταξὺ πολλῶν καταβέβληται, ὡς μετὰ θηρίων καὶ ἑρπετῶν ἰοβόλων, ἐν μέσῳ τε πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι παρηλλαγμένων καὶ διαφόρων φύσεων τὰς διατριβὰς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰκότως αὐτῷ ἡ διαμάχη καὶ ἡ ἔνστασις οὐ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐστὶ καὶ συνημμένην αὐτῷ μόνον φύσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς μυρία τὰ ἐκτὸς συμβεβηκότα, ὧν ἐν μέσῳ ζῇ ὁ τὸν θνητὸν βίον διεξάγων, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα καρτερῶς ἀντέχειν. | 6.39 If, then, its whole struggle were against the body’s own nature alone, the struggle would be moderate. But since God has cast man's life and society in the midst of many things—as among wild beasts and venomous reptiles, in the midst of fire, water, surrounding air, and the varied and different natures in all these—reasonably its struggle and opposition are not merely against its own joined nature of the body, but also against countless external accidents among which he who lives this mortal life must exist, so as to endure firmly against these as well. |
| 6.40 πολλαὶ γοῦν ἤδη καὶ τοιόνδε τροφῶν φύσεις καὶ τοιαίδε συγκράσεις τοῦ περιέχοντος, κρυμῶν τε ἐπιφοραὶ καὶ φλογμῶν ἐκκαύσεις, πλεῖστά τε ἄλλα κατά τινας οἰκείους λόγους φυσικῶς μὲν κινούμενα, συμβατικῶς δὲ ἡμῖν προσπίπτοντα τάραχον οὐ τὸν τυχόντα τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτεξουσίῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συμπλοκὴν παρέσχηκε, τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων σωμάτων φύσεως τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιφορὰς οὐχ ὑπομενούσης, κρατουμένης δὲ καὶ νικωμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείαν ἐπιτελουμένων. | 6.40 Many different natures of foods, diverse temperaments of the surrounding air, invasions of cold and burning heats, and many other things moving naturally according to their own principles, fall upon us circumstantially and cause no ordinary disturbance to our free will because of our connection to the body—since the nature of our bodies cannot endure external assaults, but is overcome and conquered by external things acting according to their own nature. |
| 6.41 πάλιν τε αὖ, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ πλείστων ἀνδρῶν ποιούμεθα τὰς διατριβάς, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς ἴσης ἡμῖν λαχόντες οὐσίας τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας ἀποφέρονται, ἐλευθέρᾳ τῇ σφῶν χρώμενοι προαιρέσει, ταύτῃ πάλιν εἰκότως καὶ ταῖς ἑτέρων γνώμαις ὑποκεισόμεθα, τοῦ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων αὐτεξουσίου ὧδέ πως ἡμῖν κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ἢ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χρωμένου. | 6.41 And again, since we spend our time among many men, and they themselves, having received an equal essence with us, carry out what is in their power according to their own authority, using their own free choice, in this respect we shall naturally be subject to the decisions of others, as their own free will acts against our body or concerning our soul in one way or another. |
| 6.42 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν φύσις νικᾶται πολλάκις πρὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων, οὕτως ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ προαίρεσις ὑπὸ μυρίων ἔξωθεν ἐνοχλουμένη προαιρέσεων, αὐτεξουσίῳ γνώμῃ πεισθεῖσα, ἑαυτὴν τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπιδίδωσι, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν βελτίων, τοτὲ δὲ χείρων ἀποτελεῖται. οἶδε γὰρ συνουσία φαύλη κακύνειν, ὥσπερ αὖ τοὐναντίον ποιεῖν ἀμείνους τῶν καλῶν ὁμιλία. «φθείρουσι γὰρ ἤθη χρηστὰ ὁμιλίαι κακαί,» ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ σῴζουσι βελτιοῦσαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱ συνουσίαι. | 6.42 For just as the nature of our body is often overcome by external influences, so too choice, disturbed by thousands of external choices, gives itself up to external things through its autonomous judgment, and is rendered now better, now worse. For bad company knows how to corrupt, just as on the other hand association with the noble makes men better: "Bad company ruins good morals," just as associations with the good preserve and improve them. |
| 6.43 καὶ λόγοις μὲν ἡ λογικὴ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπισυμβαινόντων ὧδέ πως καὶ τῇδε φέρεται· ἰσχύει δὲ πάλιν οἰκεία καὶ λογικῆς οὐσίας ἀρετή, καὶ θείαν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ θεοειδῆ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπιδείκνυται, ὅτε πρὸς πάντα τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀντέχουσα, καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐλευθέρῳ φρονήματι ὑπερνικῶσα, πρὸς οὐδὲν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς ὑφιεμένη, φιλοσοφεῖν παρεσκεύασται. ὅτε μὴν ὀλιγωρεῖ, ὑπὸ τῶν χειρόνων τὰ χείριστα διατίθεται, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ βελτιοῦται τῆς ἔξωθεν τυγχάνουσα ἐπιμελείας. | 6.43 Thus, by words, the rational power of the soul is carried this way and that by external events; yet the proper virtue of the rational essence gains strength again, displaying a truly divine and godlike power when, resisting all external things and overcoming everything with a free spirit, yielding nothing of its own virtue, it is prepared to practice wisdom. But when it is negligent, it is disposed toward the worst by inferior things, just as it is improved when receiving care from without. |
| 6.44 τί χρὴ λέγειν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὡς καὶ φοραὶ καὶ ἀφορίαι τοιῶνδε ψυχῶν καὶ σωμάτων, κατά τινα περίπτωσιν οἰκείως τῇ τοῦ παντὸς διοικήσει συντελούμεναι, εὖ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχουσαι τῷ παντί, πλείστην ὅσην τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν παντοίας κινήσεως περιουσίαν ἀπειργάσαντο; | 6.44 What need is there to add to this that abundance and scarcity of such souls and bodies—contributing by circumstance appropriately to the governance of the whole, and being well and rightly ordered for the universe—produce an immense surplus of every kind of movement for individual parts and for what is in our power? |
| 6.45 πᾶσι δὲ καθόλου τοῖς οὖσι, τοῖς τε παρ’ ἡμᾶς γινομένοις καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν, καὶ τοῖς ἔξωθεν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπιοῦσι, τοῖς τε φυσικῶς ἐνεργουμένοις, μία παναλκὴς καὶ παντοδύναμος ἐπιστατεῖ ἡ διὰ πάντων ἐπιπορευομένη τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοια, ἣ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα θειοτέροις ἡμῖν τε ἀρρήτοις οἰκονομεῖ λόγοις, εὐηνίως τὸ πᾶν διακυβερνῶσα, πολλά τε καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τὸ προσῆκον τοῖς καιροῖς μετασκευάζουσα, συνεργοῦσά τε καὶ συμπράττουσα τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς πάλιν συμβαίνουσι τὴν δέουσαν τάξιν ἀπονέμουσα. | 6.45 Over all existing things generally—both those that happen through us and through our agency, those that come upon us externally by circumstance, and those that act naturally—there presides one all-powerful and almighty Providence of God that pervades all things. It administers most things by divine and unutterable principles, steering the universe smoothly, transforming many natural things for what is fitting according to the times, cooperating and working together with what is in our power, and assigning proper order to external events. |
| 6.46 τούτων εἰς τρία τοῦτον διῃρημένων τὸν τρόπον, εἴς τε τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν γινόμένα, τά τε κατὰ συμβεβηκός, πάντων δὲ εἰς ἕνα λόγον τὸν ἐκ θεοῦ βουλῆς ἀνακεφαλαιουμένων, οὐδαμοῦ μὲν ὁ περὶ εἱμαρμένης χώραν ἕξει λόγος. | 6.46 Since these matters are divided into three ways—what is in our power, what happens according to nature, and what happens by circumstance—and all are summed up under one principle from the will of God, the doctrine concerning Fate will nowhere have a place. |
| 6.47 γένοιτο δ’ ἂν ἡμῖν εὑρημένη καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπορουμένη τῆς κακίας πηγή, ἐν οὐδενὶ μὲν χώραν ἔχουσα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν, οὔτ’ ἐν σώμασιν οὔτ’ ἐν οὐσίαις, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔξωθεν ἐπιγινομένοις· εὑρεθείη δ’ ἂν ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ κινήσει, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ οὐχ ὅτε κατὰ φύσιν ὁδεύουσα τὴν εὐθεῖαν βαδίζει, ἀλλ’ ὅτε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐκστᾶσα οἰκείᾳ γνώμῃ τὴν παρὰ φύσιν τρέπεται, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς καθεστῶσα κυρία. | 6.47 Thus we may find the source of evil, about which many are at a loss: it has no place in things that exist according to nature, neither in bodies nor in essences, and far less in external accidents. Rather, it is found solely in the self-chosen motion of the soul—and in this not when it walks the straight path according to nature, but when, departing from the royal road, it turns by its own judgment to what is contrary to nature, being mistress of itself. |
| 6.48 ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γέρας ἐξαίρετον παρὰ θεοῦ λαβοῦσα ἐλευθέρα καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ τυγχάνει, τῆς οἰκείας ὁρμῆς τὸ κριτήριον εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναδεδεγμένη· νόμος δὲ θεῖος αὐτῇ συνεζευγμένος κατὰ φύσιν, λαμπτῆρος καὶ φωστῆρος δίκην, ἐπιφωνεῖ ἔνδοθεν ὑπηχῶν αὐτῇ καὶ λέγων· «ὅσῳ βασιλικῇ πορεύσῃ, οὐκ ἐκκλινεῖς δεξιὰ οὐδὲ ἀριστερά,» βασιλικὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πορείαν εἶναι διδάσκων. | 6.48 For having received this special gift from God, the soul is free and sovereign, having taken into itself the criterion of its own impulse. And a divine law joined to it by nature, like a lamp and luminary, calls out from within, sounding in its ears and saying: "As long as you walk the royal road, you shall not turn to the right or to the left," teaching that the royal road is the path according to right reason. |
| 6.49 τοῦτον γὰρ ἁπάσῃ ψυχῇ φυσικὸν νόμον βοηθὸν αὐτῇ καὶ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τῶν πρακτέων ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς ὑπεστήσατο, διὰ μὲν τοῦ νόμου τὴν εὐθεῖαν αὐτῇ παραδείξας ὁδόν, διὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῇ δεδωρημένης αὐτεξουσίου ἐλευθερίας τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων αἵρεσιν ἐπαίνου καὶ ἀποδοχῆς ἀξίαν ἀποφήνας γερῶν τε καὶ μειζόνων ἐπάθλων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατορθουμένοις, ὅτι μὴ βεβιασμένως, γνώμῃ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ κατώρθου, παρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἑλέσθαι· ὡς ἔμπαλιν τὴν τὰ χείριστα ἑλομένην ψόγου καὶ τιμωρίας εἶναι ἀξίαν, ἅτε οἰκείᾳ κινήσει τοῦ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν νόμου παραμελήσασαν, κακίας δὲ ἀρχὴν καὶ πηγὴν ἀπογεννήσασαν, φαύλως τε ἑαυτῇ κεχρημένην οὐκ ἔκ τινος ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐλευθέρας γνώμης καὶ κρίσεως. | 6.49 This natural law the Creator of all established as a helper and ally for every soul in matters of conduct, showing it the straight path through the law, and through the free will granted to it, revealing the choice of the better as worthy of praise and acceptance, deserving of gifts and greater prizes for right actions—because it acted rightly not by compulsion, but by free judgment when it was possible to choose the opposite. Conversely, the soul that chooses the worst is worthy of blame and punishment, because by its own movement it neglected the law of nature, gave birth to the origin and source of evil, and used itself wrongly—not from any external necessity, but from free judgment and decision. |
| 6.50 αἰτία δὴ τοῦ ἑλομένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος. οὔτε γὰρ φύσιν φαύλην ὁ θεὸς εἰργάσατο, οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς οὐσίαν· ἀγαθῷ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλὴν ἀγαθὰ δημιουργεῖν θέμις. ἀγαθὸν δὲ πᾶν ὅ τι κατὰ φύσιν. ψυχῇ δὲ πάσῃ λογικῇ κατὰ φύσιν πάρεστι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ’ ἀγαθῶν αἱρέσει γεγενημένον. | 6.50 "The blame belongs to the chooser; God is blameless." For God did not make a bad nature, nor a bad essence of the soul; for it is lawful for the Good to create nothing except good things. And everything according to nature is good. To every rational soul, free will belongs as a natural good, created for the choice of good things. |
| 6.51 φαύλως δὲ ὅτε πράττει, οὐ τὴν φύσιν αἰτιατέον. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ αὐτῇ γίνεται τὸ φαῦλον, προαιρέσεως ὄν, ἀλλ’ οὐ φύσεως ἔργον. ᾧ γὰρ παρῆν δύναμις τῆς τἀγαθοῦ αἱρέσεως, ὅτε μὴ τοῦτο εἵλετο, ἑκὼν δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον ἀπεστράφη τοῦ χείρονος μεταποιηθείς, τίς ἂν τούτῳ τόπος ἀποφυγῆς λείποιτο τῆς οἰκείας αἰτίῳ καταστάντι νόσου, τοῦ τε συμφύτου νόμου σωτῆρος οἷα καὶ ἰατροῦ παραμελήσαντι; | 6.51 When it acts badly, one must not blame nature. For evil comes to it not according to nature, but contrary to nature—being the work of choice, not of nature. For he who possessed the power to choose the good, when he did not choose it, but voluntarily turned away from the better and claimed the worse—what place of refuge remains for him who has become the cause of his own disease, having neglected the innate law that served as his savior and physician? |
| 6.52 ὁ δὴ τούτων ἁπάντων μηδένα λόγον ποιούμενος, ἀνάγκης τε καὶ ἄστρων φορᾶς ἀναρτῶν τὰ πάντα, τῆς τε τῶν πλημμελουμένων ἀνθρώποις ἀτοπίας μὴ ἐξ ἡμῶν εἶναι φάσκων τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τὰ πάντα κινούσης δυνάμεως, πῶς οὐκ ἀνόσιον καὶ δυσσεβῆ λογισμὸν εἰσφέροι ἄν; | 6.52 He who takes no account of all these things, but hangs everything upon necessity and the motion of the stars, claiming that the causes of human wrongdoing are not from us, but from the power that moves all things—how could he fail to introduce an impious and ungodly reasoning? |
| 6.53 εἴτε γὰρ αὐτόματον καὶ ἀπρονόητον θείη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φοράν, ἐλέγχοιτ’ ἂν ὡς αὐτόθεν ἄθεος, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἀβλεπτεῖν περὶ τὴν πάνσοφον ἁρμονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων διάταξιν εὖ καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ τὴν δι’ αἰῶνος κίνησιν ἀνακυκλουμένην· εἴτε θεοῦ πρόνοιαν ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπιστατεῖν τε πᾶσι καὶ πανσόφῳ λόγῳ διοικεῖν ὁμολογήσει, οὐδ’ οὕτω τοῦ δυσσεβοῦς ἐκπέφευγε τὴν ἀτοπίαν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἁμαρτανομένων τοὺς μὲν πλημμελοῦντας ἀπολύει, ὡς μηδὲν τῶν ἀτόπων ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης διαπεπραγμένους, ἀνάγει δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν κακῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καθόλου πρόνοιαν, ἀνάγκην αὐτὴν καὶ εἱμαρμένην ἀποκαλῶν, καὶ πάσης τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχρουργίας καὶ ἀρρητοποιίας ὠμότητός τε καὶ μιαιφονίας αἰτίαν εἶναι λέγων. | 6.53 For if he should posit the motion of the universe to be automatic and without providence, he would be convicted as an atheist on the spot, besides being blind to the all-wise harmony and order of the whole, whose motion revolves through eternity in good order. But if he acknowledges that God's providence guides, carries, presides over all things, and governs by all-wise reason, even so he does not escape the absurdity of impiety—since he acquits those who sin among men as having done nothing wrong of their own judgment, while laying the cause of evil upon universal Providence, calling it necessity and Fate, and declaring it to be the cause of all human shamefulness, unmentionable deeds, cruelty, and murder! |
| 6.54 καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη τούτου δυσσεβὴς ἄλλος, τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεόν, αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, εἰσάγων ἐπάναγκες ἐκβιάζόμενον τόνδε μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα ἀσεβεῖν τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ ἄθεον εἶναι κατ’ ἀνάγκην, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν βλάσφημον, τόνδε δέ, ὃν αὐτὸς τὴν φύσιν ἄρρενα συνεστήσατο, πάσχειν παρὰ φύσιν τὰ θηλειῶν οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, κατηναγκασμένον δὲ πρὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄλλον ἀνδροφόνον γίνεσθαι μὴ παρὰ τὴν οἰκείαν γνώμην, ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης δὲ ἐλαυνόμενον τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς μηδ’ εὐλόγως ἐπιμέμφεσθαι τοῖς πλημμελοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἤτοι μηδὲ ἁμαρτήματα ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι; | 6.54 And who could be more impious than one who introduces the God of all—the very Maker and Creator of this universe—as forcing by necessity this man who does not wish to be impious to commit impiety, to be an atheist by necessity, and a blasphemer against Himself; and forcing that man, whom He made male by nature, to suffer contrary to nature the things of females not by choice, but compelled by Him; and forcing another to become a murderer not by his own judgment, but driven by the necessity of God—so that one cannot even reasonably blame those who sin, but must either consider these things not to be sins at all, or declare God to be the maker of all evils? |
| 6.55 εἴτε γὰρ αὐτὸς τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιπαρὼν καὶ τὰ πάντα ὁρῶν καὶ πάντα ἀκούων ταῦτα πράττειν ἀναγκάζει, εἴτε τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ῥοὴν καὶ τὴν τοιάνδε τῶν ἄστρων κίνησιν αὐτὸς τούτων ποιητικὴν καὶ ἀναγκαστικὴν ὑπεστήσατο, ὁ τὸ τοιόνδε συστήσας ὄργανον, καὶ τὴν τῶν θηρωμένων παγίδα μηχανησάμενος, εἴη ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ καὶ τῶν ἁλισκομένων αἴτιος. | 6.55 For whether He Himself, being present to all things, seeing all and hearing all, forces men to do these things, or whether He instituted the flow of the universe and such motion of the stars to produce and compel these things, He who constructed such an instrument and devised the trap for those who are hunted would Himself be the cause of those who are caught. |
| 6.56 εἴτ’ οὖν αὐτὸς καθ’ ἑαυτόν, εἴτ’ οὖν πάλιν αὐτὸς διά τινος ἄλλης πρὸς αὐτοῦ μεμηχανημένης ἀνάγκης τοὺς οὐκ ἐθέλοντας τοῖσδε τοῖς κακοῖς περιβάλλει, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλος, ὁ πάντων κακῶν ποιητικός, καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἂν ἐν δίκῃ ἡμαρτηκὼς ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγοιτο, ἀλλ’ ὁ τούτου ποιητὴς θεός. | 6.56 Whether, therefore, by Himself or through some other necessity devised by Him, He surrounds those who do not wish it with these evils, He Himself—and no other—would be the maker of all evils; and man could no longer justly be said to have sinned, but rather God, his Creator. |
| 6.57 καὶ τίς ἂν τούτου γένοιτο ἕτερος λόγων ἀσεβέστερος; ὁ δὴ οὖν εἱμαρμένην εἰσάγων ἄντικρυς θεὸν καὶ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν ἐξωθεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ τὸν θεὸν ἐφιστὰς τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνέλοι ἂν τὸν περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγον. ἢ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη ὁ θεὸς καὶ εἱμαρμένη, ἢ θάτερον διεστὼς ἑτέρου. ταὐτὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. | 6.57 And what argument could be more impious than this? He who introduces Fate directly drives out God and God's providence, just as he who sets God over all things would abolish the doctrine of Fate. For either God and Fate are the same, or one is distinct from the other. They cannot, however, be the same. |
| 6.58 εἰ γὰρ τὴν εἱμαρμένην εἱρμόν τινα αἰτιῶν εἶναί φασιν ἀπ’ αἰῶνος ἀπαραβάτως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων ἄστρων φορᾶς καθήκοντα, πῶς οὐ πρότερα ἂν εἴη τῆς εἱμαρμένης τὰ σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ οὐράνια συνέστηκεν, ὧν τὴν εἱμαρμένην συμβεβηκός τι σύμπτωμα λέγοι ἄν τις εἰκότως; | 6.58 For if they say that Fate is a chain of causes descending unalterably and immovably from eternity through the motion of the heavenly stars, how would the physical elements from which the heavens were composed not be prior to Fate—elements of which one might reasonably call Fate an accidental outcome? |
| 6.59 καὶ πῶς ἂν ταὐτὸν εἴη τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς στοιχείοις τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ, εἰ δὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἄψυχα καὶ ἄλογα κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπιθεωρεῖται φύσιν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἔξω σωμάτων αὐτοζωὴ καὶ σοφία τυγχάνει ὤν, τῆς ἐξ αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας τοῖς τε κατὰ μέρος στοιχείοις καὶ τῇ τῶν ὅλων διακοσμήσει τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν δωρούμενος; οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα θεὸς καὶ εἱμαρμένη. | 6.59 And how could an accident belonging to the elements be the same as the God over all, if indeed the elements are observed to be inanimate and irrational according to their proper nature, while God is outside bodies, being Life-itself and Wisdom, bestowing from His creation the enjoyment of life upon both the individual elements and the order of the whole universe? Therefore, God and Fate are not the same. |
| 6.60 εἰ δὲ δὴ ἕτερον, πότερον κρεῖττον; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τοῦ θεοῦ κάλλιον, οὐδέ τι δυναμικώτερον. οὐκοῦν κρατήσει καὶ περιέσται τοῦ χείρονος, ἢ συγχωρῶν κακοποιῷ τυγχανούσῃ τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ αὐτὸς ἂν ἐφέλκοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν, ὃς δυνατὸς ὢν ἐπισχεῖν τὴν κακοποιὸν ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἐπέσχεν, ἀνῆκε δ’ ἄφετον ἐπὶ λύμῃ καὶ διαφθορᾷ τῶν ἁπάντων, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸς τοῦτο εἰργάσατο, εἰ δὴ πάντων καὶ αὐτῆς εἱμαρμένης ποιητὴς καὶ δημιουργὸς εἰσάγοιτο. | 6.60 If, then, Fate is different from God, which of the two is superior? Nothing is nobler than God, nor anything more powerful. Therefore, He will master and prevail over the inferior; or, if He yields to Fate (which happens to be an evil-doer), He Himself would draw the blame—He who, being able to restrain evil-doing necessity, did not restrain it, but let it loose for the ruin and destruction of all things; or rather, He Himself accomplished this, if indeed He is introduced as the Maker and Creator of all things and of Fate itself. |
| 6.61 εἰ δ’ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ λόγος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διατάξεως, ἀθέων αὖθις ἀνακύψειεν ἂν φωνή, πρὸς ἣν τὰς ἀκοὰς ἀποκλειστέον, τῆς ἐνθέου προνοίας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐναργῶς ἀποφαινούσης ἑαυτὴν ἔκ τε τῶν καθόλου πανσόφων καὶ τεχνικῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἔκ τε τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἀναμφιλόγως τὴν ἐλευθέραν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν παραδεικνυμένων. | 6.61 And if He takes no thought for the ordering of the universe, again the voice of the godless will arise, to which we must close our ears—since godly Providence and power clearly demonstrate themselves both from overall all-wise and artistic works, and from the things within us that unmistakably demonstrate the free and sovereign power of the rational soul. |
| 6.62 καθ’ ἣν καίτοι μυρίων ἔξωθεν ἐμποδὼν τῇ τε τοῦ σώματος φύσει ταῖς τε κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὁρμαῖς κατά τι συμβεβηκὸς προσπιπτόντων, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀντέχει, ἄμαχον καὶ ἀήττητον τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τῶν καλῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον. | 6.62 According to this power—even though thousands of external obstacles fall by circumstance upon the nature of the body and upon our voluntary impulses—nevertheless, the freedom of virtue in the soul holds out against everything, showing that what is in our power to choose the noble is invincible and unconquerable. |
| 6.63 τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ὁ παρὼν καιρὸς τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν διδασκαλίας ἔργοις αὐτοῖς παρεστήσατο· ὅτι γὰρ ταῦτα οὐ ψόφοι καὶ κενὰ ῥήματα, πάρεστί σοι τὸν τῶν θεοσεβῶν ἀγῶνα ἐπιβλέψαι, καὶ συνιδεῖν τοὺς προαιρέσει αὐθεκουσίῳ τοὺς πόνους τῶν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ἄθλων ἀναδεδεγμένηους, οὓς καθ’ ὅλης τῆς ἀνθρώπων οἰκουμένης μυρία πλήθη Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων ἐνεδείξατο, πάσας μὲν προθύμως τὰς κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπομείναντα αἰκίας, πᾶν δὲ βασάνων εἶδος φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ διελθόντα, καὶ τέλος πολυτρόποις σχήμασι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος λύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσπαστῶς καταδεξάμενα. | 6.63 And this especially the present time of our Savior's teaching has demonstrated by actual deeds. For to show that these are not mere noises and empty words, it is open to you to look upon the struggle of the godly, and to observe those who by free choice have undertaken the labors of the contests for piety—which vast multitudes of both Greeks and barbarians across the whole inhabited world have demonstrated, willingly enduring every torture against the body, passing through every form of torment with a radiant countenance, and finally receiving with gladness the release of the soul from the body in manifold ways. |
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6.64
Καὶ μὴν οὐδεὶς ἐνταῦθα λόγος ἐπιτρέψειεν ἂν τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἰτιᾶσθαι.
Ποῦ γάρ σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος τοιούσδε ἀθλητὰς εὐσεβείας ἤνεγκεν ἡ τῶν ἄστρων φορά; Ἢ πότε ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος πρὸ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους καταβληθείσης διδασκαλίας τοιόνδε προβέβληται καθ’ ὅλης τῆς ἀνθρώπων οἰκουμένης ἀγῶνα; |
6.64
And indeed, no reason here would permit one to blame Fate.
For where, I ask you, throughout all time has the motion of the stars produced such champions of piety? Or when before the teaching of our Savior was cast down unto all humankind did the life of men set forth such a struggle throughout the entire inhabited world of men? |
| 6.65 Ποῦ δὲ τοιωνδὶ λόγων διδασκάλιον, δεισιδαίμονος μὲν πλάνης ἀναιρετικόν, ἑνὸς δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ γνώσεως διδακτικόν, ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, ὁ πᾶς αἰὼν ἤνεγκε; | 6.65 Where throughout all age has the whole of time produced a school of such teachings—one capable of destroying superstitious error, yet capable of teaching the knowledge of the one God over all—to all men, both Greeks and barbarians alike? |
| 6.66 Τίς δὲ τῶν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀοιδίμων σοφῶν, βάρβαρος ἢ Ἕλλην, τοιᾶσδέ ποτε ἠξιώθη εἱμαρμένης ὡς εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον διαφανῆ καταστῆσαι τὸν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ προβληθέντα λόγον, γνωσθέντα τε μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἐσχατιῶν, καὶ θεοῦ δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς αὐτῷ καθωσιωμένοις κτήσασθαι; | 6.66 And who among the renowned wise men from the beginning of time, whether barbarian or Greek, was ever deemed worthy of such a fate as to render the doctrine set forth by him manifest throughout the entire world, known even unto the uttermost ends of the earth, and to acquire the glory of God among those consecrated to Him? |
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6.67
Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐξ αἰῶνος οὔτ’ ἦν οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε ἀκοαῖς ἤκουσται, οὐκ ἦν ἄρα εἱρμὸς αἰτιῶν καὶ ἀνάγκη τὸ τούτων αἴτιον.
Πάλαι γὰρ ἂν διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀνακυκλήσεως καὶ περιφορᾶς τῶν ἄστρων οὐδεὶς ἦν φθόνος καὶ ἄλλους τῆς αὐτῆς τυχεῖν γενέσεώς τε καὶ εἱμαρμένης. |
6.67
Now if these things were neither present, nor occurred, nor were heard of by report throughout all time, then a chain of causes and necessity was not the cause of these things.
For long ago, through the same revolution and circuit of the stars, there would have been no grudge preventing others also from obtaining the same birth and fate. |
| 6.68 Ἐκ ποίας δὲ ἄρα εἱμαρμένης ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος σωτὴρ θεὸς ἐπιφανεὶς καθ’ ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀνηγόρευται, οἱ δὲ πάλαι νενομισμένοι παρά τε Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις θεοὶ καθῄρηνται, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως καθῄρηνται ἢ διὰ τῆς τοῦ νέου θεοῦ διδασκαλίας; | 6.68 From what sort of fate, then, has our Savior God appeared and been proclaimed throughout the whole inhabited world, while those gods formerly acknowledged among both Greeks and barbarians have been overthrown—and overthrown in no other way than through the teaching of the new God? |
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6.69
Ποία δ’ αὐτῶν εἱμαρμένη θεὸν δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κατήγγειλεν, εἱμαρμένην δὲ μὴ εἶναι φάναι ἐξηνάγκασε;
Καὶ πῶς ἡ εἱμαρμένη μὴ εἶναι ἑαυτὴν λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐβιάσατο; Τί δὲ οἱ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῦς ἕνεκα διδασκαλίας παντοίους ἄθλους ἔκπαλαι ἠγωνισμένοι, καὶ εἰσέτι δεῦρο διαθλοῦντες; |
6.69
What fate of theirs announced the Creator God of all things to all men, and forced them to say that fate does not exist?
And how could Fate compel men to say and think that she herself does not exist? And what of those who, for the sake of the pious teaching of our Savior, have of old contested in all manner of trials, and are even now still striving? |
| 6.70 Μιᾶς ἄρα καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔτυχον μοίρας, ὡς ὑφ’ ἑνὶ λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ δουλωθῆναι, μίαν τε γνώμην καὶ προαίρεσιν ἐνδείξασθαι, καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν μίαν, ἕνα τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναδέξασθαι βίον, καὶ λόγον ἀγαπῆσαι τὸν αὐτόν, τάς τε αὐτὰς ἀγαπητικῶς ὑπομεῖναι πάθας δι’ ἔνστασιν εὐσεβείας; | 6.70 Did they all then chance upon one and the same lot, so as to be brought into subjection under one doctrine and teaching, and to exhibit one mind and purpose, one virtue of soul, to embrace one and the same way of life, to love the same doctrine, and lovingly to endure the same sufferings for the sake of holding fast to piety? |
| 6.71 Καὶ τίς ἂν ὀρθὸς τοῦτο συγχωρήσειε λόγος, νέους κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρεσβύτας, καὶ πᾶν μέτρον ἡλικίας, ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν γένη, φύσεις τε βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν, οἰκετῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἐλευθέρων, λογίων τε καὶ παιδείας ἀμετόχων, οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ γῆς οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τοῖσδε γενομένων τοῖς ἄστροις, καθ’ ὅλης δὲ τῆς ἀνθρώπων οἰκουμένης, εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκῃ φάναι βεβιασμένους τόνδε τινὰ τῶν πατρῴων ἁπάντων προτιμῆσαι λόγον, καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ἑνὸς τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ θάνατον ἀσπάσασθαι, τά τε περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας εὖ μάλα δόγματα παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν οὐ τὴν ἐν λόγοις, τὴν δὲ δι’ ἔργων προτιμῆσαι; | 6.71 And what sound reasoning would concede this: that young men together with old, and every measure of age, both male and female sexes, the natures of barbarian men, slaves together with free men, the learned along with those having no share in education—not in a single corner of the earth nor existing under these specific stars, but throughout the entire inhabited world of men—were compelled by the necessity of fate to prefer this particular doctrine above all ancestral traditions, to welcome death for the sake of piety toward the one God over all, to be well instructed in doctrines concerning the immortality of the soul, and to prefer a philosophy demonstrated not in words, but in deeds? |
| 6.72 Ταῦτα γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλα, ὡς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης, μαθήσεως δὲ καὶ διδασκαλίας οἰκεῖα τυγχάνει, αὐθεκουσίου γνώμης καὶ προαιρέσεως ἐλευθέρας ἐναργῆ τυγχάνοντα παραδείγματα. | 6.72 For these things would be clear even to a blind man: that they belong to no necessity, but rather to instruction and teaching, standing as vivid examples of a self-willed mind and a free choice. |
| 6.73 Γένοιτο δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τοῦ προβλήματος παραστατικὰ μυρία, ὧν τὰ πολλὰ παρεὶς, αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀρκεσθήσομαι, σοὶ δὲ τὸ σὸν ἀνάγνωσμα τῶν σεπτῶν σου φιλοσόφων καταλείψω σκοπεῖν, ὡς ἂν μάθῃς ὅσον ἄρα τῶν χρησμῳδῶν σου θεῶν σοφώτερος ἦν καὶ βελτίων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τοὺς θαυμασίους χρησμοὺς ψευδεῖς ἀπελέγχων καὶ τὸν Πύθιον αὐτὸν ἐφ’ οἷς ἔχρησε περὶ εἱμαρμένης ἐπιρραπίζων. | 6.73 Myriad other proofs of this proposition could also be produced, but passing over most of them, I myself shall content myself with what has been said, leaving it to you to examine your reading of your venerable philosophers, so that you may learn how much wiser and better than your oracle-delivering gods was the man who refuted those wondrous oracles as false, and who rebuked Pythian Apollo himself for what he prophesied concerning fate. |
| 6.74 Ἄκουε δ’ οὖν αὖθις τοῦ τὴν τῶν γοήτων φωρὰν τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπονομάσαντος σύγγραμμα, ὡς εὖ μάλα νεανικῷ φρονήματι τὸν πλάνον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ γε τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπανορθοῦται, δι’ ὧν γράφει τάδε κατὰ λέξιν· | 6.74 Listen, then, once more to the man who titled his own treatise On the Exposure of Impostors, as he corrects with vigorous spirit the error of the multitude and of Apollo himself, through the following words written verbatim: |
Chapter 7
Oenomaus of Gadara directly attacks Apollo, oracle-consulters, Stoics (Chrysippus, Cleanthes), and Atomists (Democritus) over the concept of Fate/Determinism (heimarmene). He argues that if every human choice and action is bound by absolute causal necessity or fate, then:
1) Moral responsibility disappears: Virtue cannot be praised, and vice cannot be blamed or punished, as humans would act under compulsion rather than free will.
2) Oracles become absurd and paradoxical: If an outcome is already fated regardless of human choice, oracles giving advice or warnings (e.g., to Laius, Oedipus, or colonizers like Telesicles) are completely pointless or logically incoherent.
3) Interference breaks the chain: Small, autonomous choices (or even tiny random events like the movement of a flea or a donkey) continuously break and restart causal chains, disproving an unbreakable web of fate.
1) Moral responsibility disappears: Virtue cannot be praised, and vice cannot be blamed or punished, as humans would act under compulsion rather than free will.
2) Oracles become absurd and paradoxical: If an outcome is already fated regardless of human choice, oracles giving advice or warnings (e.g., to Laius, Oedipus, or colonizers like Telesicles) are completely pointless or logically incoherent.
3) Interference breaks the chain: Small, autonomous choices (or even tiny random events like the movement of a flea or a donkey) continuously break and restart causal chains, disproving an unbreakable web of fate.
| 7.1 Σὲ οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς καθῆσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον, μηδ’ εἰ βούλοιο, σιωπᾶν. ὁ δ’ Ἀπόλλων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ Διὸς υἱὸς νυνὶ βούλεται, οὐχ ὅτι βούλεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης εἰς τὸ βουληθῆναι τέτακται. | 7.1 So then, you are unable to sit in Delphi, or keep silent even if you wanted to! Apollo, then, the son of Zeus, now wills—not because he chooses to, but because he is ordered by Necessity to choose it. |
| 7.2 δοκῶ δέ μοι τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα παρεὶς, ἐπειδὴ εἰς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ὑπήχθην, οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ ἀξιοζήτητον ζητήσειν πρᾶγμα. ἀπόλωλε γὰρ, τό γ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου, ἀπόλωλεν, εἴτε οἴακά τις αὐτὸ εἴτε ἓρμα εἴτε κρηπῖδα ὀνομάζων χαίρει, τῆς ἡμετέρας ζωῆς ἡ ἐξουσία, ἣν ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων τιθέμεθα, Δημόκριτος δέ γε, εἰ μή τι ἠπάτημαι, καὶ Χρύσιππος, ὁ μὲν δοῦλον, ὁ δὲ ἡμίδουλον ἐπινοεῖ τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιδεῖξαι. | 7.2 I think that setting aside all the rest—since I don't know how I was led into this line of argument—I shall investigate an intrinsic matter worthy of inquiry. For from human life, at least according to the wise, there has perished—perished completely!—the very authority/free agency (exousia) over our life, whether one rejoices in calling it a rudder, a ballast, or a foundation. We establish this authority as sovereign over our most vital choices; but Democritus (unless I am mistaken) and Chrysippus envision it as a slave or a half-slave, while pretending to showcase the finest of human traits. |
| 7.3 ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν λόγος τοσοῦτος, ὅσον ἄν τις ἀξιώσειεν ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρωπίνοις· εἰ δ’ ἤδη καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἡμῶν καταστρατεύεται, παπαῖ, οἷα πεισόμεθα. | 7.3 But let there be only so much talk of these men as a mere human might deem fitting for human matters. Yet if the Divine itself now wages war against our free agency—alas, what shall we suffer! |
| 7.4 ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰκὸς, οὐδὲ δίκαιον, ἀπὸ γοῦν τούτων τεκμαιρομένοις ἡμῖν· «Ἐχθρὲ περικτιόνεσσι, φίλ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν, εἴσω τὸ προβόλαιον ἔχων πεφυλαγμένος ἧσο.» | 7.4 But it is neither reasonable nor just, judging at least from these oracles given to us: "Enemy to those dwelling around, yet dear to the immortal gods, sit guarded, holding your spear-point inward!" |
| 7.5 τί γάρ; φησὶν ὁ Ἀργεῖος, εἰ βουλοίμην, ἔξεστί μοι, καὶ δύναμαι, εἴ μοι δόξειεν, ἧσθαι καὶ πεφυλάχθαι; ἔξεστιν, εἴποις ἄν, καὶ δύνασαι· ἢ πῶς ἄν σοι τοῦτ’ ἐγὼ προσέταττον; | 7.5 "Why?" says the Argive. "If I should wish, is it permitted to me, and am I able—if it seems good to me—to sit still and be guarded?" "It is permitted," you [Apollo] would say, "and you are able; or how else could I have commanded this of you?" |
| 7.6 «Χείρωνος φίλε τέκνον ἀγακλειτοῖο, Κάρυστε, Πήλιον ἐκπρολιπὼν Εὐβοίας ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι, ἔνθ’ ἱερὰν χώραν κτίζειν σοι θέσφατόν ἐστιν.» ἀλλ’ ἴθι, μηκέτι μέλλε. | 7.6 "Dear child of famed Chiron, Carystus! Leave behind Pelion and go to the peak of Euboea, where it is ordained for you to found a sacred land." Come on then, delay no longer! |
| 7.7 ἦ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπῳ τί ἐστιν, ὦ Ἄπολλον, καὶ βουληθῆναι Πήλιον ἐκπρολιπεῖν κύριός εἰμι ἐγώ; καὶ μὴν ἤκουον παρὰ πολλῶν καὶ σοφῶν ὅτι εἴ μοι πέπρωται Εὐβοίας ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι καὶ ἱερὰν χώραν κτίζειν, καὶ ἕξομαι καὶ καθιῶ, εἴτε λέγοις εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε βουλοίμην εἴτε μή. εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ βουληθῆναι ὅ τι μοι ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ μὴ βουλοίμην βουληθῆναι, ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Ἄπολλον, πιστεύεσθαι δικαιότερος. | 7.7 For is it truly up to a man, O Apollo, and am I master over choosing to leave Pelion behind? And yet I used to hear from many wise men that if it is fated for me to reach the peak of Euboea and found a sacred land, I will reach it and settle there whether you tell me to or not, and whether I want to or not! But if I must also desire what is necessary for me to do—even if I should not want to desire it—then you, O Apollo, are the more worthy to be believed! |
| 7.8 ἔοικα δή σοι μᾶλλον προσέξειν. «Ἄγγειλον Παρίοις, Τελεσίκλεες, ὥς σε κελεύω νήσῳ ἐν Ἠερίῃ κτίζειν εὐδείελον ἄστυ.» Ἀγγέλλω, νὴ Δία, φήσει τάχα που τίς τετυφωμένος, ἢ σὲ ἐλέγχων, κἂν μὴ κελεύσῃς· πέπρωται γάρ. καὶ ἔστι Θάσος μὲν ἡ Ἠερία νῆσος· ἥξουσι δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν Παρίοι, Ἀρχιλόχου τοῦ ἐμοῦ υἱοῦ φράσαντος ὅτι ἡ νῆσος αὕτη πρὶν Ἠερία ἐκαλεῖτο. σὺ οὖν, δεινὸς γὰρ ἐπεξελθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ, οἶμαι, αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὄντος ἀχαρίστου καὶ θρασέος, ὃς, εἰ μὴ σὺ μηνῦσαι αὐτῷ ἐβουλήθης, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἤγγειλεν, οὐδ’ ἂν Ἀρχίλοχος ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Παρίους ἐξενάγησεν, οὐδ’ ἂν οἱ Παρίοι Θάσον ᾤκησαν. | 7.8 I seem likely to pay closer attention to you then: "Announce to the Parians, Telesicles, that I command you to found a far-seen city in the misty island." "I announce it, by Zeus!" someone puffing with conceit or putting you to the test will quickly say, "even if you don't command it—for it is fated! And misty Thasos is the island; and the Parians will go to it because my son Archilochus said that this island was formerly called Eeria." You then—being terrible at pursuing vengeance—will not tolerate him, I suppose, being so ungrateful and bold as to claim that unless you had wished to reveal it to him, he would never have announced it, nor would his son Archilochus have guided the Parians, nor would the Parians have inhabited Thasos! |
| 7.9 οὐκ οἶδ’ οὖν εἰ σὺ λέγεις μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ οἶσθα δὲ ἃ λέγεις. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ σχολὴν ἄγειν ἐοίκαμεν καὶ μακρὰ διαλέγεσθαι, ὁ δὲ λόγος οὐ πάρεργος, ἐκεῖνό μοι λέγε· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ὀλίγα ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρκεῖ· | 7.9 I do not know, then, whether you say these things without knowing what you are saying. But since we seem to have leisure and are engaging in a lengthy dialogue—and the matter is no side-issue—tell me this (for perhaps a few points out of many will suffice): |
| 7.10 ἆρά γέ τί ἐσμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ; φαίης ἄν. τοῦτο δὲ ὁπόθεν ἴσμεν; τῷ ποτ’ ἄρα τοῦτο εἰδέναι ἐκρίναμεν; ἢ οὐκ ἄλλο ἱκανὸν οὕτως ὡς ἡ συναίσθησίς τε καὶ ἀντίληψις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; | 7.10 Are you and I actually anything at all? You would say yes. But how do we know this? By what criterion did we judge this knowledge? Is anything else as sufficient as our own self-perception and direct awareness (synaisthesis and antilepsis) of ourselves? |
| 7.11 τί δ’; ὅτι ζῷά ἐσμεν πῶς ποτ’ ἄρα ἐξεύρομεν; | 7.11 And what then? How did we ever discover that we are living beings? |
| 7.12 πῶς δ’ ὅτι καὶ ζῴων, ὡς μὲν ἂν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι, ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὁ μὲν γόης, ὁ δὲ γόητος ἀπελεγκτής· ὡς δ’ ἂν σύ, ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ θεός, καὶ ὁ μὲν μάντις, ὁ δὲ συκοφάντης; καὶ ἔστω γέ σοι οὕτως ἔχον, ἐάνπερ ἔγωγε ἁλῶ. πῶς δ’ ὅτι διαλεγόμεθα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐγνώκαμεν; τί φῄς; ἆρ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐκρίναμεν τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντίληψιν τῷ πάντων ἐγγυτάτῳ πράγματι αὐτῷ; δῆλον ὅτι. οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἀνώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε πιστότερον. | 7.12 And how did we discover that among living beings, as I would put it, we are humans; and among humans, one is a charlatan and another the exposer of the charlatan—or as you would put it, one is human and another a god, and one is a prophet and another a fraud? And let it be as you say, if I am caught out! But how have we known that we are conversing in the present moment? What do you say? Did we not correctly judge our own self-awareness by the very thing closest of all to us? Obviously so! For there was nothing higher, older, or more trustworthy than it. |
| 7.13 ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἕξει, μήτε ἄρα ὥς σέ τις εἰς Δελφοὺς παραγενέσθω λοιπὸν ὄνομα Ἀλκμαίων, ἀπεκτονὼς τὴν μητέρα, καὶ οἴκοθεν ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ οἴκαδε ἐπιθυμῶν. οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν οὔτ’ εἰ ἔστι τι αὐτὸς τὸ παράπαν, οὔτε εἰ οἴκοθεν ἐλαύνεται, οὔτ’ εἰ οἴκαδε ἐπιθυμεῖ· ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ μαίνεται ὁ Ἀλκμαίων καὶ ὑπονοεῖ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ὅ γε Πύθιος οὐ μαίνεται. μηδὲ λέγε οὕτως· «Νόστον δίζηαι πατρίην ἐς γαῖαν ἱκέσθαι, Ἀμφιαρηιάδη.» οὐδὲ γὰρ σὺ οἶσθά πω εἰ σέ τις ἐρωτᾷ Ἀμφιαρηιάδης, οὐδ’ εἰ σὺ τί εἶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, καὶ λέγειν ἔχων περὶ ὧν τίς ἐρωτᾷ. | 7.13 For if it is not so, then let no one named Alcmaeon come to Delphi anymore after having slain his mother, being driven from home and desiring to return home. For he does not know if he himself exists at all, nor if he is driven from home, nor if he desires to go home. But even if Alcmaeon is mad and suspects things that are not real, Pythian Apollo at least is not mad! Nor should you speak thus: "You seek a return to your native land, son of Amphiaraus." For you do not yet even know if someone asking you is the son of Amphiaraus, nor if you yourself are anything—you who are being asked and have something to say about what you are asked! |
| 7.14 μηδὲ Χρύσιππος ἄρα, ὁ τὴν ἡμιδουλείαν εἰσάγων, ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ εἰδώς, ἀπαντάτω εἰς τὴν Στοάν, μηδ’ οἰέσθω ἀπαντήσεσθαι τοὺς βλέννους ἐκείνους ὡς αὐτὸν ἀκουσομένους τὸν Οὖτιν· μηδὲ διατεινέσθω περὶ μηδενὸς καταστὰς πρὸς μὲν Ἀρκεσίλαον παρόντα, πρὸς δὲ Ἐπίκουρον οὐ παρόντα. | 7.14 Nor then should Chrysippus, who introduces this "half-slavery," go to meet people at the Stoa when he doesn't even know what this very thing is! Nor should he think that those fools will meet him to hear "Nobody" himself (Outis / Odysseus)! Nor should he contend about anything, taking his stand against Arcesilaus who is present, or Epicurus who is absent! |
| 7.15 τί γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος, τί δὲ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἢ τί ἡ Στοά, ἢ τί οἱ νέοι, ἢ τίς ὁ Οὖτις, οὔτ’ οἶδεν οὔτε οἷός τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι· πολὺ γὰρ πρότερον οὐδ’ εἰ αὐτός τί ἐστιν οἶδεν. | 7.15 For what Arcesilaus is, or what Epicurus is, or what the Stoa is, or who the young men are, or who "Nobody" is, he neither knows nor is capable of knowing—for long before that, he does not even know if he himself is anything at all! |
| 7.16 ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνέξεσθε οὔτε ὑμεῖς οὔτε ὁ Δημόκριτος, εἰ λέγοι τις ταῦτα· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι πιστότερον μέτρον οὗ λέγω· οὐδ’ εἰ δοκεῖ καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ εἶναι, τούτῳ γ’ ἂν παρισωθείη· ἢ παρισωθείη μὲν ἄν, ὑπερβάλλοι δὲ οὐκ ἄν. | 7.16 But neither you nor Democritus would tolerate it if someone said these things; for there is no criterion more trustworthy than that of which I speak. Nor if there seem to be other criteria, could anything be equaled to it; or if equaled, it certainly could not surpass it. |
| 7.17 οὐκοῦν, φήσειεν ἄν τις, ὦ Δημόκριτε, καὶ σύ, ὦ Χρύσιππε, καὶ σύ, ὦ μάντι, ἐπειδὴ ἀγανακτεῖτε εἴ τις ἐθελήσαι παρελέσθαι τὴν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντίληψιν — οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τὰς πολλὰς ἐκείνας βίβλους εἶναι — φέρε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνταγανακτήσωμεν. | 7.17 "Therefore," someone might say, "O Democritus, and you, O Chrysippus, and you, O Prophet—since you are indignant if anyone should wish to take away your own self-perception (for then those many books of yours would no longer exist)—come, let us be indignant in turn!" |
| 7.18 τί δή ποτε; ἔνθα μὲν ἂν ὑμῖν δοκῇ, ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ πιστότατον καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ἔνθα δ’ ἂν μὴ δοκῇ, ἐκεῖ καταδυναστεύσει τι λεληθὸς αὐτοῦ εἱμαρμένη καὶ πέπρωται, διαφορὰν ἑκάστῳ ὑμῶν ἔχουσα, τῷ μὲν ἐκ θεοῦ, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν μικρῶν ἐκείνων σωμάτων τῶν φερομένων κάτω καὶ ἀναπαλλομένων ἄνω καὶ περιπλεκομένων καὶ διαλυομένων καὶ διισταμένων καὶ παρατιθεμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης; | 7.18 Why so? Because whenever it suits you, this self-perception will be the most trustworthy and ancient thing; but whenever it does not suit you, there an unobserved Fate and Destiny will lord it over us, having a different cause for each of you: for one derived from a god, for the other from the necessity of those tiny bodies floating downward, bouncing upward, intertwining, dissolving, separating, and positioning themselves! |
| 7.19 ἰδοὺ γὰρ ᾧ τρόπῳ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντειλήμμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐθαιρέτων καὶ βιαίων. οὐ λέληθε δὲ ἡμᾶς ὅσον τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ βαδίζειν καὶ τοῦ ἄγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὅσον τοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκάζεσθαι. | 7.19 For look: in the very same way that we perceive ourselves, we also perceive what is voluntary and what is forced in us. It does not escape us how great the difference is between walking and being dragged, nor between choosing and being compelled! |
| 7.20 ὧν δὲ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προσήνεγκα τῷ λόγῳ; ὅτι σε ἐκπέφευγεν, ὦ μάντι, ὧν κύριοί ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ ὁ τὰ πάντα εἰδὼς ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἰδείης, ὧν τὰ πείσματα ἀνῆπται ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας βουλήσεως. | 7.20 Why have I brought these things into the argument? Because it has escaped you, O Prophet, what things are in our power; and you who know all things could not know these things, whose reins are attached to our own will! |
| 7.21 αὕτη δέ γε ἐφαίνετο οὐκ ὀλίγων οὖσα πραγμάτων ἀρχή· ὧν δὲ ἡ ἀρχή, ἥτις ἦν τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα αἰτία, ἐκπέφευγεν, ἤ πού γε τὰ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰδείη ἂν οὗτος. | 7.21 And this will appeared to be the origin of no small number of things. But he from whom the origin—which was the cause of what followed—has escaped, how could he possibly know what comes after the origin? |
| 7.22 ἀναίσχυντος δηλαδὴ ὁ Λαΐῳ προμαντευόμενος ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀποκτενεῖ ὁ φύς. ἤμελλε γάρ που ὁ φὺς κύριος ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσεως, καὶ οὔτε τις Ἀπόλλων οὔτε τις αὐτοῦ ὑπέρτερος ἐξικνεῖσθαι ἱκανὸς οὐδεμιᾷ δυνάμει ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ὕπαρξις οὔτε γενέσεως ἀνάγκη. | 7.22 Shameless, clearly, was the one prophesying to Laius that his own offspring would kill him. For the offspring was surely going to be master of his own will; and neither any Apollo nor anyone greater than he was capable by any power of reaching things which have neither existence nor the necessity of coming into being! |
| 7.23 ἐκεῖνο γὰρ δὴ τὸ καταγελαστότατον ἁπάντων, τὸ μῖγμα καὶ ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τι εἶναι, καὶ εἱρμὸν οὐδὲν ἧττον εἶναι. προσεοικέναι γὰρ αὐτόν, ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ σοφώτεροι, τῷ Εὐριπιδείῳ λόγῳ· | 7.23 For that is the most laughable thing of all: the mixture and combination of something being up to human choices, and yet there being a chain of fate no less! For it resembles, as the wiser men say, the line from Euripides: |
| 7.24 τεκνῶσαι μὲν γὰρ ἐθελῆσαι τὸν Λάϊον, κύριον εἶναι τὸν Λάϊον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκπεφευγέναι τὴν Ἀπολλωνίαν ὄψιν· τεκνώσαντι δ’ αὐτῷ ἐπεῖναι ἀνάγκην ἄφυκτον ὑπὸ τοῦ φύντος αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν· οὕτως οὖν τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ μέλλοντι ἀνάγκην παρέχειν τῷ μάντει τὴν τοῦ γενησομένου προαίσθησιν. | 7.24 For Laius wished to beget a child, and Laius was master of this, and this escaped the Apollonian vision; but once he begot the child, an inescapable necessity was laid upon him to die by his offspring! Thus, the necessity regarding the future provided the prophet with foreknowledge of what would happen. |
| 7.25 ἦν δέ που καὶ ὁ φὺς τῆς ἰδίας βουλήσεως κύριος, ὥσπερ ὁ φύσας, καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖνος τοῦ τεκνῶσαι καὶ μή, οὕτως οὗτος τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ μή. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὑμῶν τὰ μαντεύματα πάντα· καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδειος Ἀπόλλων τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνο ἦν ὃ ἔλεγεν, «τὸ καὶ πᾶς σὸς οἶκος βήσεται δι’ αἵματος.» | 7.25 But surely the offspring was also master of his own will, just as the father was! And just as the father was master of begetting or not, so was the son master of killing or not! Such are all your oracles; and Euripides’ Apollo was saying that very thing: "And all your house shall go through blood." |
| 7.26 ὅτι πήρωσις μὲν ἔσται αὐτοχειρίᾳ τοῦ φύντος ἐπὶ γάμῳ μητρὸς καὶ τυραννίδι, ἣν παρέλαβεν ἐπ’ αἰνίγματος λύσει, παίδων δὲ ἀλληλοκτόνοι σφαγαὶ ἐπὶ φυγῇ μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου πλεονεξίᾳ, καὶ γάμῳ τοῦ φυγάδος ἐν Ἄργει, καὶ στόλῳ στρατηγῶν ἑπτὰ καταγελάστων καὶ συμβολῇ· ὧν ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐξουσίας διαιρουμένων, πῶς ἂν εἴη σοι ἐξεπίστασθαι ἢ ὁ εἱρμὸς συνδεῖν δύναιτο; | 7.26 Because there will be blinding by the offspring's own hand upon marrying his mother and taking the tyranny (which he received upon solving the riddle), and there will be mutual slaughter of children over exile from rule, caused by one brother's greed, the marriage of the exile in Argos, an expedition of seven laughable generals, and a battle! When these things are divided among so many origins and authorities, how could you know them thoroughly, or how could the chain of fate bind them together? |
| 7.27 εἰ γὰρ αὑτοῦ κύριος ὢν μὴ ἐβουλήθη τυραννεῖν ὁ Οἰδίπους, ἢ τοῦτο βουληθεὶς καὶ πράξας γαμεῖν τὴν Ἰοκάστην οὐ προείλετο, ἢ γήμας μὴ ἐτετύφωτο μηδ’ ἦν δύσθυμος καὶ δυσάρεστος, πῶς ἂν τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπράχθη; πῶς δ’ ἂν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἥψατο; πῶς δ’ ἂν τοῖς παισὶν ἐπηράσατο τὴν Εὐριπίδου καὶ τὴν σὴν ἀράν; | 7.27 For if Oedipus, being master of himself, had not wanted to rule as tyrant; or if, wanting and doing this, he had chosen not to marry Jocasta; or if, having married her, he had not been driven mad, nor become despondent and ill-tempered—how would these detailed events have been carried out? How would he have touched his eyes? How would he have pronounced upon his children the curse of Euripides and your curse? |
| 7.28 τά τε ἑξῆς τούτων τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγεγόνει, μὴ πρότερον αἰτιῶν γιγνομένων ᾗ σὺ τί περὶ τῶν μελλόντων λέγειν ἠδύνασο; πάλιν δ’ αὖ εἰ συμβάντες οἱ παῖδες ἅμα ἐβασίλευον, ἢ εἰ συνθέμενοι παρὰ μέρος ἔμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς συγκειμένοις, ἢ εἰ ὁ ἀπελαθεὶς ἔγνω μὴ εἰς Ἄργος, ἀλλ’ εἰς Λιβύην ἢ εἰς Περραιβοὺς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ εἰσελθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ Ἄργος ἔγνω ταριχοπωλεῖν, καὶ μὴ πλουσίαν λαβεῖν γυναῖκα, | 7.28 And in what manner could the events following these have happened, unless prior causes had occurred by which you could say anything about the future? Or again, if the sons had agreed to rule together, or if having made a contract by turns they had stuck to their agreements; or if the expelled brother decided not to go to Argos, but to Libya or Perrhaebia; or if upon coming to Argos he decided to sell salted fish rather than take a wealthy wife, |
| 7.29 ἀλλὰ χερνῆτίν τινα ἢ κάπηλιν, ἢ εἰ ὁ Ἄδραστος μὴ ἔδωκε τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτῷ, ἢ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔδωκεν, ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἐπεθύμησε τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ, ἢ εἰ ἐπιθυμήσας ἐκράτησεν ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ εἰ μὴ προσέσχεν αὐτῷ δεομένῳ συμμαχίας ὁ Ἄδραστος, ἢ εἰ τῷ Ἀδράστῳ μήτε ὁ Ἀμφιάραος μήτε ὁ Τυδεὺς μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταξιάρχων ἕκαστος ἠκολούθουν, ἢ εἰ οἱ μὲν συνηκολούθουν, ὁ δὲ ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐμάχετο τῷ ἀδελφῷ, ἀλλ’ ἢ συμβὰς ἐβασίλευεν ἅμα αὐτῷ ἢ μὴ βουλομένῳ ἀνεχώρησε, πεισθεὶς Εὐριπίδῃ λέγοντι· «Ἀσύνετα δ’ ἦλθες καὶ σὺ πορθήσων πάτραν», | 7.29 but rather some day-laborer or female shopkeeper; or if Adrastus had not given his daughter to him; or if Adrastus gave her, but the son did not long for the road home; or if longing for it, he controlled himself; or if Adrastus paid no attention to him when he begged for an alliance; or if neither Amphiaraus nor Tydeus nor each of the other commanders followed Adrastus; or if they did follow, but he came and did not fight his brother, but either made peace and ruled with him or withdrew against his brother's will, persuaded by Euripides saying: "Foolishly did you come, you too, to sack your fatherland"; |
| 7.30 ἢ εἰ οὗτος μὲν μή, ὁ δ’ ἕτερος, τῶν Εὐριπιδείων ἀκούσας σοφιστευμάτων ἐκείνων τῶν ἄλλων· «Εἶθ’ ἥλιος μὲν νύξ τε δουλεύει βροτοῖς, σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἀνέξῃ δωμάτων ἔχειν ἴσον;» πῶς ἂν συστάντες ἐμάχοντο καὶ Λαΐου πᾶν δῶμα ἔβη δι’ αἵματος; | 7.30 or if he did not, but the other brother listened to those other Euripidean sophisms: "If sun and night serve mortals, will you not endure to hold an equal share of the house?"—how would they have joined in battle, and how would all the house of Laius have gone through blood? |
| 7.31 ἀλλὰ μήν, φήσεις, γέγονε ταῦτα. γέγονεν· ἀλλὰ σὺ ποίᾳ ὁδῷ εἰσῆλθες εἰς τὴν τούτων εἴδησιν; ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς πυκνὰ διακέκοφε τὸ ὅλον δρᾶμα ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς τὸ δρᾶμα συμπληροῦσι δύναμις; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἣν βούλει ὑπόθεσιν λαβὼν διατεμῶ τὸν εἱρμὸν ὑμῶν, ἀποφανῶ τε ἀδύνατον ὄντα. | 7.31 "But indeed," you will say, "these things happened!" They happened; but by what path did you enter into the knowledge of them? Or do you not see how frequently the power within us—who complete the drama—breaks apart the whole drama? In this way, taking whatever premise you wish, I will slice through your chain of fate and demonstrate that it is impossible! |
| 7.32 ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔσχατα εἰδέναι λέγεις, ἡ δὲ ὑπόθεσις ἐκ διακοπῆς εἱρμοῦ δυνάμεως ὅλη συντέτακται. | 7.32 But you claim to know the end results of the premise, while the premise as a whole is put together by the interruption of the chain's power! |
| 7.33 ἢ ὃ λέγω οὐ συνίης; ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἑκάστην ὑπόθεσιν, ὦ μάντι, τὰ ζῷα ἢ ὀλίγας πολλάκις ἀρχὰς ποιούμενα, ἢ πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ. αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ ἀεὶ τὰ μέχρις αὐτῶν διακόψασαι αὐτὰ ἄλλα προάγουσι πράγματα· τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προχωρεῖν δύναται, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἄλλη ποθὲν ἐπιστᾶσα ἀρχὴ τὰ μετ’ αὐτὴν μὴ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑαυτῇ κελεύσῃ. | 7.33 Or do you not understand what I am saying? In every situation, O Prophet, living creatures initiate either a few origins (archai) or many within it. And these origins, always interrupting the things up to themselves, produce other outcomes; and these can proceed only so far as another origin arriving from elsewhere orders the subsequent things not to follow the previous ones, but to follow itself! |
| 7.34 εἴη δ’ ἂν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὄνος καὶ κύων καὶ ψύλλα. οὐ γὰρ παραιρήσει οὐδὲ τῆς ψύλλης, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἀλλ’ ὁρμήσει τινὰ ἰδίαν ὁρμὴν ἡ ψύλλα, ἣ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν ἐνίοτε συμπλακεῖσα ἀρχὴν ἑαυτὴν παρέξεταί τινος ὁδοῦ. σὺ δὲ χρώμενος οὐκ αἴσθῃ τῷ γένει τούτῳ. | 7.34 And an origin could be a donkey, a dog, or a flea! For by Apollo, you will not strip even the flea of its free power; but the flea will set out on its own impulse, which, sometimes entangling itself with human affairs, will provide itself as the origin of a path. But you, in delivering oracles, fail to notice this class of things! |
| 7.35 «Τρηχῖν’ ἐξεῖλες πόλιν Ἡρακλέος θείοιο, ὦ Λοκρέ· σοὶ δὲ Ζεὺς ἄλλας δῶκ’ ἠδ’ ἔτι δώσει.» τί φῄς; οὐ γὰρ ἐπέπρωτο ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ἐξαιρεθῆναι αὐτήν; καὶ τί αἴτιοι ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ ὑμετέρα ἀνάγκη; οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖς, ὦ Ἄπολλον, οὐδ’ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾷς τοῖς οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦσιν ἡμῖν. | 7.35 "You destroyed Trachis, city of divine Heracles, O Locrian; but Zeus gave you other cities and will yet give more." What do you say? Was it not fated by you gods for it to be destroyed? And why are we to blame, rather than your Necessity? You do not act justly, O Apollo, nor do you correctly rebuke us who have done no wrong! |
| 7.36 ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς οὗτος, ἡ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀνάγκης ἀνάγκη, τί ἡμᾶς τίννυται, ἀλλ’ οὐκ, εἴπερ ἄρα, ἑαυτόν, ὅτι τοιαύτην κατέδειξεν εἶναι τὴν ἀνάγκην; τί δὲ καὶ ἀπειλεῖ ἡμῖν; ἢ τί ἡμεῖς, ὡς ὄντες τούτου κύριοι, λιμώττομεν; ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤτοι ἀνοιγισθήσεται πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἢ οὔ· ὁπότερον δ’ ἂν ᾖ, τοῦτο πέπρωται. | 7.36 And this Zeus—the Necessity of your Necessity—why does he punish us, and not rather himself (if anyone), since he showed Necessity to be of such a nature? And why does he threaten us? Or why do we starve, as if we were masters of this? But either a storehouse will be opened by us, or it will not; whichever it is, this is fated! |
| 7.37 λῆξον δὴ, ὦ Ζεῦ λιμοποιέ, τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἔσται γὰρ ὃ πέπρωται, καὶ τοῦτο προστέτακται ποιεῖν ὁ σὸς εἱρμός· ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον οὐδέν ἐσμεν. παῦσαι δὲ καὶ σύ, ὦ Ἄπολλον, μάταια χρησμῳδῶν· ἔσται γὰρ ὃ δεῖ, ἔσται, κἂν σὺ σιωπᾷς. ἡμεῖς δέ, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Ἄπολλον, τί πάθωμεν, οὐδὲν ὄντες αἴτιοι τῆς ὑμετέρας νομοθετήσεως, τουτέστιν ἀναγκοθετήσεως; τί δ’ ἡμῖν καὶ ταῖς ὑμετέραις ἄταις, ἃς αὐτοὶ ἔχειν δίκαιοί ἐστε ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἠναγκάσθημεν; | 7.37 Cease then, O Zeus, maker of hunger, from your wrath! For what is fated will happen, and your chain of fate is commanded to do this; we are nothing in comparison to it. And stop, you too, O Apollo, uselessly singing oracles! For what must be will be, even if you are silent! And we, O Zeus and Apollo, what should happen to us, being in no way responsible for your law-giving—that is to say, your necessity-giving? And what do we have to do with your calamities, which you yourselves deserve to suffer for the things we were forced to do? |
| 7.38 «Οἰταῖοι, μὴ σπεύδετ’ ἀτασθαλίῃσι νόοιο.» ἀλλ’ οὐ σπεύδομεν, ὦ Ἄπολλον, ἀλλ’ ἐλαυνόμεθα, οὐδὲ ἀτασθαλίαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἀνάγκῃ. | 7.38 "Oetaeans, hurry not in the recklessness of your mind!" But we do not hurry recklessly, O Apollo; we are driven! Nor by recklessness, but by your Necessity! |
| 7.39 τὸν δὲ Λυκοῦργον ἐκεῖνον πῶς, ὦ Ἄπολλον, ἐπαινοῖς, ὃς οὐκ ἦν ἀγαθός, οὔτε ἑκὼν οὔθ’ ἑλόμενος, ἀλλὰ ἄκων; εἴπερ που καὶ γίνεταί τις ἀγαθὸς ἄκων. ἔοικε δὲ ὃ νῦν ποιεῖτε, ὡς εἴ τις τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς τὰ σώματα ἐπαινοίη καὶ γεραίροι, τοὺς δὲ αἰσχροὺς ψέγοι καὶ κολάζοι. | 7.39 And that famous Lycurgus—how do you praise him, O Apollo, when he was not good either voluntarily or by choice, but unwillingly—if indeed anyone becomes good unwillingly! What you are doing now seems like praising and honoring people who are handsome in body, while blaming and punishing those who are ugly! |
| 7.40 δίκαια γὰρ εἴποιεν ἂν πρὸς ὑμᾶς οἱ πονηροί, ὅτι «οὐκ ἐπετρέψατε ἡμῖν, ὦ θεοί, ἀγαθοῖς γίνεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐβιάσασθε εἶναι πονηρούς»· οἵ τε ἀγαθοί, εἰ ἐξηγκωνισμένοι περιπατοῖεν, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψει τις αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ φήσει· «Ὦ Χρύσιππέ τε καὶ Κλέανθες καὶ ὅσοι τούτου τοῦ χοροῦ, ὑμεῖς γὰρ πεποίησθε εἶναι ἀγαθοί, ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινῶ, ὑμᾶς δὲ τοὺς ἐναρέτους οὐκ ἐπαινῶ.» | 7.40 For the wicked might justly say to you: "You did not allow us, O gods, to become good; and not only that, but you forced us to be wicked!" And as for the good, if they walk around with their arms pinned back, no one will permit them [to claim merit], but will say: "O Chrysippus and Cleanthes and as many as belong to this chorus—since you have made them to be good—I praise virtue, but I do not praise you who possess virtue!" |
| 7.41 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ὃν σὺ πολλά, ὦ Χρύσιππε, ἐβλασφήμησας, ἐγὼ τό γε ἐπὶ σοὶ ἀφίημι τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. τί γὰρ πάθῃ ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἦν μαλακὸς οὐδὲ ἄδικος, ὥσπερ πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐλοιδόρησας; | 7.41 Furthermore, as for Epicurus, whom you so greatly slandered, Chrysippus, I—for my part—release him from your charges. For what should happen to one who was not voluntarily soft or unjust, as you often reviled him for being? |
| 7.42 «Εὐτάκτων θνητῶν βιοτῇ θεοὶ ἵλαοί εἰσιν, εὐσεβέων θ’ ἁγίας θυσίας τιμάς τε δέχονται.» δοκεῖτε δέ μοι οὐκ ἂν ταῦτα λέγειν, μὴ πεπεισμένοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄκοντες, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι χωροῦσιν ἐφ’ ἃ χωροῦσιν. ἃ δ’ ἂν βουληθῶσιν, οὔτε θεὸς οὔτε ἄνθρωπος σοφιστής, οὕτω προεληλεγμένων, τολμήσει λέγειν ὅτι ὑποτέτακται· ἢ λόγους μὲν οὐκέτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιησόμεθα, σκῦτος δέ τι τῶν εὐτόνων λαβόντες, ὡς ἐπ’ ἀνάγωγον παῖδα, τὰς πλευρὰς εὖ μάλα καταξανοῦμεν αὐτοῦ. | 7.42 "To the life of orderly mortals the gods are gracious, and they accept holy sacrifices and honors from the pious." But you seem to me unlikely to say these things unless you were convinced that men proceed to what they proceed to not unwillingly, but because they choose to! And whatever they choose to do, neither god nor human sophist—after such arguments—will dare to say that it is subjected to fate; or else we shall no longer address arguments to him, but taking a whip of strong leather, as if to an unruly child, we shall thoroughly skin his ribs with it! |
| 7.43 Τοσαῦτα πρὸς τὸν χρησμῳδὸν ὁ Οἰνόμαος ἀπετείνατο. Σὺ δ', εἰ μὴ τῷ τοιῷδε χαίρεις, λαβὼν ἀνάγνωθι τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων περὶ εἱμαρμένης οὐ μόνον τῶν προπαρατεθέντων χρησμῶν ἀνατρεπτικὰ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καθόλου περὶ τοῦ δόγματος ἐπινοουμένων. | 7.43 [Eusebius speaking:] So many arguments did Oenomaus direct against the prophet. But you, if you do not take pleasure in such a style, take up and read the writings of the other philosophers concerning Fate—writings which overturn not only the previously quoted oracles, but also generally the theories devised about this doctrine. |
| 7.44 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἰδιῶται, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ μέγα φρονήσαντες πλείους κατεσύρησαν ὁμόσε τῷ δόγματι, ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν ἀναγκαίως τὰς αὐτῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πρὸς σφὰς αὐτοὺς ἀντιρρήσεις ἐκθέσθαι εἰς ἀκριβῆ τοῦ προβλήματος διάσκεψιν. πρῶτα δὴ οὖν σοι παραναγνώσομαι ἀπὸ τῶν Διογενιανοῦ τὰ περὶ εἱμαρμένης, ὧδέ πως τῷ Χρυσίππῳ ἀντειρημένα· | 7.44 For since not only uneducated laymen, but by now even those who pride themselves greatly on education and philosophy have been dragged down together into this doctrine, I consider it necessary to set out the counter-arguments of the philosophers themselves against one another for a precise examination of the problem. First of all, then, I will read to you from the works of Diogenianus on Fate, where he replies to Chrysippus roughly as follows... |
Chapter 8
In this chapter, Eusebius quotes Diogenianus the Peripatetic offering a sustained critique of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus and his doctrine of Fate. Diogenianus highlights two central contradictions in Chrysippus’s work:
1) Misuse of Homer: In Book 1 of On Fate, Chrysippus cites Homeric passages to prove universal determinism, yet ignores counter-passages where Homer emphasizes personal responsibility. Moreover, the passages Chrysippus cites merely illustrate unavoidable biological constraints (such as mortality) or conditional outcomes, not universal fate.
2) Inconsistency on "Co-fated" Actions: Diogenianus refutes Chrysippus’s attempt in Book 2 to resolve the "Idle Argument" using the concept of co-fated events (e.g., escaping enemy harm is co-fated with running away). Diogenianus argues that if human effort and choice are genuinely necessary conditions that can be chosen or neglected, they cannot simultaneously be governed by an external, necessary fate without destroying moral responsibility, praise, and blame.
1) Misuse of Homer: In Book 1 of On Fate, Chrysippus cites Homeric passages to prove universal determinism, yet ignores counter-passages where Homer emphasizes personal responsibility. Moreover, the passages Chrysippus cites merely illustrate unavoidable biological constraints (such as mortality) or conditional outcomes, not universal fate.
2) Inconsistency on "Co-fated" Actions: Diogenianus refutes Chrysippus’s attempt in Book 2 to resolve the "Idle Argument" using the concept of co-fated events (e.g., escaping enemy harm is co-fated with running away). Diogenianus argues that if human effort and choice are genuinely necessary conditions that can be chosen or neglected, they cannot simultaneously be governed by an external, necessary fate without destroying moral responsibility, praise, and blame.
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8.1
Ἄξιον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἅπασι παραθέσθαι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα Χρυσίππῳ τῷ Στωικῷ περὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε. οὗτος γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης βιβλίῳ βουλόμενος δεικνύναι τὸ δὴ πάνθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης κατειλῆφθαι, μαρτυρίοις ἄλλοις τέ τισι χρῆται καὶ τοῖς οὑτωσὶ παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ τῷ ποιητῇ λεγομένοις·
«ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ μὲν κὴρ ἀμφέχανε στυγερή, ἥπερ λάχε γεινομένῳ περ», |
8.1
In addition to all this, it is worth setting alongside the views held by Chrysiptus the Stoic concerning this doctrine. For in the first book of his work On Fate, wishing to demonstrate that indeed all things are encompassed by necessity and fate, he uses various other testimonies and especially these lines spoken in Homer the Poet:
“But hateful doom has swallowed me up, the very fate allotted to me as I was born,” |
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8.2
καὶ ὕστερον·
«αὖτε τὰ πείσεται, ἅσσα οἱ αἶσα γεινομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ»· καὶ «Μοῖραν δ’ οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν». οὐ θεωρῶν ὅτι τὰ ἀλλαχοῦ πάλιν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ λεγόμενα τούτοις ἄντικρυς ἠναντίωται, οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ χρῆται, βουλόμενος συνιστᾶν τὸ καὶ παρ’ ἡμᾶς πολλὰ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ «αὐτοὶ γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο», καὶ τὸ «ὢ πόποι, οἷον δή νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται. ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ’ ἔμμεναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσι». |
8.2
and later again:
“and hereafter he shall suffer whatever Destiny spun for him with her thread at his birth, when his mother bore him;” and: “for I say that no man has escaped his fate.” Yet he failed to observe that what is said elsewhere by the poet directly opposes these passages—passages which Chrysiptus himself uses in his second book when he wishes to establish that many things depend on us, such as: “for by their own foolishness they perished,” and: “Ah, how foolishly mortals blame the gods! For they say that evil comes from us, yet they themselves suffer grief beyond what is fated through their own foolishness.” |
| 8.3 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην ἠναντίωται. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνο συνιδεῖν ἠδυνήθη, τὸ μηδαμῶς τὸν Ὅμηρον μηδ’ ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἔπεσι συμμαρτυρεῖν αὐτοῦ τῷ δόγματι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τό τινα κατ’ ἐκείνην συμβαίνειν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑποβάλλων εὑρεθήσεται. | 8.3 For these and similar expressions directly oppose the view that all things happen according to fate. Nor indeed was he able to perceive that Homer by no means supports his doctrine, even in those former verses. For it will be found that Homer does not suggest that all things happen according to fate, but rather that certain things happen according to it. |
| 8.4 τὸ γὰρ «ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ μὲν κὴρ ἀμφέχανε στυγερή, ἥπερ λάχε γεινομένῳ περ», οὐχ ὅτι πάντα κατὰ τὴν κῆρα συμβαίνει λέγοιτ’ ἄν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τεθνήξεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς παντὶ γεννητῷ ζῴῳ θανεῖν καθείμαρται. | 8.4 For the phrase, “but hateful doom has swallowed me up, which was allotted to me as I was born,” does not mean that all things happen according to doom, but refers specifically to the act of dying itself; for indeed, death is fated for every generated living creature. |
| 8.5 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ «ὕστερον αὖτε τὰ πείσεται ἅσσα οἱ αἶσα γεινομένῳ ἐπένησε λίνῳ, ὅτε μιν τέκε μήτηρ», τὸ αὐτὸ βούλεται. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα αὐτῷ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην συμβήσεται λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι κατ’ ἀνάγκην αὐτῷ τινὰ συμβήσεται. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ «ἅσσα» διαστολὴ τί ποτε ἕτερον ἢ τοῦτο σημαίνει; πολλὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἐπίκειται. | 8.5 Furthermore, the line “hereafter he shall suffer whatever Destiny spun for him with her thread at his birth, when his mother bore him,” means the very same thing. For Homer does not say that all subsequent events will happen to him according to fate, but that certain things will happen to him by necessity. For what else does the distinction implied by the word “whatever” (hassa / "certain things") signify? Many things—even if not all—lie as a necessity upon us. |
| 8.6 καὶ τὸ «Μοῖραν δ’ οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν», ἄριστα εἴρηται. τίς γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο τὰ κατ’ ἀνάγκην παντὶ ζῴῳ συγκυροῦντα διαφυγεῖν; ὥστ’ οὐχ ὅπως σύμψηφον ἂν ἔχοι τὸν Ὅμηρον Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πάντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεσθαι νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντιούμενον, εἴ γε ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὅτι πολλὰ γίνεται παρ’ ἡμᾶς σαφῶς καὶ πολλάκις εἴρηκε, τὸ δ’ ὅτι κατ’ ἀνάγκην πάντα συμβαίνει, οὐδαμοῦ ῥητῶς λέγων ἂν εὑρεθείη. | 8.6 And the line, “for I say that no man has escaped his fate,” is stated excellently. For who could escape the conditions that necessarily happen to every living creature? Thus, Chrysippus could hardly claim Homer as a supporter of his belief that all things happen according to fate; rather, he finds him an opponent—since Homer clearly and repeatedly states that many things depend on us, whereas nowhere can he be found explicitly declaring that all things happen by necessity. |
| 8.7 καὶ τῷ ποιητῇ μέν, ἅτε οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ὑπισχνουμένῳ, ἀλλὰ μιμουμένῳ πάθη τε καὶ ἤθη καὶ δόξας παντοίας ἀνθρώπων, ἁρμόττον ἂν εἴη καὶ τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν πολλάκις· φιλοσόφῳ δὲ οὔτε τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν οὔτε ποιητῇ δι’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο χρῆσθαι μάρτυρι. | 8.7 Now, for a poet—who does not promise to deliver the truth regarding the nature of reality, but rather imitates human passions, characters, and varied opinions—it might be fitting to speak contradictorily at times. But for a philosopher, it is appropriate neither to contradict himself nor to employ a poet as a witness for that very reason! |
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8.8
καὶ μεθ’ ἕτερά φησι·
«Τεκμήριον δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἰσχυρὸν φέρειν Χρύσιππος οἴεται τῆς ἐν ἅπασιν εἱμαρμένης τὴν θέσιν τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων. τήν τε γὰρ πεπρωμένην πεπερασμένην τινά φησιν εἶναι καὶ συντετελεσμένην διοίκησιν, τήν τε εἱμαρμένην, εἰρομένην τινὰ εἴτε ἐκ θεοῦ βουλήσεως εἴτε ἐξ ἧς δή ποτε αἰτίας. |
8.8
And after other remarks, he [Diogenianus] says:
“Chrysippus thinks he brings another strong proof that fate governs all things from the derivation of such words. For he says that Pepromene ('Fate') is a kind of bounded (peperasmene) and completed administration, and Heimarmene ('Fate') is a kind of continuous thread (eiromene), whether arising from God's will or from whatever cause. |
| 8.9 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Μοίρας ὠνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μεμερίσθαι καὶ κατανενεμῆσθαί τινα ἡμῶν ἑκάστῳ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ χρεὼν εἰρῆσθαι τὸ ἐπιβάλλον καὶ καθῆκον κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην. τόν τε ἀριθμὸν τῶν Μοιρῶν τοὺς τρεῖς ὑποβάλλει χρόνους ἐν οἷς κυκλεῖται τὰ πάντα καὶ δι’ ὧν ἐπιτελεῖται. | 8.9 Furthermore, he says the Moirai ('Fates') are so named from being partitioned and apportioned to each of us. Likewise, Chreon ('necessity/destiny') is named as that which falls to us and is fitting according to fate. He also suggests that the number of the Moirai—being three—corresponds to the three periods of time in which all things revolve and through which they are accomplished. |
| 8.10 καὶ Λάχεσιν μὲν κεκλῆσθαι παρὰ τὸ λαγχάνειν ἑκάστῳ τὸ πεπρωμένον, Ἄτροπον δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀμετάθετον τοῦ μερισμοῦ, Κλωθὼ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συγκεκλῶσθαι καὶ συνείρεσθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ μίαν αὐτῶν τεταγμένην τινὰ εἶναι διέξοδον. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια φλυαρῶν ἀποδεικνύναι τὴν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνάγκην νομίζει. | 8.10 And Lachesis is so named from allotting to each person what is fated; Atropos from the unalterable and unchangeable nature of the distribution; and Klotho from the spinning together and weaving together of all things, there being a single ordered pathway through them all. By babbling these and similar arguments, he fancies he proves universal necessity. |
| 8.11 ἐμοὶ δὲ θαυμάζειν ἔπεισιν εἰ τοιαῦτα λέγων οὐκ ᾐσθάνετο τῆς ματαιολογίας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστω γὰρ ταύταις ταῖς ἐννοίαις κεχρημένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καθὼς αὐτὸς ἐτυμολογεῖ, τὰ ὀνόματα τεθεῖσθαι τὰ ἐκκείμενα, δοξάζοντας τὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην, καὶ ἀμεταθέτους εἶναι τὰς ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατειλημμένας ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ γινομένοις αἰτίας. | 8.11 But I am overcome with wonder that in saying such things he did not perceive his own foolish talk. For grant that men used these names under such concepts—just as he etymologizes them—setting down the established terms under the belief that fate encompasses all things, and that the causes established from eternity in all existing and coming-to-be things are unchangeable. |
| 8.12 τί οὖν ἀκολουθεῖς, ὦ Χρύσιππε, πάσαις ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαις, καὶ οὐδεμία σοι περὶ οὐδενὸς φαίνεται διεψευσμένη, ἀλλὰ πάντες τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσὶ θεωρητικοί; | 8.12 Why then, Chrysippus, do you follow all the opinions of mankind? Does no opinion seem false to you on any subject, but are all men spectators of the truth? |
| 8.13 πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῂς ἄνθρωπον, ὃς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαί σοι δοκεῖ κατ' ἴσον Ὀρέστῃ τε καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι, πλὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ; ἢ ἵνα γὲ δύο μόνους φῇς σοφοὺς γεγονέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους δι’ ἀφροσύνην ἐπ’ ἴσης τοῖς προειρημένοις μεμηνέναι; | 8.13 How is it then that you say no man exists who does not seem to you to be mad equally with Orestes and Alcmaeon, except for the Wise Man? Or that you say only one or two men have ever become wise, while all others through folly are mad to the same degree as those mentioned? |
| 8.14 πῶς δὲ ἀνασκευάζεις αὐτῶν τὰς δόξας ἐκείνας ὡς διημαρτημένας, οἷον τὰς περὶ πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ τυραννίδος καθόλου τε ἡδονῆς, ἅπερ ἀγαθὰ νενομίκασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι; πῶς δὲ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ἡμαρτῆσθαι φῂς ἅπαντας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας; ἢ διὰ τί πλῆθος τοσοῦτον βιβλίων συνέγραψας, εἰ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶχον οἱ ἄνθρωποι δόξας διημαρτημένας; | 8.14 And how do you refute their opinions as completely mistaken—such as those concerning wealth, fame, political power, and pleasure in general, which the majority hold to be good? How do you claim that all established laws and constitutions are errors? Or why did you compose such a vast quantity of books, if men held no mistaken opinions about anything? |
| 8.15 οὐ γάρ, ὅταν μὲν ταὐτὰ σοὶ δοξάζωσιν, ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς φήσομεν, ὅταν δὲ διάφορα, μαίνεσθαι. | 8.15 Surely we shall not say that when men hold the same opinions as you they think correctly, but whenever they differ, they are mad! |
| 8.16 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ σὺ φῂς σοφὸν εἶναι σεαυτόν, μήτι γε ἡμεῖς, ἵνα κριτήριον ποιώμεθα τοῦ καλῶς ποτὲ ἐκείνους φρονεῖν τὸ τῇ σῇ δόξῃ συνδραμεῖν· ἔπειτ', εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν ἀληθές, τί λέγειν ἐχρῆν μαίνεσθαι πάντας ἐπ' ἴσης, καὶ οὐχὶ καθὸ μὲν ἐφαίνοντο ταὐτὰ σοὶ δοξάζοντες κατὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς ὀρθοῦ τινὸς ἐπειλημμένους, καθὸ δὲ διεφώνουν ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν; | 8.16 For in the first place, you do not even claim to be wise yourself—let alone the rest of us—so that we might treat agreement with your opinion as a criterion for whether others are thinking soundly. Secondly, even if this were true, why was it necessary to say that all men are equally mad, rather than praising them in so far as they appeared to share your opinions (as having grasped something correct), and regarding them as mistaken only in so far as they disagreed? |
| 8.17 μαρτύριον μέντοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἱκανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐχρῆν φύσει, καὶ μὴ μαίνεσθαι καθάπερ σὺ οἴει, ἀλλὰ πολύ γε ἀφεστηκέναι σοφίας πᾶς ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειε. | 8.17 However, it was not right to consider the opinion of the masses a sufficient witness of truth by nature—not indeed that they are mad, as you think, but everyone would agree that they are far removed from wisdom. |
| 8.18 γελοίως οὖν καὶ σὺ χρήσῃ μάρτυσι τούτοις διὰ τῆς θέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὓς οὐδὲν ἂν κατά γε σύνεσιν σεαυτοῦ φήσαις διαφέρειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θεμένους ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα σοφοὺς εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, ὅπερ οὐδαμῶς δεῖξαι δυνήσῃ. | 8.18 Ridiculously, then, do you use these men as witnesses through the derivation of words—men whom, according to your own judgment, you would claim do not differ at all in intelligence from madmen; unless, of course, those who originally established these names happened to be wise, a point which you will in no way be able to demonstrate. |
| 8.19 ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεδόσθω σοι τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐκεῖνα τίθεσθαι ὡς σὺ βούλει τὰς σημασίας ἔχοντα, καὶ μὴ κατὰ δόξας ψευδεῖς τὸ τοιοῦτον γεγονέναι· ποῦ τοίνυν δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνεται τὰ πάντα ἁπαξαπλῶς καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἶναι, καὶ μή, εἰ ἄρα, ταῦτα μόνα ὧν ἐστιν εἱμαρμένη; | 8.19 But let it be granted to you that this is so, and that those names were established with the meanings you wish, and that such an act did not arise from false opinions. Where, then, is it signified through these names that all things without exception are according to fate, and not—if anything—merely those things of which fate is truly master? |
| 8.20 ὅ τε γὰρ τῶν Μοιρῶν ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ τῆς Κλωθοῦς ἄτρακτος, καὶ τὸ ἐπειλημένον αὐτῷ νῆμα, καὶ τὸ ἐπίκλωσμα τούτου, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἐνδείκνυται τὸ ἀπαράβατον καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος καθῆκον τῶν αἰτιῶν, ὅσα οὑτωσὶ κατηνάγκασται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλως ἔχειν κεκώλυται. | 8.20 For the number of the Fates, their names, the spindle of Clotho, the thread attached to it, its spinning, and whatever else is said in those myths, indicate the unalterable sequence of causes extending from eternity for those things that are compelled to happen in this way and forbidden to happen otherwise. |
| 8.21 πολλὰ δ' ἂν εἴη τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὅσα δὲ οὐχ οὕτω γίνεται, τούτων τισὶ μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι θεοὺς διοικητὰς καὶ δημιουργοὺς ἐπεφήμισαν, τινῶν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰτίους ὑπέλαβον, ἄλλων δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλων τὴν τύχην. | 8.21 And such things may well be many. But as for things that do not happen in this way, to some of them men have assigned gods as directors and creators; of others they believed ourselves to be the causes; of others again, nature; and of others, fortune (tyche). |
| 8.22 ἧς τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον καὶ νῦν μὲν οὕτως, νῦν δὲ οὕτως ἔχον ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενοι, εἰδωλοποιήσαντες τὸ ποιὸν τοῦτο σύμπτωμα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ σφαίρας βεβηκυῖαν τὴν Τύχην ἔδειξαν. | 8.22 Wishing to demonstrate the changeable, unstable, and ever-shifting nature of fortune, men personified this condition of affairs and represented Fortune standing upon a sphere. |
| 8.23 ἢ οὐχὶ δεδόξασται παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ταῦτα; καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε συνταράττουσι τὰ αἴτια, καὶ ὅσα μὲν καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἢ κατὰ τύχην γίνεται, ταῦτα ἐκ θείας δυνάμεως γίνεσθαι νομίζουσιν, ὅσα δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ' ὅτι γε πάντα τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι δοξάζουσι παντί που δῆλον. | 8.23 Or have not these beliefs also been held among men? For even if they sometimes confuse the causes—thinking that what happens by fate or fortune comes from divine power, and what depends on us (par' hemas) happens by fate—it is nevertheless clear to everyone that they believe all these distinct causes exist among real things. |
| 8.24 ὥστε οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεις, οὐδὲ τὰς θέσεις τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων συμμαρτυρεῖν τῇ Χρυσίππου δόξῃ συμβέβηκε.» | 8.24 So neither the assumptions of men nor the establishment of such names supports the doctrine of Chrysippus.” |
|
8.25
Τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐπιλέγει·
«Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης βιβλίῳ τοιαύταις τισὶν ἀποδείξεσιν κέχρηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ λύειν πειρᾶται τὰ ἀκολουθεῖν δοκοῦντα ἄτοπα τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πάντα κατηναγκάσθαι λέγοντι, ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐτίθεμεν· οἷον τὸ ἀναιρεῖσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν περὶ ψόγους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ προτροπὰς καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰτίαν γινόμενα φαίνεται. |
8.25
To these remarks he [Diogenianus] adds the following:
“In the first book On Fate, then, he employed proofs of this kind; but in the second book he attempts to resolve the absurdities that seem to follow from the statement that all things are necessitated—the very absurdities we set forth at the beginning: namely, that thereby our own eagerness regarding praise, blame, exhortation, and everything that visibly occurs through our own agency is abolished. |
| 8.26 φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον συγκαθειμάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων διοικήσει. | 8.26 He says, therefore, in the second book that while it is clear that many things happen through our agency, these things are nonetheless co-fated with the overall administration of the universe. |
| 8.27 κέχρηταί τε παραδείγμασι τοιούτοις τισί· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολεῖσθαι, φησί, θοἰμάτιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς καθείμαρτο, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων σωθήσεσθαι τόνδε τινὰ μετὰ τοῦ φεύγειν αὐτὸν τοὺς πολεμίους· καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι παῖδας μετὰ τοῦ βούλεσθαι κοινωνεῖν γυναικί. | 8.27 And he uses examples such as these: for he says that a cloak not being destroyed was not fated unconditionally (haplōs), but along with its being cared for; and that a certain person being saved from enemies was fated along with his fleeing from those enemies; and the fathering of children along with the willingness to mate with a woman. |
| 8.28 ὥσπερ γάρ, φησίν, λέγοντός τινος Ἡγήσαρχον τὸν πύκτην ἐξελεύσεσθαι τοῦ ἀγῶνος πάντως ἄπληκτον, ἀτόπως ἄν τις ἠξίου καθιέντα τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἡγήσαρχον μάχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἄπληκτον αὐτὸν καθείμαρτο ἀπελθεῖν, τοῦ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ποιησαμένου διὰ τὴν περιττοτέραν τἀνθρώπου πρὸς τὸ μὴ πλήττεσθαι φυλακὴν τοῦτο εἰπόντος, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. | 8.28 For just as if someone said that Hegesarchus the boxer would leave the match completely unstruck, it would be absurd for anyone to expect Hegesarchus to fight with his hands down because it was fated for him to leave uninjured—since the speaker said this on account of the man's extraordinary defense against being hit—so it is in other cases as well. |
| 8.29 πολλὰ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι γενέσθαι χωρὶς τοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐκτενεστάτην γε περὶ αὐτὰ προθυμίαν τε καὶ σπουδὴν εἰσφέρεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τούτου, φησίν, αὐτὰ γενέσθαι καθείμαρτο. | 8.29 For many things cannot happen without our willing them and bringing to bear the most intense zeal and eagerness regarding them, because it was fated, he says, for them to happen in conjunction with this effort. |
| 8.30 πάλιν οὖν κἀνταῦθα θαυμάσειέ τις ἂν τἀνθρώπου τὸ ἀθεώρητον καὶ ἀνεπιλόγιστον, καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων λόγων ἀνακολουθίας. οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ τὸ καλούμενον γλυκὺ τῷ καλουμένῳ πικρῷ συμβέβηκεν ἐναντιώτατον εἶναι, τῷ τε λευκῷ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμόν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς τῷ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην, εἴ γε καθ’ εἱμαρμένην μὲν ἐκεῖνα καλεῖν προείληφεν ὅσα καὶ ἑκόντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκόντων πάντως γίνεται, παρ’ ἡμᾶς δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔρχεται, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀμελεῖν καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν οὐκ ἐπιτελεῖται. | 8.30 Here again, then, one might marvel at the man's lack of insight and reflection, and the inconsistency between his actions and his own arguments. For I think that just as what is called sweet is directly opposite to what is called bitter, white to black, and cold to hot, so too is that which depends on us (to par' hemas) opposite to that which occurs according to fate (to kath' heimarmenen)—if indeed he defines as 'according to fate' those things that happen in any event, whether we are willing or unwilling, and as 'depending on us' those things that reach fulfillment through our zeal and activity, or fail to be completed through our neglect and carelessness. |
| 8.31 ἐὰν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ σπουδάζειν ἐμὲ θοἰμάτιον φυλάττειν ἐκεῖνο σώζηται, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ γυναικὶ πλησιάζειν τὰ τέκνα γίγνηται, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βούλεσθαι φεύγειν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνδρείως φυλάττεσθαί τε αὐτοῦ τὰς τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιβολὰς τὸ ἄπληκτον ἐκ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πῶς τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐνταῦθα σωθήσεται; | 8.31 If, therefore, through my eagerness to preserve my cloak it is saved, and through my willingness to approach my wife children are born, and through my desire to flee the enemy I avoid death at their hands, and through fighting bravely against an opponent and guarding against the blows of his fists I leave the contest unhurt—how can the 'according to fate' be preserved here? |
| 8.32 εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνην ταῦτα συμβαίνει, παρ' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο συμβαίνειν· εἰ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἂν κατ' ἐκείνην δηλαδή, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνδραμεῖν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις. | 8.32 For if these things happen according to fate, they cannot be said to happen through us; and if through us, clearly not according to fate, because these two concepts cannot coincide with one another. |
| 8.33 ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμᾶς μὲν ἔσται, φησί, περιειλημμένου μέντοι τοῦ παρ' ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης. καὶ πῶς, εἴποιμ' ἄν, περιειλημμένου; εἴ γε καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν θοἰμάτιον καὶ τὸ μὴ φυλάττειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγίνετο τῆς ἐμῆς. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τοῦ σώζεσθαι τοῦτο δηλονότι κύριος ἂν εἴην ἐγώ. | 8.33 'But,' he says, 'they will be through us, yet with that which depends on us being encompassed by fate.' And how, I might ask, 'encompassed'? If both the preserving of the cloak and the not preserving it stemmed from my own power! For in that way I would clearly be master over its preservation. |
| 8.34 καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἣν ποιεῖται Χρύσιππος, δῆλον γίνεται τὸ ἀπολελύσθαι τῆς εἱμαρμένης τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. καθείμαρται γάρ, φησί, σωθῆναι θοἰμάτιον, εἰ φυλάττοις αὐτό, καὶ παῖδας ἔσεσθαι, εἰ καὶ σὺ βουληθείης, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἂν ἔσεσθαί τι τούτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης προκατειλημμένων οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὑποτιμήσεσι τοιαύταις χρησαίμεθα. | 8.34 And from the very distinction Chrysippus makes, it becomes clear that the cause depending on us (he par' hemas aitia) is liberated from fate. For he says: 'It is fated for the cloak to be saved if you protect it, and for children to be born if you too should wish it; but otherwise none of these things will happen.' But in the case of things foreordained by fate, we would never use such conditional qualifications. |
| 8.35 οὐκ οὖν φαμεν τεθνήξεσθαι πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἰ τόδε τι γένοιτο, μὴ τεθνήξεσθαι δὲ εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τεθνήξεσθαι, κἂν ὁτιοῦν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καθόλου γίγνοιτο· ἢ μὴ ἀλγηδόνος ἔσεσθαι δεκτικὸν ἄνθρωπόν τινα, κἂν ταδὶ πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ πάντ' ἄνθρωπον ἀλγηδόνος εἶναι δεκτικόν, ἐάν τε βούληται ἐάν τε μή· καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα οὑτωσὶ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἔχειν καθείμαρται. | 8.35 We do not say that every human being will die if such-and-such happens, and will not die if it does not happen, but simply that he will die, even if every measure is taken to prevent death. Nor do we say that a man will be susceptible to pain if he does certain things, but that every human being is susceptible to pain whether he wills it or not—and whatever else is fated to be thus and not otherwise. |
| 8.36 ὥστε εἰ τὸ γενέσθαι τόδε τι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, εἰ βουληθείημεν ἡμεῖς, ἄλλως δὲ οὐχί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἡμᾶς βουληθῆναί τε καὶ μὴ βουληθῆναι ὑπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἑτέρας αἰτίας προκατείχετο, ἀλλ' ἦν αὐτεξούσιον· | 8.36 So if the coming-to-be of a certain thing is necessary if we should wish it, but otherwise not, it is manifest that our willing or not willing was not foreordained by any other cause, but was autonomous (autexousion). |
| 8.37 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκατανάγκαστον ἦν, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τόδε τι δῆλον ὡς ἀπ’ αἰῶνος οὐ προκατείχετο, εἰ μή τι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ βούλεσθαι φυλάττειν θοἰμάτιον, ἢ μὴ βούλεσθαι, παρά τινα εἱμαρμένην καὶ κατὰ αἰτίαν ἔξωθεν ἀναγκαίαν ἐγίνετο. | 8.37 And if this was unnecessitated, then the coming-to-be of that certain outcome was clearly not foreordained from eternity—unless indeed the very willing or not willing to protect the cloak occurred according to some fate and an external, necessary cause. |
| 8.38 ἀλλ’ οὕτω τέλεον ἡ παρ’ ἡμᾶς ἐξουσιαστικὴ δύναμις ἀναιρεῖται, καὶ οὐκέτι σώζοιτο ἂν θοἰμάτιον παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ἐμήν, ἢ ἀπολλύοιτο· διὸ καὶ εἴην ἂν ἐγὼ καὶ ἀπολλυμένου τούτου κατὰ λόγον ἀνεπιτίμητος (ἄλλη γὰρ αὐτό τις ἀπώλλυεν αἰτία) καὶ σωζομένου πάλιν οὐδαμῶς ἐπαινούμενος, ὅτι μηδὲ τοῦτο εἰργαζόμην ἐγώ. σὺ δὲ ὡς σῶσαι πάντα δυνάμενος οὕτως ἀνετείνου τῷ λόγῳ.» | 8.38 But in that case, our power of choice (he par' hemas exousiastike dynamis) is completely destroyed, and the cloak would no longer be saved or lost through my agency; wherefore, even if it were lost, I would logically be blameless (for another cause destroyed it), and if saved, I would by no means be praised, since I did not effect this either. Yet you, as though able to preserve everything, raised such a defense in your argument!” |
| 8.39 Ταῦτα μὲν ὁ προδηλωθεὶς ἀνήρ. συνήφθω δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Ἀφροδισιέως, ἀνδρὸς εὖ μάλα διαφανοῦς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς Περὶ εἱμαρμένης τοιαῖσδ’ ἐχρήσατο φωναῖς εἰς ἀνασκευὴν τοῦ δόγματος· | 8.39 Thus far the aforementioned man [Diogenianus]. Let us attach to these remarks also the words of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a man distinguished in philosophical discourse, who himself in his work On Fate used the following expressions to dismantle the doctrine... |
Chapter 9
In this chapter, Eusebius continues quoting Diogenianus the Peripatetic, who refutes the Stoic doctrine of universal fatalism by using Aristotelian causal analysis:
1) The Four Causes (9.1–9.6): The text outlines Aristotle's fourfold taxonomy of causes (efficient/productive, material, formal, and final), using the classic illustration of a statue (the sculptor, the bronze/stone, the shape, and the honor or religious devotion driving its creation). Fate is classified under efficient/productive causes.
2) Classification of Events & Efficient Causes (9.7–9.17): Efficient causes are subdivided into:
3) Refutation of Universal Fate (9.18–9.31): Diogenianus argues that if Fate is aligned strictly with natural regularities (ta kata physin), it cannot govern rational deliberate choices (proairesis), contingent actions (ta endechomena), or chance events. Furthermore, even natural processes are routinely hindered or altered by medicine, training, and philosophy (e.g., Zopyrus the physiognomist correctly assessing Socrates’s innate flaws, which Socrates overcame through philosophical discipline).
4) Conclusion (9.31–9.32): The Stoics themselves contradict their own fatalistic philosophy through their everyday behavior—teaching, writing books, praising virtue, and blaming vice—all of which presume autonomous moral responsibility (to autexousion). Eusebius notes that these philosophical arguments align with Christian scripture and serve as a transition to evaluating Chaldean astrology through Bardaisan (Bardesanes).
1) The Four Causes (9.1–9.6): The text outlines Aristotle's fourfold taxonomy of causes (efficient/productive, material, formal, and final), using the classic illustration of a statue (the sculptor, the bronze/stone, the shape, and the honor or religious devotion driving its creation). Fate is classified under efficient/productive causes.
2) Classification of Events & Efficient Causes (9.7–9.17): Efficient causes are subdivided into:
a) Inconsequential actions: Purposeful yet trivial (e.g., twirling straw, touching hair).
b) Purposive actions: Divided into natural processes, rational/deliberate choices, and accidental/contingent outcomes.
3) Refutation of Universal Fate (9.18–9.31): Diogenianus argues that if Fate is aligned strictly with natural regularities (ta kata physin), it cannot govern rational deliberate choices (proairesis), contingent actions (ta endechomena), or chance events. Furthermore, even natural processes are routinely hindered or altered by medicine, training, and philosophy (e.g., Zopyrus the physiognomist correctly assessing Socrates’s innate flaws, which Socrates overcame through philosophical discipline).
4) Conclusion (9.31–9.32): The Stoics themselves contradict their own fatalistic philosophy through their everyday behavior—teaching, writing books, praising virtue, and blaming vice—all of which presume autonomous moral responsibility (to autexousion). Eusebius notes that these philosophical arguments align with Christian scripture and serve as a transition to evaluating Chaldean astrology through Bardaisan (Bardesanes).
| 9.1 «Διαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τῶν γινομένων αἴτια εἰς τρόπους αἰτιῶν τέσσαρας, καθὼς ὁ θεῖος Ἀριστοτέλης δέδειχε· τῶν γὰρ αἰτίων τὰ μέν ἐστι ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ὕλης ἐπέχοντα λόγον· ἔστι δέ τις ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτία· παρὰ δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς αἴτιον καὶ τέλος, οὗ χάριν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται. | 9.1 “The causes of coming-to-be are divided into four modes of cause, as the divine Aristotle has demonstrated: for among causes, some are efficient (poiētika), while others hold the place of matter (hylē); there is also among them the cause according to form (eidos); and beside these three causes, there is also among them the cause which is the end (telos), for the sake of which that which comes to be is produced. |
| 9.2 καὶ τοσαῦται μὲν αἱ τῶν αἰτίων διαφοραί· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν αἴτιον ᾖ τινός, ὑπό τι τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν ὂν εὑρεθήσεται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα τοσούτων αἰτίων δεῖται, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλείστων δεόμενα οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει τὸν εἰρημένον ἀριθμόν. | 9.2 And such are the distinctions among causes; for whatever cause there may be of anything, it will be found to fall under one of these kinds of cause. For even if not all coming-to-be requires so many causes, nevertheless those requiring the most do not exceed the stated number. |
| 9.3 γνωριμωτέρα δ’ ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορὰ γένοιτο, εἰ ἐπὶ παραδείγματός τινος τῶν γινομένων ὁραθείη. ἴστω δὴ ἐπ’ ἀνδριάντος ἡμῖν ἡ τῶν αἰτίων δεικνυμένη διαίρεσις. τοῦ δὴ ἀνδριάντος ὡς μὲν ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὁ ποιήσας τεχνίτης, ὃν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν καλοῦμεν, ὡς δὲ ὕλη ὁ ὑποκείμενος χαλκός, ἢ λίθος, ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου σχηματιζόμενον κατὰ τὴν τέχνην· αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ γεγονέναι τε καὶ εἶναι τὸν ἀνδριάντα. | 9.3 Now, their distinction would become clearer if observed in an example of generated things. Let the division of causes be demonstrated for us in the case of a statue: as the efficient cause of the statue is the craftsman who made it, whom we call the sculptor; as matter, the underlying bronze or stone, or whatever material is shaped by the craftsman according to his art—for this too is a cause of the statue having been made and existing. |
| 9.4 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τούτῳ γενόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος αἴτιον· διὸ εἶδός ἐστι δισκεῦον, ἢ ἀκοντίζον, ἢ ἐπ’ ἄλλου τινὸς ὡρισμένου σχήματος. | 9.4 There is also the form (eidos) produced in this underlying material by the craftsman, which is itself a cause of the statue; wherefore the form is that of a discus-thrower, or a javelin-hurler, or some other definite shape. |
| 9.5 οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος γενέσεως αἴτια, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν αἰτίων τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ δεύτερον τὸ τέλος, οὗ χάριν γέγονε, τουτέστιν, ἢ τιμή τινος, ἢ εἰς θεὸν εὐσέβειά τις. ἄνευ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας οὐδ’ ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐγένετο. | 9.5 Nor are these alone the causes of the statue’s coming-to-be, but second to none of the causes of its generation is the end (telos) for the sake of which it was made—that is to say, either the honor of someone or an act of piety toward a god. For without such a cause, the statue would not have been made in the first place. |
| 9.6 ὄντων τοίνυν τοιούτων τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορὰν ἐχόντων γνώριμον, τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐν τοῖς ποιητικοῖς αἰτίοις δικαίως ἂν καταριθμοῖμεν, ἀναλογίαν σῴζουσαν πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα κατ’ αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος δημιουργῷ τέχνῃ.» | 9.6 These causes being of such a nature and having a clear distinction from one another, we would rightly reckon Fate among efficient causes, preserving an analogy between the things that come to be according to Fate and the art of the craftsman who produces the statue.” |
| 9.7 «Τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων ποιήσασθαι τὸν λόγον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται γνώριμον εἴτε πάντων τῶν γιγνομένων χρὴ τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἰτιᾶσθαι εἴτε δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ παρὰ τήνδε συγχωρεῖν, ὡς οὖσι ποιητικοῖς τινῶν αἰτίοις. | 9.7 “This being so, it would naturally follow to make our argument concerning efficient causes; for in this way it will become clear whether one must blame Fate for all coming-to-be, or whether one should yield to certain other causes alongside it as being efficient causes of certain things. |
| 9.8 ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν γιγνομένων Ἀριστοτέλης ποιούμενος τὴν διαίρεσιν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν τινὸς χάριν γίγνεσθαι λέγει, σκοπόν τινα καὶ τέλος τῶν γιγνομένων προκείμενον ἔχοντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτά, τὰ δὲ οὐδενός, ὅσα οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσίν τινα τοῦ ποιοῦντος γίγνεται, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τέλος ὡρισμένον ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν, τοιαῦτα οἷόν ἐστι καρφῶν τε τινῶν διακρατήσεις καὶ περιστροφαί, καὶ τριχῶν ἐπαφαί τε καὶ ἐκτάσεις, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὁμοίως γίνεται. | 9.8 Aristotle, in making his division of all generated things, says that some of them come to be for the sake of something—when the producer has a certain aim and end set before him—while others come to be for the sake of nothing, namely those that do not happen according to any intention of the producer, nor have a reference to a defined end; such things are, for example, the holding and twirling of bits of straw, the touching and stretching of hairs, and whatever happens in a similar fashion. |
| 9.9 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ γίνεται καὶ αὐτὰ γνώριμον· οὐ μὴν ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν οὗ χάριν αἰτίαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω γινόμενα ἀσκόπως καὶ ἁπλῶς γινόμενα οὐδεμίαν εὔλογον ἔχει διαίρεσιν· | 9.9 For that these things themselves happen is obvious; yet they do not possess the cause that is according to the end and that for the sake of which. Things that happen in this aimless and simple manner possess no rational division. |
| 9.10 τῶν δὲ ἐπί τι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐχόντων καί τινος γιγνομένων χάριν τὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίγνεται. τά τε γὰρ φύσιν αἰτίαν ἔχοντα τῆς γενέσεως κατά τινας ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τάξιν ὡρισμένην πρόεισιν ἐπί τι τέλος, ἐν ᾧ γιγνόμενα τοῦ γίγνεσθαι παύονται, εἰ μή τι αὐτοῖς ἐνστὰν ἐμποδὼν γίγνοιτο τῇ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ὁδῷ. | 9.10 But among those things that have a reference to something and come to be for the sake of something, some happen according to nature (kata physin), and others according to reason (kata logon). For those that have nature as the cause of their coming-to-be proceed according to certain numbers and an ordered sequence to a certain end, reaching which they cease from coming-to-be—unless something stands in their way and hinders their natural course toward the set goal. |
| 9.11 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ λόγον γιγνόμενα ἔχει τι τέλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε τῶν κατὰ λόγον γιγνομένων γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐπί τινα σκοπὸν ἡ ἀναφορὰ πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς. | 9.11 Moreover, things that come to be according to reason also have an end. For nothing that comes to be according to reason happens at random, but all have reference to a certain goal. |
| 9.12 ἔστι δὲ κατὰ λόγον γιγνόμενα ὅσα ὑπὸ τῶν ποιούντων αὐτὰ γίγνεται λογιζομένων τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ συντιθέντων καθ’ ὃν ἂν τρόπον γένοιτο. οὕτω γίγνεται τά τε κατὰ τὰς τέχνας γιγνόμενα πάντα καὶ τὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν· | 9.12 And those things come to be according to reason which are produced by agents calculating concerning them and putting them together in whatever way they may come about. In this way happen all things that come to be according to the arts, as well as those that come to be according to deliberate choice. |
| 9.13 ἃ διαφέρει τῶν γιγνομένων φύσει τῷ τὰ μὲν φύσει γιγνόμενα ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης γενέσεως, (τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ φύσις), καὶ γίγνεσθαι μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινά, οὐ μὴν τῆς ποιούσης αὐτὰ φύσεως ὁμοίως ταῖς τέχναις λογισμῷ περὶ αὐτῶν χρωμένης. | 9.13 These differ from things coming to be by nature in that things coming to be by nature have within themselves the origin and causes of such coming-to-be (for such is nature), and they come to be according to a certain order—though the nature producing them does not employ calculation concerning them in the manner of the arts. |
| 9.14 τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα κατὰ τέχνην τε καὶ προαίρεσιν ἔξωθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν αὑτοῖς, καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἡγεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν λογισμός. | 9.14 But things that come to be according to art and deliberate choice have the origin of their movement and their productive cause from without, not in themselves, and the calculation of the producer concerning them guides their coming-to-be. |
| 9.15 τρίτον δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης τε καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γίγνεσθαι πεπιστευμένα, ταύτῃ τῶν προηγουμένως ἕνεκά του γιγνομένων διαφέροντα, ᾗ ἐπ' ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ πρὸ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ τέλους χάριν γίγνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους ἄλλου χάριν γίγνεται, ἀπαντᾷ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἄλλου χάριν γιγνομένοις, ὡς τέλος, τὸ αὐτομάτως τε καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γίγνεσθαι λεγόμενον.» | 9.15 Thirdly, among things coming to be for the sake of something, there are also those believed to come to be from chance (tyche) and spontaneity (to automatou), differing from things primarily coming to be for the sake of something in this respect: in the latter, the steps prior to the end occur for the sake of that end; but in the case of chance, the steps prior to the end occur for the sake of something else, but there meets them—as an outcome—that which is said to happen spontaneously and by chance.” |
| 9.16 «Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ πάντων τῶν γιγνομένων εἰς τούτους τοὺς τρόπους νενεμημένων ἀκόλουθον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων χρὴ τιθέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην. | 9.16 “These things being so, and all coming-to-be being distributed into these modes, it follows next to consider in which of the efficient causes we ought to place Fate. |
| 9.17 ἆρά γε ἐν τοῖς οὐδενὸς γιγνομένοις χάριν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν παντάπασιν ἄλογον; ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλους τινὸς τῷ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὀνόματι χρώμεθα, καθ' εἱμαρμένην τε αὐτὸ λέγοντες γεγονέναι· διὸ ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις ἀναγκαῖον τιθέναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην.» | 9.17 Is it among those that happen for the sake of nothing? Or is this completely irrational? For we always use the name of Fate with reference to some end, saying that a thing has occurred according to Fate; wherefore it is necessary to place Fate among those things that happen for the sake of something.” |
| 9.18 Ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ῥήμασιν ὁ προδηλωθεὶς ἀνὴρ διελὼν διὰ πλειόνων ἑξῆς συνίστησιν, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἢ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν γινόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ λογισμὸν ἡμέτερον καὶ κατὰ τέχνην ἐπιτελουμένοις τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην ἐπιθεωρεῖσθαι· | 9.18 Having distinguished these matters in these very words, the aforementioned man [Diogenianus] next establishes through further arguments that Fate is nothing other than things that happen according to nature; for he says that the necessity of Fate is not to be observed in those things accomplished according to our calculation and art. |
| 9.19 φησὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν πλεῖστα ἐμποδίζεσθαι συμβαίνειν, ἃ καὶ καλεῖσθαι παρὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὰ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην λέγεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ὅλως παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν γίγνεταί τινα, γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ καθ' εἱμαρμένην. | 9.19 He says, moreover, that most natural events happen to be hindered—which are then called 'contrary to nature' (para physin)—just as in artistic production certain things are said to be 'contrary to art.' But if anything comes to be entirely contrary to what is according to nature, it would also come to be contrary to Fate—if indeed those things according to nature are identical with those according to Fate. |
| 9.20 «Ὁρῶμεν γοῦν, φησίν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἐν νόσοις καὶ φθοραῖς ἀκολούθως τῇ φυσικῇ συστάσει γίνεται, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἱκαναὶ γὰρ ἐκκροῦσαι πολλάκις τὴν τοιάνδε ἕξιν ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ βίων ὑπαλλαγαὶ καὶ προστάξεις ἰατρῶν καὶ συμβουλίαι θεῶν. | 9.20 “We see at any rate,” he says, “that the body, by having a nature of this or that kind, undergoes diseases and decay in accordance with its natural constitution—yet not similarly in all cases, nor out of absolute necessity. For care, changes of diet, prescriptions of physicians, and counsels of the gods are often sufficient to knock out such a physical disposition. |
| 9.21 κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εὕροι τις ἂν παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κατασκευὴν διαφόρους ἐν ἑκάστῳ προαιρέσεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ βίους ἐξ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ἀπὸ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀπὸ λόγων κρειττόνων βελτιουμένων... | 9.21 In the very same way, regarding the soul, one might find—contrary to its natural setup—different choices, actions, and lives in each person, as they are improved through training, instruction, and superior arguments... |
| 9.22 εἰπόντος γοῦν ποτε τοῦ φυσιογνώμονος περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἄτοπά τινα καὶ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶτα τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Σωκράτην καταγελωμένου, οὐδὲν εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐσφάλθαι τὸν Ζώπυρον· ἦν γὰρ ἂν τοιοῦτος, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἄσκησιν ἀμείνων τῆς φύσεως ἐγένετο.» | 9.22 At any rate, when the physiognomist once said certain absurd things about Socrates the philosopher, which were far removed from his deliberate choice of life—and when those around Socrates laughed at the man for this—Socrates said that Zopyrus had made no mistake at all: for he would have been such a man, as far as his nature was concerned, had he not become better than his nature through the discipline of philosophy.” |
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9.23
Καὶ τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἃ καὶ μηδέν φησι διαφέρειν τῶν καθ’ εἱμαρμένην.
«Τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης τοιαῦτα, ὅταν ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν γενομένῳ τινὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπαντήσῃ οὗ χάριν ἐγένετο, ἄλλο δέ τι ὅπερ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ ἠλπίζετο. θησαυρόν τε γάρ φησιν ἀπὸ τύχης εὑρηκέναι τινά, ὅταν ἄλλου χάριν ὀρύσσων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν, θησαυρῷ περιπέσῃ· καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ἀπὸ τύχης κεκομίσθαι τινὰ λέγουσιν, ὅταν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν προελθὼν ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν ἀργύριον ἔχοντι περιπεσὼν τῷ χρεώστῃ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον λάβῃ· καὶ ὁ ἵππος δὲ αὐτομάτως τισὶ λέγεται σεσῶσθαι, ὅταν τροφῆς μὲν ἐλπίδι, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν, ἀποφύγῃ τοὺς κατέχοντας αὐτόν, ἀπαντήσῃ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ φυγῇ καὶ τῷ δρόμῳ τὸ τοῖς δεσπόταις περιπεσεῖν. |
9.23
Such, then, are things according to nature, which he says differ in no way from things according to Fate.
“And things from chance are of this sort: when someone acts for the sake of one thing, and there meets him not that for the sake of which he acted, but something else which was not even hoped for at first. For he says a man finds a treasure by chance when, digging for another purpose and not to find a treasure, he happens upon a treasure; and people say someone received money by chance when, having gone out into the marketplace for another reason, he happens upon his debtor who has money and receives what was owed. A horse, too, is said to have saved itself spontaneously when, in the hope of food or for some other reason, it escapes those holding it, and by its flight and running happens upon its masters. |
| 9.24 ὧν οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἂν εἴη καθ’ εἱμαρμένην. καὶ ἄδηλα δέ ἐστί τινα αἴτια ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, ἃ κατά τινας ἀντιπαθείας γίνεσθαι πεπίστευται, ἀγνοουμένης τῆς αἰτίας δι’ ἣν γίνεται. ὁποῖα περίαπτά τινα ποιεῖν προείληπται, οὐδεμίαν εὔλογον καὶ πιθανὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔχοντα· ἔτι δὲ ἐπαοιδαί, καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες μαγγανεῖαι. τούτων γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων ἄδηλος εἶναι ἡ αἰτία· διὸ καὶ ἀναιτιολόγητα λέγουσιν αὐτά. | 9.24 Such being the case, neither would these things be according to Fate. Furthermore, certain causes are obscure to human calculation, which are believed to happen according to certain antipathies, the cause for which they happen being unknown—such as things assumed to act as amulets, which possess no rational or plausible cause for doing what they do; and further, incantations and certain such sorceries. For the cause of these is admitted by all to be obscure; wherefore they call them unexplainable. |
| 9.25 πολλὰ δ' εἶναι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνδεχομένως καὶ ὁπότερα ἔτυχε γινόμενα, ἃ οὐδὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καθ' εἱμαρμένην. | 9.25 Moreover, there are many things beside these that happen contingently and whichever way it turns out, which would not be according to Fate either. |
| 9.26 λέγεται δὲ ἐνδεχομένως γίνεσθαι ταῦτα ἐφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι χώραν ἔχει, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὁπότερα ἔτυχε λεγόμενον ποιεῖ γνώριμον· οἷον τὸ κινῆσαί τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν, καὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν τοῦ τραχήλου περιστροφὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ δακτύλου ἔκτασιν καὶ τὸ ἐπᾶραι τὰ βλέφαρα, καὶ τὸν καθεζόμενον στῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κινούμενον ἠρεμῆσαι, καὶ τὸν λαλοῦντα σιγῆσαι, καὶ ἐπὶ μυρίων εὕροι τις ἂν δύναμίν τινα ἐνυπάρχουσαν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικήν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐξ εἱμαρμένης· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς οὐ δέχεται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον.» | 9.26 These are said to happen contingently in cases where there is also room for them not to happen, as the phrase 'whichever way it turns out' itself makes clear: such as moving one of one's limbs, turning the neck at random, stretching out a finger, raising the eyelids, standing up when seated, resting when moving, or keeping quiet when talking; in ten thousand instances one might find a capacity present receptive of opposites, which could not come to be out of Fate—for things arising from Fate do not admit the opposite in that wherein they exist.” |
| 9.27 «Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ εἰς μάτην αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ἦν δ' ἂν εἰς μάτην βουλευτικός, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπραττε τὰ πραττόμενα· ἀλλ' ἐναργῶς φαίνεται τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχων πλέον, τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ταῖς φαντασίαις ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τῶν προσπιπτόντων κριτὴν τὸν λόγον· ᾧ χρώμενος, εἰ μὲν ἐξεταζόμενα τὰ φαντασθέντα οἷα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφάνη καὶ ἔστι, συγκατατίθεται τῇ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω μέτεισιν αὐτά· εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα φαίνεται, οὐκέτι ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς προλήψεως, ἐλέγξαντος αὐτὰ τοῦ λόγου, διὰ τὸ συμβουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.» | 9.27 “Furthermore, man's ability to deliberate is not present in him in vain; but he would be deliberate in vain if he performed by necessity the things he performs. On the contrary, man visibly alone of all living creatures possesses this advantage from nature: not to follow impressions in the same manner as animals, but to have reason as a judge of incoming impressions. Using reason, if the impressions upon examination prove to be such as they appeared at first and really are, he assents to the impression and pursues those things; but if they appear otherwise, he no longer abides by his initial impression, reason having refuted them because he deliberated about them.” |
| 9.28 «Βουλευόμεθα γοῦν περὶ μόνων ὧν δυνάμεθα πράττειν· εἰ δέ ποτε μὴ βουλευσάμενοι πράττοιμεν, πολλάκις μετανοοῦμεν καὶ μεμφόμεθα ἑαυτοῖς τῆς ἀβουλίας· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλους ἴδωμεν ἀβούλως πράττοντας, ἐπικαλοῦμεν ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἀξιοῦμέν τε συμβούλοις τοῖσδε χρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὄντων τῶν τοιούτων.» | 9.28 “At all events, we deliberate only about those things that are in our power to do; and if ever we act without deliberating, we often repent and blame ourselves for our foolishness; but even if we see others acting foolishly, we charge them with sinning, and we expect them to use advisers, inasmuch as such matters depend on us.” |
| 9.29 Ὅτι δὲ ψεῦδος ἦν αὐτῶν ὁ περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγος, ἱκανὸν μαρτύριον τὸ μηδ’ αὐτοὺς τοὺς προστάτας αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν λεγομένοις. καὶ γὰρ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἐπαγγέλλονται, καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ παιδεύεσθαι συμβουλεύουσιν, ἐπιτιμῶσί τε καὶ ἐπιπλήττουσι τοῖς οὐ τὰ προσήκοντα δρῶσιν, ὡς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἰδίαν ἁμαρτάνουσιν. | 9.29 That their argument concerning Fate was false is sufficiently testified by the fact that not even the champions of Fate themselves are able to be persuaded by their own assertions. For they profess to exhort and to teach, they advise men to learn and to be educated, and they censure and rebuke those who do not act fittingly, as though they were sinning according to their own deliberate choice. |
| 9.30 ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγράμματα πλεῖστα καταλείπουσι, δι’ ὧν ἀξιοῦσι παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νέους. ἐπαύσαντο δ’ ἂν τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φιλοτιμίας, εἰ προσέσχον ὅτι καὶ συγγνώμης ἀξιοῦσι τοὺς ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἑκουσίως πλημμελοῦντας κολάσεως, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς δηλονότι τοῦ τε ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ τοῦ μή κειμένου. | 9.30 Furthermore, they leave behind vast numbers of writings through which they expect the young to be educated. Yet they would have ceased from their ambition in arguments if they had paid attention to the fact that they deem those who sin involuntarily worthy of pardon, but those who transgress voluntarily worthy of punishment—inasmuch as both sinning and not sinning clearly lie within their own power. |
| 9.31 ὥστε καὶ κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξ εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγκην, συνίστασθαι δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον· μετὰ τὸ πλεῖστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τύχης, ἕτερα ὄντα καὶ αὐτὰ παρὰ τὸν τῆς εἱμαρμένης λόγον, καθὼς προδέδεικται. | 9.31 So, even according to the Stoics themselves, the necessity arising from Fate is abolished, and it is established that free will belongs to us by nature—along with the fact that there are many things not in our power, such as natural events and things from chance, these being themselves distinct from and outside the principle of Fate, as has been demonstrated previously. |
| 9.32 Τούτων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ πλείστων ἐπιτετμημένων, τῷ πολὺν εἶναι τὸν περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου λόγον ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς δόγμασιν· ᾧ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων συνέδραμον αἱ παρατεθεῖσαι φωναί, τοῖς μὲν καθ’ ἡμᾶς θείοις γράμμασιν ἐπιμαρτυροῦσαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ εἱμαρμένης οὐ μόνον τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θαυμαστῶν χρησμῳδῶν θεῶν τὰς δόξας ψευδεῖς οὔσας ἀπελέγχουσαι· καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τοὺς γενναίους χρησμοὺς κυνικώτερον ἀποταθέντων, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θαυμαστοὺς φιλοσόφους παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς γνωρίμων ἀντειρημένων, ὥρα καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀστρολογίας πρὸς τοὺς Χαλδαίζοντας τῶν τὴν κακότεχνον ταύτην γοητείαν ὡς ἐν μέρει μαθήματος ἐπαγγελλομένων τοὺς λόγους ἐπισκέψασθαι· παραθήσομαι δέ σοι καὶ τῶνδε τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐξ ἀνδρὸς Σύρου μὲν τὸ γένος, ἐπ’ ἄκρον δὲ τῆς Χαλδαικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐληλακότος. Βαρδησάνης ὄνομα τῷ ἀνδρί, ὃς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους διαλόγοις τάδε πῃ μνημονεύεται φάναι· | 9.32 These excerpts having been summarized by us from a larger work—because the argument concerning free will is prominent in our own doctrines (with which the quoted utterances of the philosophers coincided, testifying to our divine scriptures and proving false the opinions concerning fate held not only by the common crowd of men, but also by the admired oracular gods; and while some have directed their arguments somewhat Cynically against the noble oracles, others have refuted the admired philosophers from among their own acquaintances)—it is now time to examine the arguments from astrology directed against the Chaldeans by those who profess this malevolent wizardry as part of their learning. And I will set before you the proofs of these matters from a man Syrian by birth, who advanced to the summit of Chaldean knowledge—Bardaisan by name—who in his dialogues with his companions is remembered to have spoken somewhat as follows: |
Chapter 10
In this famous chapter, Eusebius continues quoting from Bardaisan’s treatise On Fate (commonly known via its Syriac title Book of the Laws of Countries), delivered as a dialogue with his student Philip:
1) Human Choice vs. Animal Instinct (10.1–10.10): While non-human animals follow uniform, fixed instincts according to their species (e.g., lions eat meat, sheep eat grass, bees make honey), human beings possess reason and free choice. Humans exhibit immense variety in diet, behavior, customs, and ethics. Consequently, humans are subject to praise, blame, and moral evaluation only in actions governed by choice, not in involuntary biological processes.
The "Laws of Countries" Refuting Astrological Fatalism (10.11–10.35): Bardaisan surveys numerous nations across the known world to demonstrate that customs and laws (nomoi) depend on free choice and human culture rather than astrological destinies (heimarmene) or planetary positions:
1) Human Choice vs. Animal Instinct (10.1–10.10): While non-human animals follow uniform, fixed instincts according to their species (e.g., lions eat meat, sheep eat grass, bees make honey), human beings possess reason and free choice. Humans exhibit immense variety in diet, behavior, customs, and ethics. Consequently, humans are subject to praise, blame, and moral evaluation only in actions governed by choice, not in involuntary biological processes.
The "Laws of Countries" Refuting Astrological Fatalism (10.11–10.35): Bardaisan surveys numerous nations across the known world to demonstrate that customs and laws (nomoi) depend on free choice and human culture rather than astrological destinies (heimarmene) or planetary positions:
Seres (China): No murder or adultery, regardless of planetary horoscopes.
Brahmins of India: Abstain from meat and wine while neighboring Indians practice contrary customs under the same sky.
Persians/Magi: Incestuous marriage laws maintained across different geographical regions.
Geli, Bactrians, Amazons, Britons, Parthians: Varying marital, gender, and social roles dictated by local law and choice, not birth-charts.
Astro-cultural Anomalies: Professions (e.g., painters, bankers) absent in vast northern and western barbarian regions despite identical planetary arrangements.
Local Law Changes & Universal Religious Practices (10.36–10.48):Bardaisan rejects Philip's objection that seven planets rule seven geographical zones (klimata). Laws change historically when rulers or conquerors (such as Romans in Arabia or King Abgar in Osroene) alter them, while stars remain unchanged.
Jews: Practice circumcision on the eighth day and observe the Sabbath universally across every nation and climate, completely ignoring astrological timing.
Christians: Spread across every nation and climate, Christians abandon local ungodly customs (e.g., incest, exposure of corpses, animal worship) out of obedience to their Teacher, demonstrating that human choice guided by truth transcends astrological necessity.
Conclusion of Eusebius (10.49–10.50): Eusebius closes the quotation of Bardaisan. Having supplied non-Christian and philosophical arguments against fate, he transitions to biblical and Christian evidence, introducing Origen’s commentary on Genesis as his next source.| 10.1 «Κατὰ φύσιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται, ἀκμάζει, γεννᾷ, ἐσθίει, πίνει, κοιμᾶται, γηρᾷ, ἀποθνήσκει, καὶ τοῦτο παντὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ παντὸς ἀλόγου ζῴου. | 10.1 “By nature man is born, matures, begets, eats, drinks, sleeps, grows old, and dies; and this applies to every human being and every irrational animal. |
| 10.2 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα ψυχικὰ ὄντα καὶ διόλου κατὰ συμπλοκὴν γεγενημένα διόλου σχεδὸν κατὰ φύσιν φέρεται. λέων σαρκοφαγεῖ καὶ ἀμύνεται ἀδικηθείς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες οἱ λέοντες σαρκοφαγοῦσι καὶ ἀμύνονται· καὶ ἀμνάδες χορτοφαγοῦσι καὶ κρεῶν οὐχ ἅπτονται καὶ ἀδικούμεναι οὐκ ἀμύνονται· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πάσης ἀμνάδος. | 10.2 Now other animals, being purely animate (psychika) and generated entirely according to physical composition, are driven almost completely by nature. A lion eats meat and defends itself when wronged, and for this reason all lions eat meat and defend themselves; ewes eat grass and do not touch meat, and when wronged they do not defend themselves; and the same behavior belongs to every ewe. |
| 10.3 σκορπίος γῆν ἐσθίει καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀδικήσαντας ἀδικεῖ, κέντρῳ ἰοβόλῳ πλήσσων· καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κακία πάντων σκορπίων. μύρμηξ κατὰ φύσιν οἶδε χειμῶνος παρουσίαν καὶ δι’ ὅλης θερείας κάμνων ἀποτίθεται ἑαυτῷ τροφάς· καὶ ὁμοίως πάντες μύρμηκες ἐργάζονται. | 10.3 A scorpion eats earth and harms those who have not wronged it, striking with a venomous sting; and the same malice belongs to all scorpions. An ant knows by nature the approach of winter, and laboring through the entire summer, lays up food for itself; and in like manner all ants work. |
| 10.4 μέλισσα μέλι γεωργεῖ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τρέφεται· καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ γεωργία πάσαις μελίσσαις. καὶ ἦν πολλὰ εἴδη ἐκθέσθαι ἡμῖν τῶν ζῴων, ἅτινα τῆς φύσεως μὴ δυνάμενα ἐκστῆναι πολὺν θαυμασμὸν παρασχεῖν ὑμῖν ἐδύνατο, | 10.4 A bee produces honey, from which it also feeds; and the same production belongs to all bees. And it were possible for us to set forth many species of animals which, being unable to depart from their nature, could afford you great wonder; |
| 10.5 ἀλλ’ αὐτάρκες ἡγησάμην ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ποιήσασθαι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῷα κατὰ τὴν κοινότητα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν κατὰ φύσιν δοθεῖσαν ἑκάστῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡδέως φέρεται, ἄνθρωποι δὲ μόνοι, τὸ ἐξαίρετον ἔχοντες τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐκ τούτου προφερόμενον λόγον, κατὰ μὲν τὴν κοινότητα ἕπονται τῇ φύσει, ὡς προεῖπον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐξαίρετον οὐ κατὰ φύσιν πολιτεύονται. | 10.5 but I considered it sufficient to make the demonstration from these at hand, showing that while other animals—according to the commonality and differentiation given by nature to each—are of necessity and gladly driven, humans alone, possessing as a special prerogative both mind (nous) and the reason (logos) uttered from it, follow nature in what is common to all (as I said before), but in what is special to them do not conduct their lives according to nature alone. |
| 10.6 οὐδὲ γὰρ μία βρῶσις ἡ τῶν ἁπάντων· ἄλλοι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς λέοντας τρέφονται, ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀμνάδας, οὐχ ἓν ἔχοντες σχῆμα φορημάτων, οὐκ ἔθος ἕν, οὐχ εἷς νόμος πολιτείας ἐν αὐτοῖς, οὐ μία κίνησις ἐπιθυμίας τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν θέλησιν αἱρεῖται ἑαυτῷ βίον, τὸν πλησίον μὴ μιμούμενος, πλὴν ἐν οἷς βούλεται. | 10.6 For there is not one diet for all: some feed after the manner of lions, others after the manner of ewes; they do not have one style of clothing, nor one custom, nor one law of governance among them, nor one movement of desire for things; rather, each human being chooses a life for himself according to his own free will, not imitating his neighbor except in matters he chooses. |
| 10.7 τὸ γὰρ ἐλεύθερον αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὑπόκειται δουλείᾳ, καὶ εἴ ποτε ἑκὼν δουλεύσει, καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῦ ἐστι, τὸ δύνασθαι δουλεύειν ἑκόντα. | 10.7 For his freedom is not subject to slavery; and even if he should ever voluntarily serve as a slave, this too belongs to his freedom—the power to serve voluntarily. |
| 10.8 πόσοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Ἀλανῶν, ὡς τὰ ἄγρια ζῷα, κρεοβοροῦσιν ἄρτου μὴ γευόμενοι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ θέλειν; ἄλλοι δὲ κρεῶν οὐ γεύονται, ὡς τὰ ἥμερα ζῷα· ἄλλοι ἰχθυοφαγοῦσι μόνον· ἕτεροι δὲ ἰχθύων οὐ γεύονται, οὐδ’ ἂν λιμώττωσιν. οἱ μὲν ὑδροποτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ οἰνοποτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ σικερατίζουσιν. | 10.8 How many men—and especially among the Alans—eat raw meat like wild beasts, tasting no bread, and this not because they lack it, but because they do not wish to? Others taste no meat, like tame animals; others eat fish only; while others taste no fish, not even if starving. Some drink water, others wine, and others strong drink (sikera). |
| 10.9 καὶ ἁπλῶς πολλὴ διαφορὰ βρωμάτων καὶ πομάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι, μέχρι καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν λαχάνων καὶ ὀπωρῶν βρώσει διαφερόμενοι. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς σκορπίοι καὶ ὡς ἀσπίδες, μὴ ἀδικηθέντες ἀδικοῦσιν· οἱ δέ, ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα ἀδικούμενοι ἀμύνονται· ἕτεροι δὲ ὡς λύκοι ἁρπάζουσι καὶ ὡς γαλαῖ κλέπτουσιν· ἄλλοι δὲ ὡς ἀμνάδες καὶ μηκάδες ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοιοπαθῶν ἐλαύνονται καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι· καὶ οἱ μὲν λέγονται ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ κακοί, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι. | 10.9 And simply put, there is great variety of food and drink among humanity, differing even down to the eating of vegetables and fruits. Moreover, some, like scorpions and vipers, harm without having been wronged; others defend themselves when wronged, like irrational beasts; others plunder like wolves and steal like weasels; while others, like ewes and goats, are driven by their fellow creatures and do not harm those who wrong them; and some are called good, others evil, and others just. |
| 10.10 ὅθεν ἔστι νοεῖν μὴ πάντως κατὰ φύσιν ἄγεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· (ποίαν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐροῦμεν φύσιν;) ἀλλὰ πῆ μὲν φέρεται κατὰ φύσιν, πῆ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. διὸ τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὴν καταδίκην ἔχει ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τὴν ἀνεγκλησίαν οὐ κατ' ἔλεος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον.» | 10.10 Whence it is possible to perceive that man is not driven entirely by nature (for what sort of 'nature' of his shall we speak of?), but in some respects is driven by nature, and in others by deliberate choice (proairesis). Wherefore he receives praise, blame, and condemnation in matters of deliberate choice, but in matters of nature he possesses blamelessness—not out of mercy, but according to reason.” |
| 10.11 Καὶ ἑξῆς φησι· «Νόμους ἔθεντο διαφόρους οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐν ἑκάστῃ χώρᾳ, τινὰς γεγραμμένης, τινὰς δὲ ἀγράφους· ἐξ ὧν διηγήσομαι, ὡς οἶδα καὶ ὧν μέμνημαι, ἀρξάμενος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἀρχῆς. | 10.11 And next he says: “Men have established different laws in each country, some written and some unwritten, of which I shall recount as I know and remember, beginning from the origin of the world. |
| 10.12 νόμος ἐστὶ παρὰ Σήραις μηδένα φονεύειν, μήτε πορνεύειν μήτε κλέπτειν μήτε ξόανα προσκυνεῖν, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ μεγίστῃ χώρᾳ οὐ ναόν ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, οὐ γυναῖκα πορνικήν, οὐ μοιχαλίδα ὀνομαζομένην, οὐ κλέπτην ἐλκόμενον ἐπὶ δίκην, οὐκ ἀνδροφόνον, οὐ πεφονευμένον. | 10.12 Among the Seres [Chinese] there is a law that no one shall murder, commit fornication, steal, or worship carved idols; and in that vast country one cannot see a temple, nor a prostitute, nor an adulteress so named, nor a thief dragged to trial, nor a murderer, nor anyone slain. |
| 10.13 οὐδενὸς γὰρ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἠνάγκασεν ὁ τοῦ πυριλαμπέος Ἄρεος ἀστὴρ μεσουρανῶν ἄνδρα σιδήρῳ ἀνελεῖν, οὐ Κύπρις σὺν Ἄρει τυχοῦσα ἀλλοτρίᾳ γυναικὶ μιγῆναί τινα παρ’ ἐκείνοις, πάντως πάσῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεσουρανοῦντος τοῦ Ἄρεος, καὶ πάσῃ ὥρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ γεννωμένων τῶν Σηρῶν. | 10.13 For the star of fiery Mars culminating in mid-heaven has forced no man's free choice among them to kill a man with iron, nor Aphrodite joining Mars to mix with another's wife, though Mars culminates every day, and Seres are born every hour and day. |
| 10.14 παρὰ Ἰνδοῖς καὶ Βάκτροις εἰσὶ χιλιάδες πολλαὶ τῶν λεγομένων Βραχμάνων, οἵτινες κατὰ παράδοσιν τῶν προγόνων καὶ νόμων οὔτε φονεύουσιν οὔτε ξόανα σέβονται, οὐκ ἐμψύχου γεύονται, οὐ μεθύσκονταί ποτε, οἴνου καὶ σίκερος μὴ γευόμενοι, οὐ κακίᾳ τινὶ κοινωνοῦσι προσέχοντες τῷ θεῷ, τῶν ἄλλων Ἰνδῶν φονευόντων καὶ ἑταιρευόντων καὶ μεθυσκομένων καὶ σεβομένων ξόανα, καὶ πάντα σχεδὸν καθ’ εἱμαρμένην φερομένων. | 10.14 Among the Indians and Bactrians there are many thousands of the so-called Brahmins, who according to the tradition of their ancestors and laws neither murder, nor worship idols, nor taste living flesh, nor ever get drunk (tasting neither wine nor strong drink), nor participate in any wickedness, paying heed to God—while the rest of the Indians commit murder, act as prostitutes, get drunk, worship idols, and are driven in almost all things according to Fate. |
| 10.15 ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κλίματι τῆς Ἰνδίας φυλή τις Ἰνδῶν, οἵτινες τοὺς ἐμπίπτοντας ξένους ἀγρεύοντες καὶ θύοντες ἐσθίουσι· καὶ οὔτε οἱ ἀγαθοποιοὶ τῶν ἄστρων κεκωλύκασι τούτους μὴ μιαιφονεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀθεμιτογαμεῖν, οὔτε οἱ κακοποιοὶ ἠνάγκασαν τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας κακουργεῖν. | 10.15 Yet in the same climate of India there is a certain tribe of Indians who hunt, sacrifice, and eat strangers who fall into their hands; and neither have the benevolent stars prevented them from blood-polluted murder and unlawful marriage, nor have the malevolent stars forced the Brahmins to commit evil. |
| 10.16 παρὰ Πέρσαις νόμος ἦν γαμεῖν τὰς θυγατέρας καὶ τὰς ἀδελφὰς καὶ τὰς μητέρας, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ κλίματι ἐκείνῳ τούτους τοὺς ἀνοσίους γάμους οἱ Πέρσαι ἐποίησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῶν τῆς Περσίδος ἐξεδήμησαν, οἵτινες καλοῦνται Μαγουσαῖοι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀθεμιστίαν διαπράττονται, παραδιδόντες τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἔθη τοῖς τέκνοις κατὰ διαδοχήν. | 10.16 Among the Persians it was law to marry their daughters, sisters, and mothers; and not only in that country and climate did the Persians practice these unholy marriages, but as many of them as emigrated from Persia—who are called Magusaeans—perpetrate the same unlawful acts, handing down the same laws and customs to their children in succession. |
| 10.17 ἐξ ὧν εἰσι μέχρι νῦν πολλοὶ ἐν Μηδίᾳ καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Φρυγίᾳ καὶ ἐν Γαλατίᾳ. καὶ οὐ δήπου Κύπρις ἐν ὁρίοις καὶ οἴκοις Κρόνου, σὺν Κρόνῳ ἐφομαρτοῦντος τοῦ Ἄρεος, ἐν ταῖς τῶν πάντων γενέσεσιν εὑρίσκετο. | 10.17 Of these there are many down to the present in Media, Egypt, Phrygia, and Galatia. And surely Aphrodite was not found in the boundaries and houses of Saturn with Mars attending Saturn at the nativities of all these people! |
| 10.18 παρὰ Γήλοις νόμος ἐστὶ τὰς γυναῖκας γεωργεῖν καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐργατικὰ πράσσειν, καὶ κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ μὴ ἐγκαλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, μήτε καλεῖσθαί τινα μοιχαλίδα, τῷ πάσας ἐργατικὰς εἶναι, καὶ πᾶσι κοινωνεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς ξένοις. | 10.18 Among the Geli there is a law that women farm, build, perform all manual labor, and associate with whomever they wish without being accused by their husbands or called adulteresses, because all are workers and associate with all, especially strangers. |
| 10.19 καὶ οὔτε μυρίζονται Γήλισσαι γυναῖκες οὔθ' ἱμάτια βαπτὰ φοροῦσιν, ἀνυπόδητοι δέ εἰσι πᾶσαι, καίτοι τῶν Γήλων ἀνδρῶν κοσμουμένων ἐν φορήμασι μαλακοῖς καὶ ἐν διαφόροις χρώμασι, καὶ χρυσοφορούντων καὶ μυριζομένων, καὶ οὐ κατά τινα ἄλλην μαλακίαν, εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ πολεμικώτατοι καὶ κυνηγετικώτατοι. | 10.19 And Gelian women do not wear perfume or dyed garments, and all go barefoot, even though Gelian men adorn themselves in soft, colorful robes, wearing gold and perfume—and this not from any effeminacy, for they are brave, warlike, and skilled hunters. |
| 10.20 καὶ οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ τῶν Γήλων γυναῖκες ἔλαχον ἐν Αἰγοκέρωτι ἢ ἐν Ὑδρηχόῳ κακοδαιμονοῦσαν τὴν Κύπριν, οὐδ' οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐν Κριῷ σὺν Ἄρει τὴν Παφίην, ἔνθα τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ σπατάλους οἱ Χαλδαΐζοντες λέγουσιν. | 10.20 And surely not all Gelian women had Aphrodite afflicted in Capricorn or Aquarius, nor do all their men have the Paphian [Aphrodite] in Aries with Mars, where astrologers say men become manly and voluptuous! |
| 10.21 παρὰ Βάκτροις αἱ γυναῖκες παντὶ κόσμῳ διαφέροντι καὶ παντὶ μύρῳ χρῶνται, ὑπηρετούμεναι ὑπὸ παιδίσκων καὶ νεανίσκων μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, προερχόμεναι μετὰ πολλῆς φαντασίας ἔφιπποι, κοσμοῦσαι πολλῷ χρυσῷ καὶ λίθοις βαρυτίμοις τοὺς ἵππους, καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀδιαφόρως κοινωνοῦσι τοῖς δούλοις καὶ τοῖς ξένοις, ἄδειαν ἔχουσαι τοιαύτην, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἐγκαλούμεναι σχεδὸν κυριεύουσιν αὐτῶν. | 10.21 Among the Bactrians, women use every exquisite ornament and perfume, served by young boy and male servants more than the men are, riding horseback with great display, decking their horses with much gold and precious stones; and they are not chaste, but mingle indiscriminately with slaves and strangers, having such impunity that, unaccused by their husbands, they practically rule over them. |
| 10.22 καὶ οὐ πάντως ἐν πάσῃ γενέσει τῶν ἐν Βακτρίᾳ γυναικῶν μεσουρανεῖ μετὰ Διὸς καὶ Ἄρεος ἐν ἰδίοις ὅροις ἡ φιλόγελως Ἀφροδίτη. ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ καὶ τῇ Ὀσροηνῇ οὐ μόνον αἱ μοιχαλίδες φονεύονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ὑποπτευόμεναι οὐκ ἀφίενται ἀτιμώρητοι. | 10.22 And surely laughing Aphrodite does not culminate with Jupiter and Mars in her own terms at every nativity of Bactrian women! On the other hand, in Arabia and Osroene not only are adulteresses executed, but even those under suspicion are not left unpunished. |
| 10.23 παρὰ Πάρθοις καὶ Ἀρμενίοις οἱ φονεῖς ἀναιροῦνται ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, ποτὲ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν καθ' αἷμα τῶν φονευθέντων. καὶ ἐάν τις φονεύσῃ γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἄτεκνον, ἢ ἀδελφὴν ἄγαμον, ἢ υἱόν, ἢ θυγατέρα, οὐκ ἐγκαλεῖται ὑπό του, νόμου τοιούτου ὑπάρχοντος ἐν ταῖς χώραις ἐκείναις· παρ' Ἕλλησι δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις μείζονι τιμωρίᾳ ὑποβάλλονται οἱ τῶν συγγενῶν φονευταί. | 10.23 Among the Parthians and Armenians, murderers are slain sometimes by judges, and sometimes by the blood-relatives of the slain. And if anyone kills his own wife, childless brother, unmarried sister, son, or daughter, he is not accused by anyone, such a law existing in those regions; whereas among the Greeks and Romans, murderers of relatives are subjected to severe punishment. |
| 10.24 ἐν Ἄτροις ὁ κλέπτων τι ὀβολοῦ ἄξιον λιθάζεται, παρὰ Βάκτροις ὁ ὀλίγα κλέπτων ἐμπτύεται, παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις πληγαῖς αἰκίζεται· τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ νόμοι. | 10.24 In Atra, he who steals something worth an obol is stoned; among the Bactrians, he who steals a little is spat upon; among the Romans, he is scourged with blows; for such are their laws. |
| 10.25 ἀπὸ Εὐφράτου ποταμοῦ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ, ὡς ἐπὶ ἀνατολάς, ὁ λοιδορούμενος ὡς φονεύς, ἢ ὡς κλέπτης, οὐ πάνυ ἀγανακτεῖ, ὁ δὲ ὡς ἀρσενοκοίτης λοιδορούμενος ἑαυτὸν ἐκδικεῖ μέχρι καὶ φόνου· παρ' Ἕλλησι δὲ καὶ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐρωμένους ἔχοντες οὐ ψέγονται. | 10.25 From the river Euphrates to the Ocean toward the east, a man insulted as a murderer or thief is not greatly incensed; but he who is insulted as a pederast avenges himself even unto murder; whereas among the Greeks, even wise men who have male lovers are not blamed. |
| 10.26 ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀνατολῇ ὑβριζόμενοι, ἐὰν γνωσθῶσιν, ὑπὸ ἀδελφῶν, ἢ πατέρων, καὶ συγγενῶν φονεύονται, καὶ ταφῆς προδήλου οὐκ ἀξιοῦνται. | 10.26 In that same East, men who are dishonored in this way, if discovered, are slain by their brothers, fathers, and relatives, and are not deemed worthy of open burial. |
| 10.27 παρὰ δὲ Γάλλοις οἱ νέοι γαμοῦνται μετὰ παρρησίας, οὐ ψόγον τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι διὰ τὸν παρ’ αὐτοῖς νόμον. καὶ οὐ δυνατόν ἐστι πάντας τοὺς ἐν Γαλλίᾳ οὕτως ἀθέως ὑβριζομένους λαχεῖν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσι Φωσφόρον μεθ’ Ἑρμοῦ ἐν οἴκοις Κρόνου καὶ ὁρίοις Ἄρεος δύνοντα. | 10.27 Among the Gauls, young men marry openly without considering this a reproach, because of the law among them. And it is impossible that all those in Gaul thus impiously violated should have Morning Star [Venus] setting with Mercury in the houses of Saturn and terms of Mars at their nativities! |
| 10.28 ἐν Βρεττανίᾳ πολλοὶ ἄνδρες μίαν γυναῖκα ἔχουσιν, ἐν δὲ τῇ Παρθίᾳ πολλαὶ γυναῖκες ἕνα ἄνδρα, καὶ πᾶσαι σωφρονοῦσι πειθόμεναι αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. | 10.28 In Britain many men have one wife; but in Parthia many wives have one husband, and all remain chaste, obeying him according to the law. |
| 10.29 αἱ δὲ Ἀμαζόνες πᾶσαι ἄνδρας οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα ἅπαξ τοῦ ἔτους περὶ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ἰσημερίαν ὑπερβαίνουσαι τοὺς ἰδίους ὅρους κοινωνοῦσι τοῖς πλησιοχώροις, ἑορτήν τινα ταύτην ἡγουμένοις· ἐξ ὧν συλλαμβάνουσαι ὑποστρέφουσι, καὶ ἀναγκαίως ἐν ἑνὶ καιρῷ κυίσκουσι κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως νόμον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γεννωμένους ἄρρενας ῥίπτουσι, τὰς δὲ θηλείας ἀνατρέφουσι· πολεμικαί τέ εἰσι, καὶ γυμνασίων προνοούμεναι. | 10.29 The Amazons all have no husbands, but like irrational beasts once a year near the spring equinox they cross their boundaries and associate with neighboring men, who consider this a festival; conceiving from them, they return, and of necessity bring forth at one season according to the law of nature, throwing away the male children born and rearing the females; and they are warlike, devoting attention to athletic exercises. |
| 10.30 Ἑρμῆς μετὰ Ἀφροδίτης ἐν οἴκοις Ἑρμοῦ ποιεῖ πλάστας καὶ ζωγράφους καὶ τραπεζίτας, ἐν οἴκοις δὲ Ἀφροδίτης μυρεψούς, ἢ φωνασκούς, καὶ ὑποκριτὰς ποιημάτων. | 10.30 Mercury with Venus in the houses of Mercury produces sculptors, painters, and bankers; but in the houses of Venus, perfumers, voice-trainers, and dramatic actors. |
| 10.31 καὶ παρὰ Ταηνοῖς καὶ Σαρακηνοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνωτέρᾳ Λιβύῃ, καὶ παρὰ Μαύροις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ Νομάσι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξωτέρᾳ Γερμανίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνωτέρᾳ Σαρματίᾳ, καὶ ἐν τῇ Σκυθίᾳ, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξ ἀρκτικῶν μερῶν τοῦ Πόντου ἔθνεσι, καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ Ἀλανίᾳ καὶ Ἀλβανίᾳ καὶ Ὠτηνῇ καὶ Σαυνίᾳ καὶ ἐν Χρυσῇ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οὐ τραπεζίτην, οὐ πλάστην, οὐ ζωγράφον, οὐκ ἀρχιτέκτονα, οὐ γεωμέτρην, οὐ φώνασκον, οὐχ ὑποκριτὴν ποιημάτων· ἀλλ’ ἐστέρηται ὁ τῆς τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἐνεργείας τρόπος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ τούτῳ τῆς οἰκουμένης. | 10.31 Yet among the Taeni, Saracens, upper Libya, Moors, Nomads by the mouth of the Ocean, outer Germany, upper Sarmatia, Scythia, and all the nations on the northern side of the Pontus, in all Alania, Albania, Otene, Saunia, and Golden Land, one cannot see a banker, sculptor, painter, architect, geometer, voice-trainer, or dramatic actor; rather, the operation of Mercury and Venus is absent throughout this entire circuit of the inhabited world. |
| 10.32 οἱ Μῆδοι πάντες τοῖς μετὰ σπουδῆς τρεφομένοις κυσὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἔτι ἐμπνέοντας παραβάλλουσι, καὶ οὐ πάντες σὺν τῇ μήνῃ τὸν Ἄρεα ἐφημερινῆς γενέσεως ἐν Καρκίνῳ ὑπὸ γῆν ἔχουσιν. | 10.32 All the Medes cast out their dead while still breathing to dogs reared with care; yet not all of them have Mars in Cancer under the earth with the Moon in a diurnal nativity. |
| 10.33 Ἰνδοὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς καίουσι, μεθ' ὧν συγκαίουσιν ἑκούσας τὰς γυναῖκας, καὶ οὐ δήπου πᾶσαι αἱ καιόμεναι ζῶσαι Ἰνδῶν γυναῖκες ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ γῆν ἐπὶ νυκτερινῆς γενέσεως σὺν Ἄρει τὸν ἥλιον ἐν Λέοντι ὁρίοις Ἄρεος. | 10.33 The Indians burn their dead, burning their willing wives along with them; yet surely not all the living Indian women thus burned have the Sun in Leo in the terms of Mars with Mars under the earth in a nocturnal nativity! |
| 10.34 Γερμανῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀγχονιμαίῳ μόρῳ ἀποθνήσκουσι, καὶ οὐ πάντως τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Γερμανῶν τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὴν ὥραν μεσολαβουμένας ὑπὸ Κρόνου καὶ Ἄρεος ἔχει. | 10.34 Most Germans die by hanging; yet the multitude of Germans certainly does not have the Moon and Horoscope intercepted by Saturn and Mars. |
| 10.35 παντὶ ἔθνει καὶ πάσῃ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῆς γενέσεως γεννῶνται ἄνθρωποι· κρατεῖ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῃ μοίρᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμος καὶ ἔθος διὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζει ἡ γένεσις τοὺς Σῆρας μὴ θέλοντας φονεύειν, ἢ τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας κρεοφαγεῖν, ἢ τοὺς Πέρσας ἀθεμίτως μὴ γαμεῖν, ἢ τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς μὴ καίεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς Μήδους μὴ ἐσθίεσθαι ὑπὸ κυνῶν, ἢ τοὺς Πάρθους μὴ πολυγαμεῖν, ἢ τὰς ἐν τῇ Μεσοποταμίᾳ γυναῖκας μὴ σωφρονοῦσι, ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας μὴ γυμνάζεσθαι γυμνοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους μὴ κρατεῖν, ἢ τοὺς Γάλλους μὴ γαμεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ ἄλλα βάρβαρα ἔθνη ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων λεγομέναις Μούσαις κοινωνεῖν· ἀλλ', ὡς προεῖπον, ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρῆται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς βούλεται καὶ ὅτε βούλεται, καὶ δουλεύει τῇ γενέσει καὶ τῇ φύσει δι' ἣν περίκειται σάρκα, πῆ μὲν ὡς βούλεται, πῆ δὲ ὡς μὴ βούλεται. | 10.35 In every nation, on every day, and under every mode of nativity, human beings are born; yet law and custom prevail in each portion of mankind through the free choice of man. Nativity does not force the Seres to kill against their will, nor the Brahmins to eat meat, nor the Persians not to marry unlawfully, nor the Indians not to be burned, nor the Medes not to be eaten by dogs, nor the Parthians not to practice polygamy, nor women in Mesopotamia not to be chaste, nor Greeks not to exercise with naked bodies, nor Romans not to rule, nor Gauls not to be married to men, nor other barbarian nations to participate in the Muses spoken of by the Greeks. But, as I said before, each nation and each human being uses his own freedom as he wishes and when he wishes, and serves nativity and the nature of the flesh with which he is clothed, in some respects as he wishes, and in others as he does not wish. |
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10.36
πανταχῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει εἰσὶ πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ ἀρχόμενοι καὶ ἐρρωμένοι καὶ νοσοῦντες, ἕκαστος κατὰ τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ κλήρους.»
«Ταῦτα, ὦ Βαρδησάνη, ἄκρως ἡμᾶς πέπεικε,» φημὶ αὐτῷ. «οἱ δὲ ἀστρονόμοι φασὶ τὴν γῆν ταύτην μεμερίσθαι εἰς ἑπτὰ κλίματα, καὶ ἄρχειν ἑκάστου κλίματος ἕνα τῶν ἑπτὰ ἀστέρων· καὶ τοὺς διαφόρους νόμους μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τεθεικέναι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστου ἄρχοντος πλεονάζειν τὸ θέλημα ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ χώρᾳ, ὃν νόμον νενομίκασιν οἱ κρατούμενοι.» |
10.36
For everywhere and in every nation there are rich and poor, rulers and ruled, healthy and sick, each according to the lots of his nativity.”
“‘These arguments, O Bardaisan, have completely persuaded us,’ I said to him. ‘But astrologers say that this earth is divided into seven climates, and that one of the seven stars rules each climate; and that humans did not establish these various laws for themselves, but rather the will of each ruling planet predominates in its own territory, which law the subjects have adopted as custom.’” |
| 10.37 Ἀπεκρίνατο· «Οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἡ διάκρισις αὕτη, ὦ Φίλιππε. εἰ γὰρ καὶ διῄρηται ἡ οἰκουμένη εἰς μέρη ἑπτὰ, ἀλλ’ οὖν γε ἐν μιᾷ μερίδι εὑρίσκομεν πολλὰς διαφορὰς νόμων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἑπτὰ νόμοι εἰσὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἀστέρας, οὐδὲ δώδεκα κατὰ τὰ ζῴδια, οὐδὲ τριάκοντα ἓξ κατὰ τοὺς δεκανούς, ἀλλὰ μυρίοι. | 10.37 He replied: “‘This division is not true, O Philip. For even if the inhabited world is divided into seven parts, nevertheless we find many differences of laws within a single part. For there are not seven laws according to the seven stars, nor twelve according to the zodiac signs, nor thirty-six according to the decans, but myriads. |
| 10.38 μνημονεύειν τε ὀφείλετε ὧν προεῖπον, ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ κλίματι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ τῶν Ἰνδῶν εἰσιν ἀνθρωποφάγοι Ἰνδοί, καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ ἐμψύχων ἀπεχόμενοι· καὶ ὅτι οἱ Μαγουσαῖοι οὐκ ἐν Πέρσιδι μόνῃ τὰς θυγατέρας γαμοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει, ὅπου ἂν οἰκήσωσι, τοὺς τῶν προγόνων φυλάσσοντες νόμους καὶ τῶν μυστηρίων αὐτῶν τὰς τελετάς. | 10.38 And you ought to remember what I said before: that even in a single climate and in one region of India there are cannibal Indians, and there are those who abstain from animal flesh; and that the Magusaeans marry their daughters not only in Persia, but in every nation wherever they dwell, preserving the laws of their ancestors and the rites of their mysteries. |
| 10.39 ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ βάρβαρα ἔθνη κατελέξαμεν, τά τε ὄντα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ καὶ δύσει, καὶ ἀνατολῇ καὶ ἄρκτῳ, τουτέστιν ἐν διαφόροις κλίμασι, μὴ μετέχοντα Ἑρμαικῆς ἐπιστήμης. | 10.39 Furthermore, we enumerated many barbarian nations—south, west, east, and north, that is, in different climates—that have no share in Hermaic learning [arts and science]. |
| 10.40 πόσοι, νομίζετε, ἄνδρες σοφοὶ παρήγαγον τοὺς κακῶς κειμένους νόμους; πόσοι δὲ νόμοι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας κατελύθησαν; πόσοι βασιλεῖς κρατήσαντες ἐθνῶν παρήγαγον τοὺς πρὸ αὐτῶν νόμους καὶ ἔθεντο τοὺς ἰδίους; καὶ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀστέρων ἀπώλεσε τὸ ἴδιον κλίμα. | 10.40 How many wise men, do you think, have abolished ill-made laws? How many laws have been dissolved through necessity? How many kings, conquering nations, have repealed the laws before them and established their own? Yet none of the stars lost its own climate! |
| 10.41 χθὲς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἀραβίας κρατήσαντες τοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων νόμους ἤλλαξαν· ἕπεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ. τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον πεῖσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους ἐκθήσομαι ὑμῖν. | 10.41 Yesterday the Romans conquered Arabia and changed the laws of the barbarians; for free choice follows free choice. But I will set forth for you what can convince even the unbelieving: |
| 10.42 Ἰουδαῖοι πάντες οἱ διὰ Μώσεως δεξάμενοι νόμον τοὺς γεννωμένους ἄρρενας παῖδας ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ ἡμέρᾳ αἱμάσσουσι περιτέμνοντες, οὐκ ἀστέρος παρουσίαν ἀναμένοντες, οὐ κλίματος ἐξουσίαν ἐντρεπόμενοι, οὐχ ὑπὸ νόμου ἀλλοτρίας χώρας ἀγόμενοι, ἀλλ’ εἴτε ἐν Συρίᾳ τυγχάνουσιν, εἴτε ἐν Γαλλίᾳ, εἴτε ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, εἴτε ἐν Ἑλλάδι, ἢ ἐν Παρθίᾳ, ἢ ὅπου ἂν ὦσι, τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν. | 10.42 All Jews who received the law through Moses circumcise their newborn male children on the eighth day, drawing blood, not waiting for the presence of a star, nor respecting the authority of a climate, nor driven by the law of a foreign land; but whether they happen to be in Syria, Gaul, Italy, Greece, Parthia, or wherever they may be, they do this. |
| 10.43 ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ γένεσιν· οὐ γὰρ δύνανται πάντες οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι μίαν γένεσιν ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ δι’ ἡμερῶν ἑπτὰ πάντες ὅπου ἂν ὦσιν ἀργοῦσιν ἐκ παντὸς ἔργου, καὶ οὔτε ὁδεύουσιν οὔτε πυρὶ χρῶνται, οὔτε ἀναγκάζει ἡ γένεσις Ἰουδαῖον οὐ κτίσαι οἶκον, οὐ καταλῦσαι, οὐκ ἐργάσασθαι, οὐ πωλῆσαι, οὐκ ἀγοράσαι ταῖς ἡμέραις τοῦ σαββάτου, καίτοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ γεννώντων Ἰουδαίων καὶ γεννωμένων καὶ νοσοῦντων καὶ ἀποθνησκόντων. | 10.43 This is certainly not according to nativity, for all Jews cannot have one nativity! Moreover, every seven days, wherever they are, they rest from all work, neither traveling nor using fire; nor does nativity force a Jew not to build a house, not to demolish, not to work, not to sell, nor to buy on the days of the Sabbath—even though on that same day Jews are giving birth, being born, falling ill, and dying. |
| 10.44 ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκέτι ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου. ἐν τῇ Συρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ὀσροηνῇ ἀπεκόπτοντο πολλοὶ τῇ Ῥέᾳ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μιᾷ ῥοπῇ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἄβγαρος ἐκέλευσε τῶν ἀποκοπτομένων τὰ αἰδοῖα ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ ἐκ τότε οὐδεὶς ἀπεκόψατο ἐν τῇ Ὀσροηνῇ. | 10.44 For these latter things no longer belong to free choice. In Syria and Osroene many castrated themselves for Rhea; but in an instant King Abgar ordered that anyone castrating himself should have his hands cut off as well, and from that time no one castrated himself in Osroene. |
| 10.45 τί δὲ ἐροῦμεν περὶ τῆς τῶν Χριστιανῶν αἱρέσεως, ἧς ἡμεῖς οἱ δοξασταὶ πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἐν διαφόροις ἀνέστημεν κλίμασιν, ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει καὶ κλίματι, οἵτινες πολλοὶ ὄντες ἑνὶ ὀνόματι κεκλήμεθα; | 10.45 And what shall we say concerning the sect of the Christians, of which we who profess it are many, and have arisen in different climates, in every nation and climate, who being many are called by one name? |
| 10.46 καὶ οὔτε οἱ ἐν Παρθίᾳ Χριστιανοὶ πολυγαμοῦσι, Πάρθοι τυγχάνοντες, οὔθ' οἱ ἐν Μηδίᾳ κυσὶ προτιθέασι τοὺς νεκρούς, οὐχ οἱ ἐν Περσίδι γαμοῦσι τὰς θυγατέρας αὐτῶν, Πέρσαι ὄντες, οὐ παρὰ Βάκτροις καὶ Γήλοις φθείρουσι τοὺς γάμους, οὐχ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ θρησκεύουσι τὸν Ἄπιν ἢ τὸν κύνα ἢ τὸν τράγον ἢ αἴλουρον, ἀλλ’ ὅπου εἰσίν, οὔτε ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶς κειμένων νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν νικῶνται οὔθ' ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄστρων πρυτανευομένη γένεσις αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζει τοῖς ἀπειρημένοις κακοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου αὐτῶν χρῆσθαι, νόσῳ δὲ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς νομιζομέναις ἀτιμίαις ὑπόκεινται. | 10.46 Neither do Christians in Parthia practice polygamy, though being Parthians; nor do those in Media cast their dead to dogs; nor do those in Persia marry their daughters, though being Persians; nor among Bactrians and Geli do they corrupt marriage; nor do those in Egypt worship Apis, the dog, the goat, or the cat; but wherever they are, they are neither overcome by ill-established laws and customs, nor does their nativity, governed by the stars, compel them to practice the evil things forbidden by their Teacher—though they remain subject to sickness, poverty, suffering, and reputed dishonors. |
| 10.47 ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἐλεύθερος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος δουλεύειν οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται, κἂν ἀναγκασθῇ ἀνθίσταται τοῖς ἀναγκάζουσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ φαινόμενος ἡμῶν δοῦλος ἄνθρωπος τῆς ὑποταγῆς ἐκφεύγειν ῥᾳδίως δύναται. | 10.47 For just as our free man is not forced to serve as a slave, and if forced resists his compulsors, so neither can our apparent slave-man easily escape subjection. |
| 10.48 εἰ γὰρ πάντα ἐδυνάμεθα, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἦμεν τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε εἰ μηδὲν ἐδυνάμεθα, ἄλλων ἦμεν, ὡς προεῖπον, ὄργανα, καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῶν. θεοῦ δ’ ἐπινεύσαντος πάντα δυνατὰ καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστα· τῇ γὰρ ἐκείνου βουλήσει οὐδὲν ἀντιστῆναι δύναται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀνθίστασθαι, αὐτοῦ χρηστοῦ ὄντος, καὶ συγχωροῦντος ἑκάστῃ φύσει ἔχειν τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ θελήματος, ἀνθίσταται.» | 10.48 For if we were able to do all things, we would be the All; just as if we were able to do nothing, we would be instruments of others (as I said before), and not of ourselves. But when God nods assent, all things are possible and unhindered; for nothing can withstand His will. For even those things that seem to resist—since He is good and permits each nature to have its own property and free choice of will—resist only to a point.’” |
| 10.49 Τοσαῦτα καὶ ὁ Σύρος. ἑνὸς δὲ ἔτι μνησθεὶς περιγράψω τὸν λόγον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν γραμμάτων αὐταρκῶς παρατέθειται, λείπει δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων, ὧν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἡμῖν δεῖ εἰς τὴν τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Ἀποδείξεως Προπαρασκευήν, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι καὶ τάδε ἐποπτεῦσαι, ὡς ἂν κατὰ μηδὲν ὁ λόγος ἐλλείποι τῶν εἰς τὸ πρόβλημα θεωρουμένων. | 10.49 Thus far the Syrian [Bardaisan]. Mentioning one thing more, I [Eusebius] will bring the argument to a close. For since quotes from outside [secular] writings have been sufficiently set forth, but those from the sacred scriptures are still lacking—which indeed we need most of all for the Preparation for the Gospel Demonstration—it would be well to inspect these as well, so that our discourse may fall short in no respect regarding the problem under consideration. |
| 10.50 ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τάδε σοι σαφῆ καταστήσω. οὐ μὴν οἷός τ’ ἂν εἴης γυμνῶν ἐπαίειν τῶν ἱερῶν λογίων τὰ πολλὰ συνεσκιασμένως προενηνεγμένων. διόπερ ἐγώ σοι τὸν ἑρμηνέα τούτων παραστήσομαι· σὺ δ’, εἰ μὴ τοῖς κρείττοσι βασκαίνεις, οἶσθά που τὸν ἄνδρα, Χριστοῦ μὲν θιάσοις εἰσέτι δεῦρο χορεύοντα δι’ ὧν ἀπολέλοιπε πόνων, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγνῶτα δι’ ἣν ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶνδε μαθήματα φιλοτιμίαν. σκέψαι δ’ οὖν ὅσα τε καὶ ὁποῖα ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν Ἐξηγητικοῖς θαυμάσιος Ὠριγένης περὶ τῆς προκειμένης ὑποθέσεως διείληφε, καὶ ὅπως ἐφώδευσε τὸν περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγον. | 10.50 Wherefore I shall make these things clear to you. Yet you would not be able to understand bare sacred oracles, many of which are delivered obscurely. Therefore I will present to you the interpreter of these things; and unless you harbor envy toward superior men, you doubtless know the man—who even down to the present dances in the choruses of Christ through the labors he left behind, nor is he unknown to those outside on account of the zeal he displayed toward their learning as well. Consider, then, how many and what sort of things the admirable Origen has set forth concerning the present hypothesis in his Expositions on Genesis, and how he treated the doctrine of Fate. |
Chapter 11
In this extensive excerpt quoted by Eusebius, Origen addresses the interpretation of Genesis 1:14 (“Let there be lights in the firmament... to serve as signs”). He refutes the deterministic astrological view that the stars, planets, and horoscopes cause human decisions, actions, or earthly outcomes.
Origen argues that the stars are signs, not causes: Celestial arrangements indicate or signal future events rather than driving or compelling them.
1) Preserving Free Will: Strict astrological determinism destroys moral accountability, praise and blame, legal justice, divine judgment, and the work of Christ and the Apostles.
2) God’s Foreknowledge vs. Causation: Divine foreknowledge of future events does not impose necessity. God knows what a person will freely choose to do; the future action is the cause of the foreknowledge, not vice versa.
3) Human Inability to Read Horoscopes Accurately: Genuine comprehension of cosmic sign-systems exceeds human capacity due to extreme precision variables (such as exact fractions of degrees, exact seconds of birth, and axial precession). Knowledge of these signs belongs only to higher angelic or demonic powers.
Eusebius concludes the chapter by stating that Christ alone has liberated humanity from the oppressive error of fate (heimarmenē) and demonic deception.
Origen argues that the stars are signs, not causes: Celestial arrangements indicate or signal future events rather than driving or compelling them.
1) Preserving Free Will: Strict astrological determinism destroys moral accountability, praise and blame, legal justice, divine judgment, and the work of Christ and the Apostles.
2) God’s Foreknowledge vs. Causation: Divine foreknowledge of future events does not impose necessity. God knows what a person will freely choose to do; the future action is the cause of the foreknowledge, not vice versa.
3) Human Inability to Read Horoscopes Accurately: Genuine comprehension of cosmic sign-systems exceeds human capacity due to extreme precision variables (such as exact fractions of degrees, exact seconds of birth, and axial precession). Knowledge of these signs belongs only to higher angelic or demonic powers.
Eusebius concludes the chapter by stating that Christ alone has liberated humanity from the oppressive error of fate (heimarmenē) and demonic deception.
| 11.1 Περὶ τοῦ «εἰς σημεῖα γεγονέναι τοὺς φωστῆρας», οὐκ ἄλλους ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄστρων τυγχάνοντας, τῶν σφόδρα ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἐστὶ διαλαβεῖν, οὐ μόνον ἐθνῶν τῶν τῆς Χριστοῦ πίστεως ἀλλοτρίων σφαλλομένων εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης τόπον, τῇ τῶν καλουμένων πλανωμένων ἀστέρων ἐπιπλοκῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῷ ζωδιακῷ πάντων αὐτοῖς νομιζομένων συμβαίνειν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπον, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀλόγων ζῴων, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πολλῶν τῶν πεπιστευκέναι ὑπολαμβανομένων περισπωμένων μή αρα ἠνάγκασται τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα, καὶ ἀμήχανον ἄλλως γενέσθαι ἢ ὡς οἱ ἀστέρες κατὰ διαφόρους σχηματισμοὺς ἐπιτελοῦσιν. | 11.1 Concerning the statement, "Let the luminaries be for signs" (meaning no other than the sun, moon, and stars), it is exceptionally necessary to treat this topic, not only because nations foreign to the faith of Christ err regarding the subject of Fate—believing that by the interweaving of the so-called wandering stars (planets) with those in the zodiac, everything on earth and every circumstance concerning individual human beings (and perhaps even irrational animals) happens accordingly—but also because many who consider themselves believers are drawn away, wondering whether human affairs are compelled and whether it is impossible for things to happen otherwise than as the stars bring about through their various configurations. |
| 11.2 Ἕπεται δὲ τοῖς ταῦτα δογματίζουσιν ἐξ ὅλων τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀναιρεῖν· διόπερ καὶ ἔπαινον καὶ ψόγον, καὶ πράξεις ἀποδέκτους πάλιν τε αὖ ψεκτάς. | 11.2 Now, for those who dogmatize these views, it completely follows that free will (to eph' hēmin) is destroyed, and along with it, praise and blame, as well as actions that are commendable or, on the other hand, blameworthy. |
| 11.3 Ἅπερ εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τὰ τῆς κεκηρυγμένης τοῦ θεοῦ κρίσεως οἴχεται, καὶ ἀπειλαὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἡμαρτηκότας, ὡς κολασθησομένους· τιμαί τε αὖ πρὸς τοὺς τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιδεδωκότας καὶ μακαριότητες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τούτων εὐλόγως ἔσται γενόμενον. |
11.3 But if these things are so, the proclaimed judgment of God is gone, along with threats against sinners as being subject to punishment, and likewise honors and beatitudes for those who have surrendered themselves to better things; for none of these would any longer take place with reason. |
| 11.4 Καὶ εἰ τὰ ἀκόλουθά τις ἑαυτῷ ἐφ’ οἷς δογματίζει βλέποι, καὶ ἡ πίστις ἔσται ματαία, ἥ τε Χριστοῦ ἐπιδημία οὐδὲν ἀνύουσα, καὶ πᾶσα ἡ διὰ νόμου καὶ προφητῶν οἰκονομία, κάματοί τε ἀποστόλων ὑπὲρ τοῦ συστῆσαι τὰς διὰ Χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκλησίας· | 11.4 And if anyone should look at the logical consequences of the dogmas he holds, faith will be proved futile, Christ's advent will accomplish nothing, the whole dispensation through the Law and Prophets will be rendered void, and the labors of the Apostles to establish the churches through Christ our God will be in vain— |
| 11.5 εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ Χριστός, κατὰ τοὺς οὕτω τολμῶντας, ὑπὸ τὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως τῷ γένεσιν ἀνειληφέναι γενόμενος, πάντα πεποιήκοι τε καὶ πάθοι, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων αὐτῷ τὰς παραδόξους δυνάμεις δωρησαμένου, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀστέρων. Οἷς ἀθέοις καὶ ἀσεβέσι τυγχάνουσι λόγοις ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ τὸ τοὺς πιστεύοντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων ἀγομένους πιστεύειν εἰς θεὸν λέγεσθαι. | 11.5 unless indeed Christ Himself, according to those who dare to speak thus, was brought under the necessity of the motion of the stars by taking on human birth, and accomplished and suffered all things, not because God and the Father of all granted Him miraculous powers, but because of the stars! Following upon these atheistic and impious arguments is also the claim that believers are led by the stars to believe in God. |
| 11.6 Πυθοίμεθα δ’ ἂν αὐτῶν τί ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος τοιοῦτον ἐποίει κόσμον, ἵν’ οἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄνδρες ὄντες τὰ γυναικῶν πάσχωσιν, οὐδαμῶς ἑαυτοῖς αἴτιοι τῆς ἀσελγείας γεγενημένοι, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀγρίων ζῴων κατάστασιν εἰληφότες, τῷ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ παντὸς τοιούτους αὐτοὺς πεποιηκέναι, διὰ τὸ τὸν θεὸν οὕτω κεκοσμηκέναι τὸ πᾶν, ἐπιδιδόασιν ἑαυτοὺς ὠμοτάτοις καὶ σφόδρα ἀπανθρώποις πράγμασιν, ἀνδροφονίαις καὶ πειρατείαις; | 11.6 We might ask them: What was God's intention in making such a world, where some men suffer the acts of women without being in any way the cause of their own licentiousness, while others, having assumed the nature of wild beasts because the movement of the universe made them so (God having thus arranged the whole), surrender themselves to the most cruel and thoroughly inhumane deeds, such as murder and piracy? |
| 11.7 Καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν ἡμᾶς περὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἁμαρτανομένων ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, μυρίων ὅσων τυγχανόντων, οὕστινας οἱ προϊστάμενοι τούτων τῶν λόγων ἀπολύοντες παντὸς ἐγκλήματος τῷ θεῷ προσγράφουσι πάντων τῶν κακῶς καὶ ψεκτῶς πραττομένων τὴν αἰτίαν; | 11.7 And why need we speak of all that happens among humans and the countless sins committed by them, which the champions of these doctrines release from all blame, assigning to God the cause of all things done wickedly and censurably? |
| 11.8 Ἐὰν δέ τινες αὐτῶν, ὡς ἀπολογούμενοι περὶ θεοῦ, ἕτερον μὲν εἶναι λέγωσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, οὐδενὸς τούτων ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρχήν, τῷ δὲ δημιουργῷ πάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα προσάπτωσι, πρῶτον μὲν οὐδ’ ὣς ὃ βούλονται δυνήσονται ἀποδεικνύναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ δίκαιος. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁ τοσούτων κακῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς πατὴρ εὐλόγως χρηματίζοι δίκαιος; | 11.8 And if some of them, as if making a defense for God, say that "the Good" is one entity having no principle in any of these things, but attribute such matters to the Creator (Demiurge) of all, first of all, not even so will they be able to prove what they desire—that He is just. For how could the father of so many evils, according to them, reasonably be named "just"? |
| 11.9 Δεύτερον δὲ περὶ ἑαυτῶν τί ποτε φήσουσιν ἐξεταστέον, πότερον ὑπόκεινται τῇ φορᾷ τῶν ἀστέρων, ἢ ἠλευθέρωνται, καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τυγχάνοντες οὐδὲν ἐνεργούμενον εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἔχουσιν ἐκεῖθεν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ φήσουσιν ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄστροις, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ ἄστρα τὸ νοῆσαι αὐτοῖς τοῦτο ἐχαρίσατο, καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς ὑποβεβληκὼς ἔσται διὰ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως τὸν λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἀνωτέρω ἀναπεπλασμένου θεοῦ, ὅπερ οὐ βούλονται. | 11.9 Secondly, we must examine what they will say about themselves: Are they subject to the movement of the stars, or have they been liberated and, living in this life, experience no influence operating upon them from above? For if they say they are subject to the stars, it is clear that the stars granted them the ability to think this, and the Creator, through the motion of the universe, will have placed in them the argument concerning the higher, fabricated god—which is something they do not want. |
| 11.10 Εἰ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦνται ὅτι ἔξω τῶν νόμων τυγχάνουσι τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἀστέρας, ἵνα μὴ ἀπόφασις ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀναπόδειξτος, πειραθήτωσαν ἡμᾶς προσάγειν ἀναγκαστικώτερον, διαφορὰν παριστάντες νοῦ τινὸς ὑποκειμένου γενέσει καὶ εἱμαρμένῃ καὶ ἑτέρου ἀπὸ τούτων ἐλευθέρου. Δῆλον γάρ ἐστι τοὺς τοιούτους ὅτι λόγον ἀπαιτηθέντες διδόναι αὐτοῖς οὐδαμῶς δυνήσονται. | 11.10 But if they answer that they stand outside the laws of the Creator concerning the stars, then so that their assertion might not be an unproven declaration, let them try to bring us a more compelling argument, demonstrating the distinction between a mind subject to birth and Fate, and another mind free from these. For it is clear that when such people are required to render an account, they will be utterly unable to give one. |
| 11.11 Πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ εὐχαὶ παρέλκουσι μάτην παραλαμβανόμεναι. Εἰ γὰρ κατηνάγκασται τάδε τινὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ οἱ ἀστέρες ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιπλοκὴν δύναται γενέσθαι, θεὸν ἀλογίστως ἀξιοῦμεν τάδε τινὰ ἡμῖν δωρήσασθαι. | 11.11 In addition to what has been said, prayers are also rendered superfluous and taken up in vain. For if such and such things are compelled to happen, and the stars produce them, and nothing can happen apart from their interweaving with one another, we irrationally ask God to grant us these things. |
| 11.12 Καὶ τί ἐπὶ πλεῖον μηκύνειν τὸν λόγον δεῖ, παριστάντα τὸ ἀσεβὲς τοῦ κατημαξευμένου ἀβασανίστως παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ εἱμαρμένης τόπου; Αὐτάρκη γὰρ εἰς ὑπογραφὴν καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα. | 11.12 And why need we lengthen the argument further, demonstrating the impiety of this topic of Fate, which is unthinkingly beaten into a common track among the many? For what has been said is sufficient for an outline. |
| 11.13 Πόθεν δὲ ἐξετάζοντες τὸ «ἔστωσαν εἰς σημεῖα» οἱ φωστῆρες ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐληλύθαμεν, ἑαυτοὺς ὑπομνήσωμεν. Οἱ μανθάνοντες περί τινων ἀληθῆ, ἤτοι αὐτόπται τῶν πραγμάτων γενόμενοι, ἀποφαίνονται τάδε τινὰ ὑγιῶς, τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν πεπονθότων ἢ ἐνηργηκότων θεασάμενοι, ἢ ἀπαγγελλόντων τῶν οὐδαμῶς αἰτίων τοῖς γεγενημένοις ἀκούσαντες τάδε τινὰ γινώσκουσιν | 11.13 Let us remind ourselves where we were when, examining the text "Let the luminaries be for signs," we arrived at these points. Those who learn the truth about certain things either become eyewitnesses of the matters and declare them soundly—having observed the passive suffering or active power of those who suffered or acted—or, hearing from those who were in no way the cause of what happened, come to know certain things |
| 11.14 (ὑπεξῃρήσθω δὲ νῦν τοῦ λόγου τὸ δύνασθαι τοὺς δεδρακότας ἢ πεπονθότας, διηγουμένους ἃ δεδράκασιν ἢ πεπόνθασιν, ἐνάγειν εἰς γνῶσιν τῶν πεπραγμένων τὸν μὴ παρατετυχηκότα). | 11.14 (excepting now from the argument the ability of those who acted or suffered, when narrating what they did or suffered, to lead one who was not present into knowledge of what was done). |
| 11.15 Ἐὰν οὖν ὁ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ μηδαμῶς αἰτίου τῶν γινομένων τὸ τάδε τινὰ τοῖσδε γεγονέναι ἢ συμβήσεσθαι μὴ διακρίνῃ ὅτι οὐ πάντως ὁ διδάσκων περί τινος ὡς γενομένου ἢ ἐσομένου αἴτιός ἐστι τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιόνδε τι τυγχάνειν, οἰήσεται τὸν παραστήσαντα περὶ τοῦ τάδε τινὰ γεγονέναι ἢ τάδε τινὰ ἔσεσθαι πεποιηκέναι ἢ ποιήσειν τὰ περὶ ὧν διδάσκει, οἰήσεται δὲ δηλονότι ἐσφαλμένως. | 11.15 If, therefore, the person being taught by someone who is in no way the cause of events does not distinguish that the teacher concerning something past or future is not at all the cause of the matter being of such a kind, he will suppose that the one who pointed out that certain things happened or will happen actually caused or will cause the things he teaches—and he will suppose so, clearly, in error. |
| 11.16 Ὡς εἴ τις ἐντυχὼν προφητικῇ βίβλῳ προδηλούσῃ τὰ περὶ Ἰούδαν τὸν προδότην νομίσαι, μαθὼν τὸ ἐσόμενον, ὁρῶν αὐτὸ ἀποτελούμενον, τὴν βίβλον αἰτίαν εἶναι τόδε τι γεγονέναι ὕστερον, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς βίβλου μεμάθηκε τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰούδα πραχθησόμενα ὕστερον· ἢ πάλιν μὴ τὴν βίβλον ὑπολάβοι εἶναι αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρῶτον γράψαντα αὐτήν, ἢ τὸν ἐνεργήσαντα, φέρε εἰπεῖν, τὸν θεόν. | 11.16 Just as if someone, encountering a prophetic book foretelling the matters concerning Judas the betrayer, should learn what will happen, and seeing it fulfilled, should suppose that the book was the cause of that event happening later—since he learned from the book what Judas would later do; or again, should suppose that not the book was the cause, but the one who first wrote it, or the one who energized it—say, God Himself. |
| 11.17 Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα προφητευομένων αὐταὶ αἱ λέξεις ἐξεταζόμεναι ἐμφαίνουσι τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν μὴ γεγονέναι τῆς τοῦ Ἰούδα προδοσίας, ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδηλωκέναι προεγνωκότα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτου κακίας πραχθησόμενα παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰτίαν, | 11.17 But just as in the case of the prophecies concerning Judas, the words themselves when examined reveal that God was not the maker of Judas's betrayal, but only revealed that He foreknew what would be done from Judas's own wickedness apart from God's cause, |
| 11.18 οὕτως εἴ τις ἐμβαθύναι τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ προειδέναι τὰ πάντα τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐν οἷς οἷον ἐτύπωσε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προγνώσεως τοὺς λόγους, κατανοήσαι ἂν ὅτι οὔτε ὁ προγνοὺς πάντως αἴτιος τῶν προεγνωσμένων οὔτε τὰ τοὺς τύπους τῶν λόγων τῆς προγνώσεως τοῦ προεγνωκότος δεξάμενα. | 11.18 so also if anyone should plunge deep into the logic of God's foreknowing all things, and into the things in which He, as it were, impressed the words of His foreknowledge, he would perceive that neither is the foreknower entirely the cause of the things foreknown, nor are the things that received the impressions of the words of the foreknower's foreknowledge. |
| 11.19 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων πρὸ πολλοῦ οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς γενησόμενον, καὶ χωρὶς μὲν γραφῆς αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς περὶ θεοῦ δῆλον τῷ συνιέντι ἀξίωμα δυνάμεως νοῦ θεοῦ. | 11.19 That God knows each future event long before it happens is clear to one who understands the power of God's mind, even without Scripture, directly from the very concept of God. |
| 11.20 Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν τοῦτο παραστῆσαι, πλήρεις μέν εἰσιν αἱ προφητεῖαι τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων, καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σωσάνναν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ γινώσκοντος τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, οὕτω λέγουσαν· «Ὁ θεὸς ὁ αἰώνιος, ὁ τῶν κρυπτῶν γνώστης, ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, σὺ ἐπίστασαι ὅτι ψευδῆ μου κατεμαρτύρησαν οὗτοι.» | 11.20 But if it is necessary to present this from the Scriptures as well, the prophecies are full of such examples; as in the story of Susanna, where God knows all things before their birth, when she says: "O eternal God, Knower of secrets, who knowest all things before their birth, Thou knowest that these men have borne false witness against me." |
| 11.21 Σαφέστατα δὲ ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν Βασιλειῶν καὶ ὄνομα βασιλεύοντος καὶ πράξεις ἀνεγράφησαν πρὸ πλειόνων ἐτῶν τοῦ γενέσθαι προφητευόμενα οὕτως· «Καὶ ἐποίησεν Ἱεροβοὰμ ἑορτὴν ἐν τῷ μηνὶ τῷ ὀγδόῳ, ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ μηνός, κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τὴν ἐν γῇ Ἰούδα. Καὶ ἀνέβη ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον τὸ ἐν Βαιθήλ, ὃ ἐποίησεν ἐν ταῖς δαμάλεσιν αἷς ἐποίησεν.» Εἶτα μετ’ ὀλίγα· «Καὶ ἰδοὺ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ Ἰούδα παρεγένετο ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου ἐν Βαιθήλ, καὶ Ἱεροβοὰμ εἱστήκει ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον αὐτοῦ ἐπιθῦσαι· καὶ ἐπεκάλεσεν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου, καὶ εἶπε, Θυσιαστήριον, θυσιαστήριον, τάδε λέγει κύριος· Ἰδοὺ υἱὸς τίκτεται τῷ οἴκῳ Δαβίδ, Ἰωσίας ὄνομα αὐτῷ, καὶ θύσει ἐπὶ σὲ τοὺς ἱερεῖς τῶν ὑψηλῶν τῶν ἐπιθυόντων ἐπὶ σέ, καὶ ὀστᾶ ἀνθρώπων καύσει ἐπὶ σέ. Καὶ ἔδωκεν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τέρας, λέγων· Τοῦτο τὸ τέρας ὃ ἐλάλησε κύριος λέγων· Ἰδοὺ τὸ θυσιαστήριον ῥήγνυται, καὶ ἐκχυθήσεται ἡ πιότης ἡ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ.» Καὶ μετ’ ὀλίγα δηλοῦται ὅτι «καὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον ἐρράγη, καὶ ἐξεχύθη ἡ πιότης ἀπὸ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, κατὰ τὸ τέρας ὃ ἔδωκεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου.» | 11.21 And most clearly in the Third Book of Kingdoms (1 Kings), both the name of a reigning king and his actions were recorded many years before they came to pass, being prophesied thus: "And Jeroboam made a feast in the eighth month, on the fifteenth day of the month, like the feast in the land of Judah; and he went up to the altar in Bethel, which he had made for the calves he had made." Then a little further on: "And behold, a man of God out of Judah came in the word of the Lord to Bethel, and Jeroboam stood at his altar to offer incense; and he called against the altar in the word of the Lord, and said: O altar, altar, thus saith the Lord: Behold, a son shall be born to the house of David, Josiah by name, and upon thee shall he sacrifice the priests of the high places who burn incense upon thee, and human bones shall he burn upon thee. And he gave a sign on that day, saying: This is the sign which the Lord hath spoken, saying: Behold, the altar is rent, and the ashes that are upon it shall be poured out." And a little later it is revealed that "the altar was also rent, and the ashes were poured out from the altar according to the sign which the man gave in the word of the Lord." |
| 11.22 Καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἠσαΐᾳ, γενομένῳ πρὸ πολλοῦ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας τῆς εἰς Βαβυλῶνα, μεθ’ ἣν αἰχμαλωσίαν ὕστερόν ποτε γίνεται Κῦρος ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς συνεργήσας τῇ οἰκοδομῇ τοῦ ναοῦ, γενομένῃ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους Ἔσδρα, ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀνομαστὶ προφητεύεται· «Οὕτω λέγει κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῷ χριστῷ μου Κύρῳ, οὗ ἐκράτησα τῆς δεξιᾶς αὐτοῦ, ἐπακοῦσαι ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ ἔθνη, καὶ ἰσχὺν βασιλέων διαρρήξω, ἀνοίξω ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ θύρας, καὶ πόλεις οὐ συγκλεισθήσονται. Ἐγὼ ἔμπροσθέν σου πορεύσομαι, καὶ ὄρη ὁμαλιῶ, θύρας χαλκᾶς συντρίψω, καὶ μοχλοὺς σιδηροῦς συνθλάσω· καὶ δώσω σοι θησαυροὺς σκοτεινούς, ἀποκρύφους, ἀοράτους ἀνοίξω σοι, ἵνα γνῷς ὅτι ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεός, ὁ καλῶν τὸ ὄνομά σου, θεὸς Ἰσραήλ. Ἕνεκεν τοῦ παιδός μου Ἰακώβ, καὶ Ἰσραὴλ τοῦ ἐκλεκτοῦ μου, ἐγὼ καλέσω σε τῷ ὀνόματί μου, καὶ προσδέξομαί σε.» | 11.22 And in Isaiah, who lived long before the captivity to Babylon—after which captivity Cyrus the King of the Persians later arose and cooperated in the building of the Temple during the time of Ezra—these things are prophesied concerning him by name: "Thus saith the Lord God to my anointed Cyrus, whose right hand I have held, to subdue nations before him; and I will break the strength of kings, I will open doors before him, and cities shall not be shut. I will go before thee, and level mountains; I will shatter bronze doors, and break iron bars in pieces. And I will give thee dark, hidden, invisible treasures; I will open them to thee, that thou mayest know that I am the Lord God, who call thy name, the God of Israel. For the sake of my servant Jacob, and Israel my chosen, I will call thee by my name, and I will receive thee." |
| 11.23 Σαφῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τούτων δεδήλωται ὅτι διὰ τὸν λαὸν ὃν εὐηργέτησεν, ὁ κύριος ὁ θεὸς μὴ γινώσκοντι αὐτῷ τὴν καθ’ Ἑβραίους θεοσέβειαν ἐδωρήσατο ἐθνῶν πλειόνων ἄρξαι. Καὶ ἔστι ταῦτα μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπὸ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀναγραψάντων τὰ περὶ τὸν προφητευθέντα Κῦρον. | 11.23 For it is clearly shown from these things that for the sake of the people whom He benefited, the Lord God granted him rule over many nations, even though he did not know the godly worship according to the Hebrews. And it is possible to learn these things even from those Greeks who recorded the history concerning Cyrus who was prophesied. |
| 11.24 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ Δανιήλ, Βαβυλωνίων βασιλευόντων τότε, τῷ Ναβουχοδονόσορ δείκνυνται αἱ ἐσόμεναι βασιλεῖαι μετ’ αὐτόν. Δείκνυνται δὲ διὰ τῆς εἰκόνος, χρυσίου μὲν τῆς Βαβυλωνίων ἀρχῆς ὀνομαζομένης, ἀργυρίου δὲ τῆς Περσῶν, χαλκοῦ δὲ τῆς Μακεδόνων, σιδήρου δὲ τῆς Ῥωμαίων. | 11.24 Furthermore, in Daniel, when the Babylonians were then ruling, the kingdoms that were to come after Nebuchadnezzar were shown to him. They were shown through the image, the gold standing for the rule of the Babylonians, the silver for that of the Persians, the bronze for that of the Macedonians, and the iron for that of the Romans. |
| 11.25 Καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ προφήτῃ τὰ περὶ Δαρεῖον καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον, καὶ τοὺς τέσσαρας διαδόχους Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνων βασιλέως, καὶ Πτολεμαῖον τὸν τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἄρξαντα, τὸν ἐπικαλούμενον Λαγόν, οὕτω προφητεύεται· «Καὶ εἶδον, τράγος αἰγῶν ἤρχετο ἀπὸ λιβὸς ἐπὶ πρόσωπον πάσης τῆς γῆς, καὶ τῷ τράγῳ κέρας ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. Καὶ ἦλθεν ἕως τοῦ κριοῦ τοῦ τὰ κέρατα ἔχοντος, οὗ εἶδον ἑστῶτος ἐνώπιον τοῦ Οὐβάλ, καὶ ἔδραμε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν ὅρμῇ τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ. Καὶ εἶδον αὐτὸν φθάνοντα ἕως τοῦ κριοῦ, καὶ ἐξηγριώθη πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἔπαισε τὸν κριόν, καὶ συνέτριψεν ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἰσχὺς τῷ κριῷ στῆναι ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔρριψεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ συνεπάτησεν αὐτόν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν ὁ ἐξαιρούμενος τὸν κριὸν ἐκ χειρὸς αὐτοῦ. Καὶ ὁ τράγος τῶν αἰγῶν ἐμεγαλύνθη ἕως σφόδρα. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰσχῦσαι αὐτὸν συνετρίβη τὸ κέρας αὐτοῦ τὸ μέγα, καὶ ἀνέβη ἕτερα τέσσαρα κέρατα ὑποκάτω αὐτοῦ εἰς τοὺς τέσσαρας ἀνέμους τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐξῆλθε κέρας ἓν ἰσχυρόν, καὶ ἐμεγαλύνθη περισσῶς πρὸς τὸν νότον καὶ τὴν δύσιν.» | 11.25 And again in the same prophet, the matters concerning Darius and Alexander, and the four successors of Alexander the king of the Macedonians, and Ptolemy who ruled Egypt, called Lagos, are prophesied thus: "And I looked, and behold, a male goat of the goats came from the southwest over the face of the whole earth, and the goat had a horn between its eyes. And he came as far as the ram that had horns, which I saw standing before the Ubal, and he ran at him in the fury of his power. And I saw him reaching as far as the ram, and he was enraged against him, and struck the ram, and shattered both his horns; and there was no strength in the ram to stand before him, and he cast him down to the ground, and trampled him, and there was no one who could rescue the ram out of his hand. And the male goat grew exceedingly great; and when he was strong, his great horn was broken, and four other horns came up under it toward the four winds of heaven. And out of one of them came forth one strong horn, and it grew exceedingly great toward the south and toward the west." |
| 11.26 Τί δὲ δεῖ λέγειν τὰς περὶ Χριστοῦ προφητείας, οἷον τόπον γενέσεως αὐτοῦ Βηθλεέμ, καὶ τόπον ἀνατροφῆς αὐτοῦ Νάζαρα, καὶ τὴν εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀναχώρησιν, καὶ τεράστια ἃ ἐποίησε, καὶ τίνα τρόπον ὑπὸ Ἰούδα τοῦ εἰς ἀποστολὴν κεκλημένου προεδόθη; Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα σημεῖά ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ προγνώσεως. | 11.26 And why need one speak of the prophecies concerning Christ—such as Bethlehem as the place of His birth, Nazareth as the place of His upbringing, His flight into Egypt, the miracles He performed, and how He was betrayed by Judas who was called to apostleship? For all these things are signs of God's foreknowledge. |
| 11.27 Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ σωτήρ, «Ὅταν,» φησίν, «ἴδητε κυκλουμένην ὑπὸ στρατοπέδων τὴν Ἱερουσαλήμ, τότε γνώσεσθε ὅτι ἤγγικεν ἡ ἐρήμωσις αὐτῆς.» Προεῖπε γὰρ τὸ ὕστερον συμβεβηκός, τὸ τέλος τῆς κατασκαφῆς Ἱερουσαλήμ. | 11.27 And the Savior Himself says: "When you see Jerusalem surrounded by encampments, then know that its desolation has drawn near." For He foretold what later came to pass—the final overthrow of Jerusalem. |
| 11.28 Ἀποδεδειγμένου τοίνυν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ προγνώστην εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἀκαίρως, ἵνα διηγησώμεθα πῶς οἱ ἀστέρες γίνονται εἰς σημεῖα, νοητέον τοὺς ἀστέρας οὕτω τετάχθαι κινεῖσθαι, ἐναντιοφορούντων τῶν καλουμένων πλανωμένων τοῖς ἀπλανέσιν, ἵνα σημεῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ σχηματισμοῦ τῶν ἀστέρων πάντων τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον γινομένων καὶ τῶν καθόλου λαμβάνοντες γινώσκωσιν—οὐχὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, πολλῷ γὰρ μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον τὸ δύνασθαι κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἐκλαμβάνειν ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν ἀστέρων τὰ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ὅ τί ποτε οὖν ἐνεργούντων ἢ πασχόντων—ἀλλ’ αἱ δυνάμεις, ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα γινώσκειν, ὡς κατὰ δύναμιν διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς δείξομεν. | 11.28 Having thus demonstrated not inopportunely that God is a foreknower, so that we may explain how the stars become signs, it must be understood that the stars were ordered to move in such a way—the so-called wandering stars moving in opposition to the fixed stars—so that from the configuration of all the stars, those who receive them might know the signs of everything happening to each individual and universally: not men (for the ability to comprehend truly from the motion of the stars the things concerning everyone in whatever they do or suffer is far too great for human capacity), but the heavenly Powers, who out of necessity must know these things for many reasons, as we shall demonstrate to the best of our ability in what follows. |
| 11.29 Συνέντες δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔκ τινων τηρήσεων, ἢ καὶ ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἀγγέλων τὴν ἰδίαν τάξιν παραβεβηκότων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν ἐπιτριβῇ διδαξάντων περὶ τούτων τινά, ᾠήθησαν τοὺς ἀφ’ ὧν τὰ σημεῖα οἴονται λαμβάνειν αἰτίους ὑπάρχειν τούτων, ἃ σημαίνειν ὁ λόγος φησί· περὶ ὧν καὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιμελέστερον εὐθέως διαληψόμεθα. | 11.29 But men, having understood from certain observations, or even from the teaching of angels who transgressed their proper order and taught some of these things to the detriment of our race, supposed that those objects from which they think they receive signs are the causes of those things which the word says they signify. Concerning these very points, we shall immediately treat more carefully in summary to the best of our power. |
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11.30
Προκείσεται τοίνυν ταῦτα τὰ προβλήματα·
α΄) Πῶς, προγνώστου ὄντος ἐξ αἰῶνος τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ τῶν ὑφ’ ἑκάστου πράττεσθαι νομιζομένων, τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν σώζεται· β΄) καὶ τίνα τρόπον οἱ ἀστέρες οὐκ εἰσὶ ποιητικοὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, σημαντικοὶ δὲ μόνον· γ΄) καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωποι τὴν περὶ τούτων γνῶσιν ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν οὐ δύνανται, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεσιν ἀνθρώπων κρείττοσι τὰ σημεῖα ἔκκειται· δ΄) τίς γὰρ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τὰ σημεῖα τὸν θεὸν πεποιηκέναι εἰς γνῶσιν τῶν δυνάμεων, τέταρτον ἐξετασθήσεται. |
These problems shall therefore lie before us:
1) How, since God foreknows from eternity the things believed to be done by each person, is free will preserved? 2) In what manner are the stars not causative of human affairs, but only indicative? 3) That men cannot have accurate knowledge concerning these things, but the signs are laid out for powers superior to men. 4) What is the cause of God's having made the signs for the knowledge of those Powers (this shall be examined fourth). |
| 11.31 Καὶ τοίνυν ἴδωμεν τὸ πρῶτον, ὅπερ εὐλαβηθέντες πολλοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἰόμενοι κατηναγκάσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μηδαμῶς σώζεσθαι εἰ ὁ θεὸς προγινώσκει τὰ μέλλοντα, ἀσεβὲς δόγμα ἐτόλμησαν ἀναδέξασθαι μᾶλλον ἢ προσέσθαι τό, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, ἔνδοξον μὲν περὶ θεοῦ, ἀναιροῦν δὲ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔπαινον καὶ ψόγον, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀποδεκτὸν τῶν τε κακιῶν ψεκτόν. | 11.31 Let us therefore look at the first question, which many of the Greeks, taking caution, and thinking that events were compelled and that free will was in no way preserved if God foreknows future events, dared to adopt an impious doctrine rather than accept what, as they say, is honorable regarding God, yet destroys free will—and thereby praise and blame, and the commendable nature of virtues and the censurable nature of vices. |
| 11.32 Καί φασιν, εἰ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἔγνω ὁ θεὸς τόνδε τινὰ ἀδικήσειν καὶ τάδε ποιῆσαι τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἀψευδὴς δὲ ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πάντως ἔσται ἄδικος ποιήσων τάδε τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι προεωραμένος, καὶ ἀμήχανον μὴ ἀδικήσειν αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ ἀμήχανον μὴ ἀδικήσειν αὐτόν, κατηνάγκασται τὸ ἀδικήσειν αὐτόν, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἔσται ἄλλο τι πρᾶξαι αὐτὸν ἢ ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω. Εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄλλο τι πρᾶξαι αὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ ποιήσας ψεκτός ἐστι, μάτην αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς ἀδίκους. | 11.32 For they say: If from eternity God knew that a certain man would act unjustly and commit these specific acts of injustice, and God's knowledge is true, then it is entirely necessary that the person foreseen to be such will be an unjust man who does these acts of injustice, and it is impossible for him not to act unjustly. But if it is impossible for him not to act unjustly, his acting unjustly is compelled, and it will be impossible for him to do anything other than what God knew. And if it is impossible for him to do anything else, and no one who fails to do the impossible is blameworthy, then we blame the unjust in vain. |
| 11.33 Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἁμαρτήματα, εἶτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα κατορθώματα· καί φασιν ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ τὸν θεὸν τὰ μέλλοντα προεγνωκέναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν σώζεσθαι. | 11.33 From the unjust man and acts of injustice, they proceed to other sins, and then conversely to supposed righteous deeds; and they say it follows from God's having foreknown the future that free will cannot be preserved. |
| 11.34 Πρὸς οὓς λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπιβάλλων ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς κοσμοποιίας, οὐδενὸς ἀναιτίως γινομένου, ἐπιπορεύεται τῷ νῷ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων, ὁρῶν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τόδε γέγονε, τόδε ἕπεται, ἐὰν δὲ γένηται τόδε, τὸ ἑπόμενον τόδε ἀκολουθεῖ· οὗ ὑποστάντος, τόδε ἔσται· καὶ οὕτω μέχρι τέλους τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιπορευθεὶς οἶδεν ἃ ἔσται, οὐ πάντως ἑκάστῳ τῶν γινωσκομένων αἴτιος τοῦ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι τυγχάνων. | 11.34 To them it must be said that God, applying Himself at the beginning of the creation of the world (since nothing happens without a cause), traverses in mind each future event, seeing that since this has happened, that follows; and if this following event happens, that will succeed it; and when that exists, this will be. And having thus traversed all things unto the end of affairs, He knows what shall be, without being in every case the cause of the occurrence of each thing He knows. |
| 11.35 Ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ὁρῶν τινὰ διὰ μὲν ἀμαθίαν προπετῆ, διὰ δὲ τὴν προπέτειαν ἀλογίστως ἐπιβαίνοντα ὁδοῦ ὀλισθηρᾶς, καὶ καταλάβοι πεσεῖσθαι ὀλισθήσαντα, οὐχὶ αἴτιος τοῦ ὀλίσθου ἐκείνῳ γίνεται, οὕτω νοητέον τὸν θεὸν προεωρακότα ὁποῖος ἔσται ἕκαστος καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι καθορᾶν, καὶ ὅτι ἁμαρτήσεται τάδε, ἢ κατορθώσει τάδε. | 11.35 For just as if someone, seeing a person who through ignorance is rash, and through rashness steps thoughtlessly upon a slippery path, should perceive that he will slip and fall, does not become the cause of the slip to that person; so God must be understood as having foreseen what kind of person each will be, beholding the causes of his being such, and that he will commit these sins or perform these righteous deeds. |
| 11.36 Καὶ εἰ χρὴ λέγειν οὐ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων (οὐ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται τοῦ προεγνωσμένου ἁμαρτησομένου ὁ θεός, ὅταν ἁμαρτάνῃ), ἀλλὰ παραδοξότερον μὲν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἐσόμενον αἴτιον τοῦ τοιάνδε εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν. | 11.36 And if one must speak, foreknowledge is not the cause of events (for God does not touch the foreknown sinner when he sins), but—we shall state something rather paradoxical, yet true—the future event is itself the cause of the foreknowledge being of such a kind regarding it. |
| 11.37 Οὐ γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσται γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γίνεσθαι ἔμελλεν ἔγνωσται. Διαστολῆς δὲ δεῖται. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ «πάντως ἔσται» οὕτω τις ἑρμηνεύει, ὡς ἀνάγκην εἶναι γενέσθαι τὸ προεγνωσμένον, οὐ διδόαμεν αὐτῷ· οὐ γὰρ ἐροῦμεν, ἐπεὶ προέγνωσται Ἰούδαν προδότην γενέσθαι, ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἦν Ἰούδαν προδότην γενέσθαι. | 11.37 For it is not because it is known that it happens, but because it was going to happen, it is known. But this requires distinction. For if someone interprets "it will entirely happen" as meaning that there is a necessity for the foreknown event to take place, we do not grant it to him; for we shall not say, because it was foreknown that Judas would become a betrayer, that there was every necessity for Judas to become a betrayer. |
| 11.38 Ἐν γοῦν ταῖς περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα προφητείαις μέμψεις καὶ κατηγορίαι τοῦ Ἰούδα ἀναγεγραμμέναι εἰσί, παντί τῳ παριστῶσαι τὸ ψεκτὸν αὐτοῦ. Οὐκ ἂν δὲ ψόγος αὐτῷ προσήπτετο, εἰ ἐπάναγκες προδότης ἦν, καὶ μὴ ἐνεδέχετο αὐτὸν ὅμοιον τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀποστόλοις γενέσθαι. | 11.38 At any rate, in the prophecies concerning Judas, blamings and accusations against Judas are recorded, presenting to everyone his censurable nature. But blame would not have attached to him if he were a betrayer of necessity, and if it were not possible for him to become like the rest of the Apostles. |
| 11.39 Ὅρα δὲ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα δηλοῦται δι’ ὧν παραθησόμεθα ῥητῶν οὕτως ἐχόντων· «Μηδὲ γενηθήτω οἰκτίρμων τοῖς ὀρφανοῖς αὐτοῦ, ἀνθ’ ὧν οὐκ ἐμνήσθη ποιῆσαι ἔλεος· καὶ κατεδίωξεν ἄνθρωπον πένητα καὶ πτωχόν, καὶ κατανενυγμένον τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ θανατῶσαι· καὶ ἠγάπησε κατάραν, καὶ ἥξει αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν εὐλογίαν, καὶ μακρυνθήσεται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.» | 11.39 See whether these things are not made clear through the words we shall set before you, which read thus: "Let there be none to extend mercy to his fatherless children, because he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man, and the broken in heart, to slay him. He loved cursing, and it shall come unto him; he delighted not in blessing, and it shall be far from him." |
| 11.40 Εἰ δέ τις διηγήσεται τὸ «πάντως ἔσται», κατὰ τὸ σημαίνειν αὐτὸ λέγων ὅτι ἔσται μὲν τάδε τινά, ἐνεδέχετο δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως γενέσθαι, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθὲς συγχωροῦμεν. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ θεὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ψεύσασθαι, ἐνδέχεται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι φρονῆσαι τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι. | 11.40 But if anyone explains "it will entirely happen" by saying it signifies that such and such things will indeed happen, though it was possible for them to happen otherwise, we concede this as true. For it is impossible for God to lie, but it is possible concerning things capable of happening and not happening to think that they will happen or not happen. |
| 11.41 Σαφέστερον δὲ τοῦτο ἐροῦμεν οὕτως· εἰ ἐνδέχεται Ἰούδαν εἶναι ἀπόστολον ὁμοίως Πέτρῳ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν θεὸν νοῆσαι περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα ὅτι μενεῖ ἀπόστολος ὁμοίως Πέτρῳ· εἰ ἐνδέχεται Ἰούδαν προδότην γενέσθαι, ἐνδέχεται τὸν θεὸν φρονῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι προδότης ἔσται. | 11.41 We shall state this more clearly as follows: If it is possible for Judas to be an Apostle like Peter, it is possible for God to think concerning Judas that he will remain an Apostle like Peter. If it is possible for Judas to become a betrayer, it is possible for God to think concerning him that he will be a betrayer. |
| 11.42 Εἰ δὲ προδότης ἔσται Ἰούδας, ὁ θεὸς τῇ προγνώσει αὐτοῦ τῶν προειρημένων ἐνδεχομένων δύο, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ εἶναι ἑνὶ αὐτῶν, τὸ ἀληθὲς προγινώσκων, προγνώσεται τὸν Ἰούδαν προδότην γενέσθαι· τὸ δὲ περὶ οὗ ἡ γνῶσις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἑτέρως γενέσθαι· καὶ λέγοι ἂν ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται μὲν τόνδε τόδε ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἐνδεχομένων δὲ ἀμφοτέρων οἶδα ὅτι τάδε ποιήσει. | 11.42 But if Judas will be a betrayer, God, in His foreknowledge of the two aforementioned possibilities (it being possible for him to be one of them), foreknowing the truth, will foreknow that Judas will become a betrayer—though concerning the thing of which there is knowledge, it was possible to happen otherwise. And God's knowledge would say: It is possible for this man to do this, but also the opposite; yet, both being possible, I know that he will do this. |
| 11.43 Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ, ὁ θεὸς εἴποι ἄν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τόνδε τινὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πτῆναι, οὕτω χρησμόν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, περί τινος διδοὺς ἐρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τόνδε σωφρονῆσαι· δύναμις μὲν γὰρ πάντη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ πτῆναι οὐδαμῶς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δύναμις δέ ἐστι τοῦ σωφρονῆσαι καὶ τοῦ ἀκολαστῆσαι. | 11.43 For God would not say—just as it is impossible for a human being to fly—so when giving an oracle concerning someone, say that it is impossible for him to practice self-control. For the power to fly does not exist in man at all, but the power to practice self-control or licentiousness does exist. |
| 11.44 Ὧν ἀμφοτέρων δυνάμεων ὑπαρχουσῶν, ὁ μὴ προσέχων λόγοις ἐπιτρεπτικοῖς καὶ παιδευτικοῖς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδίδωσι τῇ χειρίστῃ· κρείττονι δὲ ὁ ζητήσας τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ βιῶσαι βεβουλημένος κατ’ αὐτό. Οὐ ζητεῖ δὲ ὅδε μὲν τἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ ἐπιρρέπει ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· ὅδε δὲ ἐξετάζει περὶ αὐτῶν, αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ λόγου προτρεπτικοῦ. | 11.44 Since both powers exist, he who gives no heed to exhortative and educational words surrenders himself to the worst power; while he who seeks the truth and desires to live according to it surrenders himself to the better power. One man does not seek the truth because he inclines toward pleasure; another examines these things, having been persuaded by common notions and exhortative speech. |
| 11.45 Πάλιν δ’ αὖ ὅδε μὲν αἱρεῖται τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐχὶ οὐ δυνάμενος ἀντιβλέπειν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγωνιζόμενος· ὅδε δὲ καταφρονεῖ αὐτῆς, τὸ ἄσχημον ὁρῶν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλάκις τυγχάνον. | 11.45 Again, the former chooses pleasure not because he is unable to resist it, but because he does not struggle against it; while the latter despises it, seeing the dishonor that often exists in it. |
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11.46
Ὅτι μέντοι γε ἡ πρόγνωσις τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἀνάγκην ἐπιτίθησι τοῖς περὶ ὧν κατείληφε, πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τοῦτο λελέξεται, ὅτι πολλαχοῦ τῶν γραφῶν ὁ θεὸς κελεύει τοῖς προφήταις κηρύσσειν μετάνοιαν, οὐ προσποιησάμενος τὸ ἐγνωκέναι πότερον οἱ ἀκούσαντες ἐπιστρέψουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἑαυτῶν ἐμμενοῦσιν· ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἱερεμίᾳ λέγεται·
«Ἴσως ἀκούσονται καὶ μετανοήσουσιν.» |
11.46
That God's foreknowledge imposes no necessity upon the things He apprehends, in addition to what has been said, this also shall be stated: in many places in Scripture, God commands the prophets to preach repentance, not pretending to know whether the hearers will turn or abide in their sins—as it is said in Jeremiah:
"Peradventure they will hear and repent." |
| 11.47 Οὐ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν ὁ θεὸς πότερον ἀκούσουσιν, ἢ οὔ, φησιν «ἴσως ἀκούσονται καὶ μετανοήσουσιν», ἀλλ’ οἱονεὶ τὸ ἰσοστάσιον τῶν δυνάμεων γενέσθαι δεικνὺς ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων, ἵνα μὴ προκατηγγελμένη ἡ πρόγνωσις αὐτοῦ καταπεσεῖν ποιήσῃ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, δόξαν ἀνάγκης παριστᾶσα, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἐπιστρέψαι, καὶ οἱονεὶ καὶ αὕτη αἰτία γένηται τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. | 11.47 For God does not say "peradventure they will hear and repent" out of ignorance whether they will hear or not, but as it were demonstrating from the words used the equilibrium of their powers, so that His foreknowledge, if proclaimed in advance, might not cause the hearers to lose heart by presenting an appearance of necessity—as though turning were not in their power—and thus itself become a cause of their sins. |
| 11.48 Ἢ πάλιν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ προεγνωσμένον καλὸν δυναμένοις ἐν τῷ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἀντιτείνειν πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ἐν ἀρετῇ βιῶσαι αἰτία γένηται ἡ πρόγνωσις ἐκλύσεως, οὐκέτι εὐτόνως ἱσταμένοις κατὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὡς πάντως ἐσομένου τοῦ προειρημένου. Καὶ οὕτω γὰρ οἷον ἐμπόδιον γένοιτ’ ἂν ἡ πρόγνωσις τοῦ ἐσομένου καλοῦ. | 11.48 Or again, to those who through ignorance of what is foreknown as good are able by striving and resisting vice to live in virtue, foreknowledge might become a cause of relaxation, no longer standing firmly against sin, as though the foretold outcome would happen regardless. And in this way foreknowledge of coming good would become a sort of obstacle. |
| 11.49 Πάντα γοῦν χρησίμως ὁ θεὸς τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον οἰκονομῶν εὐλόγως ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα ἐτύφλωσεν. Ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἀνῆκε μὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθλεῖν κατὰ τῆς κακίας, ἐπέτρεψε δ’ ἂν δόξασα κατειλῆφθαι, πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀντιπαλαίσαντας ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ τάχιον αὐτῇ ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι. | 11.49 God, therefore, administering all things in the world usefully, reasonably blinded us toward the future. For knowledge of future events would have relaxed us from contending against vice, and if thought to be fixed, would have led us, by not struggling against sin, to fall under its power all the sooner. |
| 11.50 Ἅμα δὲ καὶ μαχόμενον ἐγίνετο τῷ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι τινὰ τὸ τὴν πρόγνωσιν ἐληλυθέναι εἰς τόνδε τινά, ὅτι πάντως ἔσται ἀγαθός. Πρὸς οἷς γὰρ ἔχομεν, καὶ σφοδρότητος καὶ τάσεως πλείονος χρεία πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι· προκαταληφθεῖσα δὲ ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ πάντως καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι ὑπεκλύει τὴν ἄσκησιν. Διόπερ συμφερόντως οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔτε εἰ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε εἰ πονηροὶ ἐσόμεθα. | 11.50 At the same time, it would also be contrary to someone's becoming good and noble for foreknowledge to have reached him that he will certainly be good. For in addition to what we possess, there is need of greater intensity and effort to become good and noble; but foreknowledge of being entirely good and noble slackens effort. Wherefore, to our benefit, we do not know whether we shall be good or evil. |
| 11.51 Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰρήκαμεν ὅτι ἀπετύφλωσεν ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα ὁ θεός, ζητούμενόν τι ῥητὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐξόδου ὅρα εἰ δυνάμεθα οὕτω σαφηνίσαι· «Τίς ἐποίησε δύσκωφον καὶ κωφόν, καὶ βλέποντα καὶ τυφλόν; Οὐκ ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεός;» Ἵνα τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τυφλὸν καὶ βλέποντα πεποιηκὼς ᾖ, βλέποντα μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἐνεστηκότα, τυφλὸν δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. Τὸ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ δυσκώφου καὶ κωφοῦ οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ διηγήσασθαι. | 11.51 And since we said that God blinded us toward the future, see whether we can clarify a questioned passage from Exodus in this way: "Who made the mute and the deaf, the seeing and the blind? Have not I, the Lord God?"—so that He made the same person both blind and seeing: seeing toward present things, but blind toward future things. For the passage concerning the mute and deaf is not for the present time to explain. |
| 11.52 Ὅτι μέντοι γε πολλῶν τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν αἴτια πλεῖστα τὸ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογήσομεν· ὧν μὴ γενομένων, λέγω δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἂν τάδε τινὰ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐπράττετο. Πράττεται δὲ τάδε τινὰ τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀκόλουθα τοῖσδε τοῖς προγενομένοις οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς προγενομένοις καὶ ἕτερα πρᾶξαι παρ’ ἃ πράττομεν. | 11.52 We ourselves shall also admit that many things not in our power are causes of many things that are in our power; without which—I mean things not in our power—certain things in our power would not be done. But these things in our power are done in consequence of these prior things not in our power, though it remains possible, given the same prior events, to act differently than we do. |
| 11.53 Εἰ δέ τις ζητεῖ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀπολελυμένον εἶναι τοῦ παντός, ὥστε μὴ διὰ τάδε τινὰ συμβεβηκότα ἡμῖν ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαι τάδε, ἐπιλέλησται κόσμου μέρος ὢν καὶ ἐμπεριεχόμενος ἀνθρώπων κοινωνίᾳ καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος. | 11.53 But if anyone demands that what is in our power be detached from the universe—so that we do not choose things because of certain circumstances happening to us—he forgets that he is part of a world, contained within the society of men and the surrounding universe. |
| 11.54 Μετρίως μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ οἶμαι ἀποδεδεῖχθαι, τὸ τὴν πρόγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ εἶναι καταναγκαστικὴν τῶν προεγνωσμένων πάντως. Φέρε δὲ ἀγωνισώμεθα καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς ἀστέρας μηδαμῶς εἶναι ποιητικοὺς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, σημαντικοὺς δὲ μόνον. | 11.54 Thus, I think it has been demonstrated moderately and in summary that God's foreknowledge is not compelling of foreknown events in an absolute sense. Come now, let us contend also concerning the stars being in no way causative of human affairs, but only indicative. |
| 11.55 Σαφὲς δὴ ὅτι εἰ ὅδε τις ὁ σχηματισμὸς τῶν ἀστέρων ποιητικὸς νομίζοιτο τῶνδέ τινων τῶν γινομένων περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον—ἔστω γὰρ περὶ τούτου νῦν ζητεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον—οὐκ ἂν ὁ σήμερον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, γενόμενος σχηματισμὸς περὶ τόνδε δύναται νοεῖσθαι πεποιηκέναι τὰ παρεληλυθότα περὶ ἕτερον ἢ καὶ περὶ ἑτέρους· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πεποιημένου. | 11.55 It is clear that if a certain configuration of the stars were considered causative of certain events regarding a person (for let this be the subject of our present inquiry), the configuration taking place today regarding this man could not be understood to have caused past events regarding another or others; for everything that causes is prior to what is caused. |
| 11.56 Ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθήμασι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπαγγελλομένων, πρεσβύτερα τοῦ σχηματισμοῦ προλέγεσθαι νομίζεται περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. | 11.56 Yet, so far as concerns the doctrines of those who make such professions, things prior to the configuration are considered to be predicted concerning men. |
| 11.57 Ἐπαγγέλλονται γὰρ τόνδε τινὰ τρόπον, τὴν ὥραν λαβόντες τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καταλαμβάνειν πῶς ἕκαστος τῶν πλανωμένων κατὰ κάθετον, ἢ τῆσδε τῆς μοίρας τοῦ ζῳδίου, ἢ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ λεπτῶν, καὶ ποῖος ἀστὴρ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνατολικοῦ ἐτύγχανεν ὁρίζοντος, ποῖός τε κατὰ τοῦ δυτικοῦ καὶ τίς κατὰ τοῦ μεσουρανήματος καὶ τίς κατὰ τοῦ ἀντιμεσουρανήματος. | 11.57 For they profess in a manner like this: taking the hour of a person, to apprehend how each of the wandering stars stands perpendicular, or at what degree of the zodiacal sign, or at what minute within it, and which star of the zodiac was at the eastern horizon, which at the western, which at mid-heaven, and which at anti-mid-heaven. |
| 11.58 Καὶ ἐπὰν θῶσι τοὺς ἀστέρας, οὓς νομίζουσιν ἑαυτοῖς ἐσχηματικέναι, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς τοῦ δεῖνος γενέσεως ἐσχηματισμένους οὑτωσί, τῷ χρόνῳ τῆς ἀποτέξεως τοῦ περὶ οὗ σκοποῦσιν, οὐ μόνον τὰ μέλλοντα ἐξετάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὰ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς σπορᾶς τοῦ περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος γεγενημένα, περὶ πατρός, ποταπὸς ὢν τυγχάνει, πλούσιος ἢ πένης, ὁλόκληρος τὸ σῶμα ἢ σεσινωμένος, τὸ ἦθος βελτίων ἢ χείρων, ἀκτήμων ἢ πολυκτήμων, τήνδε τὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ τήνδε ἔχων. Τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ περὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀδελφῶν, ἐὰν τύχωσιν ὄντες. | 11.58 And when they set the stars—which they consider to have been configured at the time of the birth of the individual under examination—they inquire at the time of delivery not only into future matters, but also past matters and things before the birth and conception of the person in question: concerning his father, what kind of man he is, rich or poor, whole in body or injured, better or worse in character, propertyless or wealthy, engaged in this or that business. And the same things concerning his mother and elder brothers, if he happens to have any. |
| 11.59 Ἔστω δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προσίεσθαι αὐτοὺς καταλαμβάνειν τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ἀληθῆ, περὶ οὗ καὶ αὐτοῦ ὕστερον δείξομεν ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. Πευσώμεθα τοίνυν τῶν ὑπολαμβανόντων κατηναγκάσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄστρων τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα, τίνα τρόπον ὁ σήμερον σχηματισμὸς ὁ τοιόσδε δύναται πεποιηκέναι τὰ πρεσβύτερα. | 11.59 Now, let it be granted for the moment that they apprehend the truth in these matters (concerning which we shall later show that it is not so). Let us ask those who suppose human affairs are compelled by the stars: In what manner can today's configuration cause things that are older than itself? |
| 11.60 Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀμήχανον, καθ’ ὃ δὴ ὅ τι εὑρίσκεται τὸ περὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τοῦ χρόνου ἀληθές, σαφὲς τὸ μὴ πεποιηκέναι τοὺς ἀστέρας οὑτωσὶ κινουμένους ἐν οὐρανῷ τὰ παρεληλυθότα καὶ γενόμενα πρὸ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτούς. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, τάχα ὁ προσιέμενος ἀληθεύειν αὐτούς, ἐπιστήσας τοῖς περὶ τῶν μελλόντων λεγομένοις, ἐρεῖ ἀληθεύειν οὐ τῷ ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀστέρας, ἀλλὰ τῷ σημαίνειν μόνον. | 11.60 For if this is impossible, according to which whatever truth is found concerning things older in time, it is clear that the stars moving in heaven in this way have not caused past events that occurred before they were thus configured. And if so, perhaps he who accepts that they speak truth, considering what is said about the future, will say that they speak truth not by the stars causing, but only by signifying. |
| 11.61 Ἐὰν δέ τις φάσκῃ τὰ μὲν παρεληλυθότα μὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀστέρας, ἀλλὰ ἄλλους μὲν σχηματισμοὺς τοὺς τῆς ἐκείνων γενέσεως αἰτίους γεγενῆσθαι, τὸν δὲ νῦν σχηματισμὸν σεσημαγκέναι μόνον, τὰ μέντοι μέλλοντα δηλοῦσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος σχηματισμοῦ τῆς τοῦ δεῖνος γενέσεως, παραστησάτω τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων δύνασθαι δεῖξαι ὅτι τάδε μὲν νενόηται ἀληθῆ, ὡς ἀπὸ ποιούντων, τάδε δὲ ὡς ἀπὸ σημαινόντων μόνον. | 11.61 But if anyone claims that the stars do not cause past events, but that other configurations were the causes of those people's births, while the present configuration merely signified them, whereas future events are revealed from the present configuration of a person's birth—let him demonstrate the difference in being able to show from the stars that these things are understood as true as coming from causes, and those as coming from signs alone. |
| 11.62 Μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ δοῦναι τὴν διαφορὰν εὐγνωμόνως συγκαταθήσονται μηδὲν τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’, ὡς προειρήκαμεν, εἰ ἄρα, σημαίνεσθαι· ὡς εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων τις ἐλάμβανε τὰ παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ διά τινος λόγου προφητικοῦ. | 11.62 Being unable to give this distinction, they will reasonably agree that none of human affairs happen from the stars, but, as we said before, if anything, are signified—just as if one were receiving past and future events not from the stars, but from the mind of God through some prophetic word. |
| 11.63 Ὥσπερ γὰρ προαπεδείξαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν λυπεῖ τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν λόγον τὸ τὸν θεὸν εἰδέναι τὰ πραχθησόμενα ἑκάστῳ, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ σημεῖα, ἃ ἔταξεν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ σημαίνειν, ἐμποδίζει τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως βιβλίῳ περιέχοντι τὰ μέλλοντα προφητικῶς ὁ πᾶς οὐρανὸς δύναται, οἱονεὶ βίβλος ὢν θεοῦ, περιέχειν τὰ μέλλοντα. | 11.63 For just as we demonstrated beforehand that God's knowing what will be done by each person in no way harms the doctrine of free will, so also the signs which God ordered to signify do not hinder free will; but like a book containing future events prophetically, the whole heaven, being as it were a book of God, can contain future events. |
| 11.64 Διόπερ ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ δύναται οὕτω νοεῖσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰακώβ· «Ἀνέγνων γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πλαξὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅσα συμβήσεται ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς ὑμῶν.» Τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ «εἱλιγήσεται ὁ οὐρανὸς ὡς βιβλίον» τοὺς λόγους τοὺς περιεχομένους σημαντικοὺς τῶν ἐσομένων δηλοῖ ἀπαρτισθησομένους καὶ, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, πληρωθησομένους, ὥσπερ λέγονται αἱ προφητεῖαι πεπληρῶσθαι τῷ ἐκβεβηκέναι. | 11.64 Wherefore in the Prayer of Joseph what is said by Jacob can be understood thus: "For I have read in the tablets of heaven whatever shall happen to you and your sons." And perhaps "the heaven shall be rolled up like a scroll" indicates that the words contained within it, signifying coming events, are to be completed and, so to speak, fulfilled, just as prophecies are said to be fulfilled by coming to pass. |
| 11.65 Καὶ οὕτως ἔσται εἰς σημεῖα τὰ ἄστρα γεγονότα, κατὰ τὴν λέγουσαν φωνήν· «Ἔστωσαν εἰς σημεῖα.» Ὁ δὲ Ἱερεμίας ἐπιστρέφων ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ περιαιρῶν φόβον τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς νομιζομένοις σημαίνειν, τάχα δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβανομένοις ἐκεῖθεν ἔρχεσθαι, φησίν· «Ἀπὸ τῶν σημείων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθε.» | 11.65 And thus the stars will have been made for signs, according to the voice saying: "Let them be for signs." And Jeremiah, turning us back to ourselves and removing fear of things supposed to be signified—or perhaps imagined to come from there—says: "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven." |
| 11.66 Ἴδωμεν καὶ δεύτερον ἐπιχείρημα, πῶς οὐ δύνανται οἱ ἀστέρες εἶναι ποιητικοί, ἀλλ’, εἰ ἄρα, σημαντικοί. Ἀπὸ πλείστων γὰρ ὅσων γενέσεων ἔστι λαβεῖν τὰ περὶ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου (τοῦτο δὲ καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν λέγομεν, συγχωροῦντες τὸ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαι)· φέρε γὰρ εἰπεῖν, περὶ τοῦ τόνδε πείσεσθαι τόδε καὶ τεθνήξεσθαι περιπεσόντα λῃσταῖς καὶ ἀναιρεθέντα φησὶ δύνασθαι λαμβάνειν ἀπό τε τῆς ἰδίας αὐτοῦ γενέσεως, κἂν τύχῃ ἔχων ἀδελφοὺς πλείονας, ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν. | 11.66 Let us see also a second argument, showing how the stars cannot be causative, but, if anything, indicative. For from very many births it is possible to gather the facts concerning one person (and we say this hypothetically, conceding that knowledge of these things can be acquired by men). For instance, concerning a man's suffering a certain fate and dying by falling into the hands of robbers who kill him, they say it is possible to gather this from his own birth, and if he happens to have several brothers, from the birth of each of them. |
| 11.67 Περιέχειν γὰρ οἴονται τὴν ἑκάστου γένεσιν, ἀδελφὸν ὑπὸ λῃστῶν τεθνηξόμενον, ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τὴν τῆς γαμετῆς καὶ τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν καὶ τῶν φιλτάτων, τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀναιρούντων. | 11.67 For they think that the birth of each brother contains his brother's coming death by robbers, and similarly the birth of his father, mother, wife, sons, servants, dearest friends, and perhaps even of the killers themselves! |
| 11.68 Πῶς οὖν δυνατόν, τὸν τοσαύταις γενέσεσιν—ἵνα αὐτοῖς τοῦτο συγχωρηθῇ—ἐμπεριεχόμενον γίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σχηματισμοῦ τῶν ἀστέρων τῆσδε μᾶλλον τῆς γενέσεως ἢ τῶνδε; Ἀπίθανον γὰρ καὶ τὸ φάσκειν τὸν σχηματισμὸν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ τοῦδέ τινος γενέσει ταῦτα πεποιηκέναι, τὸν δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶνδε γενέσει μὴ πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλὰ σεσημαγκέναι μόνον. | 11.68 How then is it possible for a man included in so many births—conceding this to them—to be produced by the configuration of the stars at this birth rather than those? For it is improbable to claim that the configuration at this man's own birth caused these things, while that at their births did not cause them, but only signified them. |
| 11.69 Ἠλίθιον γὰρ τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ πάντων γένεσις περιεῖχε καθ’ ἕκαστον ποιητικὸν τοῦ τόνδε ἀναιρεθῆναι· ὥστε ἐν γενέσεσιν, καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν λέγω, πεντήκοντα περιέχεσθαι τὸ τόνδε τινὰ ἀναιρεθῆναι. Οὐκ οἶδα δ’ ὅπως δυνήσονται σῶσαι τὸ τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ σχεδὸν πάντων τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸν σχηματισμὸν ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως, ὡς ὀκταήμερον αὐτοὺς λαμβάνειν περιτομήν, ἀκρωτηριαζομένους καὶ ἑλκουμένους καὶ φλεγμονῇ περιπεσουμένους καὶ τραύμασι, καὶ ἅμα τῇ εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσόδῳ ἰατρῶν δεομένους· τῶν δὲ ἐν Ἰσμαηλίταις τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἀραβίαν τοιόνδε ὡς πάντας περιτέμνεσθαι τρισκαιδεκαετεῖς (τοῦτο γὰρ ἱστόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· | 11.69 For it is foolish to say that the birth of all contained in each case the cause of this man being killed; so that in fifty births, hypothetically speaking, the killing of this single individual was contained. And I do not know how they will save the fact that almost all those in Judea have such a configuration at birth as to receive circumcision on the eighth day, being mutilated, wounded, and falling into inflammation and sores, and needing physicians upon their very entry into life; while among the Ishmaelites in Arabia the configuration is such that all are circumcised at thirteen years of age (for this is recorded concerning them). |
| 11.70 καὶ πάλιν τῶνδέ τινων τῶν ἐν Αἰθίοψι τοῖσδε τὰς κόγχας τῶν γονάτων περιαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν Ἀμαζόνων τοὺς ἑτέρους τῶν μαστῶν. Πῶς γὰρ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ἀστέρες τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; Οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ ἐπιστήσαιμεν, οὐδὲ μέχρι τοῦ στῆσαι δυνησόμεθά τι ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. | 11.70 And again, that certain people among the Ethiopians have their kneecaps removed, and the Amazons have one of their breasts removed. For how do the stars do these things to these nations? I think that if we pay attention, we shall not be able to say anything true about them even up to making a stand. |
| 11.71 Τοσούτων δὲ φερομένων ὁδῶν προγνωστικῶν, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἐξώκειλαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐπὶ τὸ τὴν μὲν οἰωνιστικὴν καὶ τὴν θυτικὴν μὴ λέγειν περιέχειν τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν μόνον, καὶ τὴν ἀστεροσκοπικήν, οὐκέτι δὲ τὴν γενεθλιαλογικήν. | 11.71 With so many paths of foreknowledge being carried about, I know not how men ran aground so as to say that bird-divination, sacrificial divination, and star-watching do not contain the causative reason, but only signify, yet birth-astrology causes! |
| 11.72 Εἰ γὰρ ἐπιγινώσκεται (ἵνα καὶ χαρισώμεθα τὸ γινώσκεσθαι), γίνεται δὲ ἐκεῖθεν ὅθεν ἡ γνῶσις λαμβάνεται, τί μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν οἰωνῶν ἔσται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰωνῶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν σπλάγχνων τῶν θυομένων; Τί δὲ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν σπλάγχνων τῶν θυομένων ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν διᾳττόντων ἀστέρων; Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀρκέσει εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ ποιητικοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. | 11.72 For if it is known (to grant that it is known), and comes from that whence the knowledge is derived, why shall events proceed from the stars rather than from birds, or from birds rather than from the entrails of sacrifices? And why from the entrails of sacrifices rather than from shooting stars? These things for the present will suffice to refute the stars as causes of human affairs. |
| 11.73 Ὅπερ δὲ συγκεχωρήκαμεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐλύπει τὸν λόγον, ὡς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυναμένων καταλαμβάνειν τοὺς οὐρανίους σχηματισμούς, καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, καὶ ὧν ἐστι σημεῖα), τοῦτο φέρε νῦν ἐξετάσωμεν εἰ ἀληθές ἐστιν. | 11.73 Now, what we conceded—for it did not harm the argument, namely that men are able to apprehend heavenly configurations, the signs, and the things signified—let us now examine whether this is true. |
| 11.74 Φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ τὸν μέλλοντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν γενεθλιαλογίαν ἀληθῶς καταλαμβάνειν εἰδέναι οὐ μόνον τὸ κατὰ πόστου δωδεκατημορίου ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος ἀστήρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ποίας μοίρας τοῦ δωδεκατημορίου καὶ κατὰ ποίου ἑξηκοστοῦ, οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστεροι καὶ κατὰ ποίου ἑξηκοστοῦ τοῦ ἑξηκοστοῦ· καὶ τοῦτό φασι δεῖν ποιεῖν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν πλανωμένων, ἐξετάζοντα τὴν σχέσιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς. | 11.74 Those skilled in these matters say that he who intends truly to apprehend birth-astrology must know not only in which twelfth-part (zodiacal sign) a so-called star is, but also at which degree of the sign, and at which sixtieth-part (minute), and the more precise say at which sixtieth of a sixtieth (second); and they say this must be done for each of the planets, examining their relation to the fixed stars. |
| 11.75 Πάλιν αὖ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνατολικοῦ ὁρίζοντος δεήσει, φασίν, ἰδεῖν οὐ μόνον τὸ δωδεκατημόριον ποῖον ἦν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν μοῖραν καὶ τὸ ἑξηκοστὸν τῆς μοίρας, τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ἑξηκοστόν. | 11.75 Again, at the eastern horizon, they say it will be necessary to see not only what sign was upon it, but also the degree and the sixtieth of the degree, the first or second sixtieth. |
| 11.76 Πῶς τοίνυν τῆς ὥρας πλατεῖ λόγῳ ἥμισυ δωδεκατημορίου περιεχούσης δύναταί τις λαβεῖν τὸ ἑξηκοστόν, μὴ ἔχων τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς διαιρέσεως τῶν ὡρῶν, ὥστε, φέρε εἰπεῖν, εἰδέναι ὅτι γεγέννηται ὁ δεῖνα ὥρᾳ τετάρτῃ καὶ ἡμίσει ὥρας, καὶ τετάρτῳ, ὀγδόῳ, καὶ ἑκκαιδεκάτῳ, καὶ δυοτριακοστῷ; | 11.76 How then, when an hour in broad terms contains half a zodiacal sign, can anyone grasp the sixtieth part, not having the proportion of the division of hours, so as to know, for instance, that so-and-so was born at the fourth hour plus a half, a fourth, an eighth, a sixteenth, and a thirty-second of an hour? |
| 11.77 Παρὰ πολὺ γάρ φασι παραλλάττειν τὰ σημαινόμενα παρὰ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν οὐ τῆς ὅλης ὥρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ποστημορίου αὐτῆς. Ἐν γοῦν τοῖς διδύμοις γεννωμένοις πολλάκις τὸ μεταξὺ καὶ ἀκαριαῖον ὥρας ἐστίν, καὶ πολλαὶ παραλλαγαὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων καὶ τῶν πραττομένων ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἀπαντῶσιν, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἀστέρων, καὶ τὸ μόριον τοῦ δωδεκατημορίου τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὁρίζοντα, οὐ καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν νομιζομένων τὴν ὥραν τετηρηκέναι. | 11.77 For they say that the things signified vary greatly through ignorance not merely of the whole hour, but of a fraction of it. Among twins born, the interval is often a moment of an hour, yet many variations in what happens and is done by them occur—as those people say—due to the relation of the stars and the fraction of the zodiacal sign near the horizon, not being comprehended by those who think they have observed the hour. |
| 11.78 Οὐδεὶς γὰρ δύναται λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦδε τῆς γενέσεως πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε ἐστὶν ὥρας τριακοστόν. Ἀλλ’ ἔστω συγκεχωρημένον αὐτοῖς τόδε κατὰ τὸ ἐκλαβεῖν τὴν ὥραν. Φέρεται δὴ θεώρημα ἀποδεικνύον τὸν ζωδιακὸν κύκλον ὁμοίως τοῖς πλανωμένοις φέρεσθαι ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπὶ ἀνατολὰς δι’ ἑκατὸν ἐτῶν μοῖραν μίαν, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐναλλάττειν τὴν θέσιν τῶν δωδεκατημορίων, ἑτέρου μὲν τυγχάνοντος τοῦ νοητοῦ δωδεκατημορίου, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ ὡσανεὶ μορφώματος. Τὰ δὲ ἀποτελέσματά φασιν εὑρίσκεσθαι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μορφώματος, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ ζῳδίου, ὅπερ οὐ πάνυ τι δυνατόν ἐστι καταλαμβάνεσθαι. | 11.78 For no one can say that the interval between this birth and that birth is a thirtieth of an hour. But let this be conceded to them regarding grasping the hour. There is a theorem holding that the zodiacal circle, like the planets, moves from west to east one degree every hundred years, and that this over much time changes the position of the signs, the intellectual sign being one thing and the visible form being another. And they say the results are found not from the visible form, but from the intellectual sign—which is hardly possible to grasp! |
| 11.79 Ἔστω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συγκεχωρημένον, τὸ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ νοητὸν δωδεκατημόριον, ἢ δύνασθαι ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ δωδεκατημορίου λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ τήν γε σύγκρασιν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλουμένην τῶν ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς τυγχανόντων καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε σώσαι κατὰ πᾶν, ἀμαυρουμένου τοῦ δηλουμένου, φέρε εἰπεῖν, χείρονος, ἀπὸ τοῦδε διὰ τὸ ἐπιβλέπεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ κρείττονος, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσόνδε ἢ τοσόνδε ἀμαυρουμένου, πολλάκις πάλιν τῆς ἀμαυρώσεως τῆς τοῦ χείρονος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιβλέψεως τῆς τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμποδιζομένης, ἐκ τοῦ ἕτερον οὑτωσὶ ἐσχηματίσθαι, χειρόνων ὄντα σημαντικόν. | 11.79 But let this also be conceded—that the intellectual sign is comprehended, or that the true sign can be taken from the sensible sign. Yet the so-called mixture among them of the stars in these configurations they themselves will agree they cannot preserve in every case, when the indicated evil, for instance, is obscured by this star because it is looked upon by that better star, and obscured to such or such a degree; and again often the obscuration of the worse by the gaze of the better is hindered, because another star is configured in such a way, signifying worse things. |
| 11.80 Καὶ οἶμαι ἐπιστήσαντά τινα τοῖς τόποις ἀπογνῶναι τὴν περὶ τούτων κατάληψιν, οὐδαμῶς ἀνθρώποις ἐκκειμένην, ἀλλ’, εἰ ἄρα, μέχρι τοῦ σημανθῆναι μόνον φθάνουσαν. | 11.80 And I think that anyone paying attention to these topics would despair of apprehending them, as being in no way laid out for human beings, but reaching, if at all, only so far as being signified. |
| 11.81 Εἰ δέ τις ἐν πείρᾳ γεγένηται τῶν πραγμάτων, μᾶλλον εἴσεται τὸ ἐν τῷ στοχάζεσθαι ἀποπτωτικὸν τῶν λεγόντων καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν συγγραψαμένων ἤπερ νομιζόμενον ἐπιτευκτικόν. Καὶ Ἠσαΐας γοῦν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένων τούτων εὑρίσκεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων, φησὶ πρὸς τὴν θυγατέρα τῶν Χαλδαίων τῶν ταῦτα μάλιστα παρὰ πάντας ἐπαγγελλομένων· «Στήτωσαν δὴ καὶ σωσάτωσάν σε οἱ ἀστρολόγοι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀναγγειλάτωσάν σοι τί μέλλει ἐπὶ σὲ ἔρχεσθαι.» Διὰ γὰρ τούτων διδασκόμεθα μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς πάνυ περὶ ταῦτα φιλομαθεῖς προδηλοῦν ἃ βεβούληται κύριος ἑκάστῳ ἔθνει ἐπαγαγεῖν. | 11.81 And if anyone has experience of these matters, he will know rather the failure in guessing on the part of those who speak and write them, than any supposed success. At any rate, Isaiah, showing that these things cannot be discovered by men, says to the daughter of the Chaldeans, who professed these things above all others: "Let the astrologers of heaven stand up and save thee, let them announce to thee what is about to come upon thee." For through these words we are taught that those who are exceedingly fond of learning these things cannot make known beforehand what the Lord has willed to bring upon each nation. |
| 11.82 Τοσαῦτα καὶ ὁ δηλωθεὶς ἀνήρ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς ἡμῖν οὗτος εἰς δύο τὰ μέγιστα συναιρεῖται λόγος, εἴς τε τὸ μὴ θεοὺς εἶναι τοὺς κατὰ πόλιν χρᾶν νενομισμένους καὶ εἰς τὸ μηδὲ ἀγαθοὺς δαίμονας, τοὐναντίον δὲ γόητάς τινας καὶ πλάνους καὶ ἀπατεῶνας, ἐπ’ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ διαστροφῇ τῆς ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας τὴν εἰς ἀνθρώπους πλάνην τήν τε ἄλλην καὶ τὴν περὶ εἱμαρμένης προβεβλημένους. | 11.82 So much for the designated author. Indeed, this whole treatise of ours is summarized into two greatest points: both that those deemed to give oracles in every city are not gods, nor even good spirits, but on the contrary certain sorcerers, wanderers, and deceivers, who for the ruin and perversion of true piety have put forward error among men, both in other matters and concerning Fate. |
| 11.83 Ἀφ’ ἧς μηδενὸς τῶν ἐξ αἰῶνος πλὴν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος λελυτρωμένου, εἰκότως ἡμῖν ἐν ἀρχαῖς τῆς Εὐαγγελικῆς Προπαρασκευῆς τὰ παρόντα πάντα διὰ σπουδῆς γέγονεν, ὡς ἂν ἔργῳ μάθοιμεν ἐκ τίνων προγόνων φύντες καὶ οἵᾳ τὸ πρὶν ἀπάτῃ συνεχομένων, ἐξ ὁπόσης τε καὶ πηλίκης ἀνανεύσαντες αὐτοί τε ἡμεῖς καὶ ὁ σύμπας τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος ἀβλεψίας τε καὶ ἀθεότητος τὴν ἴασιν τῆς μακρᾶς καὶ πολυχρονίου δαιμονικῆς ἐνεργείας διὰ μόνης τῆς σωτηρίου Εὐαγγελικῆς εὑράμεθα διδασκαλίας. | 11.83 From which error, no one from eternity except Jesus our Savior has redeemed the whole human race; wherefore reasonably at the beginning of the Evangelical Preparation all these present matters have been treated by us with diligence, so that we might learn in deed from what ancestors we grew and by what deception we were formerly held, and from how great an blindness and atheism we ourselves and the whole life of mankind have emerged, finding healing from the long and ancient demonic activity through the saving Evangelical teaching alone. |